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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at the racialized experiences of gay black minority ethnic (GBME) 
men in white gay spaces within England. This thesis makes an original contribution to 
the field of racialized embodied subjectivity and racialized spaces by theorizing the 
lived-Body using Edmund Husserl‟s phenomenology of embodied sense to develop 
Frantz Fanon‟s concept of embodied dissonance in relation to racialized information 
present within the invisible white Gestalt in white gay spaces. This approach is 
important where the racialized discursive formations and practices around whiteness in 
gay spaces are often „invisible‟ or strategically obscured, whilst being simultaneously 
visible and understood by GBME men as implicating racialized Othering. This sensed 
pattern of perceptual information is defined as the invisible white Gestalt.  
The empirical research involved face-to- face semi-structured interviews with 11 GBME 
men and 3 gay support officers who were GWME (gay white majority ethnic) men. The 
locations for the interviews were London and the north of England. The ages of my 
respondents ranged from 21 to 56 years. This thesis begins by exploring how 
interpellation and the interpellative gaze respectively impact upon the discursive and 
affective attributes of embodied subjectivity. Here for example racist behaviour not 
expressed verbally will require sensing through feelings of being unwelcomed or 
understanding particular language as „invisibly‟ referring to „race‟. I then explore how 
embodied subjectivity around the whole self and the penis interprets and understands 
the racialized information circulating within the white gay space. Here I show how 
sense can enable complex understandings of the social interactions. Finally this thesis 
explores how atmospheres in white gay spaces can be sensed by GBME men, here I 
show how atmospheres may be racialized to exclude GBME men. This thesis argues 
that whiteness can be experienced as an affective sense of whiteness by GBME men in 
white gay spaces.   
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Chapter One  
Introduction, Contexts and Definitions 
 
 
Introduction 
In this thesis I am looking at how the invisible white Gestalt can be sensed through the 
embodied subjectivity of gay black minority ethnic (GBME) men within white gay 
spaces. The invisible white Gestalt can be summarized as the phenomenological pattern 
of racialized information around whiteness. I define these terms in more detail later in 
this chapter. This thesis seeks to provide original contributions to the problematic 
around the racialized phenomenology of embodied sense. Firstly this thesis combines 
Edmund Husserl‟s (2001:54) theoretical concept of “noema” with the idea of 
topographies in order to explicate embodied subjectivity.  Husserl‟s description of 
noema is interpreted as meaning different things by different academics (Dreyfus, 
1982b:97), however Herbert Dreyfus (1982a:7) suggests that the general consensus is 
that “noema must „refer‟, „describe‟ and „synthesize‟”. In essence noema are the 
theoretical „units‟ or „domains‟ where information is interwoven over time in order to 
provide the overall phenomenal sense of the experience of an object. In this thesis, 
rather than noema being „hidden‟ as background processes, I have foregrounded them 
conceptually as topographies. This addresses and removes the issue of the possible 
homunculization (the model of an infinite regression of interpretive entities) within the 
model. The term topology has been used in phenomenology (for example Baldacchino, 
2011) however this use often conflates noema with schema, and relates again to 
„hidden‟ processes. Johnstone (2012) uses the term topology to describe the physical 
location of experienced emotions but does not relate the term to any noematic type of 
concept. Edmund Husserl (2002:98) suggests that types of information “are bound and 
interwoven together, they flow into one another in layers and are possible only in this 
unity of a stream”, and it is within this concept of layers that I frame my definition of 
topography.  
 
By looking at the data from the interviews with my GBME male respondents it became 
clear to me that the multiple „part‟ components which constitute the noema were already 
being sensed and experienced, that the time taken for the constitution of the final object 
could take long periods rather than be rendered instantaneously, and that these had 
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regular patterns. The idea of simultaneous multiple phenomenal awareness resulting 
from negative racialized experiences (Alcoff, 1999:24; Fanon, 1993:112; Yancy, 
2008:5) also suggested the need to theorize the „parts‟ as separate yet interwoven 
domains. Using the data from the interviews and from reviewing the literature on „race‟, 
four topographies seemed relevant for the area of research I conducted, namely the 
discursive, the affective, the corporeal, and the hyletic (material). These interweave to 
provide the overall sense of the experience of an object. By using the term topography 
(related to the „surface‟ sensed experience and constituent matrix) rather than topology 
(the constituent matrix) I am also including within the conceptual framework the idea 
that these „parts‟ can be experienced, understood and interpreted by individuals, and that 
this in itself also provides an additional experience that produces a sense of the life-
world (the phenomenal social field) particularly where topographies show dissonance or 
incoherence between one another. This incoherence of topographies can be explicitly 
felt in those who experience negative racializations (Alcoff, 1999:24; Fanon, 1993:112; 
Yancy, 2008:5), and I would argue that this would be even more so for those individuals 
who are simultaneously exposed to social processes which impact upon their „race‟ and 
sexuality, for example GBME men.  In addition the idea of topography suggests a 
domain which is always interwoven with the intersubjective life-world. This approach 
therefore extends Husserl‟s concept of the noema as a domain of sense within the 
„atomistic‟ individual to one which includes the information within the life-world as a 
component part of the topography. Using this approach we can therefore talk about a 
topography extending into the life-world outside of the body image for example in order 
to explicate the affective concept of striving.         
 
Secondly it develops, within the analysis in the chapters, a phenomenological model of 
racialized and sexualized embodied subjectivity which links embodied subjectivity to 
the life-world both through the phenomenological concept of the Gestalt and through 
extending Frantz Fanon‟s (1993) concept of the dissonance experienced within the 
racialized epidermal schema in moments of racialization within social contexts. The 
life-world (Husserl, 1970) is a phenomenological term which relates to the phenomenal 
experience of the social field.  The life-world has been previously theorized using 
Gestalts (for example Schroeder, 2007), and similar ideas to Gestalts have been used to 
look at embodied subjectivity (for example Seamon, 1979). This thesis explores how 
the social information within the Gestalt present within white gay spaces is not only 
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understood and interpreted as communicating information related to „race‟ and sexuality 
but is also productive of the racialized and sexualized embodied experiences of GBME 
men. Discursive formations are productive of discursive social relations, meanings and 
subject positions (Foucault, 2011), and in a similar way the Gestalt is productive of both 
the discursive and extra-discursive (such as affective information) within a specific 
locality. In addition I show in this thesis how the complex understood sense obtained 
from the information within the Gestalt is used by GBME men to navigate and resist the 
impact of racializations operating within white gay spaces. Nina Held et al. (2008:142) 
suggest that “the racialization of sexualized space has been under-explored in works on 
sexuality and space”, and in this regard the use of the concept of the Gestalt provides a 
useful alternative model with which to analyse the complex intersections of „race‟ and 
sexuality within white gay spaces. I discuss the invisible white Gestalt in more depth in 
section two of this chapter. Finally this thesis also addresses the paucity of academic 
research in England on GBME men‟s experiences of whiteness and their experiences in 
LGBTQI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, intersex) contexts or gay spaces, and so it 
provides a qualitative study of this particular social group and their relationship with the 
white gay community. 
 
In this thesis I aim to address three core questions related to GBME men‟s experience of 
whiteness in white gay spaces: 
 
 Through what social processes can whiteness be understood and 
interpreted by GBME men? 
 How do GBME men experience whiteness within their embodied 
subjectivity? 
 Is there an affective sense of whiteness and how can this be theorized? 
 
In section one of this chapter I situate myself as the researcher, contextualise the 
position of GBME men in English society, and I also look briefly at how the theories of 
Frantz Fanon (1993) can help to explicate the experiences of GBME men. In section 
two I define the concept of the invisible white Gestalt beginning with the „part‟ 
concepts from which it is developed related to information, meanings, sensings, sense 
and whiteness. I also define the racial categories and sexual orientation categories, since 
these are also part of the invisible white Gestalt. In section three I outline the thematic 
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chapters, where I also define some of my key concepts and terms, and provide a 
rationale for the chapters and overall structure for the thesis. I now go on to look at the 
contexts for this research in section one. 
 
Section One: Contexts 
 
In this section I explore the social and theoretical contexts which underpin this thesis. I 
begin by situating myself as the researcher. I then look at the context for GBME men in 
England. I end this section by looking at how Frantz Fanon‟s (1993) phenomenology of 
„race‟ is relevant to the theoretical analysis within this thesis.  
 
Situating the Researcher 
It is strongly encouraged for the type of research undertaken for this thesis that 
researchers write a personal rationale, particularly emphasising their social identity 
categories (Taylor, 2009). This is also part of the methodology within social theory, for 
example Sally Munt (2007) who describes her sexuality and ethnic background in 
relation to her research as well as experiences of homophobia in society and academia, 
and Yasmin Gunaratnam (2003) who discusses her ethnic, racial, and class background 
as well as her experiences of racism in society and academia. This is seen as a form of 
reflexivity (Davies, 1999; Taylor, 2009) to help situate the researcher and their 
interpretations in order to give „validity‟ to the work. Although this approach has 
several important contributions to make to issues of validity and to the political (Davies, 
1999) I have several concerns with this.  
 
Firstly many of the social categories to which we are encouraged to align ourselves are 
imposed upon us by the society in which we live (Gunaratnam, 2003), and so to identify 
with them in terms of identity and subjectivity could be seen as accepting the imposed 
power of governmental and disciplinary practices. Here for example Michel Foucault 
was averse to describing himself as „gay‟ (Gutting, 2005:91) given that he theorized the 
term as historically contingent upon psychiatric, judicial, and theological manifestations 
of power. Equally, although „race‟ is a real phenomenon (Collins, 2004) it is a concept 
invented by white supremacists, and thus carries traces of white supremacism to the 
present-day. For me to define myself as BME or mixed race would contribute to the 
reification of racialized categories (Gilroy, 1998; Gunaratnam, 2003).  Secondly being 
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identifiable as BME (Gunaratnam, 2003) or gay (Munt, 2007) within universities can 
result in discrimination. The practice of encouraging gay academics to „out‟ themselves 
within their texts may be beneficial to the wider LGBTQI political movements, but risks 
causing harm to that academic‟s career prospects (Munt, 2007).  
 
I would be defined by society as being mixed race (Asian/white), and in present-day 
English Islamophobic discourses and policy as being “Muslim-looking” (Amin, 
2010:10). I would also be defined by society as gay. I define myself as being politically 
Black and politically Gay or Queer, however these are contingent upon the need to take 
up a position against oppressive dominant categories which continue to impose their 
power in society and impose categories on social groups.   
 
In situating myself as the researcher within this thesis, I should discuss why I chose the 
works of Edmund Husserl over those of Martin Heidegger in this thesis, where much 
contemporary phenomenological social theory uses the latter (for example, Ahmed, 
2006a; Davidson, 2003).  I am against the practices of enforced censorship, so others 
may use Heidegger as they wish, however his complicity with the German Nazi‟s in the 
second world war (Steiner, 1978:113 ; Deleuze and Guattari, 2009:109) and his racist 
persecution of Edmund Husserl in academia (Carr, 1970; Steiner, 1978) has resulted in 
making the ethical decision and political statement to not include Heidegger here. Many 
of the choices I made when exploring the literature for this thesis were informed by 
ethical considerations of this nature, which I consider to be important given that I am 
looking at the experiences of a marginalised and oppressed social group within this 
research. 
  
The Context for Research on GBME Men 
BME groups are often excluded from mainstream gay and LGBTQI contexts (Browne, 
2006:886; Hubbard, 2008:645; Manalansan, 2005; Puar, 2006:68, 2005; Visser, 
2008:1353), for example David Bell and Jon Binnie (2004:1810) suggest that “many 
„gay‟ consumption spaces are bounded communities, where processes of exclusion 
operate, for instance on the basis of race and gender.” More worryingly whiteness is 
dominant within many Queer groups (Young, 1997:64) suggesting that the inclusionary 
project of „queerness‟ as a political strategy has not been successful.  
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GBME groups are often positioned as less valued within gay and LGBTQI contexts and 
communities (Caluya, 2006; Han, 2007; Held, et al. 2008; Nast, 2002; Pinar, 2003) and 
this may be one important factor in maintaining the racialized boundaries of the 
normative gay spaces and cultures. There are various examples in the media where 
GBME groups are represented and positioned as less valued than white LGBTQI groups 
and gay white communities (Avila-Saavedra, 2009; Munoz, 2005; Papacharissi et al, 
2008; Teunis, 2007). This is significant because queer media may be important for 
queer identity formation in GBME groups (Yue, 2000:252), and so this representation 
helps to sustain the negative racialized discourses and positionings within society which 
impact upon the identities of these individuals. In addition sexual health promotions and 
campaigns often ignore GBME groups within the representations of LGBTQI and gay 
groups in their media (Bredstrom, 2005; Klesse, 2007), although PACE (1998, 2000) 
did obtain a balanced sample of ethnic categories for respondents in the two surveys. 
Christian Klesse for example found in health literature produced for gay men in the UK 
that:  
 
“There is a striking silence on race and ethnicity in most of the books that I have 
studied. Most of the case stories presented stage the experiences of white 
couples of dominant ethnicity. The possible significance of race/ethnicity or 
racial and ethnic differences for intimate and sexual relationships is usually not 
considered at all” (Klesse, 2007:579).  
 
LGBTQI groups generally are considered hard to reach within academic research (Cull 
et al., 2006; Matthews 2008), and so this means that BME groups within LGBTQI 
groups who are studied in research tend to be under represented (for example Binnie 
and Skeggs, 2004) or not present (for example Pritchard 2002; Casey, 2004:458) or not 
referred to as a group in the research (for example Grogan, 2006). One of the reasons 
for this low number of LGBTQI BME participants in academic research may be that 
few BME people are on the gay scene or in LGBTQI support groups which are 
predominantly white (Casey, 2004:458). Studies which have looked at predominantly 
LGBTQI BME groups include those by Andrew Yip (2008, 2004, 2003) on LGBTQI 
Muslims, although Yip‟s research focused mostly on the Muslim faith and community 
issues with sexuality, rather than looking at the practices of whiteness.  A study by 
Stonewall (2012) into LGBTQI BME groups again focused upon the „problems‟ within 
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(straight) BME communities and homophobia, there was no mention of experiences of 
racism from the (white) LGBTQI community. The study even suggested that LGBTQI 
BME individuals are racist against BME groups where for example LGBTQI BME 
respondents said they would avoid interactions with BME health staff in case they were 
homophobic. A study by the Asian Rainbow Project (2011) into gay Asian men found 
again mostly comments about faith issues and prejudice within the Asian community 
with only one ambiguous comment by a respondent about “racism” (2011:14) which 
was not further addressed in the findings. The three key issues with the current state of 
research are that firstly there is not enough research into LGBTQI BME individuals, 
groups or communities. Secondly what little research there is frequently repeats the 
stereotype that BME communities are homophobic, which reinforces this discourse 
within society. Thirdly current research fails to address issues such as racism and how 
racialized discourses and practices impact upon LGBTQI BME communities. Therefore 
one of the aims of this thesis is to address these trends in academic research into this 
population. 
 
I initially started my PhD with the aim of looking at racialized homonormativity based 
on Lisa Duggan‟s (2002) concept of homonormativity, hoping to explore how whiteness 
in the LGBTQI communities in England came to exclude GBME men. The concept of 
homonormativity, theorized by Duggan (2002) as related to the economic conditions of 
Western gay communities, has become an important theoretical model of gay 
discourses, ideologies, and practices over the last decade (Browne, 2006:886; Holmes, 
2009:81; Hubbard, 2008:645; Manalansan, 2005; Puar, 2006:68), although the term 
homonormativity has been used by some queer theorists from as early as the 1990s 
(Bryant, 2008:456). One of the problems I found with Duggan‟s (2002) concept of 
homonormativity, for this thesis, was that its framework was too closely related to the 
economic and political conditions of LGBTQI communities, rather than the lived-
experiences per se, and would therefore distract from the phenomenological 
interpersonal and intersubjective relationships between white and black gay men in 
favour of a more macro socio-political analysis.  
 
Authors such as Frantz Fanon (1993) have explored this depth and breadth of the wider 
historical, cultural, discursive, political and economic analysis and also the 
interpersonal, embodied subjective experience in their works related to „race‟. In the 
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famous quote from Frantz Fanon below, we can see an example of how he draws 
together the macro-social processes around for example history and culture with the 
micro-social processes around subjectivity and embodied subjectivity:  
 
“And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white mans eyes. An 
unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real world challenged my claims. In the 
white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his 
bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a 
third-person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain 
uncertainty” (Fanon, 1993:110).  
 
In this short extract from Fanon (1993:110) we can also see the themes developed 
within the thematic chapters of this thesis, namely interpellation, the gaze, embodied 
subjectivity, and atmospheres. It is through the interwoven social processes impacting 
upon Fanon‟s embodied subjectivity that the phenomenal experience he describes 
occurs. Therefore I will be using Fanon‟s theories in this thesis to help explicate the 
discursive formations, practices, and positionings occurring within the present-day 
white gay spaces and contexts I am researching. Fanon‟s (1993) phenomenological 
postcolonial approach also provides a theoretical bridge between the discursive 
approach within „race‟ and whiteness studies and the phenomenological approach to 
embodied subjectivity, enabling theoretical integration between the two.  
 
Some academics question whether authors such as Fanon are still relevant to discussing 
contemporary issues around „race‟ (Yancy, 2008:9), and additionally there is also the 
stylistic question as to whether or not the use of certain authors on „race‟ is simply a 
device to position this thesis within the whiteness studies academic milieu, where for 
example Bridget Byrne (2006:7) describes the “obligatory references to and quotations 
from James Baldwin and Frantz Fanon” within the school of whiteness studies. Firstly 
around the relevance of Fanon, I would argue that although we cannot say definitively 
when an historical discursive formation begins or ends (Foucault, 2010), we can look at 
the continuations of the social field through time and the evidence which points to the 
relationships and intersections (Foucault, 2010; Stoler, 1995). Using these criteria we 
can explore how contemporary white gay contexts intersect with past colonial 
discursive formations. However even if they are in no way descended from colonial 
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discursive formations, the similarities mean we can compare and contrast the past 
formations with the current white gay discursive formations in England, to explicate the 
experiences of GBME men. Secondly, although there may be an academic canon and 
style of theorising in whiteness studies, these are still relevant authors for many areas of 
research. Frantz Fanon (1993) for example offers this thesis a rich conceptualisation of 
how the racialized social field interacts with the racialized Other, to elicit a range of 
phenomenological experiences of racialized embodied subjectivity. James Baldwin was 
of course a gay African-American man, and so his insights into racialized sexualized 
subjectivity are especially relevant to the population I am researching here. I now go on 
to look at the theoretical approaches in section two.  
 
Section Two: Theoretical Approaches 
 
In this section I look at the theoretical approaches and definitions I use in this thesis to 
explicate the model of the invisible white Gestalt. Here I look at the concept of sense, 
the unified Ego, whiteness and „race‟, and gay contexts. I give a brief overview since 
the concepts are developed more fully in the thematic chapters. I then finish this section 
by drawing together these concepts to explicate the model of the invisible white Gestalt. 
I begin by looking at the concept of sense and how it relates to understanding social 
experiences.  
 
The Concept of Sense 
In this thesis I am looking at how GBME men experience their sense of the life-world 
of white gay spaces, and therefore I will need to differentiate between and explain how I 
am using the concepts of qualia, sensings, meanings and information related to the 
concept of sense. Qualia (or quale for singular) in this thesis is derived from the 
philosophical concept referring to the ideal experience of phenomenal perceptions in 
their „pure‟ form (Husserl, 2002:70; Kohler, 1961:208; Merleau-Ponty, 2002:5; Ryle, 
1963:199). Qualia refers to the phenomenal experience I have for example of the colour 
„red‟, which is a private and probably a unique synthesis to me. Here for example if you 
and I were looking at an intersubjectively or culturally understood „red rose‟ my 
phenomenal experience of „red‟ could be your phenomenal experience of „blue‟ or other 
colour. Qualia do not inherently relate to concepts of understanding or interpretation, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out: 
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“The pure quale would be given to us only if the world were a spectacle and 
one‟s own body a mechanism with which some impartial mind made itself 
acquainted. Sense experience, on the other hand, invests the quality with vital 
value, grasping it first in its meaning for us, for that heavy mass which is our 
body, whence it comes about that it always involves a reference to the body” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002:61; original italics).  
 
Here we see that Mereau-Ponty (2002:61) is suggesting that there is more to sensed 
experience than the „pure‟ perception, and that a level of understanding that he refers to 
as “meaning” is part of the experience intrinsically associated with the lived-Body. As 
we see in Merleau-Ponty‟s example here the term „meaning‟ is used interchangeably 
with the term „sense‟, and this type of conflation occurs in many theoretical texts for 
example the conflation or confusion between “perceptual and sensory phenomena [and] 
cognitive and conceptual phenomena” (Dretske, 1981:135), hence the need for me to 
define these terms for this thesis. Husserl suggests that there is a difference between 
meaning and sense and that it is important to establish this distinction: 
 
“It is dangerous here to speak of represented and representing, of interpreting 
data of sensations, or to speak of a function that outwardly signifies through this 
„interpreting‟. Adumbrating, exhibiting in data of sensation, is totally different 
from interpretation through signs” (Husserl, 2001:55).  
 
Meaning is often used by Husserl to describe (predominantly) verbal expression and 
sense is used for indicative understandings for example a feeling (Derrida, 1973:33). 
Since within social theory meaning is discursively constructed (Hall, 2007), I am 
defining meaning as strictly related to representational modalities and discourse. For 
this thesis the fundamental experience of perceiving and understanding is defined as 
being phenomenal sense (Ayer, 1969:139; Husserl, 2001:33; Kohler, 1929; Merleau-
Ponty, 2002:61). Here sense is an embodied, complex and intelligent field of 
understanding that is non-representational, non-discursive and is phenomenally 
experienced. There are a number of epistemological issues around the concept of sense 
(Ryle, 1963), one being that sense cannot in itself be expressed either to oneself or to 
other people. However sense can be indicated and understood.  Sense can be „coded‟ 
and simplified into meanings, where meanings can be expressed and interpreted both to 
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the self and to others, however meanings are less rich and less complex than the 
fundamental sense to which they refer (Dretske, 1981:142).  A. J. Ayer describes how 
phenomenologists have failed to consider fully the implications of the interaction 
between words and sense, although he agrees with their fundamental ideas on sense:  
 
“The character of our experiences themselves is affected by our beliefs 
concerning the physical world, beliefs which are incorporated in the language 
which we learn to speak [...]. But while [the phenomenologists] may fairly be 
criticised for this, their logical thesis is not affected by it” (Ayer, 1969:148).  
 
Here for example Ayer (1969:138) suggests that the fundamental sense is the 
experiential core of understanding upon which encoded meanings are superficially 
expressed, where he gives the example of the “phenomenal sense” expressed using 
either of the two words “„look‟ and „appear‟”, stating that the choice of word in this 
particular context is irrelevant because the fundamental sense underpinning the 
expression is the understood experience.  
 
Given these definitions of qualia, sense and meaning, it is important for me to establish 
the additional concept of sensings. Since the terms meaning and meanings strictly only 
refer to discursive expressions (such as words, non-verbal communication, images), the 
noun sensings is the non-representational/non-discursive „equivalent‟ of meanings. Here 
sensings are understood non-discursive information obtained from the life-world and 
the self, which (along with meanings) communicate information related to sense. 
Sensings can be communicated by for example smells, bodily orientations, the non-
discursive attributes of spoken words, and other processes (Brennan, 2004).  Both 
meanings expressed or interpreted and sensings indicated or understood within the 
intersubjective life-world are interwoven to elicit the given moment of the understood 
sense of a particular experience. I am using the verb sensing (as distinct from the noun 
„sensings‟) as being related to the processes of obtaining the information from the life-
world.   
 
In this thesis, I am taking the ontological position that both the material (Smolin, 2001) 
and the ideal (Dretske, 1998) are to be theorized as information, where “information is a 
correlation between two things that is produced by a lawful process (as opposed to 
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coming about by sheer chance)” (Pinker, 1998:65). In addition I am taking phenomenal 
awareness and its processes to be conceptualised as information (Hammerhoff & 
Penrose, 1996). This enables the conceptualising of the interweaving of different 
modalities (material, cognitive processes, perception) since it is all the same „stuff‟, 
albeit with different attributes. Within the discipline of „philosophy of the mind‟, 
information is an “objective commodity, something whose generation, transmission, 
and reception do not require or in any way presuppose interpretive processes.” (Dretske, 
1981:vii), yet information has the potential to become meaning (Dretske, 1981:44).  
Meaning in sociology is usually conceptualized in terms of subjective meanings and “is 
not sufficiently understood in terms of intersubjective communication” (Leydesdorff, 
2011:392), and here Husserl‟s (2002) concept of intersubjective „themes‟ provides a 
way of understanding meanings intersubjectively, where these „themes‟ are shared 
meanings understood by a community of people. Loet Leydesdorff defines how 
meaning and information are related whereby:   
 
“Meaning is generated in a system when different pieces of information are 
related as messages to one another, for example, as words in sentences [...]. The 
information is then positioned in a network with an emerging (and continuously 
reconstructed) structure. This positioning can be done by an individual who - as 
a system of reference - can provide personal meaning to the events; but meaning 
can also be provided at the supra- individual level, for example, in a discourse.” 
(Leydesdorff, 2011:394). 
 
Here we not only see meaning as being produced through interpretation by an 
individual, but also by the social field itself without the (momentary) presence of 
individual actors. However what is clear from Leydesdorff‟s (2011) approach is that 
meaning is being theorized as a process which does not require an underlying sense of 
the meaning or even a sentient being who is able to perceive the meanings in some way. 
This supports my use of the terms sensings and sense to provide this concept in this 
thesis. In this thesis both meanings and sensings are information which are present 
within the life-world (including the self), and only become meanings and sensings when 
they are related synchronically or diachronically with human (or other sentient) 
experience. Meanings and sensings are information which contribute to the final 
phenomenally rendered experience of sense within an individual, they are the parts 
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which contribute to the whole. I use the term render to convey the construction and 
creation of the final phenomenal object in perception, and define this term in greater 
detail in chapter five.  
 
Following from Merleau-Ponty‟s (2002:61) discussion of the interrelationship between 
quale and sense, I am defining a quality in this thesis as being qualia combined with the 
dialectic that occurs between sensings (and sense) and meanings. This dialectical 
relationship between sensings and meanings can be observed in the ebb and flow of 
indication and expression during phenomenal experience, for example there are no 
human words which are purely meanings without an underlying affective quality 
(Descartes, 1983), and conversely there are very few moments of pure sense without 
some form of expression intruding into awareness (exceptions may include for example 
meditation and moments of intense feelings). Hence the term affective qualities which 
can refer to for example embodied feelings, an emotion, or a mood. I will therefore not 
be using the terms „quality‟ or „qualities‟ in this thesis outside of these definitions. 
Qualia, sense and affective qualities can only be experienced within the lived-Body, 
since these are embodied experiences. Sensings and meanings can be experienced both 
within the phenomenal lived-Body and the phenomenal life-world, since these are types 
of information rendered within all phenomenal objects. In addition sensings and 
meanings can be communicated intersubjectively between individuals and groups.  
 
Unified Ego 
The concept of the unified Ego is theorized using Husserl‟s (2002) concepts around the 
unity of the embodied self and the lived-Body, where the embodied self is the 
phenomenal awareness within the entire corporeal body image, and the lived-Body is 
the interaction and unity between the material (hyletic) body and the phenomenal Body. 
I have used particular terms such as the unified Ego, topography and rendering to help 
simplify the concepts and models I have interpreted from Edmund Husserl‟s oeuvre, 
particularly where his style of language (original German and translated English) is hard 
for the reader to engage with and his extensive descriptions for concepts are difficult to 
summarize (Carr, 1970). My use of the term Ego relates to the sense of „I‟ or „me‟ 
which in the unified Ego is related to the dynamic interweaving between the material 
body and phenomenal awareness.  
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The unified Ego is rendered through the interweaving of various topographies. The 
concepts of topographies or topologies have been used by other theorists on the 
embodied self (for example Barad, 2003; Massumi, 2001; Pile, 2010), where Steven 
Pile (2010:13) relates this to psychopathological structures such as “the psychoanalytic 
topography of unconscious, preconscious and conscious”. Husserl (2002) referred to 
strata or schema in his approach, but these again are related to hidden processes or 
structures.  Although I am using the concept of topography to infer the hidden synthesis 
of experience (Barad, 2003; Massumi, 2001; Pile, 2010), I am also using the term 
topography in the sense of an experienced spatio-temporal domain where meanings are 
interpreted, feelings are felt, and bodies are rendered. For example we can speak about 
thinking about the meaning of a poem as located within a part of our body (the head) 
over a duration of time, we can speak of feeling tired as a feeling located within the 
space of our body at a given time, and we can speak about the embodied sense of having 
a hand as a spatial and temporal phenomenon.  These spatial and temporal attributes of 
experience suggest the term „topography‟ is a useful concept for theorizing these 
perceptions. In this thesis I look at the discursive topography, the affective topography 
and the corporeal topography of the unified Ego. The corporeal topography also 
requires the hyletic topography (the material body which helps contribute to the body 
image). These topographies interweave to render the phenomenal experience of the 
unified Ego. It is through the rendering of these topographies with meanings and 
sensings, through the dynamic changes within these topographical patterns and through 
the understood sense of these that GBME men can map and navigate the invisible white 
Gestalt within white gay spaces.   
 
Whiteness 
Racialized practices are embedded and sedimented within everyday contemporary 
social structures, practices, and discourses which in turn sustain and re-produce racism 
(Fanon, 1993:87; Omi & Winnant, 1986:67). Whiteness is one of the dominant 
racializing discourses and practices, and as long as racialized categories remain 
operationalised within English society, for example in government Census categories 
(Peach, 1996), then  issues around „race‟ will remain a reality in our everyday lives.  
Whiteness is one of the interwoven meanings that will always by definition be a part of 
the invisible white Gestalt. Here I am defining whiteness as a racialized discursive 
formation although it also interweaves with other elements of the social field. The 
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concept of whiteness involves an understanding of the multi-dimensional interaction, 
synthesis, and processes between a number of features, attributes or conditions 
(Frankenberg, 1993). These attributes have changed over the years with 
biological/scientific essentialist approaches bring replaced with cultural approaches as 
the dominant discourse and narrative in society (Agnew, 2007:9; Frankenberg, 1993; 
Ware, 1992; Yancy, 2008). These approaches to whiteness are constantly changing 
within society and also vary within specific localities within society (Bonnett, 2000; 
Byrne, 2006:3). Whiteness can be said to include the following components: colonial 
discourses (Alcoff, 2006; Dyer, 1997; Mills, 1997; Said, 1978; Yancy, 2008), 
nationalistic discourses (Agnew, 2009; Alcoff, 2006; Yancy, 2008), subjectivity 
(Alcoff, 1999; Yancy, 2008), cultural factors, institutional, structural factors, and 
material factors (Yancy, 2008). Whiteness is also a set of relations of knowledge/power 
embedded within the interactions and intersections of these diverse components (Mills, 
1997:127; Tate, 2005:47). These particular components do not simply exist 
independently outside of relationships to one another, for example where “culture is 
viewed more broadly as constructing daily practices and worldview in complex relation 
with material life” (Frankenberg, 1993:128; original italics).  
 
Whiteness is a relational racialized category (Agnew, 2009:18; Frankenberg, 1993; 
Mills, 1997: 58; Yancy, 2008:34), defined by the other “named cultures it has flung to 
its perimeter” (Frankenberg, 1993:231). However it is important not to essentialize this 
relational aspect for example in terms of stereotyping BME groups as oppressed or 
victims (Byrne, 2006:4; Frankenberg, 1993:230). There is also an issue around the 
binary categories used within social theory in many cases of subordinate-dominant 
relations (Hall, 2007, 2012), where binary oppositions came to be seen as too simplistic 
a model given the multiple identities of individuals (Byrne, 2006:5). Within this thesis, 
as the interview data in the chapters indicate, concepts such as black/white, gay/straight, 
do not simply form binary hierarchical relationships but more complex 
intersectionalities and a fluidity of power dynamics which can be utilised agentically by 
some of the GBME men I interviewed. In addition if whiteness is relational, then 
without the presence or representations of non-white others, the ontological conditions 
for whiteness‟ existence as a raced category loses its coherency, again contributing to 
the invisibility of whiteness.  
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Whiteness is also considered to be productive of discursive themes and narratives 
around white supremacy (Ware, 1992; Yancy 2008). This is related to early colonial 
discourses derived from racialized hierarchies utilising narratives from biology and 
culture  designed to help facilitate the colonial expansion into the „new world‟. Some 
would argue that „race‟ and racial hierarchy existed before colonialism (see Friedman, 
2002), or view „race‟ as a discourse synonymous with ethnic or tribal representations 
and practices, and not exclusively a white European ideology (see Agnew, 2009; and 
also Bonnett, 2000). I would see this as being a conflation between historical ethnic 
discourses and racial discourses, and as such I interpret pre-colonial representations 
around „race‟ within historical textual sources as relating to ethnic or other social 
categories. The position I am taking here is that „race‟ was constructed as part of 
European colonial discourses (Bonnett, 2000:8) utilising the various social institutions 
(for example the state, academic, medical, military, political, legal, economic, 
mercantile, religious) to create narratives which positioned non-white others as less than 
human (Stoler, 1995).    
 
The Invisibility of Whiteness 
Whiteness is theorised as „invisible‟ due in part to its normativity (Puwar, 2004) and 
privilege (Yancy, 2008). Charles Mills (1997:76) describes the invisibility of whiteness 
as where “the fish does not see the water, and whites do not see the racial nature of a 
white polity because it is natural to them, the element in which they move”. Yet 
whiteness is visible to those it excludes or harms through forms of violence 
(Frankenberg, 1993:231; Mills, 1997; Yancy, 2008). Therefore we can look at particular 
forms of violence against BME groups within society to explicate the operations of 
power through whiteness. Many factors help to sustain the invisibility of whiteness in a 
number of ways. Firstly as the sedimented historical racialized norm it creates a present-
day cultural disciplinary regime, where BME individuals feel the forces of these 
discourses in their everyday existence and discursive positionings. Thus we find that 
processes around normalization and the normative coalesce around particular white 
norms within English society, where whiteness as the universal norm (Dyer, 1997:2; 
Frankenberg, 1993; Julian & Mercer, 1996:456) and as racially a-paradigmatic 
(Chambers, 1997:189) is rendered invisible. Charles Mills discusses how whiteness 
seizes upon discourses and narratives to construct a form of racialized false-
consciousness within the phenomenology of whiteness:  
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“One could say then, as a general rule, that white misunderstanding, 
misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race are 
among the most pervasive mental phenomena of the past few hundred years, a 
cognitive and moral economy psychically required for conquest, colonisation 
and enslavement” (Mills, 1997:19).  
 
Since the dominant representations, narratives, and discourses are situated within 
whiteness, it therefore makes sense that these self-deceiving “mental phenomena” are 
incorporated into the life-world, helping to render invisible the attributes of whiteness. 
Here I would suggest that these mental phenomena are not only expressed meanings but 
also indicated sensings. Whiteness can also be considered to be an identity or subjective 
condition as a result of positioning, where for example Bridget Byrne suggests that: 
  
“People are positioned as white through a range of discourse and practices. They 
also identify as white, responding to the ways in which they are positioned 
discursively and within racialized performativity. They „see‟ themselves as 
white” (Byrne, 2006:26).  
 
Where people identify as white or have a white identity then whiteness can be made 
visible, through the expression of the meanings individuals have around their white 
identity. However, often many people who would be categorised as „white‟ by society 
do not have a white identity or subjectivity per se (Bonnett, 2000), in part due to the 
mechanisms I have already outlined that contribute to the invisibility of whiteness. One 
example is where the terms „ethnic‟ or „race‟ are confused in whiteness discourses as 
being only about BME groups or black categories.  This absence of expressed white 
identity (to self or others) again helps to conceal whiteness since, like power, 
subjectivity is often invisible as the condition of meanings, sensings, and sense within 
an individual. In addition, whiteness might simply reside within the cognitive processes 
(the „unconscious‟) of an individual rather than as an acknowledged social-categorical 
or subject-positioning within their own conscious identity. In this sense a person may be 
performing white racialized subject positionings but feel themselves subjectively as un-
raced. We can see this in how (white) LGBTQI groups and (white) gay commercial 
venues do not consider themselves to be „white‟ or to represent „whiteness‟, yet they do 
not have LGBTQI BME members and behave towards BME individuals in ways which 
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exclude them.  This can also be seen where (white) LGBTQI or gay events and groups 
are simply labelled „LGBTQI‟ or „gay‟, contrasted with specific contexts for BME 
groups which are labelled as „the BME gay‟ group or event, or given an „exotic‟ non-
Western sounding name. Charles Mills (1997:2) suggest that whiteness is “the 
background against which other systems, which we are to see as political, are 
highlighted”. Therefore where we find the explicit articulation of a non-white racialized 
category, which in present-day society is always a political act, we can detect the back-
grounding of whiteness, like for example „Black president‟, „Asian film-maker‟ etc. 
This can be seen within my interviews in the explicit articulation of terms like „Black‟ 
and „BME‟,  for „Black LGBTQI‟ groups, where by contrast „LGBTQI‟ is never 
racialized in expressed terms although it indicates „white LGBTQI‟. However this 
absence of articulation of whiteness where blackness is articulated speaks loudly about 
whiteness to GBME men, and reveals much about its discursive structures and 
processes. 
 
The interaction between the diverse components within the life-world can often be a 
factor in the invisibility of whiteness. Within the thematic chapters of this thesis we find 
this occurring in two ways, firstly through many „subtle‟ manifestations of whiteness 
across the diffused life-world creating an „atmosphere‟ rather than a specific identifiable 
object which indicates or expresses whiteness. Secondly we find that where whiteness is 
identifiable within an object, a second „de-whitening‟ object can be operationalized 
within the life-world to distract or deny the explicit object of whiteness, for example 
where GBME men are denied entry into a white gay venue but told it‟s for members 
only. George Yancy suggests that:  
 
“Whiteness, after all, is a master of concealment; it is insidiously embedded 
within responses, reactions, good intentions, postural gestures, denials, and 
structural and material orders [however] the operations of whiteness are by no 
means transparent” (Yancy, 2008:229).  
 
As Yancy shows us, sometimes whiteness can be implicitly articulated, indicated or 
embedded, for example existing within the „third space‟ of cultural meanings (Bhabha, 
1994). Racialized sensings can exist within the architecture of buildings and spaces 
(Degen, 2008; Lefebvre, 1991:416), they exist in the way a person sits in a chair (Dyer, 
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1997), in everyday language (Yancy, 2008), in the gaze between individuals (hooks, 
1993; Yancy, 2008), and they exist in the geography of where you live (Twine, 1999).  
Within the social conditions where whiteness is rendered invisible through the processes 
already described in this chapter, and through strategic denials and practices to obscure 
its existence, one method of sensing racialized whiteness in a social context is through 
the phenomenal awareness of affective information and subjectivities elicited within 
GBME men within white gay spaces. Charles Mills directs us that:  
 
“One has to learn to trust one‟s own cognitive powers, to develop ones own 
concepts, insights, modes of explanation, overarching theories, and to oppose 
the epistemic hegemony of conceptual frameworks designed in part to thwart 
and suppress the exploration of such matters; one has to think against the grain”  
(Mills, 1997:119). 
 
Mills here points towards a phenomenological epistemology which prioritizes the sense 
of racialization understood by GBME men, where the subjectivities of GBME men can 
give us insights into the meanings, sensings and social processes operating within white 
gay spaces. Using these we can find new ways of rendering whiteness visible and 
nameable, in order to begin to think about how to undo „race‟ (Gilroy, 1998).  
 
Race and Ethnicity Categories 
One of the problems with defining „race‟ or ethnicity categories is the reification and 
essentialization of these terms (Modood, 1997), where what we aim to do is undo „race‟ 
(Gunaratnam, 2003; Gilroy, 1998). However „race‟ is both a real part of people lives as 
well as being a social construction (Collins, 2004; Gunaratnam, 2003). Therefore given 
that I am looking at whiteness in white gay spaces, and that my sample of respondents 
are selected from their racialized positioning in society or role in gay organisations, the 
use of categories is necessary to explore the patterns of social interaction and the 
subjectivity this elicits. However it is important to bear in mind that categories change 
over time and across place or may mean something different for individuals (Modood, 
1997; Peach, 1996). 
 
Black minority ethnic (BME) I am defining as any ethnic category in present-day 
society which is considered to be visible and identifiable through signifiers which can 
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be read as black, or have other signifiers related to BME heritage (for example 
perceived ethnic heritage of names). Therefore I also include in the term BME those 
categories that are racially visible from southern Europe, Jewish, Roma, Irish, and 
mixed race.  I also include the category Muslim in cases where this is (erroneously) 
conflated with „race‟ or ethnicity in terms of signifiers of visibility. White majority 
ethnic (WME) groups are those which are racially invisible or racially normative within 
northern European cultures, and are of northern European descent. I define the term 
Black (capitalised) as referring to political identification with anti-racist activism which 
seeks to undo the legacy of white supremacism.  
 
 I define black and white as related to corporeal „phenotype‟ or corporeal style which 
can be used to signify „race‟ and which are used to operationalize „race‟ in present-day 
English society. These signifiers can include skin colour, hair texture, nose shape, and 
vocal accent, but as Jin Haritaworn (2009) shows us, these corporeal features are not 
sufficient to provide epistemological certainty and consistency in everyday social 
readings of „race‟ from the body. Therefore to corporeally read black or white bodies 
relies upon a combination of factors, attributes and contexts, which may vary depending 
upon who is doing the reading and categorisation. I define heritage, for example 
African-Caribbean heritage, as country of birth or country of cultural identification or 
ethnic or faith cultural identification. I define descent, for example African descent, as 
the „race‟ or „racial‟ continental category as commonly used in English culture.  
 
My respondents self-defined their „race‟ and ethnicity in the interviews, and these are 
the descriptions I use in this thesis. However there are instances where I use alternative 
definitions such as black where I am referring to processes around the reading and 
categorisation of the body rather than identity, culture or geographic origin per se. In 
addition I use the term racialized Other to describe the racialized process or positioning 
related to Othering (Kitzinger et al., 1996) and particularly in examples in the chapters 
where this term more accurately describes the racialized Othering which impacts upon 
and conflates all black bodies or BME categories.  
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Gay Contexts 
In this thesis I am looking at the experiences of GBME men within white gay contexts, 
and so I define the terms related to this here. Gay contexts refers to social spaces or 
contexts where gay culture, LGBQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer) sexual orientation, or 
LGBTQI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, intersex) identity impacts upon the social 
context in ways which, for those being interviewed at the time, phenomenally 
foreground the gay meanings and background the heteronormative or heterosexual 
meanings. These phenomenal meanings may be projected within the space for a short 
period of time (such as a five minute „blow job‟ at the bus stop) or for a longer period 
(such as the geographical space of the gay village in Soho London).  
 
Different individuals will interpret diverse and possibly conflicting phenomenal 
meanings around whether a context is gay or not, for example some straight people may 
not be able to read the gay cultural signifiers present within a particular social space. 
This means a social context or space can simultaneously be a „gay context‟ for a gay 
individual and a „straight context‟ for a straight individual occupying different and non-
integrated life-worlds.  However, having said this, my questions to my interviewees 
were about “gay contexts or spaces” so their answers related to their understanding of 
these terms, and therefore I am defining gay spaces and gay contexts as those 
understood as being such by my interviewees. The capitalised terms Gay and Queer 
refer to collective politicised identities, discourses or cultures. The acronym LGBTQI 
can refer to social categories as well as political or activist identifications.  
 
The Invisible White Gestalt in White Gay Spaces 
Having described the various „parts‟ which contribute to the „whole‟ of the racialized 
life-world, it is important for me to theorise how these parts are interpreted as meanings 
and understood as sensings by GBME men in white gay spaces. There have been a 
number of approaches to theorizing how information and meanings circulating in the 
social field come to produce meanings within an individual subjectivity, including 
mathematical phenomenological approaches (for example Leydesdorff, 2011) and 
mathematical post-structural models (for example Deleuze & Guattari, 2011). These 
approaches have a tendency towards being interpreted with an emphasis on the 
„systems‟ rather than the lived experience of an individual. For example Leydesdorff 
(2011) models subjective meanings by drawing images of semantic maps. Some authors 
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who are inspired by Deleuze & Guattari‟s oeuvre (for example Delanda, 2002; Protevi, 
2001; Robinson, 2009) link the social theory to physics and mathematical models, 
which again tends to focus the analysis away from individual lived experience.    
 
In this thesis, the starting point was the subjectivity of GBME men framed within a 
phenomenological model, and from this I developed the concepts which related this to 
the social field and life-world. The alternative models for theorizing the interactions 
between the social and the subjective that I have just outlined, take their concepts and 
models from disciplines which are not necessarily related to perception or lived 
experience. By contrast Gestalt theory, which was developed from phenomenology, 
looks at patterns within the „real‟ world and how these are related to perception and 
lived experience (Arnheim, 1961; Henle, 1961; Jordi, 2007; Kohler, 1929, 1961, 1971).  
Historically Gestalt theory explored the perceptions around music and the visual arts, or 
around perception in cognitive science or psychology, and would look at singular 
modalities (visual, auditory) and how simple objects were experienced by individuals. It 
was developed later to explore social spaces and subjectivity (Langewitz, 2007). 
Therefore the concept of the Gestalt provides a useful model for this thesis. A Gestalt 
can be defined as being: 
 
 “Wherever a process dynamically distributes and regulates itself, determined by 
the actual situation in a whole field[...]. The process will have some 
characteristic which exists in an extended area only, so that consideration of 
local points or local factors as such will not give us full insight into the nature of 
the process. According to the most general definition of Gestalt, the process of 
learning, of reproduction, of striving, of emotional attitude, of thinking, acting, 
and so forth may be included as subject matter for Gestalttheorie insofar as they 
do not consist of independent elements, but are determined in a situation as a 
whole” (Kohler, 1929:192; original italics). 
 
Therefore we can look at the whole of the life-world within white gay spaces and the 
component parts within it for the dynamic patterns, or Gestalts, to provide the 
phenomenal sense experienced by GBME men.  A perceptual Gestalt within the life-
world will comprise the diverse types of information which form a pattern with the 
potential to provide an understood sense to an individual. One well known example of a 
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visual Gestalt is the famous image of the old woman/young girl Gestalt illusion, where 
the same visual image will switch from the old woman to the young girl and vice versa 
in the perception of the viewer of the image. Here although the same information is 
present in the image, the subjective state of the individual provides the understanding 
and interpretation of the image and how it is finally rendered in perception.  However it 
is the total „system‟ that is involved in the final sense of the perception (Jordi, 2007; 
Kohler, 1929, 1961, 1971; Welsh, 2006), as Talia Welsh suggests:     
 
“Understanding a perception is not simply the intellectual application of thought 
to a factum brutum. Gestalt psychology suggests that the meaning of a 
perception is not co-extensive with the intellect; rather meanings exist within the 
perception taken as a whole” (Welsh, 2006:531; original italics).  
 
The invisible white Gestalt is defined here as the dynamic configuration of the „parts‟ of 
information within a space or context that provides a pattern or „whole‟ that can elicit a 
phenomenal experience of racialized whiteness in individuals whilst simultaneously 
operating to make whiteness invisible. This can be compared with the old woman/young 
girl Gestalt, where two differently sensed experiences can occur within the same 
individual, yet when you perceive the old woman you cannot simultaneously perceive 
the young girl. The invisible white Gestalt can be both visible and invisible to different 
individuals or the same individual at different times, depending on the parts of 
information present and also on the subjectivities of the individuals (whose unified Egos 
are also part of the invisible white Gestalt).  
 
The type of information I am looking at in this thesis are meanings and sensings which 
are to be found within the life-world. The social field comprises an interactional matrix 
of the discursive, the cultural, the material, the structural, the subjective, the 
intersubjective, and power relations. Not all the information and „meanings‟ in the 
social field are available to human perception and in addition some „meanings‟ are 
produced by the social field outside of direct human subjectivity and agency 
(Leydesdorff, 2011), however they still participate in the production of human 
experience. Therefore whilst acknowledging the complexity of the production of 
information within the social field, I am looking at the meanings and sensings within the 
phenomenal life-world that can be interpreted and understood by people, and which 
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form the phenomenal pattern of the invisible white Gestalt. The life-world Gestalts have 
been theorized as being complex and productive of information within their 
configurations, for example Herbert Schroeder who suggests that:  
 
“Meanings in the life-world do not stand alone. They do not exist independently, 
but are interrelated with each other from the start. A meaning is what it is only in 
the context of its relationship to other meanings. The Gestalt quality of life-
world meanings refers to the way in which meanings self-organize to form 
coherently structured wholes. The structure of the whole ( the Gestalt) is not 
imposed from outside, but is determined by the interrelations among its 
constituent parts” (Schroeder, 2007:300).  
 
The parts of the Gestalt are determined by the information residing in the attributes and 
processes of the life-world, and the whole is shaped by the dynamic patterns which can 
be phenomenally rendered, experienced and sensed as a coherent Gestalt. The invisible 
white Gestalt is the whole phenomenological Gestalt which will always have 
interwoven within its dynamic configuration both (at least) one „part‟ comprising 
discourses around whiteness and also (at least) one „part‟ which maintains the 
invisibility of whiteness. By „part‟ I do not only refer to a particular localisable point, 
but as is more often the case, to a patterned diffusion of information, meanings, sensings 
or sense. 
 
Given the operations of power within the social field and life-world, the Gestalt is never 
fixed but is always shifting and changing, this dynamic re-configuration along with the 
interwoven parts producing the invisibility of whiteness makes understanding and 
interpreting the invisible white Gestalt a complex and difficult process for those within 
the phenomenal life-world it encompasses. For a Gestalt to produce the perceptual 
meaningful whole it is not necessary for all the possible parts circulating in the life-
world to be incorporated into the formation, but for sufficient and relevant parts in the 
correct configuration to combine (Arnheim, 1961; Henle, 1961; Kohler, 1929, 1971).  
Therefore one of the ways of navigating this invisibility is by interpreting the meanings 
and understanding the sensings obtained from the various other parts of the invisible 
white Gestalt, such that they are sufficient to produce a coherent whole. Here for 
example the topographies of the unified Ego can map and navigate the invisible white 
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Gestalt, where the affective topography is rendered with affective qualities which 
provide the sense of the racialized space whilst at the same time the discursive 
topography is rendered with meanings that deny the interpretation of racialization. This 
can be seen in examples with my respondents where they describe feeling they are being 
excluded from a white gay venue due to their „race‟ but the words spoken by the door 
staff relate to it being a „members only club‟. It is within the totality of their embodied 
subjectivity that GBME men are able to interpret and understand the racialization of the 
white gay space, through mapping and navigating the information within the invisible 
white Gestalt. I now go on to describe the rationale for this thesis and chapter outline in 
section three. 
 
Section Three: Rationale and Outline of Chapters and Overview of Thesis 
 
The invisible white Gestalt is a configuration comprising „parts‟ and the „whole‟, where 
these „parts‟ may also exist as the absence of parts in the Gestalt. This interweaving of 
parts and how they interact to provide a coherent phenomenal experience of the 
invisible white Gestalt provides the rationale for the structure of this thesis. It is through 
the topographies rendered and interwoven within the unified Ego that we can interpret 
and understand the invisible white Gestalt. As discussed in the previous section, I chose 
to examine four distinct topographies, namely the discursive, the affective, the 
corporeal, and hyletic. I also explore the affective topography of atmospheres (an 
affective field which permeates the unified Ego and life-world). Analysis of the hyletic 
topography is of less importance in this thesis.  By looking at a specific topography and 
how it relates to particular social processes in each chapter I am teasing apart the 
interwoven patterns of the invisible white Gestalt in order to analyse them. Within each 
of the thematic chapters I begin by describing the historical and present-day racialized 
discourses, cultures and practices related to the social processes analysed within each 
chapter. This is to establish that „race‟ remains as a reality within the present-day gay 
contexts being described, and to describe the racialized meanings that are circulating 
within the white gay cultures and wider society. In chapter two I develop my 
methodology. Here I look at how a queer(ed) „race‟ qualitative study can be used to 
look at the embodied subjectivity of GBME men. Comb ining critical „race‟, queer and 
feminist approaches within a phenomenological framework, I develop a method which 
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enables the lived experiences of GBME men to be analysed in relation to their 
perceptions of white gay spaces.  
 
In chapters three and four I look at the discursive and affective topographies 
respectively. Chapter three examines how the discursive topographies are rendered with 
meanings obtained from the social process of interpellative speech acts. Here I use 
Louis Althusser‟s (1998) concept of interpellation with Edmund Husserl‟s (2001) 
phenomenology to explicate how the meanings rendered within the discursive 
topographies coincide or contrast with the affective qualities rendered within the 
affective topography. Here GBME men frequently sense and understand that the 
meanings interpreted from the speech acts are incongruous with the affective qualities 
elicited by the social interaction. For example the door staff in white gay venues may 
say to GBME men “you‟re not gay so you‟re not coming in” which at face value means 
that the GBME men are categorised and interpellated as „not gay‟, however GBME men 
sense a feeling of being unwelcomed related to their „race‟. I also look at how 
interpellation operates when the subjectivity of the GBME man does not correlate with 
the racialized positioning imposed through the social interaction, showing that 
interpellation can be resisted through reconfiguring the interpretation and 
understanding. Whilst the interpellative speech act positions GBME men as the 
unwanted racialized Other, it simultaneously inscribes the gay community and the gay 
venue as white. This reveals whiteness hidden within the unracialized speech act 
„you‟re not gay‟. Chapter four looks at the affective topography and how this is 
rendered with affective qualities and sensings elicited through the social processes of 
the white interpellative gaze. I define in more detail the affective concepts I outlined 
previously in this chapter. GBME men in white gay spaces have to understand the 
sensings communicated by the gaze from GWME men as to whether this gaze is hostile 
or desiring. Using Baruch Spinoza‟s (1899) definition of affect and Edmund Husserl‟s 
(2001) phenomenology I explicate how affect can be theorized as an embodied 
experience related to the operations of power in the life-world. The gaze in these 
contexts is generally a transmitter of affective information and so is a useful process 
with which to analyse the impact upon the affective topography and the affective 
qualities, sensings and sense experienced by GBME men. Whilst I focus upon the 
discursive and affective topographies in chapters three and four respectively, these are 
interwoven within the unified Ego. We can see this in the category of affective quality 
27 
 
 
 
called emotions (discursively constructed affective qualities), in which we see most 
clearly the interweaving of qualia and the dialectic between sensings and meanings. One 
of the ways of sensing the invisible white Gestalt is through the foregrounding and 
backgrounding between the discursive and affective topographies, in response to the 
operations of power within the life-world. 
 
In chapters five and six I look at the corporeal topographies of the unified Ego (as a 
whole) and the penis, respectively. In chapter five I describe how the discursive 
topography and the affective topography as explicated in chapters three and four, are 
interwoven with the hyletic topography (the material body in process) to render the 
phenomenal corporeal topographies of the unified Ego. I define the concepts related to 
the unified Ego, outlined previously in this chapter, in greater detail. A corporeal 
topography is a body-part that is rendered with meanings, sensings and affective 
qualities, and the unified Ego as the centre of the sense of „I‟ or „me‟ can also be 
rendered with the same information. Here I show that the unified Ego of GBME men is 
able to sense the complex information within the invisible white Gestalt to understand 
the process of racialization occurring within white gay spaces. In addition the unified 
Ego can also transmit sensings through the invisible white Gestalt which can be mapped 
and understood by GWME men. Here the metaphor of „auras‟ and „energy‟ are used by 
GBME men to describe this flow of information. These „auras‟ can be used strategically 
by GBME men to reconfigure the invisible white Gestalt in order to make it more 
welcoming for them. In chapter six I look more closely at the specific corporeal 
topography of the penis. The penis is a nodal point for a diverse range of discursive 
meanings and affective qualities which can be rendered into its topography and these 
are experienced within the embodied subjectivity of GBME men. The penis is also a 
signifier of racialized discursive meanings within the life-world, and therefore 
communicates these meanings intersubjectively to those present within the white gay 
space, particularly the meanings that signify the black penis as a „trophy‟. The penis 
therefore communicates meanings around „race‟, sexuality and masculinity within the 
life-world and these combine in ways which result in a complex pattern of meanings 
through the practices of power and the racialized positioning of GBME men.  The 
corporeal topography of the penis understands and senses the complex information 
within the life-world and these are also rendered within the whole unified Ego of 
28 
 
 
 
GBME men, making the corporeal topography of the penis highly receptive to the 
racialized processes occurring in white gay spaces.  
 
In chapter seven I look at the phenomenal topography of the affective field of the life-
world. Here I look at how atmospheres, theorized as the affective field of the life-world, 
permeate the unified Ego and the life-world and communicate complex information 
about white gay spaces. Using Edmund Husserl‟s (2001, 2002) phenomenology to 
describe how the life-world is rendered with atmospheres I explore how racialized 
meanings can be elicited from the atmospheres and how these operationalize 
interpellation and the white interpellative gaze. I show that atmospheres can be 
productive of processes of racialized Othering as well as inclusion. GBME men who 
find the atmosphere of white gay spaces to be unwelcoming or unattractive are able to 
reconfigure the white gay space, or find alternative black gay venues or less perceived 
racialized spaces. I end this thesis with the final chapter where I discuss the conclusions 
arising from the analysis within the thematic chapters. Here I show how the parts of the 
invisible white Gestalt enable a coherent whole to be experienced by GBME men, 
allowing them to sense the whiteness within white gay spaces.  Here I argue that in 
addition to being a discursive formation and practice of power, whiteness can be sensed 
as an affective quality. I go on to discuss the implications arising from this research for 
GBME men, how the racializations impact upon this group, and what strategies enable 
GBME men to resist the negative impacts of racialized practices within white gay 
spaces. I finish this chapter by considering future research that can be developed from 
the findings within this thesis. The next chapter develops the methodology and methods 
I use in this thesis, using a queer(ed) „race‟ qualitative approach.  
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Chapter Two 
A Queer(ed) ‘Race’ Qualitative Methodology 
  
 
Introduction 
This chapter explicates the research methodology, research design and methods for 
obtaining and analysing the research data. Given that the thesis looks at the sensings and 
meanings arising from the embodied subjectivity of GBME men, the methodology 
needs to be sensitive to data around the subjectivity of GBME men, the social context, 
and the intersubjective meanings coproduced between myself as the researcher and my 
respondents.  I have therefore combined relevant  approaches from phenomenological 
methodologies and qualitative approaches to researching „race‟ and sexuality in order to 
develop a queer(ed) „race‟ qualitative methodology for this thesis.  
 
This chapter contains five sections and conclusions. In section one I explain some the 
methodological issues related to this research, the methodological approaches developed 
for this thesis, and how the theoretical models relate to the research into the experiences 
of GBME men in white gay spaces. Here I discuss the phenomenological, feminist, and 
„race‟ approaches and how I use them to develop the methodology. In section two I look 
at the process of sampling, including the issues around finding respondents, issues 
encountered with gatekeepers, and an outline of the sampling demographics. In section 
three I discuss the approach taken within the interviews, and how this relates to the 
qualitative methodology. Here I look at issues around interview context, the structure of 
the interview, and how intertextuality arises in the interview. In section four I describe 
the data analysis methods. Here I consider the idea of life-world „bubbles‟ as units of 
analysis, how I approach the discourse analysis and textual analysis and I look at the 
method of transcription. In section five I look at issues around reflexivity and ethical 
implications. Here I consider my position as a researcher within the interviews and how 
this relates to being seen as part of the „institution‟ or being seen as a GBME man by 
respondents. I also consider the issue of class and vocal accent, the interpretation by 
some respondents of „bias‟ or an anti-racist „agenda‟, and I look at the wider political, 
theoretical and personal ethical issues within the research. I conclude this chapter by 
drawing together the themes from the discussion in this chapter, to show that a 
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queer(ed) „race‟ qualitative approach can help to explicate the embodied subjectivity of 
GBME men in regards to their experiences of white gay spaces.  
 
There are many approaches to research design and methods, each with particular 
objectives, outcomes, and ethical issues (Silverman, 2011, 2005; Denzin, 1997). 
Quantitative research (or mixed with qualitative) is often used when looking at GBME 
male populations (for example Asian Rainbow Project, 2011; PACE, 1998, 2000) as 
these studies are primarily conducted as sexual health research and funded by 
institutions situated within traditions of scientific statistical paradigms. In spite of the 
useful information and knowledge obtained on GBME men‟s health, often the voices of 
GBME men‟s experience are lost in the statistical agglomerations, and the small 
sentence interview quotes used to illustrate the statistical data may not be sufficient to 
provide understanding of the experiences, and risks “anecdotalism” (Silverman, 
2005:34) which is the practice of selectively using quotes which supports the 
researcher‟s own position.  
 
Qualitative methods have been devised to explore research topics which aim to 
investigate the lived experiences and cultures of social groups and individuals, or as 
Normal Denzin (1997:27) suggests, “how our subjectivity becomes entangled in the 
lives of others”. Silverman (2005:36) suggests that quantitative approaches can be 
combined in a qualitative approach where instances of the respondent‟s own definitions 
and categories occur in the interview, and this helps to defend the research from 
accusations of anecdotalism.  Where I felt it was important to establish the frequency of 
a particular experience, for an individual or within the sample population, I have made 
this clear in the text, (for example where I ask Brian about the frequency of times he has 
been asked about his penis by strangers in gay bars).  
 
Methodologies can be often represented in literature as a packaged „tool kit‟ used by 
researchers (Gunaratnam, 2003), or what Smith et al. (2009:5) refer to as 
“methodolatory”, an example being Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Given 
the unique nature of each project, adaptations and hybridisations of different approaches 
often occur in practice (Denzin, 1997). However one issue for this thesis is that at 
present there are no definitive methodologies for researching the embodied self, where 
David Nightingale suggests that: 
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 “The best we can hope to achieve is a sensitization to the body, a recognition 
that not all bodies are the same, and that discourses and the ways in which they 
shape and form social reality are constrained and shaped in their turn by the 
physical realities they describe” (Nightingale, 1999:174).  
 
I therefore developed a qualitative methodology which combined models from 
phenomenology which explore the embodied self and the life-world, and feminist, 
„race‟, and queer methodologies as these provided an anti-essentialist and emancipatory 
epistemology (Gunaratman, 2003) as well as reflecting theoretical approaches to 
studying the sample population of GBME men as a subordinated group situated within 
the dominant white gay social context. I did not conduct a pilot study for this research, 
for reasons of time and resources, as I had just changed supervisors and so had a „lost‟ a 
year for the completion of the study, and also being self- funded meant that I had limited 
resources to spend on data collection (for example travel and accommodation expenses). 
However given the semi-structured nature of the interviews around the question of 
experiences of GBME men in white gay spaces and the phenomenological approach, the 
absence of a pilot study did not significantly impact upon the topics being discussed as 
these were often led by the respondent. In addition since I had already been involved in 
research projects prior to the research for this thesis, the lack of a pilot study in this 
instance did not impact on my understanding of the physical, emotional and logistical 
realities of conducting interviews. In section one I go on to describe the methodology I 
developed for this thesis. 
 
Section One: Methodology 
 
Within qualitative approaches there are multiple and conflicting methodologies in terms 
of the ethical and political agendas, validity or verisimilitude, ontologies and 
epistemologies (Denzin, 1997; Silverman, 2005). For example Denzin (1997:15) 
describes the history of qualitative research and how this can be mapped onto the 
cultural, political and economic contexts of societies, moving through realism, 
modernism, and various postmodernisms. These discursive and structural contexts also 
contributed to the reification of embedded racialization in research (Gunaratnam, 
2003:10) whereby taken for granted racialized epistemologies obtained from society‟s 
practices and discourses provided „evidence‟ for racist academic analysis of black social 
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categories. In addition there are often conflicting and aggressive debates between 
exponents of particular perspectives (Denzin, 1997:260), for example Silverman 
(2005:221) takes a hostile view of some feminist emancipatory research which he 
claims is validated “just on the basis of the researcher‟s political credentials”. This 
tension is addressed in this thesis by acknowledging a visible political and emancipatory 
approach, for example giving voice to the experiences of a marginalized group and 
including myself within the narrative, whilst still grounding the arguments within 
theoretical frameworks. This means I am not making any claims to objectivity, 
universality, „scientific‟ validity, or reliability in this thesis (Taylor, 2009), rather the 
closest to these concepts is that I am constructing an “explanatory abstraction” (Davies, 
1999:24). 
 
Early approaches to qualitative research took the ontological position that there was a 
real, stable social world which could be accessed through epistemologies which 
connected “meanings (culture) to observable action in the real world” (Denzin, 
1997:xvi). By contrast the later “critical poststructuralist approach” (Denzin, 1997:9), 
stresses the dynamic, fluid, and unstable nature of subjectivity and cultures. Within 
feminist approaches debates between feminist standpoint and feminist postmodernism 
considered how black and lesbian feminist epistemologies could find a voice (Stanley et 
al. 1993). In response to these approaches were developed feminist, „race‟, and queer 
critical standpoint approaches. In particular for this thesis, Black feminist approaches 
were seen as being able to provide knowledge about the dominant social categories, for 
example white ethnic groups and men, as well as being an approach that explo res 
“contextually grounded experiences and recognises difference and complexity” (Stanley 
et al., 1993:31). Some authors (for example Davies, 1999: 21; Denzin, 1997:53-87) 
suggest that these approaches take a critical realist ontology (the position that an 
„external‟ world exists although without claims to establishing truths and validities). 
However given the social construction of „race‟ and sexuality I felt that a combination 
of „race‟, queer, and feminist methodologies, and phenomenological approaches a lso 
suggested a need for a more postmodernist theoretical approach.    
 
Yasmin Gunaratnam‟s (2003:36) concept of “doubled research” provides a lens through 
which both a realist ontology and the social constructedness of „race‟ and sexuality can 
be theorized as a methodology. “Doubled research” (Gunaratnam, 2003:36) relates to 
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how we need to theorize „race‟ as both materially „real‟ in impacting upon black 
people‟s lives whilst also recognising that „race‟ is a socially constructed category. 
Using this approach enabled me to explore the materiality of „race‟ for example in terms 
of racialized demographics in white gay spaces and the concatenation between „race‟ 
and class categories. It also helped me to theorize the social constructedness of „race‟ 
through for example the analysis of racialized discourses in the eliciting of subject 
positions and interpellations in white gay spaces. Since I was theorizing sense as being 
non-representational and non-material I then developed the doubled research concept 
into a „tripled research‟ which took into account the idea that sense was elicited by 
racialized experiences in the life-world, but was not in itself racialized. Here for 
example I would argue that the social constructedness of „race‟ is interpreted within the 
discursive topography of the unified Ego, whilst an embodied sense is elicited within 
the affective topography by the racialized experience. This approach helped me to 
theorize the racialized experiences of GBME men as „located‟ within the topographies 
of the unified Ego as separate phenomenal experiences, yet always interwoven in ways 
which produce the overall experience of a racialized life-world.   One particular aspect 
of the doubled research approach Yasmin Gunaratnum suggests is that:  
 
“In epistemological and methodological terms, what matters to me is how we 
might develop ways of thinking and working with categories of „race‟ and 
ethnicity in qualitative research that question and disrupt categorisation, and in 
the process bring about different ways of knowing, doing and being”  
(Gunaratnum, 2003:49). 
 
One of the ways of disrupting „race‟ and sexuality is through using insights from 
phenomenology, where in particular the process of categorisation is subordinated to the 
processes of experience, sensing, affect, and (non-representational) understanding. The 
emphasis on the sensed phenomenal experience, and in particular „what it feels like‟, 
does not inherently impose categorical and in particular binary categorical semantic 
meanings on social experiences. This conceptual prioritising of the phenomenological 
over the discursive is an approach Paul Gilroy (1998) suggests may gradually eliminate 
the concept of „race‟ within the society.  
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There are a number of social research methods which are compatible with a 
phenomenological approach, and have common and overlapping approaches 
(Moustakas, 1994:21).  These include ethnography, grounded theory, hermeneutics, 
empirical phenomenological research, heuristic research (Moustakas, 1994), and 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (Smith et al. 2009). These authors show that 
phenomenological and social research methods are theoretically compatible, and 
therefore since I am not following a prescriptive method, I have taken ideas from those 
approaches which were suitable for this qualitative methodology, for example adapting 
the three stage approach to interviews I describe later in this chapter (Tomura, 2009:57). 
I was interested in researching the experiences of GBME men within white gay spaces, 
and so this meant my methodology had to include the context of lived experienced 
social spaces, and here the phenomenological theory of the life-world (Husserl, 1970) 
provided a useful concept. Norman Denzin describes the life-world in relation to social 
research where: 
 
 “The everyday life-world is that moving moral space in which the dialogical 
self realizes itself in its so-called public and private narrative relations with 
others... these relations are always immediate, phenomenologically real within 
the contours of the present” (Denzin, 1997:278).  
 
One of the GBME experiences I wanted to explore was how the embodied GBME man 
sensed and understood white gay spaces, and here a purely constructionist approach 
could have potentially erased the productivity and unification of the „body‟ within the 
experiences of the phenomenal self, through the notion of the „body‟ as “sufficiently 
malleable and homogenous that bodily discourses may write over or through them as 
though they were not there” (Nightingale, 1999:169).  
 
 One important method within phenomenology is what is known as the epoche or 
phenomenological reduction (Davidson, 2003; Husserl, 1964; Moustakas, 1995; Smith 
et al., 2009) that can be summarised as being a distancing from and suspension of the 
„natural attitude‟ towards everyday life. This method can be taken from one extreme, 
namely Husserl‟s (1964) early (failed) attempts to remove all extraneous life-world 
influences from his perception (Dreyfus, 1982a), to the other extreme where we accept 
the inextricable interweaving of the social field with subjectivity and perception 
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(Davidson, 2003; Husserl, 1970; Moustakas, 1994). My interpretation of the method of 
epoche follows the „open-mindedness‟ (Davidson, 2003; Seamon, 1979) approach to 
epoche. This can be seen where for example my personal understanding and 
interpretations around embodied subjectivity do not favour terms such as „aura‟ or 
„energy‟ (I prefer less „metaphysical‟ descriptions), and so removing this restrictive 
framework from my analysis enabled me to „see‟ the importance of these descriptions 
from my respondents in the interviews and use them in this thesis.  
 
I therefore chose to develop a methodology which was strongly emancipatory, ethical, 
and political, which looked at subjective, affective and phenomenal sensings and 
meanings situated within a local context, and which combined „race‟, queer and feminist 
methodological approaches. Gunaratnam‟s (2003:36) concept of “doubled research” 
provided a theoretical lens through which to engage with the queer, „race‟, and feminist 
methodologies. These I combined with a phenomenological approach (Berger & 
Luckman, 1971; Husserl, 2002; 1970; Schutz, 1970; Schutz & Luckman, 1974) to 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity using the phenomenological methods already outlined, 
in order to develop my queer(ed) „race‟ qualitative methodology. By combining 
Gunaratnam‟s (2003) doubled research with phenomenology I developed the analysis to 
consider how affect is part of „race‟, thus devising a „tripled research‟. Here affective 
sensings are elicited by racialized experiences yet are not in themselves racialized, since 
the categorical and discursive interpretation of the racialized meanings are rendered 
within the discursive topography. Affective sensings are part of the racial experience 
but are not part of the materiality of „race‟ or the social construction of „race‟, but a 
phenomenal understanding elicited by the racialized social experience.  This 
methodology was then used to inform my approaches to sampling, interviewing 
methods, data analysis, and reflexivity. I now go on to discuss the processes around 
sampling and data collection.  
 
Section Two: Data Collection and Sampling 
 
It is useful to initially explore a variety of forms of data (Davies, 1999: Silverman, 
2005:61), where even if this is not cited directly in the text of the thesis it contributes to 
knowledge of the research site and the culture and language of the group being 
researched (Davies, 1999). As part of the qualitative research I looked at a variety of 
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data. The primary data consisted of 14 face to face interviews, 11 with GBME men and 
3 with GWME men (who were LGBTQI support officers). The interviews ranged from 
54 minutes to 2 hours, and were between 1 and 3 sessions. The total hours of recorded 
interview time was 27 hours and 51 minutes.  
 
I also collected secondary data in the form of field notes obtained from attending a 
range of LGBTQI contexts, attending five sessions of GBME support groups (3 
different groups) and 2 GBME conferences, attending LGBTQI leisure spaces, as well 
as diverse media obtained from the LGBTQI spaces such as photos, magazines, flyers, 
pamphlets, and a GBME health video. Much of this secondary data was obtained on an 
ad hoc basis rather than using a schedule, since for example all the GBME groups had 
irregular and unplanned meeting schedules. The types of media in LGBTQI spaces were 
also of a random nature depending on who was promoting an event, and LGBTQI BME 
or GBME oriented conferences are also rare and irregular. I used this secondary data to 
look for themes related to my research topic, and to contextualise the experiences and 
settings described by GBME men in their interviews. For example the observed absence 
of other GBME men at LGBTQI leisure spaces I attended gave me an understanding of 
the life-world described by my GBME male respondents in interviews who also 
described being the only BME person in these spaces. The field notes were used to help 
contextualise the interviews and also add meta-process information such as where one 
respondent asked me if my university department were happy with me asking questions 
about white men and whiteness and another GBME man asked me if I worked for the 
police, which gave me an insight into the potential anxieties raised in marginalised 
groups when researching a dominant social group or discourse.  
 
I was primarily interested in data consisting of interviews with GBME men, although 
the interviews with LGBTQI support officers who happened to be GWME men was 
also important in establishing how the experiences of GBME men are understood by 
those who may be gatekeepers and providers of resources for GBME men‟s groups and 
events . This required me to devise a strategy for sampling. In interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) the samples of respondents are usually small in 
number and fairly homogenous, so that their subjective experiences can be analysed for 
convergences and divergences (Smith et al, 2009:3). Other approaches look for 
homogeneity in order to establish certain criteria of validity, such as reliability and 
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generalizability (Davies, 1999). I decided to adopt a non-random volunteer sampling 
approach (O‟Connell Davidson et al, 1994:95), which meant I specifically targeted 
organisations and locations which provide resources for GBME men, as well as other 
groups which dealt with political activism (namely trade unions and human rights 
groups), and requested volunteers who would wish to be interviewed.  
 
Gatekeepers also presented both problems and opportunities for accessing the sample 
population. One gatekeeper who originally gave permission for me to approach his 
GBME men‟s group subsequently told me they were not interested any more in 
participating and the group itself folded a week later. Another gatekeeper gave me the 
wrong email address for the GBME men‟s group facilitator and this resulted in a delay 
in making contact. Gatekeepers from large national LGBTQI BME organisations were 
also not forthcoming in supporting this research. However the gatekeepers from two 
northern based LGBTQI charities were very helpful for gaining access to respondents. 
These groups had fairly low numbers of members, one group had three members and all 
three agreed to be interviewed, the other group had seven regular members and four of 
these agreed to be interviewed. 
 
In the first phase of interview requests I sent out letters to ten LGBTQI NUS officers at 
universities in England, but none replied. I followed this up with emails, but again none 
replied. I spoke to a colleague at one of these universities who told me that the LGBTQI 
society there had received my letter but were „embarrassed‟ to reply as they didn‟t have 
any BME members.  Although I cannot confidently infer that this university was 
representative of the whole sample of initial contacts, it may be that the absence of 
response at this stage was due to there being no LGBTQI BME people in the (white) 
LGBTQI student groups at the ten universities I contacted. In the second phase of 
sampling I emailed five BME or Muslim LGBTQI organizations, three health focused 
LGBTQI organizations, and made visits to the two local universities‟ LGBTQI officers. 
The LGBTQI officer at my own university told me I could not obtain permission for 
interviews since I was told it was a „safe space‟. This of course is an important issue for 
the safety of LGBTQI students, however I was concerned that his perception of my 
request for interviews as being „unsafe‟ may have implied some racialized perception of 
me as a BME man (since the LGBTQI group has allowed other researchers to conduct 
interviews), and of course the issue of „safety‟ should also include the safety of GBME 
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men who may feel already unsafe in white gay spaces and may wish to talk about this. 
There were no self- identified LGBTQI BME people at the social event at the university 
when I initially tried to make contact with the NUS officers, since I asked those (white) 
LGBTQI people present if they knew any and gave my out email address. The LGBTQI 
officer at the other local university was very supportive, although he told me that there 
were no LGBTQI BME people in the LGBTQI group. He gave me a recorded interview 
in the LGBTQI office, where we discussed the issues around BME inclusion, and he 
offered to put up the posters on the LGBTQI notice-board and put a notice on the 
LGBTQI website about the project. This particular „post-92‟ university had a 
significantly higher proportion of BME students compared with the „red-brick‟ 
universities I had contacted, so one can speculate that if they did not have LGBTQI 
BME students attending their groups and events, that the others with less BME students 
in general would probably have very few or none at a ll.  
 
One organization, a GBME men‟s health group in the north of England, offered to put 
an advert on their web-page advertising the project. However I did not get any 
respondents from the advert which was there on the website for two years. Another 
organization based in the north of England was very helpful and allowed me to ask their 
GBME men‟s group if they wished to participate. They allowed me to interview within 
the organization‟s building and to attend some of the GBME support group meetings. 
This was useful as conducting the research in situ can provide additional information 
(Bryun, 1966; Coleman, 1970), which often came from casual conversations with staff 
and group members, as well as providing a more comfortable and familiar environment 
for interviewees (Davies, 1999). A GBME men‟s group in a northern city did allow me 
to attend one of their meetings, and initially the group decided to give me permission 
interview them. But when I turned up to the following session they had changed their 
minds. At the first session I had attended I made field notes about their comments on 
racist discrimination within the gay scene, and further interviews would have been very 
useful to gain a more detailed picture. One reason I suspect as to why the group did not 
wish to participate on the second session was that most of the group were Asian Muslim 
men, and there is a fear of being discovered as gay within the tight knit local 
community. There is also the fear of negative consequences from the dominant white 
groups, police and government authorities. Another reason this group would not have 
been able to participate in a long term study was that it closed down a week later. The 
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various other LGBTQI BME groups contacted at this stage did not produce respondents, 
although the emails from most of the groups‟ administrators were promising. One 
Muslim LGBTQI group posted a request for respondents on their website, and I had 
optimistically hoped that some would reply as I had attended some of their conferences 
over the years as part of my political activism and built up a good relationship with the 
group, however on this occasion none participated. I also emailed a number of personal 
contacts from LGBTQI BME organizations or who were politically active as 
individuals, but many did not reply, and so this provided only one respondent. A final 
phase of interview requests was successful in allowing me to attend an initial event 
which consisted of a WME gay men‟s group and a BME gay men‟s group. I also joined 
the GBME group for two gay support group meetings and one social event. From this I 
found four respondents willing to be interviewed. I also put up posters within my 
academic department and asked students and staff if they knew any GBME men, and 
this did not result in any respondents, perhaps again supporting the possibility that many 
GBME men are not socially connected to the wider white LGBTQI community. This 
shows that the sample I obtained is not representative of GBME men in the regions I 
studied. Many will not be „out‟, some will be concerned about the perceived 
consequences of participating in the interviews, some will be unreachable through gay 
media or groups since they may not use these. Indeed, it may be that the individuals 
who comprised the sample are those who are generally „out‟, have a gay identity, and 
have the political, economic, and cultural resources to feel comfortable in participating 
in academic research on the topic of this thesis. This also confirms the previous studies 
into the GBME male community that show GBME men are „hard to reach‟.  
 
All of my GBME male respondents eventually came from the geographical areas of 
West Yorkshire and London (see appendix 1 for biographical data in table form). Their 
ages ranged from 21 to 56 years of age. They came from African (2), African-Caribbean 
(1) Mixed African-Caribbean/white (2), Arab (1), South Asian (3), Chinese (1), and 
Mestizo (1) „racial‟ backgrounds (as self-defined). I also interviewed three LGBTQI 
officers who happened to be white and male, two from university student unions, and 
one health/support bisexual/gay men‟s group.  I anonymized all the interview data by 
changing the names of the respondents. I asked the respondents if they would suggest a 
name themselves and two did, whilst the other respondents suggested I could choose a 
name for them.  I also anonymized the data by not referring to country of origin if 
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outside of England, not specifically naming cities or the names of gay venues or 
organizations. This was necessary since I found that there may be just one identifiable 
GBME individual in a location based upon country of origin, age and occupation. This 
may result in some specific biographical details of the data being sparse, however this is 
necessary as this helps to maintain anonymity. I now go on to discuss the interview 
methods I used to interview my respondents.  
 
Section Three: Interview Methods 
 
I interviewed my respondents in one to one, face to face interviews. These were 
arranged according to the availability of the respondents, and I encouraged them to 
suggest locations. Four interview locations were in cafés, three in an LGBTQI health 
support organisation, four were in a (primarily LGBTQI) local community centre, one 
was in a business support centre, two on university campuses. There are issues around 
the site of the interviews, for example in anonymity for those respondents who are not 
„out‟ and privacy where expressed opinions may not be heard favourably by gatekeepers 
or other LGBTQI individuals. There may be power relations and pos itionings resulting 
from interviewing in a particular space (Davies, 1999; Gunaratnam, 2003), where for 
example being in a white LGBTQI setting may create a sense of gratitude towards the 
organisation, or more dominant salient positionings as a racialized „minority‟ within the 
GBME respondents, or reticence to discuss particular topics. I did not find any patterns 
in relation to interview location and expressed narratives around whiteness in gay 
spaces, although other power relations may have been present for example between the 
researcher and the respondent.  
 
I was not permitted by the university ethics policy to conduct interviews within the 
private homes of the respondents. Some respondents asked if this was possible, and I 
declined by citing the university policy. This may have resulted in different data being 
obtained (Davies, 1999; Gunaratnam, 2003; Taylor, 2009), for example where GBME 
men may feel safer to express certain views at home rather than in a café, or where their 
subjectivity or gay identity may have been changed by the familiar context of their own 
home. Although the policy is a general one impacting on all research, it also brings into 
the interview process feelings of risk, danger and the presence of governmental 
discourses related to sexual orientation and „race‟.  I certainly felt slightly anxious (in 
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terms of danger) when respondents asked if I could interview them at home as a result 
of the university policy drawing my attention to this, where this feeling would not have 
otherwise emerged, for example in general social contexts.  I did not ask my 
respondents whether they had interpreted the restrictions on interview location as 
relating to negative stereotypes around their „race‟ or sexuality, however as the thematic 
chapters of this thesis show, GBME men are sensitive to interpreting the underlying 
meanings within narratives.  
  
A phenomenological approach suggests conducting three interviews with each 
respondent, the first being a biographical interview, the second being related to the 
topic, the third being about topics brought up in the earlier interviews (Tomura, 
2009:57). I used this approach in my early interviews, but found that some respondents 
were not contactable for the subsequent interviews, or that most were only happy to do 
one or two interviews. For this reason I chose to compress the three phenomenological 
cycles into each interview session, which thus contained both biographical and thematic 
topics. This meant that in terms of sampling I had to discuss the number of interviews 
the respondent would be willing to attend and plan how I was going to conduct the 
interview questions in each session. The robustness of the data was not significantly 
affected by this issue, since all of my respondents were able to speak at length about 
their experiences in the time they had available, and none suggested any further 
questions I could have asked them when prompted to by me at the end of the interview.  
 
I conducted my interviews with a semi-structured approach, using broad general themes 
from an aide memoire (see appendix 2) to prompt the direction of the topics related to 
my research for example focusing on whiteness, affect, embodiment and gay spaces, 
rather than specific written down questions (Davies, 1999), this enabled my questions to 
dovetail into the interview in a „naturalistic‟ way rather than being randomly and 
suddenly thrust into the interview process as might be the case with a list of questions. 
Additionally the interview expanded in directions taken from the respondents‟ 
discussion providing additional data around the core themes. I also felt that having a 
notebook with questions would alter the power relations, where this may have portrayed 
me as being more official or premeditated, and thus impacted upon the flow and context 
of the interview process.  My interviewees often talked about other topics, such as 
homophobia, family background, and government policy, and these topics would be 
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expressed until a natural point where I could redirect the interview closer to the main 
research theme. I felt that this approach was important for several reasons, firstly 
because it showed I was listening rather than interrupting rudely and so helped 
communicate empathy, secondly because I felt the tangential topics may be linked in 
some way to the main research topic in later post- interview analysis, thirdly because the 
topics discussed may have redirected my original research topic (Silverman, 2005), and 
finally because the information expressed would help to fill-out the meanings of the 
life-world I was trying to understand.  
 
Intertextuality (Denzin, 1997; Shapiro, 2007:318) is an important way of bringing in a 
shared interwoven understanding of the life-world of respondents. Intertextuality occurs 
in the context of the interview process where previous interviews trigger new questions 
or examples I can introduce in the current interview, concepts from literature are used to 
help frame a question, as well as helping to assure the respondent that his comments 
aren‟t controversial in cases where this issue emerges. For example where both Imran 
and Yusuf in the interviews suggest that they  didn‟t feel comfortable using the word 
„white‟ to describe white people, which I sensed was out of fear as they were happy to 
describe other racial categories such as Asian, African, and Chinese. My response was 
to mention that other respondents had used the word in their interviews, and that white 
academics were studying whiteness in my university, and this put them at greater ease 
with using „white‟ as a term.  Of course, in this case, there are issues around reifying the 
power of whiteness by reiterating the position of white academics as the „adjudicator‟ of 
what language and research topic are acceptable, and perhaps this may even reflect on 
my own subjectivity around whiteness here. We can therefore see how intertextuality 
within the interview process is useful in opening up the frame of reference and giving 
assurance to anxious interviewees, whilst also having drawbacks in bringing in specific 
power relations from outside of the interview context. In section four I go on to describe 
the approach to data analysis within the methodology.  
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Section Four: Data Analysis 
 
The data analysis I developed was a combination of methods. The phenomenological 
approach for this thesis meant I had to use approaches which initially prioritized the 
phenomenal meanings understood by my respondents and myself, rather than the more 
conventional qualitative approach of initially abstracting categories (Davies, 1999; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  This meant for example looking at how affects were described 
in relation to social experiences, looking at how embodied meanings were described 
dynamically in process, and looking at how the life-world was rendered with 
phenomenal meanings. My approach here was to look at large text segments of 
descriptions of „experiential bubbles‟ (events experienced as phenomenally contained in 
time and/or space), and how the sensings and meanings were interwoven with the 
narrative of the social context. I then compared these experiential bubbles (for example, 
waiting in a queue to enter a gay venue, or buying a drink at the bar) between the 
different respondents to look for consistency, difference, and alternative sensings and 
meanings. The meanings were then related to concepts and the relationship between 
these concepts, a method used in many conventional qualitative approaches (Davies, 
1999).  
 
The data from my interview respondents created a synthesis between Husserl‟s 
phenomenology and the lived experiences of my GBME male respondents, filling in 
and developing the epistemological lacuna in Husserl‟s (later) transcendental 
phenomenological method which essentially neglected the theorization of social 
processes (as we would understand this term today) and empirical evidence from social 
contexts. Here for example my respondents‟ descriptions o f their embodied sense in 
relation to particular social processes helped to develop the concept of the unified Ego 
and how information flowed between the unified Ego, the topographies and the invisible 
white Gestalt in the life-world.  The descriptions from my respondents enabled me to 
focus in this thesis upon four categories of topography (discursive, affective, corporeal 
and hyletic), since these were predominantly the domains described by my respondents 
in response to my questions. If for example my respondents had provided more data on 
the phenomenology of physical movements in racialized spaces I might have developed 
a theorization of a distinct kinaesthetic topography interwoven through the unified Ego 
and the life-world. 
44 
 
 
 
The data also helped to develop alternative theorizations of Husserl‟s approach for 
example in developing a phenomenological concept of the „Other‟ through my GBME 
male respondents‟ accounts of their sense of exclusion from white gay spaces. Here 
although Husserl did not consider the „Other‟ in his work (Derrida, 1973) the interview 
data from my respondents helped to show that their experiences of Othering could be 
theorized using Husserl‟s approach. By reading Husserl (2002:201) through the „lens‟ 
of the data, in particular around my interviewees‟ descriptions of embodied sense of 
place, space and exclusion, I developed a „reversal‟ of Husserl‟s positive account of 
inclusion to theorize the negative contexts of Othering.    
 
To explore the interrelations of the meanings and social context I followed a 
Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis (Edley, 2009; Parker, 1999; Taylor, 2009) 
that helps to explicate how meanings are related to social processes occurring within a 
dynamic fluid society, and how this relates to the sedimented histories (genealogies) and 
power which imbricate the social field (Carabine, 2009; Taylor, 2009:9). Here the 
meanings obtained from the interviews were read alongside one another, and 
additionally were compared with the secondary data, to help me fill-out my sensings 
and meanings of the life-world experienced by other GBME men. I also read the data 
alongside social theories, academic literature, literature from queer, Black, queer Black 
authors, and racist and homophobic authors, in order to explicate possible concepts and 
relationships. Various tangents and dead-ends occurred throughout this stage, where 
ideas were developed and continued, rejected outright, or developed and subsequently 
rejected. Some insights occurred through discourse analysis of the data where I sat at 
the computer reading, writing, and thinking, thereby working through the data and the 
theory methodically and „mechanically‟. Other insights occurred spontaneously whilst I 
was doing other things, such as cooking food or walking into town, and here having a 
notepad and pen handy, or typing a note into my mobile phone helped me to remember 
the ideas.  In addition I had what I referred to as my „philosophy book‟ in which I kept 
hand written ideas and thoughts about the thesis which were usually of a more 
abstracted theoretical nature.  Using these approaches to data analysis enabled a 
synthesis between the data and theory which result in what are presented in this thesis as 
the five thematic chapters as well as the overarching phenomenological co ncepts of the 
invisible white Gestalt and unified Ego.  
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I chose not to use computer software analysis such as ATLAS, NUD*IST , 
ETHNOGRAPH for the main reason that nuanced meanings can be lost in analysis 
(Davies, 1999; Parker, 1999:2). For example in the interviews where Christopher 
describes the activities in the public park and finishes his list with the phrase: “and you 
can do this, you can do that”, which I interpreted in the context as referring to sexual 
activity. Most forms of computer analysis would not have been sensitive enough to find 
this meaning in the data. The other reason is that I was also interested in descriptions of 
particular events rather than searching specifically for categories, in order to gain an 
understanding of the phenomenal life-world of my GBME respondents, here for 
example an experiential bubble could take several pages of transcript and would have to 
be considered as a whole to contextualise and analyse the meanings. In addition to 
reading the transcripts I also listened to the recordings in order to get a „feel‟ of the 
interview, the tone of voice, the affective qualities of the words spoken, which helped 
me to theorize about how meanings and sensings were interwoven in the 
communication.  
 
I transcribed the audio by listening to the recording and typing the words and 
conversation transcription codes (Wooffitt, 2009:62) into a computer. I chose to 
transcribe the audio in a way which was sensitive to language and the interpretation of 
meaning (Parker, 1999:2), rather than the overuse of transcription codes which can be 
distracting and overcomplicating (Davies, 1999:116), and which  Byrne (2006:39) 
suggests can be “difficult to read, providing another barrier to the sense of what is being 
said”. Taylor (2009:36) describes how overly coded transcripts can promote the sense of 
positivistic analysis and detachment from reflexivity, whilst also suggesting that basic 
transcripts promote the misconception that the text is a reasonable interpretation of 
society and not contentious. Therefore I limited the use of the codes and conventions of 
transcription to those I felt helped to convey the meanings, sensings and overall sense 
within the interviews. In addition I asked my respondents if they wanted copies of the 
transcripts to enable them to add comments to or review the interview text, only one 
said that they did, and I gave a copy of the transcript which he agreed he was happy 
with. Most respondents suggested that they would like to see the final thesis or a 
summarized report. I told the respondents that I would arrange this, or provide a group 
presentation of the findings in person as a workshop. I now go on to discuss additional 
issues around reflectivity and ethics.  
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Section Five: Reflexivity and Ethics 
 
One important attribute of qualitative research is reflexivity (Davies, 1999; Denzin, 
1997; Silverman, 2011, 2005), and particularly for anti-racist research (Gunaratnam, 
2003:86). This is especially the case for standpoint or emancipatory epistemologies 
where critics could argue that the research is „biased‟ by the agenda of the researcher 
(Denzin, 1997:269) where this issue of „bias‟ can be addressed through “sufficient 
reflexivity” (Bevan, 1999:25). I have tried to show my own presence in the thesis where 
this is relevant, for example showing the question I asked before the respondents 
comments in interview extracts, or by making my own political and personal positions 
explicit in the thesis text. Another aspect of reflexivity is self-disclosure to the 
respondent, where this is seen as helpful in establishing empathy and providing possible 
contrasting views in the interview to open up the debates.  
 
It would be difficult to determine how I was positioned within the interviews as the 
researcher. Various cues would have implicated me as „institutionalised‟, for example 
the restrictions on location for interview, the consent forms and research information 
sheet which cite both the university and legislative gazes, the fact that I was based 
within a university setting, my comments about future publication of the findings and 
my comments about other academics within the interviews. By contrast I also 
mentioned in the interviews my previous Black, LGBTQI, and Black LGBTQI 
activism, my own personal experiences, my anti-establishment attitude and open-
mindedness towards topics, and my approach to social justice issues. It may well be that 
throughout the interview sessions I would be dynamically positioned along both 
extremes of the continuum, namely as an official „spy‟ through to a confidant and ally. 
As an official „spy‟ I refer to the fear in some potential interviewees that academic 
researchers may be spying for the government or police (indicated by the information 
sheet‟s citing of legal obligations for the researcher to inform the police of criminal 
activity), but I also include the idea of surveillance by a wider audience, including the 
general public. The association between state population control and sociology has a 
historical basis (Stanley, 1993). This may have dissuaded some potential respondents, 
for example one GBME man who did not wish to be interviewed asked me directly if I 
worked for the police. This of course would influence the types of answers my 
respondents gave in the interviews (Davies, 1999:87), for example the anxiety around 
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using the term „white‟ as already discussed, but also the idea of a wider audience. Here 
interviewees (particularly those in official roles) would sometimes present a „political 
speech‟ which I felt was directed to the imagined wider audience (particularly where 
they expressed holding contrary views outside of the interview context), situated within 
“rhetorical discourse” (Billig, 2007:214).  This type of data was however useful firstly 
in showing how discourses around whiteness elicit a range of subject positions and 
narratives within the course of a single interview. Secondly it shows how whiteness 
seeks to maintain its invisibility at a foregrounded level whilst in doing so reveals its 
background presence. It also shows how whiteness can silence or suppress the voices of 
marginalized groups, through the fear that research into non-white racialized minority 
groups may be used to enact forms of state violence against them.  
 
Myself being positioned as a GBME man also raised issues within the interview. Here 
for example, I found that when I asked certain types of „obvious‟ questions the 
respondent would answer in basic terms, taking for granted that I knew what he meant, 
for example when discussing how people might dance to communicate sexual 
attraction. In these cases I had to invoke the imaginary straight audience and rephrase 
the question as „how would you explain this to someone who was straight who had 
never been to a gay venue?‟ in order to unpack the details of the expe rience. I was often 
ambiguously read „racially‟ by my respondents, it may be that some traces of this 
remained throughout the sessions, particularly in terms of „race‟ where despite being 
BME it was clear I was not personally implicated with any of my respondents BME 
cultural practices and languages. This was useful in some ways in that they would take 
care to explain in detail the cultural meanings of particular statements they made. It also 
may have enabled them to be more critical of their own ethnic communities in relation 
to homophobia in the interviews, where they may have been more reluctant to do this 
with someone positioned as being from „their‟ community, although I was not looking 
at this theme specifically for my research. However there were assumptions made for 
example James in the interviews suggesting that I would have experienced less racism 
through being lighter-skinned. Again here I felt that my self-disclosure as someone who 
has been involved in activism helped to re-position myself as someone who was not 
complicit with the negative ideologies of whiteness (Baldwin, 1961:19), and also 
disclosing my own ethnic heritage (rather than simply stating I was „BME‟) also helped 
in this regard. Again the perceptions around my „race‟ would have been a fluid and 
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dynamic construction within the interview process (Motzafi-Haller, 1997), perhaps at 
times tending towards „white‟ where I was unfamiliar with specific cultural terms, and 
at other times tending towards Black in discussions around racism or Black activism 
where I shared my own experiences. I chose to dress in what I considered to be 
relatively „neutral‟ clothing (which was actually my usual style), rather than a suit or 
fashionable clothing, in order to reduce the power a suit projects and to dissociate 
myself from particular classed, raced, gendered, and cultural potential power relations. 
How this helps to create a more equal relationship when taken together with the other 
issues is open to debate. One additional attribute I felt personally might have impacted 
upon the power relationships, was my „southern‟ accent, which I was concerned might 
be interpreted as having more authority, credibility or intelligence than other regional 
accents (Taylor, 2009). Some of my respondents asked me where I was from, adding 
that they knew I wasn‟t from the north of England. This is a legacy from English 
history, where particular accents were erroneously associated with positive social 
meanings. Again, here I made sure that in the interviews I took an approach which did 
not prioritise my role as „academic with middle-class southern accent‟ but tried to 
position myself as someone who had experienced gay contexts as a GBME man and 
whose own opinions were subjective and open to critique by the respondent.  One 
pattern I did find was that those interviewees with present or past roles as LGBTQI 
support officers in organisation would speak at length without interruption in long 
narratives. This may have been due to the general or racialized power relationships, or 
may have been due to the previous experience of talking about gay issues to groups or 
media.  
 
One issue which arose in terms of reflexivity was the assumption that I had 
preconceived ideas on „race‟ and the types of answers I wanted to hear (Davies, 
1999:109). I did not state that I was looking at racism when asking for respondents, nor 
did I mention the topic until it was brought up by the respondent themselves. However 
one Arab respondent felt that my asking a question about how other gay men respond to 
his body hair (he had just described) was a leading question about white racism. I 
attempted to unpack this immediately, and we continued by discussing how GWME 
men may also be attracted to hairy men, as well as how white European men can also 
have body hair. Nevertheless, this was important in showing how the meanings behind 
particular questions can be interpreted as being loaded with researcher bias by 
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interviewees. In this instance the issue was brought to the surface by the interviewee, 
however it may well be that my questions elicited similar interpretations in other 
interviews, and that these were either resisted or acquiesced to within the answers. 
There are potential ethical issues in researching a group consisting of only men, where 
issues around power relations in the wider LGBTQI community may arise. Lesbian and 
bisexual women, particularly those who are from BME backgrounds, may also be 
marginalized within LGBTQI communities or social groups. Given current issues 
around government funding, and the battle for resources between BME, LGBTQI, and 
LGBTQI BME charities and groups, focusing upon the experiences of GBME men may 
draw attention and resources away from other marginalized groups and communities. 
Another issue is that by looking at the discourses and practices around whiteness in 
relation to LGBTQI contexts and GWME men, that this may be misinterpreted as 
suggesting these are unique to gay contexts and so be misrepresented by those with 
homophobic or racist agendas. It is important at all times when reading this thesis to 
acknowledge that the discourses and practices around whiteness are derived from the 
wider racialized discursive formations in society, and these can impact upon the 
identities and subjectivities of all racialized and sexualized categories.    
 
Given that I am looking at affect in this thesis it is important to acknowledge the 
historical ethical issues around this. Some authors have pointed out the issue of ethno-
centrism in Western academic theories of affect (Fussell, 2002:22; Grosz, 1994), one 
impact being here of the portrayal of BME people as emotional and WME people as 
rational (Collins, 2004).  Others have also suggested that patriarchy has featured 
significantly in many approaches to affect (Burkitt, 1999:102; Grosz, 1994), an example 
being the affective observations and conclusions in gendered social-psychological 
experiments (for example Exline et al., 1966). Therefore it is important to maintain the 
awareness that these ideological and ethical issues will need to be deconstructed and 
addressed, not only in the literature cited but also in the formation of myself as the 
„research instrument‟ and researcher situated in racist (Gunaratnam, 2003; hooks, 1991; 
Puwar, 2004; Tate, 2011) and homophobic (Munt, 2007) societal institutions 
(universities), cultures and discursive formations.   
 
One final ethical consideration is whether my asking particular questions may reframe 
the life-world for my respondents. Here for example it may be that individuals do not 
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have a „raced‟ perspective in terms of racialized historical or collective understandings 
of their experiences. I myself have found this to be an ongoing process within me, 
where having had a white identity early in my life (being brought up in a white family), 
albeit with the sense of difference from the actual white ethnic groups around me, I did 
not understand the racist slurs „wog‟ or „nigger‟ in the 1970s and „paki‟ in the 1980s in 
collective racialized terms, just as personalized attacks on me.  I now reframe these past 
experiences and present-day experiences within a race-cognizant framework 
(Frankenberg, 1993). My questions to respondents in interviews may reframe their past 
experiences in negative ways. I ask at the end of each interview if the respondent feels 
happy with the interview and if there are issues I have brought up which need to be 
addressed, the respondents always say they are feeling fine. But there may be long term 
changes in their perspective as a result of the interview, particularly where events are 
framed as collective norms for GBME men.  
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have described the queer(ed) „race‟ qualitative methodology I have 
developed for the research in this thesis. By using the doubled research (Gunaratnam, 
2003) ontological and epistemological approach to theorising „race‟ I acknowledge the 
reality of „race‟ in peoples‟ everyday lives whilst holding to the theory that „race‟ is 
socially constructed (Collins, 2004). By using a phenomenological approach to 
subjectivity and sensings, I begin from a position where experience and understanding 
is a non-representational/non-discursive embodied subjectivity, and where social 
categories only emerge in the interweaving of meanings and discourses. In this 
phenomenological approach „race‟ does not exist in the experience until the experience 
is interwoven with discourse, and within the dialectic between non-representational 
sensings and representational meanings we can sometimes find moments where we can 
disrupt „race‟ rather than be carried along by its discursive operations. This can be 
described as a „tripled research‟, where I take the ontological position that „race‟ is a 
real part of people‟s lives and that it is socially constructed, but in addition that the 
meanings around „race‟ exist in a dialectic with affective qualities and understood as an 
embodied sense. This third phenomenological part of „race‟ is the sense elicited by 
racialized experiences, and can be analysed through the embodied subjectivity of 
GBME men. By analysing these feelings we can „indicate‟ (Derrida, 1973; Husserl, 
2002) the subjective sensings that can be elicited by and interwoven with racialized 
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discourses. This moves the analysis into the domain of the phenomenological (Gilroy, 
1998; Puar, 2006), as well as the discursive. By using feminist approaches in the 
methodology, I draw particularly upon the ethical and reflexive approaches to making 
power relations visible between myself as the researcher, the interviewee and the social 
institutions and cultures within which the research is situated (Stanley et al. 1993), and 
theorizing the ontological position of the Other (Stanley, 1993). The queer approach 
also disrupts the taken-for-granted hetero-patriarchal conceptions of how relationships 
and social or sexual interactions are framed, and leaves the conceptualisation of GBME 
men‟s experiences open to be interpreted by their own personal values and affective 
desires. 
 
I have written this thesis with a number of audiences in mind, and this is reflected in the 
interweaving of both academic theoretical explanations, descriptions located within the 
lived experiences of GBME men, and emancipatory narratives directed at other 
activists, policy makers and the general public. The reasons for this are that as a PhD 
thesis the explanations I give of the findings are grounded in academic theory which is 
necessary to take the research from pure description into concepts and theories. 
However I also wanted the thesis to be accessible to GBME men and identifiable as a 
description and analysis of a life-world they might also recognize and perhaps find 
useful for negotiating racialized gay spaces. In addition, one of the aims of this thesis 
was to contribute to change in the social, cultural, and political influences on GBME 
men‟s lives, and which may also help to positively influence other social groups and 
communities. Of course in this regard, we cannot know how research will be used or 
misused by others (Davies, 1999), but making my own positions clear should clarify the 
approaches I consider to be of benefit and those which would do harm.    
 
The next five chapters are the thematic chapters. The methodology explicated in this 
methods chapter has been used to obtain and analyse the data within these chapters. 
These five thematic chapters show how particular social processes impact upon the 
embodied subjectivity of GBME men, and how these reveal a „part‟ of the invisible 
white Gestalt. I begin the thematic chapters with chapter three which looks at how the 
discursive social process of interpellation is experienced, interpreted and sensed 
phenomenally within the embodied subjectivity of GBME men.  
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Chapter Three 
The Discursive Topography: 
Interpellation, Subjectivity, Whiteness  
 
  
Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the process of interpellation (Althusser, 1998) using 
experiences of GBME men in white gay contexts, for example situations where GBME 
men are accused of „not being gay‟ by door staff in order to exclude them from white 
gay venues. Here I adopt the tripled research approach described in chapter two, which 
develops the „doubled research‟ (Gunaratnam, 2003) position that „race‟ is a reality in 
peoples lives whilst being socially constructed (Collins, 2004; Gunaratnam, 2003) and 
also being interwoven with a phenomenal embodied sense within individuals. This 
chapter uses these three dimensions of „race‟ to analyse the process of racialized 
interpellation. This chapter also shows that interpellation is a process which involves 
both sensings and meanings in a dynamic interrelationship within the self, which can be 
distributed over time rather than just being in the moment of the interpellative speech 
act. As a result of this temporal extension of the interpellative process I argue that sense 
often takes priority over the discursive meanings in relation to the interpellations 
experienced by GBME men in white gay spaces.  
 
In section one I begin by outlining the various relevant theoretical approaches to the 
concept of interpellation, and how these help to theorise how the subject is „hailed‟ into 
being by the social field and life-world.  Here I will use Edmund Husserl‟s 
phenomenology to argue that, for this thesis, a phenomenological approach to defining 
interpellation is necessary in order to explicate the embodied sense of the interpellated 
social meanings. In section two I go on to look at how GBME men are impacted upon 
by interpellation, exploring how linguistic meanings are interpreted and how affective 
sensings contradict or reinforce the interpellative speech acts by door staff at gay 
venues. I will show that the speech acts undertaken by the door staff although not 
explicitly citing „race‟ are often understood phenomenally as racialized interpellations 
by GBME men. These also include the act of mis-interpellation  (Hage, 2010) defined 
here as where racialized individuals are previously „tolerated‟ within the gay collective 
identity or community until a future (politically strategic) moment where they are 
53 
 
 
 
rejected. Here we also find the double moment of interpellation into a racialized 
category and mis- interpellation from the category „gay‟ for the GBME man, whilst 
simultaneously interpellating the gay community as „white‟. In section three I explore 
how the readings and categorisations involved in interpellation find dissonance when 
they are used to interpret ambiguous racialized „phenotypes‟. Here we see how 
racialized meanings understood within the intersubjective life-world are productive of 
racialized meanings incongruous with the racialized subjectivity of GBME men. What 
happens when the life-world attempts to interpellate a subjectivity which at some level 
refuses to identify with the racialized interpellation? In section four I go on to explore 
how subjective meanings elicited by interpellation can help reveal the „hidden‟ 
meanings within the life-world, including for example around BME groups as violent 
and homophobic and white supremacy in relation to the gay community. What are the 
racialized interpellations attempting to transmit into the subjectivity of GBME men 
from the life-world? 
 
I finish this chapter with conclusions about how the affective qualities, sense, and 
embodied subjective experiences discussed in this chapter help to make the invisible 
white Gestalt visible to GBME men in white gay spaces. Here I discuss how inclusion 
into the gay venues would allow GBME men to feel part of the community, whereas the 
actual outcomes from my interviewees descriptions show that mis- interpellation (Hage, 
2010) from the gay community not only elicits a sense of not being wanted in gay 
spaces and contexts, but also inscribes the gay spaces as white. The interpellations 
experienced by GBME men only make sense if the gay venue and the gay community 
are sensed as white. The discourses around whiteness are sustained by the performative 
reiteration of racialized discourses around BME groups, thereby reproducing valorised 
whiteness relationally to depreciated blackness. I also suggest that the mis- interpellation 
by the white gay community is a strategic mis- interpellation, both in terms of applied 
agency and in terms of the socio-political moment LGBTQI activism finds itself within. 
I now go on to discuss the theoretical approaches used in this chapter.  
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Section One: Interpellation and Social Theory 
 
In a text produced prior to the well known works of J.L. Austin (1963,1970), Edmund 
Husserl (2001/1920) describes performative speech acts in regard to social contexts 
giving the example of a person saying “God be with me!” (2001:15). The analysis of 
speech acts has historically been one of the central questions within Husserl‟s 
phenomenology (Derrida, 1973), although Husserl did not expand the concept to 
explore the life-world as significantly as others.  J.L. Austin‟s (1963) ideas around the 
speech act and the performative includes theories regarding the role of context and the 
enactment of words or signs, and the validity of these in relation to the social 
circumstance. This is important since it helps to show that meanings rely upon the 
contextual life-world as much as upon the semantic and categorical meanings of 
linguistic signs:    
 
“Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the 
words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very 
commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also 
perform certain other actions, whether „physical‟ or „mental‟ actions or even acts 
of uttering further words” (Austin, 1963:8).  
 
Austin (1963, 1970) emphasises the social roles associated with the social processes 
around the speech acts, suggesting that authority helps give validity to a statement even 
when this statement is incorrect. In addition Austin suggests the “relationships and 
interconnections” (Austin, 1963:162) between speech acts and their “force” (Austin, 
1970:251), pointing to similar concepts related to discourses later developed by Michel 
Foucault (2011). Austin (1963:42) also developed a category of performative speech 
acts called “veridictives” which impose a categorisation or definition upon an object, 
idea or person (whether correct or not). In the concept of veridictives Austin‟s previous 
ideas can be seen to combine where the authority of the speaker, the life-world in which 
the speech acts are interrelated, the power within the life-world, and the person being 
categorised by the speaker are all implicated in the performative speech act. Austin‟s 
concepts around the „speech act‟ extended the theoretical ideas outside of the linguistic 
analytic framework and into the social context (Foucault, 2011:93), although the impact 
of discourses is marginalised as being the repository of inchoate inert material through 
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which speech acts are crafted (Foucault, 2011:96) by a “sovereign” agent (Butler, 
1999c:164) . What is also absent from Austin‟s (1963) theories around the speech act is 
the explicit relationship of ideological formations (Althusser, 1998:165/1971), including 
concepts around „race‟, sexuality, gender, and class, and here Althusser‟s (1998/1971) 
concept of interpellation provides an important addition to the theory. Austin‟s (1963) 
concept of speech acts has strong similarities with Althusser‟s concept of 
“interpellation” (Althusser, 1998:160), as can be seen by comparing how the authors 
outline their ideas. Louis Althusser defines interpellation according to the context 
where:  
 
 “All ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects [...] 
I shall then suggest that ideology „acts‟ or „functions‟ in such a way that it 
„recruits‟ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or „transforms‟ 
the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise 
operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be 
imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) 
hailing: „hey you there!‟” (Althusser, 1998:160).  
 
Althusser‟s concept of interpellation thus helps to relate speech acts to the wider social 
context of ideology, and suggests expanding a synchronic analysis to a diachronic one 
(namely from Austin‟s specified moments of performative speech acts towards 
Althusser‟s extended spatio-temporal social domains and institutions), resulting in a 
more dynamic and reciprocal interweaving of relationships between the social context 
and the individual. Althusser‟s Marxist approach to ideology in his theory of 
interpellation also brings in relationships of power, social structure, and difference. 
These elements of Althusser‟s theory of interpellation therefore makes it useful as a 
model to explicate the experiences of GBME men in white gay contexts.  
 
Althusser‟s (1998/1971) theory of interpellation (read discursively) was subsequently 
incorporated within feminist psychoanalytic approaches to subjectivity (for example 
Ahmed, 2007, 2006:133; Butler, 1999b; McNay, 1999), some of which also took into 
consideration embodied subjectivity, in order to develop the theory to address the 
question of how the social field or specifically the symbolic order imbricates and 
inscribes both the body and psyche. Stuart Hall (1996:15) suggests that Judith Butler‟s 
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(1993) integration of discourses and psychoanalytic approaches to the psychic in her 
theory “does not provide an elaborate theoretical meta-argument” linking the two. There 
are also questions as to whether „race‟ can be theorized in the same way as Butler 
theorizes gender in her theory (Hall, 1996:16). However Butler (1999c) suggests that 
power imbricates and links these approaches.  In addition Althusser‟s core theory does 
already suggest a relationship between interpellation, subjectivity, embodiment and 
affective qualities where he cites the affective quality of feeling guilt when hailed by a 
policeman (Althusser, 1998). Althusser‟s concept of interpellation was also utilised by 
other Marxist theorists to explicate how identities become subjects within the 
ideological state apparatuses (Purvis et al, 1993), focusing more upon the social context 
than the psyche. These approaches to interpellation consider discursive formations 
without the use of monolithic ideology, the state, or Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts 
(for example the law, the symbolic order). Douglas Kellner (1995:59) proposes that 
ideology encapsulates concepts such as discourse, and this allows for the suggestion 
from Purvis et al. (1993:483) who propose a “ „discursive conception of ideology‟ that 
makes possible a re-reading of Althusser- one that permits something closer to the 
recognition of the role that discourse has to play in the constitution of the social and 
social subjects”. It is this discursive approach to subjectivity that I will be using to 
define the term „interpellation‟ rather than ideology (as used by Althusser), or the 
symbolic order, or the law (as described by Butler (1999a) and Hall (1996)).  
 
Phenomenology and Interpellation: The Discursive Topography  
Husserl‟s (2001, 1970) phenomenology explores the question as to how sense and 
meaning come to be experienced, understood and interpreted by the phenomenal self 
from information obtained from the life-world. The core model of Husserl‟s approach to 
meaning and sense is interpreted in diverse ways by different academics (Dreyfus, 
1982b), and so  in order to explicate my understanding of Husserl‟s approach I develop  
the concept of the discursive topography which I define as the topography within the 
unified Ego (or life-world) where discursive meanings are experienced, understood and 
interpreted. In so doing I avoid the usual discussions around the mathematical, logical, 
and linguistic formalisms associated with the analysis of meaning and sense (for 
example Mohanty, 1982).  Discursive meanings have been important early on in 
Husserl‟s phenomenology where Herbert Dreyfus (1982:24) suggests that Husserl‟s 
position was that “we must rediscover what counts as world for us, and how it came to 
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have that „validity‟. Or, as Husserl says elsewhere, we must discover the „intentional 
history‟ of what we simply take for granted”. In Husserl‟s last work the Crisis (1970) 
we find discourse and subjectivity to be one of the central themes. These approaches 
resonate with Michel Foucault‟s archaeological approaches (2011, 2002) in terms of the 
validity of knowledge and his genealogical approaches (1991) in terms of their relation 
to subjectivity. Indeed Foucault (2007) used phenomenology to theorise discursive 
social spaces and Stuart Hall (1996:14; original italics) suggests that in later works 
Foucault follows “a discursive phenomenology of the subject”.  Husserl‟s 
phenomenological theories around discourse and subjectivity were later taken up by 
other social theorists who developed the concepts to examine more particular modes of 
social interaction related to social groups (for example Berger & Luckman, 1971; 
Schutz, 1970; Schutz & Luckman, 1974). David‟s interview here shows us how the 
discursive and the phenomenological are interwoven in the context of interpellation by 
door staff at white gay venues: 
 
R: have you ever had any problems getting into gay clubs or questions or door staff 
being a bit more [interrupted]? 
 
David: yeah quite often actually. 
[....] 
David: I suppose if you‟re being generous with them, it‟s because they‟ve had problems 
with people, probably straight people trying to get in who are BME and being 
homophobic or you can only construe it could be something like that. 
 
R: and what happens? Do they stop you at the door? 
 
David: yeah. 
 
R: do they ask you if you‟re gay? 
 
David: they say „you‟re not gay‟. 
 
R: they‟ve actually said that? 
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David: yeah. 
 
David, who has frequently been interrogated by door staff at gay venues, suggests in the 
interview that the reason BME people who are categorised as being heterosexual are 
excluded is the perception of homophobic violence, although he qualifies this with the 
expressions “probably”, “generous” and “construe” indicating he has not seen this 
himself and that the assumption by the door staff is tenuous. These qualifying 
expressions infer that David is initially experiencing his understanding as a phenomenal 
sense or a feeling, which in the interview he expresses to me as discursive meanings. He 
also distances himself from believing the stereotype with the comment “I suppose”. 
What David‟s interview also shows us is that although the discourses around BME 
homophobia would be expected to relate to “straight people [...] who are BME”  it also 
impacts upon GBME men who are not straight. The interpellation David experiences of 
being a „straight homophobic BME man‟ is communicated by the speech act „you‟re not 
gay‟, and here the discourses construct the racialized meanings.  
 
In Ibrahim‟s interview we see how interpellation operates to elicit a sense of 
discrimination in encounters with door staff in white gay venues. Ibrahim would attend 
white gay venues with a group of gay male South Asian friends: 
 
R: have you had any other types of experiences with door staff or bouncers? Do they 
ask you if you‟re gay or [interrupted]? 
 
Ibrahim: no, no. If they don‟t want to let you in they won‟t let you in. If they don‟t like 
them they don‟t let them in. They‟ll tell you on the door „not tonight‟. 
[...] 
R: when you were going out how often would there be some kind of comment or being 
treated differently by door staff or bouncers? Was it most of the time or fifty percent of 
the time, or [interrupted]? 
 
Ibrahim: well it was most of the time when we were going out. There was a group of my 
friends, they say „not tonight, you can‟t come in‟, on numerous occasions we weren‟t 
allowed to. Sometimes they‟d be alright and let you in, but most of the time it used to 
happen so we always felt discriminated against.   
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In Ibrahim‟s interview we see that GBME men are interpellated as being the unwanted 
racialized Other not through being categorized as „not gay‟ but just through the speech 
act „you can‟t come in‟. Here we see that interpellation is not only operating through the 
discursive topography as meanings, but through the affective topography as feeling 
“discriminated against” which for Ibrahim is related to his „race‟. It may be the case 
that within the dominant „war on terror‟ discourses, South Asian gay men (categorized 
as „Muslim looking‟) are not even considered „worthy‟ of being given a duplicitous 
reason such as „you‟re not gay‟ or „it‟s members only‟, and are expected to make do 
with a blunt „no‟. In the life-world bubble of the door staff interaction and speech act, a 
wider field of phenomenal understanding and interpretation is rendered for Ibrahim. 
Ibrahim senses the racialization rendered as a feeling of discrimination, he understands 
the speech act „not tonight‟ really means „not on most nights‟ and indicates a persistent 
lingering atmosphere of racial discrimination at the gay venue, and Ibrahim also 
conveys a sense of resignation to the impact of racialized power in the actions of the 
door staff (who are also representations of the venue‟s policy and venue‟s clients‟ 
attitudes) where he says “if they don‟t want to let you in they won‟t let you in”. 
 
According to McIntyre et al. (1982:83), Husserl‟s approach to the question of how 
discursive meanings are interpreted by the unified Ego involves the concept of 
discursive meanings being “ontologically independent of consciousness”, and that 
phenomenal meaning is the expression of sense, and conversely that any sense which is 
expressed symbolically is therefore a meaning.  Here discursive meanings are one of 
many modalities considered in phenomenology where the position is taken that “the 
human being does not actually ex-„press‟ all of his psychic life in language, nor can he 
express it through it.” (Husserl, 2001:13). Husserl makes explicit the notion that from 
discursive linguistic meanings the Ego is oriented by the meanings interpreted from the 
words, yet the Ego also understands the indicated sense intuitively:  
 
“The Ego seizes the words in regarding it; it grasps its indicative tendency; it 
willingly allows itself to be guided by it, to be initiated into the execution of 
thinking; it allows itself to be oriented by what is thought as what is meant by 
the words. But we do not intend the words themselves here!” (Husserl, 2001:23).  
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Here the words of a speech act themselves are not important, but rather the discursive 
meanings interpreted from the words are what are utilized in thinking. However all 
meanings are ultimately expressions of underlying intuitive sense (McIntyre et al., 
1982:84). Therefore in this context, a meaning cannot exist outside of discourse (Hall, 
2007:73) but it also cannot exist without the underlying intuitive sense. David‟s 
interview shows us how the linguistic meanings obtained from the speech act “you're 
not gay” are sensed and understood by David as being about something else, for 
example around exclusion. This is subsequently interpreted as discursive meanings 
around racialized Otherness. The door staff may „genuinely‟ believe that David is not 
gay, and the other white people in the queue may „genuinely‟ interpret the event as 
being about David not being gay, which shows how the discursive meanings will be 
associated with a unique sense within each individual.  
 
Although developed from linguistic theories, interpellation does not have to involve 
words (Butler, 1999c), for example it can occur through the gaze (Fanon, 1993; hooks, 
1992), touch (Lemert, 2002), or the spatial locations of people (Phoenix et al, 2012). 
Therefore we do not have to limit the discursive topography to modalities involving 
interpersonal speech or linguistic communication, or internalized (verbalized) thought 
as social model of internalized speech (for example Bahktin, 1994; Ryle, 1963). 
However it may be the case that the interpellation, though citing discourse, is initially 
understood through the phenomenal sense prior to the discursive meanings being 
interwoven with the sense to provide the phenomenal meanings, and that this process 
may even be dislocated in time, whereby the interpellative speech act can occur before 
the racialized meanings were interwoven with the meanings as we see in David‟s 
description and also later on in Brian‟s description on page 72 where the racialized 
meanings were interwoven some years after the event. Thus phenomenological 
interpellation „hails‟ the subjectivity of GBME men not only through linguistic speech 
acts or other cultural signifiers, but also extra- linguistically or non-representationally 
through the shared horizon of intersubjective sensings which includes affective 
information. This also suggests that any process of interpellation can carry multiple 
meanings and simultaneously interpellate an individual‟s subjectivity across a domain 
of coexisting yet non-superposable discursive formations circulating in a social context, 
as suggested by Frantz Fanon‟s (1993:112) phenomenological description of being “in a 
triple person” when he was racially abused, and also as the findings in this chapter 
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support. The discursive topography is the phenomenological topography where sensings 
and discursive meanings dynamically interweave, and give rise to expressible 
phenomenal meanings (as well as inexpressible sensings with the potential to be 
reconfigured as expressive meanings). The impact of interpellation upon the discursive 
topography can therefore be described as discursive phenomenological interpellation.  
 
Racialized Discursive Formations and Interpellation 
One further aspect of interpellation which needs further explication for this chapter is its 
relationship to theories around „race‟. Racialized discursive interpellation (Goldberg, 
1994:57) emphasises the sedimented past historical experiences of racialized discourses  
in order to not only allow an individual to recognise the act of interpellation as directed 
towards them but also to elicit a multiplicity of related meanings (Goldberg, 1994; 
Yancy, 2008:114). Frantz Fanon gives the example of his experience of a boy making a 
racist comment which here not only interpellates Fanon within a racialized framework 
but also elicits a range of affective qualities: 
 
 “ „Look a Negro!‟...„Mama, see the Negro! I‟m frightened‟ Frightened! Now 
they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to 
tears, but laughter had become impossible” (Fanon, 1993:112).  
 
We can see how Fanon‟s famous description of racialized interpellation when the boy 
on the train says “look a negro” not only interpellates Fanon into a domain of 
subjectivity associated with the moment, but triggers a flood of racialized meanings 
associated with the history of colonialism and white supremacy up from the past 
towards a racialized teleology of possible emergent future racialized social formations 
(where Fanon describes his thwarted aspirations, hopes and ambitions associated with 
the interpellation). The power of colonial racialized discursive formations and their 
sedimented history centred around the past five hundred years results in the act of 
racialized interpellation reaching deeper and further than the localised space-time 
context. Fanon goes on to explore this, triggered by the interpellation, where he begins 
with general concepts and goes on to locate these within historical and cultural 
racialized discursive formations: 
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“I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. 
I subjected myself to an objective examination. I discovered my blackness, my 
ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, 
intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, 
above all: „sho good eatin‟ ” (Fanon, 1993:112).  
 
Fanon (1993) describes throughout his book contexts in which generally it seems 
difficult to avoid resisting racialized interpellations and positionings, I would suggest as 
a result of his historical moment (Macey, 1999). Linda Alcoff (1999:24) describes this 
inability to resist as still prevalent in contemporary society suggesting that “one‟s lived 
self is effectively dislodged when an already outlined but very different self appears to 
be operating in the same exact location”. George Yancy (2008:114) by contrast 
describes how an individual can resist racialized interpellations by bringing to visibility 
the power of whiteness involved in the process of interpellation thereby enabling BME 
people to act from an “epistemologically privileged position”. Whilst retaining the 
assertions from Fanon and Alcoff that racialized interpellations are difficult to counter, 
and additionally as Alcoff (1999:24) cautions that making whiteness visible can 
sometime exacerbate the problems for BME people, one of the themes of this chapter is 
that Yancy‟s (2008) position of making whiteness visible helps GBME men to utilise 
their agency in resisting racialized interpellations. I now go on to look at how GBME 
men experience racialized interpellations in white gay spaces.  
 
Section Two: Interpellation of GBME Men in White Gay Contexts  
 
In this section I use the interview data to look at how GBME men are impacted upon by 
interpellation, exploring how expressed speech acts are interpreted by GBME men and 
sensed affectively. I show that the speech acts which linguistically express meanings 
around sexuality are understood as racialized interpellations. I also look at the process 
of mis-interpellation  (Hage, 2010) defined as the context where individuals are 
previously interpellated as part of a collective identity or community until a future 
(politically strategic) moment where they are rejected. It is through the racialized 
interpellations and mis- interpellations experienced by GBME men that gay venues 
become categorised as white and the gay community is intersubjectively interpellated as 
white. Here the gay community can be understood as an imagined community 
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(Anderson, 2011:124), in that its unity is through cultural and affective relationships 
rather than for example structural, ancestral or geographic factors. I will be looking at 
how interpellation occurs both linguistically and through the performativity of practices 
such as interrogation or exclusion of GBME men at gay venues by door staff, which can 
be both interwoven with semantic modalities and other modalities such as the affective.  
Judith Butler (1999c:168) suggests “speech acts don‟t always have to be explicit verbal 
statements - it‟s not that one becomes raced as it were by being addressed explicitly”. 
Here we can consider the performativity (Butler, 1993) of social interactions which cite 
racialized discourses as also interpellating GBME men into particular subjectivities and 
social categories, for example the searching of GBME men for drugs or weapons.  
 
The issue of GBME men not being allowed entry into commercial white gay venues is a 
problem which occurs internationally (Caluya, 2008; Han, 2007:58). The issue of 
GBME men being excluded from gay venues has also been looked at by academic 
authors in the U.K. (Johnson, 2008) and by journalistic investigations (Burston, 2011; 
Buttoo, 2010; EMMA, 2010; Out North-West, 2009), where some studies have found 
gay venues in the north of England to be racist (Butler, 2006; Held et al, 2008). A 
recently published incident involved the famous Black Gay activist John Amaechi who 
was “flagged by a joint radio system as argumentative and aggressive” (QX magazine, 
2010:34) when excluded from entering a gay venue in Manchester in England. This 
accusation by door staff that people are drunk, anti-social, or not wearing the right 
clothes are common methods of excluding particular groups that are discriminated 
against in society, and particularly for BME groups. Another investigation in the 
northern English city of Leeds of (non-gay) bars and clubs found that BME men were 
excluded more often than WME men (Inside Out, 2007), indicating that the practice 
extends across sexual orientation categories in society, although this does not 
necessarily mean that the same racialized practices are occurring in gay and straight 
venues. One strategy utilised by door staff at gay venues is the homophobic and racist 
slur (where I would suggest that both sexuality and „race‟ are simultaneously challenged 
by the actions) of accusing the GBME man of „not being gay‟. Buttoo (2010) for 
example reports how gay Asian men are forced by gay venue door staff to kiss other 
men to prove they are gay, which here reframes the Queer activist strategy of public 
same-sex kissing from being Queer emancipation from homophobia and 
heteronormativity (Alexander, 1999; Samuels, 1999) into one of kissing as racialized 
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sexual violation by the white LGBTQI community (see also Judith Butler, 2008:3 for a 
critique of same-sex kissing as a racialized interpellation in the Netherlands). However 
even if the GBME men are subsequently permitted to enter the venue after kissing, the 
act of forced kissing is performative of being „raced‟, and interpellates them as the 
racialized unwanted Other.  
 
The exclusion of GBME bodies from gay spaces materially contributes to the whiteness 
of the space by virtue of number and ratio (Han, 2007). This of course is not necessarily 
the most significant attribute, since  only a few BME bodies present in a space can 
distort the perception of how many are actually present, where white people often report 
higher numbers perceived than are actually present (Puwar, 2004). In addition the 
impact of discourses and cultural attributes also contributes to the perception of a 
space‟s whiteness (as will be discussed further in chapter seven). Nevertheless practices 
which reduce the body count of BME people entering a white gay space are a crude yet 
effective method of maintaining the whiteness of these venues, both materially in terms 
of bodies visible, and also discursively in terms of the performativity of these 
exclusionary actions where performativity helps to sustain the discursive formations 
(Butler, 1993), which in this context are racialized. James in the interview extract below 
describes his understanding of how white gay venues exclude GBME men: 
 
James: so if you go in as a black person, if you, if you‟re lucky enough to be able to get 
in, because that‟s a whole different story [...]. So, erm, you wanted to know what it is? 
Or what are the difficulties getting in? 
 
R: well you mentioned about getting into the bars and the bouncers, that‟s happened to 
me a few times. 
 
James: getting in can be a challenge. 
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: I mean I‟ve had examples of, especially when I was doing this project a few 
years ago, I haven‟t experienced any of this myself, 
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R: right, right. 
 
James: so it‟s all second hand, but I‟ve heard of people being, black people being asked 
to prove that they are gay, before being let in, I‟ve heard of black people being told it 
was a „members club only‟.  
 
R: right yeah. 
 
James: and because you‟re black couldn‟t possibly be a member, so off you go. 
 
R: hmm. 
 
James: I‟ve heard of black people being asked to be searched before they go in, for 
drugs, when no else has been asked. 
 
Here in James‟ example GBME people are being read and categorised by the door staff 
as either not being gay, not being of the „status‟ to be a club member (perhaps citing 
positionings related to class, „race‟ or both), or being a drug dealer. This is a form of 
racial profiling. The racialized discursive formations being cited here relate to BME 
men in general being stereotyped as homophobic, the unwanted working class, 
dangerous, and criminal. In addition these are interwoven with (and contingent upon) 
the colonial discourses around the racialized Other which are sedimented and 
transmitted through time to the present. The GBME man is being interpellated into 
positionings within these racialized discursive formations during the experiences with 
the door staff in James‟ description. Here interpellation operates by reaching into the 
matrix of racialized social practices and racialized discursive formations sedimented and 
extending through history. 
 
Recognition is an act of categorisation by door staff „prior to‟ the onset of social 
processes such as interpellation, although it could also be argued that both processes 
might occur simultaneously. To be mis-recognised as „not gay‟ and interpellated out 
from the LGBTQI social and political collective structures to which GBME men have 
contributed and felt connected to will therefore impact strongly upon their subjectivity 
and identity. Ghassan Hage‟s (2010:122) concept of racialized “mis- interpellation”, 
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which explores the affective dimensions of interpellation, and incorporates Frantz 
Fanon‟s ideas on „race‟ and Althusser‟s concept of interpellation, provides another 
theoretical perspective on the experiences of the GBME men in my interviews:  
 
“In the first instance the racialized person is interpellated as belonging to a 
collectivity „like everybody else‟. S/he is hailed by the cultural group or the 
nation, or even by modernity which claims to be addressing „everyone‟... yet, no 
sooner do they answer the call and claim their spot than the symbolic order 
brutally reminds them that they are not part of everyone: „No, I wasn‟t talking to 
you. Piss off. You are not part of us‟ ” (Hage, 2010:122).  
 
For a GBME man to identify himself as „gay‟ and be able to approach a gay venue, he 
almost certainly would have been interpellated into the LGBTQI political or gay 
cultural identity in order to feel socially connected to the cultural identity „gay‟. 
Exceptions might include gay men who for example use the term „gay‟ as a synonym 
for homosexual from within medical and judicial discourses and have rejected a gay 
cultural identity. Even if this self- interpellation as gay was on a relatively background 
level of subjectivity, some connection must have been felt for the GBME man to 
approach the doorway of the gay venue.  Hage‟s (2010) theory of mis- interpellation 
echoes James‟ description of GBME men who were interpellated as gay but 
subsequently find out that in the context of particular gay venues (which can be 
perceived as a representation of the collective gay community) they are mis-
interpellated through exclusion from the (white) gay community.   
 
The social interaction with door staff where GBME men are asked to “prove that they 
are gay” is performative of  discourses in which BME people are positioned as not gay. 
However there is a mis- interpellation from the white valorised gay community which 
indicates to the GBME man „you‟re not one of us, you‟re not part of our social group‟.  
Here I use the term valorised to define a particular process involving the LGBTQI 
community and gay social contexts in England which would be similar to Lisa 
Duggan‟s (2002) concept of homonormativity. Duggan‟s (2002) homonormativity is 
framed around ideas about gay consumption practices, power and economic privilege 
within the US. Although the actual economic privileges theorized around the gay 
community have been shown to be inaccurate these discourses remain prevalent 
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(Weber, 2012), and the racialized practices associated with the socio-economic 
privileging of gay whiteness persist in society (El Tayeb, 2012; Puar, 2006).  There is 
often a relational depreciation in the social capital of Othered groups when 
homonormative groups (white, male, middleclass) are valorised (Duggan, 2002). The 
positionings around race and class cited through the performativity around the statement 
by door staff that the bar was “a members club only” also may suggest the 
categorisation of GBME men as „not gay‟ and also as „homophobic‟ where the door 
staff are possibly not telling the BME man that it is a gay venue in case there is 
homophobic violence from the BME man. However it may also be related to race and 
class, where membership of a club, or permission to enter valorised social spaces in 
these contexts is historically related to social status and race (Carbado, 2005:193). 
James uses the expression “lucky” in relation to gaining access to the venue, which also 
suggests the valorisation and exclusivity of the space. Here the gay venue is being 
represented by the actions of the door staff as a valorised and exclusive space contrasted 
against the GBME man who is depreciated as “you‟re black [so you] couldn‟t possibly 
be a member”. The interpellation „you‟re not a member of the club‟ therefore mis-
interpellates GBME men from gay positionings within the valorised white gay 
community, albeit invisibly or indirectly addressing sexual orientation and „race‟.  
 
Ibrahim here talks about being interpellated as a drug dealer by white people in gay 
venues, both through speech acts and through the power of touching and searching the 
body:  
 
R: are there any other experiences with door staff? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah, a few years back, four or five, I got accused of being a drug dealer in 
[name of gay venue].  
 
R: in the club? 
 
Ibrahim: inside the club. I was inside the club and this guy thought I was a drug dealer, 
and asked if I had any drugs, I said I don‟t have any, so he went and told the bouncer, 
saying that I‟m dealing. So the bouncer came over, and I was scared in case he planted 
something on me, I got scared, and the bouncer searched me and let me back in again. 
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He said „come out and I‟ll just search you‟, there was no need, he can‟t just search 
somebody without proof, there should have been some kind of evidence. 
 
R: was the guy who accused you of being a drug dealer white? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah. It was a white guy. He went and told the bouncer I was dealing drugs.  
 
R: were you with other Asian people at the time? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah I was. 
 
The act of searching a GBME body for drugs is performative of the discourses which 
position BME men in general as „criminals‟ and a threat, and of racialized power 
relations around whiteness and the racialized Other (Holdaway, 1984:69). One of the 
ways Ibrahim was categorized as the racialized Other by the white man in the gay venue 
was through his proximity to the other South Asian bodies of his friends in the venue, 
since Ibrahim mentions in the interview (see page 84) that due to his white skin colour 
he is often categorized as white by white people until they read his South Asian-ness 
through other signifiers (for example dress, accent, group of friends). Through being 
identified as being South Asian through proximity to other South Asian bodies his white 
skinned South Asian body becomes an intercorporeal racial signifier used in the racial 
profiling applied to black bodies in general. Here we see the word and accusations of a 
white man in the gay venue having the power to persuade the door staff in the venue to 
search Ibrahim‟s body. The door staff were familiar with Ibrahim and already knew his 
South Asian heritage, and so perhaps were more inclined to follow up on the white 
man‟s false accusations. The act of the white man categorizing Ibrahim and reporting 
him falsely as a drug dealer, and the ac t of searching Ibrahim‟s body interpellated him 
as the dangerous racialized Other within discourses around BME men being drug 
dealers and criminals, eliciting affective qualities in Ibrahim around feeling scared. This 
also shows us how „race‟ operates in the absence of an individual‟s black skin colour as 
the salient signifier of „races‟ discursive construction, and here merges intercorporeally 
with other black bodies present and the sense by white men in the gay venue of Ibrahim 
being a black man with „white‟ skin.  
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Buttoo‟s (2010) survey found that gay South Asian men entering white gay venues were 
forced by door staff to remove their trousers to show they are not carrying weapons on 
them and were referred to as „suicide bombers‟ by the other gay clients. This insult 
„suicide bombers‟ has also been shouted at LGBTQI Muslims on gay pride marches in 
England (Burston, 2011). This categorisation of South Asian men as Muslim terrorists 
fails to recognise that to date the only terrorist attack on a gay venue was committed on 
the 30th April 1999 by the white Christian „London bomber‟ David Copeland with the 
police failing to arrest any accomplices (BBC news, 1999). This was not only a terrorist 
campaign against the gay community but also included the bombing of BME locations 
in London on two other days in April 1999 (Hart, 2003). Karim who is of South Asian 
descent describes how this categorisation has impacted upon him: 
 
Karim: up to 9/11 most of my experiences were positive, after 9/11 it‟s all been a load 
of crap. 
 
R: how many times were you asked questions by door staff before 2001? 
 
Karim: never, in fact I used to be on guest lists [...]. 
 
R: were you refused entry into gay clubs? 
 
Karim: not prior to 9/11, only after. Every time I‟ve been refused entry was after 2001, 
prior to that, never. 
 
These actions are witnessed by the LGBTQI groups participating at these events and so 
the meanings reiterate and reconfigure the sedimented discourses, practices and social 
meanings around the gay Muslim body. For South Asian men, the interpellation of 
being a „terrorist‟ by door staff and white gay LGBTQI customers results in exclusion 
and negative feelings. The invisibility of whiteness can be seen in the evidence that the 
white London Bomber has been forgotten by those LGBTQI individuals interpellating 
gay South Asian men as terrorists, observed in the fact they do not shout „bomber‟ at 
GWME men. It is also evidenced in the behaviour of the door staff who are not 
interrogating or excluding GWME men they suspect of being terrorists. Here whiteness 
is not only invisible, but its invisibility has also translated into an erosion of the memory 
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of the murder of the people in the Admiral Duncan gay pub on the 30th April 1999 from 
the collective gay psyche. 
 
In James‟ interview extract he described the body searches, where here the immediate 
context includes the GBME person, the door staff, and the witnesses of other (white) 
gay and heterosexual people in the queue. The performativity around searching the body 
foregrounds the discourses that enable the racialized interpellation as racialized Other 
and mis- interpellation from the gay community, whereby the “hailing” (Althusser, 
1998:160) here is non-verbal communication. The initial interpellation would be the 
prior actions which permit GBME men to enter the club doorway (meaning „we accept 
you this far‟) the mis- interpellation would be the overzealous racially profiled searching 
by the door staff (meaning „you are not quite one of us‟).  
 
The categorisations, interpellations, mis- interpellations and positionings around 
sexuality, class and criminality described by James, are part of the same racialized 
discursive formation which position GBME men as the unwanted racialized Other 
(Goldberg, 1994). The reason James has not experienced the door staff apartheid 
practices himself is because he now refuses to go to gay bars or clubs in the northern 
city he lives in due to other types of racist experiences he has had within those venues, 
but as someone who has worked on projects for GBME men James has heard their 
collective experiences around door staff at gay venues. James‟ age (mid fifties), 
experience, and his interest in black politics and history discussed throughout the 
interviews has given him a race-cognizant framework (Frankenberg, 1993:239) with 
which to interpret the exclusions by door staff. However those new to the gay scene and 
with a differently worked-through understanding of racism might not initially make this 
conclusion particularly where “the perceptual practices involved in racializations are 
then tacit, almost hidden from view, and thus almost immune from critical reflection” 
(Alcoff, 1999:21). Brian, in his early twenties, describes his first few times going to gay 
bars and being interrogated by door staff: 
 
Brian: just things like there‟d be a different bouncer on the door from the last time you 
went out, they‟d ask you like „are you‟re sure if you want to be coming in here?‟ 
[...] 
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R: what else did they ask you apart from „are you sure you want to come into this 
place?‟ 
 
Brian: „do you know this is a gay bar?‟ 
 
R: yeah, that‟s one I get. 
 
Brian: there‟s another one, I can‟t think of it, something else I was asked one time. 
 
Brian suggested that the first few times he would be interrogated, until the door staff got 
to know him, after which  they would allow him to enter. At the time (when he was a 
teenager) he told me he didn‟t relate it to his „race‟ and he says he was more concerned 
about “the fact that I was underage”, but upon reflection (in his early twenties), he 
interpreted „race‟ as a factor. Chong-Suk Han suggests that the interaction with door 
staff is not an uncommon experience for GBME men: 
 
“Standing at the door of various gay bars, I‟ve been asked, on several occasions, 
by doormen if I was aware that it was a gay bar. [...]. In these instances, unlike 
other instances of blatant racism [...], it just didn‟t occur to the doormen that 
being gay and Asian was within the realm of the possible” (Han, 2007:55).  
 
Brian initially read the categorisation as being the door staff interpellating him as 
heterosexual with the questions „are you‟re sure if you want to be coming in here?‟ and 
„do you know this is a gay bar?‟. This act of stopping and interrogating was read by 
Brian initially as performative of the venues identity as a „safe gay space‟, namely the 
exclusion of heterosexuals and potential homophobes. However Brian is openly gay and 
does not describe himself as „straight acting‟ and expects to be allowed to participate in 
gay contexts equally with white gay people. Irving Goffman draws attention to how 
mis- interpellation impacts upon social conceptions around unfairness and injustice: 
 
“Society is organized on the principle that any individual who possesses a 
certain social characteristic has a moral right to expect that others will value and 
treat him in an appropriate way. Connected with this principle is a second, 
namely that an individual who implicitly or explicitly signifies that he has 
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certain social characteristics ought in fact to be what he claims he is” (Goffman, 
1980/1959:158). 
 
The act of mis-recognition by the door staff has violated these two principles suggested 
by Goffman and this transgression of the moral right contributes to the negative feelings 
alluded to throughout Brian‟s interviews. Brian goes on to describe these affective 
qualities in more detail:  
 
Brian: at the time I didn't care. 
 
R: you didn‟t care that much? 
 
Brian: I think I just decided to get drunk and didn‟t think about it. But when you sit  
down and think about it, it does, erm, sort of make you feel pushed out of their scene 
and things. 
 
R: and, [interrupted] 
 
Brian: unwelcome that's what I was going to say unwelcome. 
 
R: and what would you think the reasons were behind what was going on at the door, 
when you do think about it, was it about being black in some way? 
 
Brian: I think that me being black does come into it at some point but it's working out in 
what way. 
 
R: yeah because it's working in so many different ways. 
 
Brian: they can be awkward about you being black but they hide it behind other things. 
 
Initially Brian believed he was being categorised and mis-recognised as heterosexual. 
However later on Brian interpreted this as an act of racial profiling “I think that me 
being black does come into it at some point”, and performative of a white identity for 
the gay venues “it does, erm, sort of make you feel pushed out of their scene and things” 
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where “their” relates to the white gay scene, as well as subjective meanings around 
racialized exclusions. Brian describes how he initially dealt with the affective qualities 
elicited by what was later understood as mis-interpellation by the door staff by getting 
drunk, a response designed to dull the impact of the affective qualities upon conscio us 
awareness “I think I just decided to get drunk and didn‟t think about it”. Here we can 
see one of the strategies suggested by Linda Alcoff (1999:24) who considers how a 
BME individual interpellated from a non-racialized phenomenal embodied subjectivity 
into a racialized one has the option of  “an attempt to return to the category of non-
threatening other, perhaps through the place of the not-really-other”. Brian deciding to 
get drunk also shows us that rather than having an initial non-racialized subjectivity, 
Brian must have a backgrounded sense of racialization that he is trying to prevent from 
becoming foregrounded, where the foregrounding of this racialized subjectivity 
facilitates the racialized interpellation by the door staff.    
 
Here Brian attempted to return to the category of “non-threatening other” (Alcoff, 
1999:24) by not thinking about the issue, which may have made him challenge the door 
staff (making him appear „threatening‟). One way of reading “the not-really-other” 
(Alcoff, 1999:24), I would suggest here, is Brian getting drunk which removes his sense 
of being- in-the-world. You cannot phenomenally be interpellated as the Other if you 
aren‟t really there, so the less of you there is (through being drunk) the less the 
interpellation will „hook you in‟ subjectively in that moment. However the racialized 
performativity around Brian being drunk in a white gay space will leave traces which 
may subsequently interpellate Brian on a future occasion. This also suggests that there 
were negative affective qualities elicited, which seems to contradict Brian‟s initial 
suggestion that “at the time I didn't care”. This could also be interpreted as that Brian 
didn‟t want to experience it in terms of his discursive topographies and salient 
emotions, but his unified Ego was infused with affective qualities at a background level, 
and Brian attempted to attenuate these with alcohol “I just decided to get drunk and 
didn‟t think about it”. Jayne et al. (2010:546) suggest that consuming alcohol is a 
strategy used by those who fear racist or homophobic harassment to enable “emotional, 
embodied and affective senses of being and „belonging‟.” Here we see getting drunk 
simultaneously acting upon affective qualities and also as a defensive shield against 
negative interpellations and mis- interpellations, with the result that Brian feels less out 
of place in the white gay venue. 
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Brian also describes his phenomenal corporeal topography as eliciting meanings where 
he says “but when you sit down and think about it, it does, erm, sort of make you feel 
pushed out of their scene and things”. Here we can contrast the description of sitting 
down with being pushed out, where rather than simply being linguistic metaphors 
actually describe phenomenal meanings associated with the corporeal topographic 
locations of the body. „Sitting down‟ here suggests feelings of comfort and belonging 
(Ahmed, 2007:160) and „pushed out‟ here suggests being unwelcomed and not 
belonging, sensed within the corporeal topographies. Alternatively if we contrast this 
with how the absence of the sense of self through being drunk reduces the impact of 
racializations in the moment, then the act of sitting down and thinking about the racist 
experiences can become a moment of discomfort and intensely remembered negat ive 
emotions rather than a refuge from the white gay space.  Therefore the racialized 
meanings that interpellate and mis- interpellate Brian within the context of white gay 
spaces, are also understood through the sensing of corporeal topographies.  
 
Since the communication from the door staff is directed with words this creates the 
dominant phenomenological domain for analyzing the meaning. Now, this of course can 
be resisted linguistically through strategic analysis and deconstruction based on past 
experience or knowledge, as can be seen in the immediate linguistic interpretation from 
some of my GBME interviewees that this is about „race‟. However the phenomenal 
foreground is linguistic, for example the words „are you gay?‟, and so we must initially 
work within this domain. Husserl (2001:27) suggests that “the word points away from 
itself and to the sense in normal discourse, that is the word directs interest”, therefore 
the words spoken by the door staff become part of the discursive topography of the 
GBME mans unified Ego, and attempt to elicit and restrict the foregrounded meanings 
to those associated with normal discourse, namely the literal and innocuous question 
„are you gay?‟. We can say therefore that the discursive topographies point to an 
interpretation that the door staff are interpellating GBME men as heterosexual (Collins, 
2004:88) and associated meanings around being homophobic. However the background 
phenomenal perceptions and affective qualities are processing, interpreting and 
understanding alternative and contradictory qualities and sensings, there are feelings 
and emotions which indicate sensings around being unwelcomed and pushed out, and 
these are interwoven with meanings around „race‟.  Husserl (2001:27) suggests that “the 
moment our interest is directed towards the signs themselves and is arrested there [...] 
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abnormality shows up in lived experience itself” and this can be seen in the dissonance 
or incongruence between the words spoken by the door staff and the affective 
understandings by GBME men of the alternative sense. This is because the signs are 
insufficient in themselves for the coherence of the meanings. We can say that the 
dynamic foregrounding and backgrounding of affective qualities interwoven within the 
unified Ego enables an understanding that what the door staff are doing is mis-
interpellating GBME men as being gay but not welcomed or accepted in that gay venue 
through being BME. This duplicity, denial and invisibility of racist acts can have on 
going negative consequences for BME subjectivity (Baldwin, 1961).  
 
This is an example of what James Baldwin (1961:150) refers to by “incoherence [...] 
this shapeless thing”, where the “incoherence” exists in „race‟ being not spoken to 
directly (verbally, semantically, categorically) but permeating the understanding of all 
people in the interaction. The saturation of the life-world with invisible racialized 
information which is sensed and understood leads to the emergence of multiple domains 
of consciousness which coexist across topographies. For example being “in a triple 
person” (Fanon, 1993:112) or “double layers of self-awareness” (Alcoff, 1999:24), or 
“double consciousness” (Yancy, 2008:5) where we are rendering multiple layers of 
incoherent perceived meanings and sensings within the embodied self  through the 
impact of the racialized life-world. This operates both as a restriction (Ahmed, 
2007:160) and as a means to navigate the racialized social context (Du Bois, 
1998/1940). These ideas around the foregrounding of the discursive topography and the 
backgrounding of other phenomenal topographies as simultaneous multiple modalities 
of meanings and sensings will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter five.  
 
It was only later on, upon reflection that Brian began to understand that his „race‟ was 
somehow implicated in the mis- interpellation „you‟re not gay‟:  
  
Brian:“I think that me being black does come into it at some point but it's working out 
in what way”   
and   
Brian: “they can be awkward about you being black but they hide it behind other 
things”.   
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Yet there is still a strong sense of uncertainty about how „race‟ is being interpellated by 
the mis-interpellation „you‟re not gay‟ by the door staff with Brian‟s words “it's 
working out in what way” and “they hide it behind other things”. Brian shows us here 
how whiteness as a practice and discourse within gay spaces is invisible to him in three 
ways. Firstly in the cognitive effort required by Brian to make issues around „race‟ 
visible rather than the immediate readings James has of these situations, where for 
example Brian uses the term “awkward” to describe racist practices. Secondly in the 
framing of the problem as being about Brian being black and not about the space as 
being white. Thirdly in the notion that „race‟ is hidden “behind other things” rather than 
issues of „race‟ being explicitly exposed through these peripheral signifiers by making 
these peripheral signifiers the focus of attention, for example Black groups in England 
campaigning publically that the current racialized practices around „Stop and Search‟ 
are an explicit expression of police racism (TUC, 2012).  
 
The affective qualities elicited in Brian by the mis- interpellation „you‟re not gay‟ are 
evidenced in Brian‟s comments:  
 
Brian: I just decided to get drunk     
and 
Brian: it does, erm, sort of make you feel pushed out of their scene and things. 
and, 
Brian: unwelcome, that's what I was going to say, unwelcome 
 
These particular affective qualities have a core theme around exclusion namely being 
drunk to reduce phenomenal awareness (here I am theorizing the effects of alcohol as 
having an affective dimension), feeling pushed-out and being unwelcomed. Although 
Brian has not actively decided upon a framework of how „race‟ is operating, and 
initially this was something he did not think about, the affective qualities Brian 
describes reveals explicitly how „race‟ operates to exclude him. At that stage Brian may 
not have expressed the meanings within his discursive topographies to himself within a 
race-cognizant framework (Frankenberg, 1993:239), but the affective qualities elicited 
gave him an understanding (Katz, 1999) which indicated he was not welcomed because 
of his „race‟. This feeling of not being welcomed mis- interpellates Brian from the 
valorised white gay community, and from positionings where GBME bodies act “as a 
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representation of blackness but could never seem to embody queerness itself [within 
the] tacitly racist white gay community” (Sedgwick, 2004:31). It mis- interpellates Brian 
as not part of the gay community using communication channels of affective 
information. Rather than the guilt of Althusser‟s (1998) example with the policeman, 
Brian feels unwelcomed. It is these affective qualities sensed by Brian around exclusion 
which give him the social information about meanings from the discursive formations 
circulating within the gay life-world related to his mis- interpellation. I now go on to 
look at how racialized interpellations operate when the GBME individual‟s subjectivity 
does not accept the raced categorisation and interpellation.  
 
Section Three: Interpellation and Ambiguity 
 
In this section I explore how the readings and categorisations involved in interpellation 
produce dissonance when they are used to interpret ambiguously racialized bodies. Here 
we see how racializing processes within the life-world are productive of racialized 
meanings incongruous with the racialized subjectivity of some GBME men, as 
described in Frantz Fanon‟s (1993:112) account of being “in a triple person”. When 
exploring how GBME men are categorised and interpellated as a racialized Other we 
must consider the attributes which help signify the meanings productive of racial 
interpretations. Throughout this thesis I am primarily looking at the corporea l attributes 
and I will discuss these in greater detail in chapters five and six. For this chapter it 
should be sufficient to suggest that historical and current racialized discourses and 
practices help to sustain cultural and social relationships between skin colour (and other 
corporeal attributes) and racialized positionings. Jin Haritaworn (2009:129) cautions 
against the use of “phenotype” as a racially reifying and essentializing concept, adding 
that instead we must look at what the dominant racialized groups gain from the 
racialized interpellation of non-white groups through the “categorical power in 
„recognising‟ and defining them, and privileges which they are cementing by excluding 
others from membership in the dominant group.”  
 
In the interview extract below Carlos echoes some of the points already made by James 
and Brian. The extracts from Carlos‟ in this section help to explore how interpellations 
by door staff at gay venues can be related to Fanon‟s (1993:112) concept of triple 
consciousness or dissociation. Carlos begins by saying he has not had these experiences 
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of categorisation and interpellation in gay cafés or bars, this may be because there are 
less likely to be door staff at these types of venues than in the more controlled gay clubs 
and larger venues.  
 
Carlos: well I think there is something with er the clubs, basically, they are quite 
restrictive with some people getting into clubs, so I personally haven‟t found any 
problem, or different attitude to me when visiting cafés or bars, but when visiting clubs 
there is always this barrier with the security staff.  
 
R: yeah? 
 
Carlos: they ask you questions „so are you gay?‟ 
 
R: hmm. 
 
Carlos: „what are you doing here?‟, „have you been before?‟, „or are you a member?‟  
 
R: right. 
 
Carlos: these kinds of things which for me are a kind of restriction, but it has happened 
in other countries, so I don't, other gay clubs in other countries.  
 
We can see that Carlos is being asked similar questions to those James and Brian have 
described. The initial question Carlos raises „so are you gay?‟ can be read here as the 
core meaning for the other questions he says he is asked “„what are you doing here?‟, 
„have you been before?‟, „or are you a member?‟” where these are variants and 
euphemisms for the (already loaded) question „so are you gay?‟. Carlos describes 
throughout the interviews being frequently mis-read as an (unwanted) immigrant from 
Pakistan, India, or North-Africa, or a „Muslim‟, whereas he is Latin American Mestizo-
heritage and Catholic-heritage. Carlos‟ sense that he is being interpellated as Muslim 
through racialized readings of his body supports Jasbir Puar‟s (2006) suggestion that the 
category „Muslim‟ is frequently cited or utilised in social interactions as a racialized 
term. Carlos here describes the police and customs officers watching him walking 
through immigration and customs in England, here he has the sense that he is being 
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observed and racially interpellated, a suspicion which proved correct since he was 
subsequently stopped and interrogated:   
 
Carlos: so they were looking at me they made comments about me because they were 
talking in between them and looking at me. So it was obvious they were waiting for me 
at that check in. 
 
R: and what do you think they were doing with their eyes? Because obviously they are 
looking at you and thinking, making judgements about you. I was wondering what you 
thought the judgements about you might be? 
 
Carlos: I don't know. Maybe they thought I was Muslim. I was an Indian or Pakistani 
immigrant. 
 
 Carlos‟ example shows us that „race‟ within this context is not about essential traits or 
„phenotype‟ but about the reading of corporeal attributes through a racialized lens 
(Haritaworn, 2009), and this applies to James‟ and Brian‟s earlier examples of racialized 
corporeal readings too. I would suggest that it is the various racialized corporeal 
attributes and cultural signifiers which are read by door staff at gay venues as s ignifying 
the racialized „Other‟ and are performative of „the racialized Other‟ rather than 
categorical „race‟ (for example African-Caribbean, Asian, Chinese, or Mestizo) being 
important here. If the door staff are reading Carlos as being racially ambiguous, rather 
than a specific racial category, this may be sufficient reason to interpellate him as the 
racially unwanted Other, in the sense of being non-white. This categorisation and 
interpellation is an important way of reading racialized corporeal attributes in order to 
maintain the purity of racially segregated groups and the boundaries between racialized 
contexts (Ahmed, 2007:163; Alcoff, 1999:23). Therefore I would suggest that in the 
context of white gay venues, Carlos is being interpellated as „not gay‟ by the door staff 
due to the racialized corporeal attributes which position him as the racialized unwanted 
Other. However Carlos does not express this racialized meaning explicitly verbally in 
the interview, but instead describes his feelings when interrogated by the door staff. 
Carlos describes these feelings when going to gay venues: 
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Carlos: yeah, but here I don't feel anything strange really, apart from dealing with the 
security staff and [interrupted], 
 
R: I mean does it happen a lot? 
 
Carlos: they don't do it to everyone, they don't. 
 
Here we see Carlos saying he doesn‟t feel anything strange, “apart from dealing with 
the security staff” which therefore suggests his experiences with the security staff elicits 
affective qualities around feeling strange. Here we see that the affective qualities around 
feeling strange links to the sense of Othering where Carlos adds that “they don't do it to 
everyone, they don't”. What they don‟t do to everyone are both the processes around 
interrogation and also the elicitation of negative affective qualities. Throughout the 
interviews Carlos does not verbally convey explicit interpretations within a racialized 
framework regarding his interrogations at gay venues, although he was able to do this 
with English border control which he felt was a racialized experience. He knows 
something is happening in relation to himself, but does not narrate this explicitly 
verbally in the interviews as related to his positioning as the racialized Other, although 
implicitly this understanding is visible within the interview text. Haritaworn (2009:129) 
suggests from his own research  that “the identities which my multi-racialized 
interviewees adopted were strategic attempts to negotiate external readings of their 
bodies, names and other racializing factors, as „ambiguous‟ and „incongruent‟, „strange‟ 
and non-belonging”. We can look at how Carlos‟ interpretations around self- identity, 
categorisation and interpellation (although not in explicit verbal terms) can be compared 
with and related to his affective qualities around feeling strange and non-belonging, as a 
result of racialized readings by the door staff. Carlos suggests in the following extract 
that he interpreted the reason they asked him if he was gay as being about preventing 
heterosexuals from entering the gay venue.  
 
R: erm, you mentioned that the door staff sometimes ask you if you gay. 
 
Carlos: yeah. 
 
R: why do you think they ask that question? 
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Carlos: I don't know, I suppose in cities like [northern city] especially in the gay 
village, erm, I suppose sometimes the bars don't want a specific type of people in the 
club, maybe they don't want heterosexuals. 
 
R: sorry they don't want? 
 
Carlos: heterosexuals. 
 
R: heterosexuals? and they assume you're hetero [interrupted] 
 
Carlos: I don't know, I don't know what the reasons. I can't say what the reasons. So I 
can't say I know. The gay village is an open place where there's a lot of people. 
 
R: yeah, yeah, absolutely. 
 
Carlos: and I personally have seen many times they restrict people as well. Avoiding  
people from getting into the place. But I have seen many times people that look very 
drunk for example or large groups that they might consider that they are not safe for the 
place or whatever. 
 
Here we can see Carlos trying to interpret the context from outside of a racialized 
framework. The door staff have asked him if he is gay or alluded to this in other forms 
of questioning. The affective quality of feeling strange is elicited from the interpellation 
of Carlos through speech acts by the door staff. One answer could be that this relates 
exclusively to his sexuality. However I would suggest that mis-recognition as „straight‟ 
may not necessarily elicit negative affective qualities. This is because in the types of 
homonormative gay venues Carlos is describing straight acting gay men are valorised 
and encouraged (Duggan, 2002), thereby giving many gay men an additional sense of 
belonging. In addition within the context of the homophobic wider culture, to be 
considered straight would bring a sense of safety and normative invisibility to many gay 
men. However, Carlos is gay, and is not straight-acting. This results in confusion, the 
face-value statement by the door staff implying the restriction of heterosexuals, leads 
Carlos to say “I don't know, I don't know what the reasons”. He then considers the times 
he has seen drunk people or aggressive large groups also being excluded and wonders if 
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this is the reason, to prevent homophobic violence, from these people.  Carlos does not 
say he is drunk or aggressive at the door of the club, so his speculation about this does 
not support the category in which he finds himself interrogated. What social and 
phenomenological processes are operating here to background the race-cognizant 
framework within Carlos‟ discursive topography?  
 
Linda Alcoff (1999:19) suggests that “the source of racializations, or at least one 
important source, is in the microprocesses of subjective existence [however] racial 
common sense varies both across and within racial groups.” Here in Carlos‟ account we 
see that Carlos is not explicitly interpreting his racialized interpellation by the door staff 
as the unwanted racialized Other, and so it could be argued that the subjective and 
intersubjective meanings are not these, and he is correct to interpret this as a 
categorisation as heterosexual based on his non-racialized attributes. In addition if 
Alcoff (1999:19) is correct then Carlos‟ subjective rejection o f this interpretation is also 
an important factor in whether the social processes are indeed racializing.  If Carlos has 
rejected an explicit verbal racialized interpretation then perhaps we must accept this. 
However Carlos‟ description of feeling “strange” is also one of the “microprocesses of 
subjective existence” (Alcoff, 1999:19), which can potentially tell us something 
additional about Carlos‟ experience with the door staff.  
 
Firstly it may be that the foregrounding of the meanings within the d iscursive 
topography over the backgrounded feelings interwoven within the unified Ego, 
attenuates the sensings which can be understood from the feelings within the unified 
Ego. Semantically the language used by the door staff to categorise and interpellate 
Carlos does not explicitly cite „race‟, and so Carlos‟ discursive topography does not 
interpret the social interaction as racialized. However Carlos‟ unified Ego feels 
“strange”.  In this example then the meanings within the discursive topographies 
dominate over the sense and sensings within the totality of the unified Ego. Secondly it 
may be that Carlos is resisting a racialized understanding. In this case Carlos rejects the 
mis- interpellation by the door staff through the strategy of phenomenally foregro unding 
himself and the interaction with the door staff as un-racialized. By making the context 
un-racialized, the mis- interpellation as racialized unwanted Other becomes instead a 
mis-recognition from being a homosexual and possible interpellation as a heterosexual, 
which Carlos is not, and so his subjective sense of racialized self and his racialized 
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identity are not directly challenged. In order to support this foregrounded rendering of 
himself and the social interaction as non-racialized, Carlos cites similar treatment of 
drunk or aggressive heterosexuals by the door staff.  Here we see that interpellation as 
„heterosexual‟ or categorisation as „drunk or aggressive‟ are understandings which are 
easier to accept for Carlos than the mis- interpellation „you‟re black so you you‟re not 
one of us‟. This resistance to racialized interpretations within the context of gay venues 
can be seen where in the quoted extract of the interview Carlos is navigating away from 
racialized interpretations. However the context for the interviews and the theme of my 
questions (namely the experiences of GBME men in white gay spaces), the references 
throughout the interviews to a particular European country  (where he is strongly 
positioned as an unwanted Latin American immigrant within racialized discourses), 
other countries which he says are racist, references to racist English customs officials, 
references to other white people being present when he wasn‟t interrogated by gay 
venue door staff, and the omission of explicit references to „race‟ in the extracts in this 
chapter, all suggest he has an awareness of racism in England which is an absent-
presence when he is talking in the interviews about the mis- interpellation „you‟re not 
gay‟. Therefore I would suggest that „race‟ is also present in the interview narrative 
about the gay venues by virtue of its explicit absence (Hall, 2012). The reason for this 
resistance could be that for Carlos to interpret the mis- interpellation by the door staff as 
„racist‟ within his discursive topographies might result in the same affective sense of 
mis- interpellation experienced by Brian or James who both now avoid going to gay 
clubs where this has occurred and feel excluded from the white gay scene. This may 
either produce feelings around ones moral right being infringed (Goffman, 1980) or of 
being excluded from the gay community towards which one has invested social, 
cultural, economic and affective capital. Avoiding this interpretation helps Carlos to 
continue to attend these venues, and to allow the interpellation of being gay and part of 
the wider gay community and social/political collective structures, albeit with the 
momentary phenomenal affective dissonance of feeling “strange” when interrogated by 
door staff. 
 
Thirdly it may be the case that Carlos‟ phenomenal experience of his racialized 
subjectivity is reconfigured by the life-world of the white gay venue. Carlos mentions 
later in the interview that the times he was interrogated at gay bars in England was when 
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he was by himself, and that when he is with a group of GWME friends he has never 
been interrogated, he says that he has no GBME male friends in England:  
 
Carlos: when I am with people from here I am not stopped at the door. 
[...] 
Carlos: all my friends are white so I don't have any black friends or any well apart from 
of some people from [European country] but they are white as well. I have some Latin 
American friends but for some reason none of them are gay so I‟ve never been to any 
gay places with these friends. So when I go to those places I am surrounded by white 
people.  
 
Sara Ahmed (2007:155) suggests that “likeness is an effect of proximity or contact, 
which is taken up as a sign of inheritance”, and so this suggests that for Carlos being in 
the company of GWME men when entering white gay venues helps „camouflage‟ his 
racialized Otherness, and become part of the gay „family‟. This can also be a strategy 
where the GBME unified Ego becomes part of an inter-subjective and inter-corporeal 
white social-body, a small group, which contingently possesses the privileges of 
whiteness. By contrast Ibrahim‟s interview here shows us how a „white skinned‟ South 
Asian body, read as white by other white people, takes on the racialized meanings and 
sensings through proximity to other South Asian bodies:  
 
R: tell me about your experiences with door staff? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah, like I was saying earlier people think I‟m white anyway, I used to go 
gay clubbing with my mates and people thought I was white. Mainly my friends have 
been [South Asian], people thought I was white. It was alright at first but then we 
started getting racist abuse, they started being racist to us. [...]. Someone started giving 
me grief. 
 
R:  someone who knew you were [South Asian]? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah so I stood up to that person and then they didn‟t want me to come in 
after that. I went back in and they said „well you caused some kind of trouble‟, which I 
didn‟t, they said „we‟ve got it on cctv‟  so I said if you‟ve got it on ccvt I want  you to 
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show it to me what you say I‟ve done because there is no evidence. They were just being 
awkward. One time me and my friends wanted to dress up in saris, drag queens 
dressing up in drag, and they wouldn‟t let us in. So after that I went a couple of times 
and they basically said „well you‟re barred‟. No reason, no explanation, nothing. So it 
was race, pure racism. 
 
R: was that in [northern city]? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah 
 
R: it wasn‟t [name of gay venue]? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah 
 
R: everyone has said that this happens at [name of gay venue].  [...] Can you tell me 
about the racist incident in the club? 
 
Ibrahim: we were out clubbing and towards the end of the night he was being abusive, 
this guy was like „you‟re a real Paki, a real Paki aren‟t you.‟ 
 
R: was this a white person? 
 
Ibrahim: yeah, „you're not really one of us‟. So I said „I don‟t need to explain myself to 
you‟, you know. 
 
In Ibrahim‟s interview we see how the proximity to other South Asian bodies results in 
a re-reading of his „white‟ body as non-white and interpellated as being the unwanted 
racialized Other. The interpellative speech act “you‟re a real Paki”  here involved the 
abusive racist language which directly implicated Ibrahim‟s racialized Otherness within 
the white gay space. It also included a mis-interpellation from whiteness “you're not 
really one of us”, where the racist white man had initially accepted Ibrahim as white 
and subsequently aggressively misinterpellated him from being part of this white gay 
community. This racist white man also impacted upon Ibrahim‟s affective topography 
through the affective qualities around discomfort suggested by the term“giving me 
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grief”. In addition the actions of the bouncers who went on to exlude Ibrahim from the 
venue reinforces the interpellative speech acts with an interpellative corporeal act, 
thereby interpellating him within three of the modalties productive of embodied 
subjectivity. If Ibrahim had not been with his South Asian friends he might have been 
able to „pass‟ as white for a longer period in the gay venue. This shows us how the 
proximity of other „racialized‟ bodies, here read as black (Ibrahim‟s friends) or white 
(Carlos‟ friends), alters the phenomenal rendering of a GBME male body as sufficiently 
Other to be excluded or not-quite-Other to be contingently accepted by the white gay 
venue.    
 
Mimicry can also render meanings into subjectivity within “a Husserlian 
phenomenological view of the noemata embedded within the individual subjectivity 
through the temporal retention of experiences” (Larrabee, 2000:283), thereby 
potentially rendering the GBME individual with a white subjectivity when in the 
company of a group of white people as in Carlos‟ example. Patricia Hill Collins 
(2004:88) describes a discursive relationality found in the distorted cultural 
representations of BME groups as straight and LGBTQI groups as white.  Haritaworn 
(2009:127) found in his study one mixed raced man who was racially categorised as 
white by an interrogator in a social context, because his homosexuality erased the 
racialization as black where “a gay man could only be white”. Given this relationship 
between categorisation, „race‟ and sexuality, it may therefore be that for Carlos, being 
part of a group of GWME men interweaves the phenomenal meanings around „race‟ and 
sexuality in a way which temporarily categorises Carlos as part of a white group and so 
interpellates him sufficiently into the white gay identity required to „pass‟ into the gay 
venue. However, even though he is eventually allowed to pass into the white gay space 
this passing does not „delete‟ the social processes accumulated with the door staff, as 
traces of this will remain sedimented within elements of the life-world within the white 
gay space, as well as lingering within Carlos‟ own subjectivity through his comments in 
the interview about feeling „strange‟. 
 
In addition Carlos‟ mis- interpellation being interpreted by Carlos as misrecognition also 
tells us something about the social processes within the white gay space. Interpellation 
is not only a process involving the individual but also involves the life-world, here 
specifically the discursive formations and practices within the white gay space. Carlos‟ 
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affective qualities around strangeness, and his unwillingness to interpret this within his 
discursive topographies as racialized tells us about the racialized nature of the white gay 
space. Carlos readily interprets the experience at English customs as racialized, simply 
from the evidence of the disciplinary gaze by officials, and within his repertoire of 
cultural knowledge about England easily finds racialized categories (Muslim, Indian, 
Pakistani) to interpret the interpellation. Carlos shows that the invisible white Gestalt 
does not always foreground whiteness to perception. Here his experiences with English 
customs elicits meanings around raced bodies, racialized boundaries and the 
maintenance of white purity, however in white gay spaces it only gives a strange feeling 
which he does not convey explicitly as related to his racialized positioning by door staff. 
Hence the invisible white Gestalt is not a fixed easily readable pattern like a text, its 
meanings and sensings will vary between individuals, yet there are sensed 
configurations which are shared intersubjectively.  
 
This shows us that the white gay venue not only has dominant discursive formations 
around whiteness which position groups according to racialized categories, but that the 
affective qualities around belonging or not belonging are so powerful that it can be in 
the interests of GBME men to make the power of these discourses invisible in order to 
maintain some sense of belonging to the valorised white gay community. Again we can 
see how sensed affective information reveals the invisible racialized practices and 
discourses within gay white spaces, when other meaning modalities are utilised by the 
gay venue to strategically contradict or hide these. Given this affective visibility of 
sensings in contexts where speech acts are complicit in the invisibility of the racialized 
meanings, I would therefore suggest that affective qualities elicited in such moments 
become themselves the interpellation. The hailing is not the shouting of a word or 
linguistic address, but instead the phenomenal interpellation is the elicitation of 
affective qualities around feeling unwelcomed or strange and the multiple phenomenal 
perceptions associated with this. Therefore we see how phenomenological interpellation 
operates across different modalities, including here within the modality of affective 
qualities and phenomenal awareness. I would also suggest that even where the speech 
acts are explicitly understood as citing racialized discourses, that the affective modality 
is interwoven with the meanings as part of the interpellation. Following Althusser‟s 
(1998:160) juxtaposing of the hailing „hey you there‟ with the feelings of guilt, I would 
suggest that the affective qualities, both for Althusser of guilt and for Carlos of feeling 
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strange, is a significant part of the process of interpellation and not a consequence of it. 
Here the moment described by Frantz Fanon (1993) of the phenomenal triple 
consciousness sensed as embodied dissonance is in itself a racialized phenomenological 
interpellation, where the moment of phenomenological alienation within the unified Ego 
mirrors the social process of Othering within the life-world. The next section looks 
more closely at how the meanings around interpellation are related to racialized 
discourses. 
 
Section Four: Racial Stereotypes and Selective Memories 
 
In this section I look in greater detail at how interpellation and mis- interpellation 
operates within the racialized discursive formations within the life-world, including 
those around colonialism. In section two I talked about what the interpellations and mis-
interpellations have meant in terms of moments of interrogation at gay venues, and 
particularly speech acts, and how racialized meanings are understood from these 
encounters. I also looked more closely at how interpellation and mis- interpellation 
operate at an affective level within phenomenal awareness, developing this in section 
three I looked at how this operates in contexts of racial ambiguity showing that reading 
the surface can impose racialized meanings, sensings, and subjectivities dissonant with 
an individuals racial identity.  In this section I will specifically explore how the 
meanings from interpellations and mis- interpellations in the context of white gay venues 
cite and sustain cultural and historical discourses around „race‟, following Frantz 
Fanon‟s (1993/1952) description of how the sedimented historical discourses impacted 
in his interpellation on the train.  
 
There remains an assumption in society that BME people are violent and aggressive 
(Holdaway, 1984; Phoenix et al., 2003), and homophobic (Sedgwick, 2004:31; Ward, 
2005), and this is what David suggests is the reason why GBME men are excluded from 
white gay venues in his interview extract on page 57. However some evidence points to 
the practice within gay venues of actually encouraging the presence of heterosexual 
women, some of whom may be homophobic. Many of the commercial gay venues 
across England appear to cater for and attract groups and parties of white heterosexual 
women, for example on hen nights. This is a point supported by academic studies (for 
example Skeggs, 1999; Pritchard, 2002) and media reports (Hensher, 2012). My field 
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notes from one particular night (17th September 2011) in a gay bar show that there were 
not only several groups of hen parties and birthday parties comprising white 
heterosexual women making up about fifty percent of the venue‟s customers, but that 
one birthday party group were making homophobic comments including one saying “I 
don‟t like it, it‟s not natural” with gestures of shaking her head and pouting (signifying 
disdain or disgust).  This is an important point since the exclusion of GBME men from 
gay venues by door staff is often due to categorisations of GBME men as either not 
being gay or accused of being potentially homophobic heterosexuals. However this 
excuse for excluding GBME men from white gay venues by the door staff clearly does 
not apply to white, heterosexual, and actually homophobic women. Derek‟s interview 
echoes what David says about this assumption around BME homophobic violence, 
supporting the suggestion that these racialized discourses are also positioning GBME 
men within the white gay spaces.  
 
Derek:  I‟ve never had that problem with race on the gay scene, at all. 
 
R: hmm. 
 
Derek:   I‟ve never been denied, er, I would say, yeah, sometimes when I go to a new 
gay, gay scene like if I go to say [northern city],  
 
R: hmm. 
 
Derek:   the bouncer might ask me „are you gay?‟, as I‟m walking in.  
 
R: hmm. 
 
Derek:  I‟ll just look at him and laugh, and he‟ll be like „yeah he‟s so gay!‟ yeah you 
know. [pause].  It comes from a place where you know, they understand that a lot of 
people from BME communities frown upon homosexuality. So when someone who‟s 
from that community walks into a place, which normally is frowned, frowned upon,  
 
R: hmm. 
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Derek:  they have to ask the question. 
 
R: so [interrupted]. 
 
Derek:  they need to make sure you know what you‟re doing, you‟re going into a gay 
venue, and there may possibly be gay people hitting on you,  
 
R: yeah. 
 
Derek:   so instead of going in blind „oh I had no idea it was a gay bar why are they 
hitting on me‟ and kicking off. You‟re told that this is a gay venue. If you go in other 
men might fancy you and you may be offended. If that offends you at this point we‟re 
going to reserve the right of admission. 
 
Derek is interpellated as a „homophobic straight BME man‟ with the speech act „are you 
gay?‟, but then subsequently interpellates himself as gay by laughing at the door staff. 
Derek‟s and David‟s interview reveal how the current discourses around BME 
homophobia are dominant in the gay community and in gay culture. However this is 
contrary to evidence suggesting there are no associations between BME groups and 
greater prevalence of homophobia than for WME groups (Chambers, 2004; Lemelle, 
2004; Ward, 2005:502). It also conveniently omits the evidence of recent homophobia 
in England with „Section 28‟, the previous ban on homosexuals in the armed forces, 
delays in implementing sexual orientation legislation, the present ban on gay marriage 
(not the same as the permitted civil partnerships), and recent polls suggesting high 
levels of homophobia in society (Grey, 2012; Sherriff, 2012a, 2012b; Spedd ing, 2012). 
Derek also implies that the door staff assume that BME men are too stupid to realise 
that a gay venue would have gay people in it “they need to make sure you know what 
you‟re doing, you‟re going into a gay venue” where the types of gay venue described 
by Derek would have very explicit posters outside, culturally understood signifiers of 
gay culture, and of course people queuing and entering the venue who would be read as 
gay through dress style, behaviour, and conversations. This assumption would suggest 
the citing of discourses around racialized intellectual inferiority or cultural naivety.  
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Derek‟s comments draw attention to the process of reading and categorising racialized 
bodies, with the statement “so when someone who‟s from that community walks into a 
place”. This raises the question as to how the door staff at gay venues read and 
categorise a body as belonging to a BME community, where it could be argued that the 
same processes of categorisation occurring at gay venues are those found in society in 
general, for example the somatic readings described by Haritaworn (2009) which I 
explore further in chapters five and six. What may also be significant is Derek‟s use of 
the singular “that community” and not „this‟ or „our‟ community regarding BME 
groups, thus conflating all BME groups into a perceived „community‟ and separating 
BME groups off from Derek‟s imagined gay community. This supports my earlier use 
of the term „unwanted racialized Other‟ for the body being read by door staff, rather 
than any specific BME category around „race‟. What suffices for the positioning is that 
the individual is not read as white. Jasbir Puar suggests that:  
 
“The move from visibility to affect takes us from a frame of misrecognition, 
contingent upon the visual to discern the mistake (I thought you were one of 
them) to the notion of resemblance, a broader affective frame where the reason 
for the alikeness may be vague or repressed (you remind me of one of them)” 
(Puar, 2006:187). 
 
 This would suggest that the sensing of GBME men as „unwanted racialized Other‟ by 
door staff, facilitated through the process of ambiguity, blurring, and conflation of BME 
categories, relies as much on affective information as it does representational meanings. 
If the door staff can‟t comprehend the racialized attributes (a particular „race‟) they have 
to „sense‟ them as anyone non-white. Here we can relate Puar‟s (2006) ideas with the 
descriptions from my interviewees regarding the differences between the categorical 
discursive phenomenal perceptions and the affective phenomenal perceptions, where the 
door staff are not just asking about the „race‟ of the GBME man trying to enter the gay 
venues or simply reading a „race‟ visually (for example skin colour), but affectively 
registering the racialized Otherness of the GBME man who reminds them of “one of 
them” (Puar, 2006:187) and who Derek suggests might start “kicking off”. This should 
not be read as me suggesting that „race‟ is not an issue here, far from it since race is 
interwoven in all social interactions in England, but that in this context, „race‟ 
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(categorically) is less important than that the GBME body transmits sensings that elicit 
the interpellation „unwanted racialized Other‟ from the door staff.  
 
Derek also points to corporeal metaphors of affective information, with the expressions 
“frowned upon” “hitting on me” and “kicking off”, where here frowning implies 
affective qualities around disapproval, hitting-on implies affective qualities around 
being approached by someone who is sexually interested, and kicking-off implies 
affective qualities around aggression. The other affective reaction is expressed by 
Derek‟s comment “I‟ll just look at him and laugh”, this suggests affective qualities 
around confidence, self- interpellation, as well as diffusing the tension (Katz, 1999). The 
act of laughing becomes an affective „speech act‟ which interpellates Derek into the gay 
community associated with the gay venue, yet it also transmits affective information 
itself as the initial process of sensing the interpellation. The act of laughing also helps to 
diffuse the tension between the door staff and Derek (who comes from an African 
country and will be read and categorised as BME by the door staff), although his 
strategy could potentially result in violence towards Derek if the door staff are in a 
hostile mood that evening. Derek here shows us how affective information is 
interwoven within the social script being cited around the processes for door staff 
interrogation at gay venues, and these in turn imbricate the racialized discourses and 
interpellations. Derek‟s description of him laughing shows us that the affective qualities 
associated with the laughter (possibly though not exclusively related to flamboyant 
sarcasm, confidence, ridicule, self-esteem) become interwoven phenomenally with both 
the rejection of the racialized interpellation by door staff „you‟re a heterosexual 
homophobic racialized Other‟ and Derek‟s simultaneous interpellations „I‟m gay‟ and 
„you‟re idiots‟. In addition, Derek‟s moment of laughing could also symbolise the 
temporal point of the re-rendering of his gay subjectivity over the emergent straight 
subjectivity imposed by the interpellation by the door-staff. The meanings sedimented 
within life-world expressed through the interpellation impact upon Derek‟s unified Ego, 
which he understands as implicating heterosexuality. These meanings around 
heterosexuality will become interwoven with Derek‟s unified Ego at some level. 
Through the rendering of his unified Ego with the affective qualities around the laugh, 
Derek „flips‟ the meanings back to his subjectivity and identity as a gay man, and also 
transmits this meaning to the life-world, thereby replacing, unravelling or overlaying the 
heterosexual meanings with gay meanings. The affective qualities around the laugh not 
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only include the emotions, but also the force of sound particularly in the corporeal 
topography of the head, the abdomen and chest, and to a lesser extent the limbs, and so 
the sense is experienced throughout the whole unified Ego. 
 
Across the two interviews Derek expresses the position that he feels there is no racism 
on the gay scene:  
 
Derek:  I‟ve never had that problem with race on the gay scene, at all. 
 
And in another extract: 
 
Derek: you know I have not experienced any racism on the gay scene.  
 
Yet Derek does not have relationships with men of African descent due to past 
experiences in his own African country of homophobia:  
 
Derek: [when] I first came to the UK, I did not want a relationship with a black man 
because of the experiences of homophobia in [African country]. Imagine having come 
from an African country where every black person hates gay people.  
 
This is not to discredit his comments regarding „race‟. In fact they are very revealing, as 
it shows how „race‟ operates according to the privileges of whiteness, and how 
whiteness has the potential to interpellate non-white „races‟. Derek does date white men, 
in spite of the explicit recent and current homophobia in English culture and society 
from traditionally white institutions and cultural groups. The white men are not 
collectively positioned by Derek as „homophobic‟ yet the men of African descent are, in 
spite of the fact that Derek himself (as a non-homophobic gay African-heritage man) 
proves his own collective positioning of other BME men as „homophobic‟ to be 
logically flawed. This suggests that the racialized mechanics of mis- interpellation 
utilises the racialized privileges of whiteness as a-paradigmatic, heterogeneous, and 
individualised (Dyer, 1997; Song, 2003; Chambers, 1997), in contrast to blackness as 
typologized, homogenous and collectively responsible (Dyer, 1997; Hall, 2012; Song 
2003), in order to maintain the racialized boundaries which protect the white gay 
community as white. In order for Derek, as an African-heritage man, to remain outside 
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of his own collective interpellations as „homophobic‟, he has to position himself within 
discourses of exceptionalism (Puar, 2006). Here Derek has said that every “black 
person hates gay people” but of course this cannot be true as he is also black and gay. 
However he has positioned himself outside of the discourses as „exceptional‟ and also 
revealed the discursive conflations of „black equals heterosexual and homophobic‟, 
where he has not qualified his statement or provided a more accurate alternative.  His 
comments here reflect the dominant discourses which elicit and sustain the practices by 
door staff at gay venues who categorise and interpellate GBME men as „heterosexual‟ 
and „homophobic‟, and mis- interpellate GBME men from the valorised white gay 
community. Derek also relates the discourses which position people of African descent 
as homophobic to those around cultural and social „evolution‟. This extract is part of the 
same paragraph in the interview transcript as the previous extract and Derek here relates 
homophobia with „cultural evolution‟:   
 
Derek: [...] a new belief system that was introduced to the African people and the 
African people took to that new belief system to the point that they abandoned their own 
traditional beliefs for Christianity throughout, I mean voodoo became evil in the eyes of 
God  [...]  a few years down the line then your beliefs were portrayed as evil at the same 
time that homosexuality is evil. 
 
R: but it sounds like from your past experiences, your experiences here would always 
seem slightly more, slightly easier than back home, if that makes sense? 
 
Derek: I think the people in this country they went through what the Africans went 
through. The evolution of how their culture developed from a culture of without 
electricity, a culture without water, we had buckets down the streets you had to boil the 
water to have a shower. Things like that, before that people lived just like Africans. Not 
just about development. Just differences in lifestyle and rate of development, you know, 
life has, life evolved a lot faster than us in Africa. 
 
Here Derek is suggesting that the homophobia in African countries is related both to the 
original imposition of Christianity by European colonisers and also to what he says is 
Africa‟s lower cultural, social and technological development and present lifestyle, 
compared with present-day UK, where he compares the past „undeveloped‟ UK society 
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as where “people lived just like Africans” with present-day Africa. This reflects the 
colonial discourses around the primitive (Brown, 2001), although this seems to 
reconfigure the discourse from the original colonial discourses around unrestrained or 
deviant sexuality ( Nagel 2003; Said, 1978; Stoler, 1995) or indigenous religious beliefs 
(Conklin, 1997; Fanon, 1993; Lindenbaum, 2004; Simpson, 2007) where Derek also  
conflates voodoo and homosexuality as simultaneously targeted by colonial discourses. 
Derek points to the current hyper-moralistic religious prohibition on sexuality as 
indicative of primitivism (Ali, 2008:37; Philips, 2007) suggested by Derek‟s relating 
religion with homophobia (as he does throughout the interviews). It is debatable of 
course whether white European culture is more evolved, considering the horrors of 
colonialism, the holocaust, and recent wars. It is also debatable as to whether white 
European society is or was more technologically advanced, where positive notions 
around „technology‟ may be erroneously conflated with Western representations of 
capitalism and industrialisation in the public imaginary. However present-day cultural 
representations and discursive formations sustain these ideologies of white supremacy 
in diverse global public imaginaries.  
 
The current Western discourses around African, Caribbean, Middle-Eastern, and Asian 
countries‟ homophobic policies can be viewed as evidence for a contemporary 
discursive formation conflating primitivism, „race‟ (and faith as „race‟) and homophobia 
(Ali, 2008; Philips, 2007). This may be derived from the previous colonial discourses 
around primitivism, „race‟, and sexuality (Goldberg, 1994; McClintock, 1995; Nagel, 
2003; Said, 1978; Stoler, 1995) and reconfigures previous colonial discourses which 
positioned colonised nations‟ homosexuality as indicative of the primitive (Hoad, 
2000).  These global racialized discourses find localised variants within England, which 
for example conflate (white) LGBTQI rights discourses with racialized discourses 
including those around immigration, race and racial hierarchy, faith, nationalism, 
belonging, terrorism (Puar, 2006), crime, violence, lower cultural capital, and lower 
intelligence that position BME groups as the „unwanted homophobic racialized Other‟. 
By contrast Aleardo Zanghellini (2012) disagrees with the idea that (white) LGBTQI 
groups are utilised in opposition to BME groups in contemporary racist discourse and 
suggests this interpretation by British Black Queer authors is both unsubstantiated and 
paranoid (2012:363), claiming epistemological invalidities and political bias 
(2012:361). These politicised critiques by authors from outside of the Black Queer 
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position is one reason why more empirical research is necessary to support the Black 
Queer position that white LGBTQI rights discourses are often operationalized in ways 
which cause violence to BME groups through the citing of colonialist discourses (Erel 
et al., 2008; Puar, 2006a, 2006b; Haritaworn et al., 2008).   
 
The comments by Derek and David about the assumption of violence from BME men in 
gay venues in England can also be read alongside these contemporary homosexualized-
racial colonial discourses to cite the positionings around the primitive and less-than-
human. As well as the mis- interpellation of GBME men from the valorised white gay 
community, I would suggest, following Derek‟s comments on African development, 
that the interpellation „you‟re not gay‟ or „are you gay?‟ qua „you‟re BME‟ also 
interpellates GBME men collectively as „you‟re not white and so not rac ially superior‟. 
This through the performativity of the exclusion (GBME interaction with the door staff) 
also intersubjectively interpellates the gay venue‟s clientele as „we are white and 
racially-superior‟ and the dominant subjects of the valorised white gay community. 
Although Derek was talking about Africa and African men, these discourses and 
positions around violence, primitivism and homophobic violence by BME groups are 
found in various configurations for other racialized groups in society for example 
Muslims (El Tayeb, 2012). These discourses also contribute to the conflated 
overarching racialized discourses and positionings around the „unwanted racialized 
Other‟, which depreciate GBME men relationally to the valorising of the white gay 
community. The (invisible) interpellation „you‟re BME‟ therefore relates to meanings 
and discourses around the unwanted racialized Other for GBME men attempting to 
enter a white gay venue, yet it simultaneously inscribes the gay venue and the clients 
who are allowed entry as white, where here whiteness directly implicates discourses 
derived from colonialism related to white supremacy. I now go on to discuss the 
conclusions for this chapter.  
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have shown how the interpellation of GBME men within white gay 
spaces elicits a range of affective qualities around feeling unwelcomed or excluded, and 
how these in turn are related to racialized meanings and positionings around the 
unwanted or dangerous Other. There are also alternative responses that relate to 
strategies employed by GBME men to resist the interpellations and mis- interpellations 
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such as avoiding white gay venues, ignoring backgrounded interpretations of racism, or 
foregrounding meanings around exceptionalism.  
 
In section two I showed how interpellations and mis- interpellations by door staff at 
white gay venues are sensed by GBME men as related to „race‟. What I also showed 
was that there was no „visible‟ citing of „race‟ in the speech acts from the door staff, but 
rather that the racialized meanings were drawn from the invisible white Gestalt. Here 
the attributes of the invisible white Gestalt include the racialized discursive formations, 
the local gay community‟s culture (where for example racialized discourses are often 
reconfigured around homophobia), the performativities resulting from interactions 
between the door staff and the GBME body, the material and structural conditions 
which produce valorised gay cultures, and the embodied subjectivity of GBME men 
(here related to phenomenal perceptions and affective information). Through sensing 
the invisible white gestalt, GBME men can derive understandings which the speech acts 
attempt to elide or obscure. Hence GBME men understand that the speech act „are you 
gay‟ or „you‟re not gay‟ is an interpellation „you‟re BME‟ and positions them as the 
unwanted racialized Other. 
  
The invisible white Gestalt is made visible from the descriptions of affective qualities 
experienced by GBME men in my interviews with them. This approach is important 
since, as we have seen in this chapter, the discursive modalities interwoven with the 
speech act between the door staff and the GBME men are loaded with duplicitous and 
covert methods of denial and invisibility. When the door staff say „you‟re not coming in 
because it‟s a private club‟ most GBME men will read the „invisible‟ message „you‟re 
not coming in because you‟re black‟, and this reading is often done using affective 
information which elicits affective qualities around exclusion. Additionally 
interpellation occurs through other modalities such as the gaze, spatial location of 
bodies, and touch. The act of touching interpellates GBME men as the unwanted 
racialized Other, though here more explicitly foregrounding meanings around crime and 
violence.  
 
I would suggest that what is occurring in these examples is actually a strategic mis-
interpellation. It is a strategic mis- interpellation because the speech act „you're not gay‟ 
or „are you gay?‟  mis- interpellates GBME men from the (white) gay community and 
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simultaneously interpellates GBME men as the unwanted racialized Other, in order to 
maintain the whiteness of the gay venue. As a strategic mis- interpellation the speech 
acts by door staff extends the domains through which the interpellation can impact. Not 
only does it result in excluding GBME men from the white gay venue, but it also 
participates in the process which attempts to both mis- interpellate GBME men from 
belongings within the valorised white gay community, it positions GBME as the 
unwanted racialized Other, it positions the white gay venue within the valorised white 
gay discursive formations in which it can justify the exercise of power (Foucault, 2002) 
over its population, and it maintains the whiteness of the gay venue and gay community.  
 
If one of the reasons for identifying the LGBTQI community as white is due to the 
augmented status, the valorising effect of whiteness, then we should consider what 
advantages this confers. Here I would suggest that one of the advantages, following 
Jasbir Puar‟s (2006a) discussion around homonationalisms and Jon Binnie‟s (2004:21) 
discussion of how LGBTQI rights are utilised in nationalist discourses, is that this 
intersubjective interpellation of the gay community as white may also benefit the gay 
community by interpellating it into the white English national or nationalistic identity, 
thereby seeking to strategically reduce homophobia from white heterosexual society, 
perhaps also through the relational increase in racist violence against BME groups. 
Another reason for the identification of the LGBTQI community as white is that it may 
reduce the historical animosities, homophobia and transphobia for example between gay 
men and lesbians (Halberstam, 2005; Humphrey, 1999; Yeung et al., 2006), 
homosexual categories and bisexual categories (Alexander, 1999; Hemmings, 1995; 
Young, 1997), sexual categories and Trans/Intersex categories (Alexander, 1999; 
Humphrey, 1999) and Queer and (homonormative) LGBTI groups (Alexander, 1999; 
Duggan, 2002). By unifying these historically divided and hostile groups through the 
racialized discourses around whiteness, the LGBTQI community can (temporarily) halt 
their internal conflicts and redirect their hostility by scapegoating BME categories, this 
both unifies the white LGBTQI community politically and reduces internal hostilities 
and conflicts. 
 
The subjective identifications with whiteness or dis- identifications with blackness 
amongst GBME men are also part of the invisibility of whiteness. Here whiteness (as an 
always-present) has become part of their subjectivity such that it helps to make the 
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whiteness of a space invisible to them, and also protects them from negative racialized 
interpretations about themselves or the eliciting of negative affective qualities. This can 
occur through using strategies of subjective exceptionalism, or being incorporated into a 
white Gestalt of white bodies (both inter-corporeally and inter-subjectively) where one 
GBME body becomes less phenomenally black as part of a larger group of white bodies 
entering a gay venue.  Here we find that GBME men are using the invisible white 
Gestalt to help reconfigure their positionings and resist interpellations. Derek for 
example draws upon discourses around exceptionalism (from other BME men in 
Enlgland and Africa) and also on discourses around primitivism where he now 
considers himself to be geographically, historically and culturally distinct from the 
black people he constructs as being less than white people, perhaps even by virtue of 
himself being gay.  Carlos draws upon attenuation of his racialized subjectivities and 
the performativity and materiality of white bodies as camouflage for passing. This 
drawing upon the invisible white Gestalt for resources to enable passing and inclusion 
suggests that it is part of the background awareness for GBME men even when its 
explicit sense is denied. 
 
This chapter has also shown how interpellation operates through both sensings and 
meanings. Through the indicated sensings a GBME man understands that he is 
implicated and that this is something related to belonging or not belonging. The 
discursive meanings are interwoven later in time. This process is on going and changing 
over time, interpellation is never complete nor sufficient to produce the subject. The 
meanings transmitted by the door staff will change as discourses change, and so the 
process of interpellation initiated through affective qualities may result in a subjectivity 
different from the presumed identity to whom the interpellative address was intended. 
For example a gay South Asian man being refused entry into a gay venue prior to 2001 
will be interpellated as the unwanted racialized Other, yet after 2001 he will be 
interpellated as the dangerous racialized terrorist Other. In chapter four I look at the 
phenomenological processes around how the white gay gaze interpellates and alienates 
GBME men within white gay spaces. Here I develop further the concepts around affect 
and the affective topography, and how the affective qualities enable an understanding of 
the sense elicited by the racializations experienced by GBME men.  
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Chapter Four 
The Affective Topography: The White Gay Gaze and Affect  
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw how interpellation through speech acts and other 
practices such as stopping, interrogation and searching can elicit phenomenal 
perceptions within GBME men which help them interpret racialized meanings around 
whiteness in white gay spaces. Here I argued that the phenomenal changes in 
themselves interpellated GBME men in ways which are sensed and understood. 
Interpellation can also occur through the modality of the gaze (Haritaworn, 2009; 
hooks, 1992; Yancy, 2008), where meanings cannot be as easily categorically or 
semantically grounded as can be the case with speech acts. The white gaze is not of 
course simply the look from a white person, but can also be the disciplinary practice of 
the gaze to maintain the whiteness of spaces. In this chapter I explore how the 
interpellative white gaze operates within white gay contexts to elicit meanings, 
phenomenal perceptions and affective qualities sensed by GBME men through mapping 
the invisible white Gestalt.  
 
In section one I look at how the model and definition of affect by the 17th century 
philosopher Baruch Spinoza as set out in his Ethics (1899) can be used as the basis for 
developing a model of affect in combination with Husserl‟s (2001) model of how affect 
operates within phenomenology. Here I follow Husserl‟s (2001) suggestion that affect is 
part of all phenomenal awareness but that affective feeling elicits particular experiences 
related to feelings and emotions. I then describe some of the historical discourses 
around „race‟ and whiteness and use Frantz Fanon (1993) to look at how the white gaze 
operates to elicit racialized embodied subjective experiences. Here I use examples of the 
white gaze and Edmund Husserl‟s phenomenology to explicate and develop Spinoza‟s 
(1899) model around the core concepts of power of action and existence and the themes 
of positive and negative affects and their relationship to power. In section two I explore 
in greater depth how the gaze is interpreted by GBME men in white gay spaces, looking 
at the methods by which feelings and emotions are understood and interpreted by 
GBME men. I explore how power and affect operate within these contexts and consider 
some of the social processes which elicit feelings and emotions within the white gay 
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space. I will also discuss how the negative impact of affective qualities is resisted by 
GBME individuals and consider how the gaze can target particular topographies of the 
GBME unified Ego (the discursive, affective, corporeal) resulting in different affective 
outcomes. How does the white gaze operate in white gay spaces to elicit affective 
qualities in GBME men? How do GBME men interpret, understand and sense the white 
gaze through their embodied affective qualities? I end this chapter with conclusions 
where I discuss how the white gay interpellative gaze elicits affective qualities within 
GBME men which enable them to map and navigate the invisible white Gestalt, and to 
understand the indicated sensings and interpret the racialized meanings. In addition I 
discuss how GBME men can reconfigure the information within the invisible white 
Gestalt through various strategies. I now go on to discuss the theoretical approaches 
used in this chapter.  
 
Section One: History and Current Literature on Affect and the Gaze  
 
There is no consensus for the contemporary definition of „affect‟ (Thrift, 2008:175). 
The definition of affect has varied between academic disciplines and authors within 
those disciplines and has been used as the overarching concept for (Brennan, 2004:5) or 
interchangeably with concepts such as „emotion‟, „feelings‟, „moods‟ and „drives‟ 
(Brennan, 2004; Fussell, 2002; Izard et al, 1966; Parkinson, 1995; Ryle 1963; Seamon, 
1990:281; Sedgwick, 2004). David Seamon (1990:281) suggests that “the result is a 
series of competing theoretical presentations that frequently seem more a function of the 
researcher‟s fertile imaginations than a function of accurate sightings of human 
emotion”.  In addition everyday cultural and social uses of affective terminology are 
also used interchangeably in society in general. This then influences academic, 
institutional and psychiatric definitions, and which in turn re- influences general cultural 
uses of the concepts (Burkitt, 1999:110; Kovelses, 2002:115; Ryle, 1963:81). This leads 
to ever changing and diverse definitions for affective terms. The outcome being that 
academics who theorise affect in their research frequently fail to set out their definitions 
of emotions in terms of both epistemology and ontology (Burkitt, 1999:110; Hemmings, 
2005:551). It is important therefore, in this chapter to establish a robust set of theories 
and definitions which are relevant to my research question. Therefore I am defining 
affect as referring to “states of being, rather than to their manifestat ion or interpretation 
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as emotions” (Hemmings, 2005:551), which I develop further in this chapter using 
Baruch Spinoza‟s (1899) and Edmund Husserl‟s (2001, 2002) theoretical approaches.  
 
Many of the contemporary approaches to the topic of affect take Baruch Spinoza‟s work 
on affect the Ethics (1899) as a foundation for their ideas (for example Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2011; Massumi, 2001), and Judith Butler (1999b:20) advocates a return to 
Spinoza within Foucauldian approaches which she suggests would mean “pleasure 
might then be understood again in relation to pain, and both in relation to desire and the 
problem of recognition”. In this chapter I will outline how I will be developing 
Spinoza‟s (1899) approach, using his model of how affect relates to the social processes 
within the life-world as the basis for developing a phenomenological model derived 
from the work of Edmund Husserl (2001) which expands the definition of affect as 
„states of being‟ to the concept affective qualities. Both Husserl and Spinoza attempted 
to overcome the mind/body dualism critiqued by feminist authors (for example Ahmed, 
2000:41; Grosz, 1994; Lousley, 2009) of cultural „Cartesian‟ derived concepts around 
the „mind‟, „body‟, and affect (see Descartes, 1983:353-368). 
 
The gaze has been recognised as a powerful mode of communication between 
individuals and groups, often signifying social relations of power (Ellis & Beattie 1986; 
Fanon, 1993; Held et al., 2008;  Holmes et al., 2007; Sartre, 2007). For example Jean 
Paul Sartre (2007) describes „the look‟ as positioning the “Other as object” (Sartre, 
2007:281), where “the alienation of myself, which is the fact of being- looked-at, 
involves at once the alienation of the world I organize” (Sartre, 2007:287), and how „the 
look‟ here can be theorized as also involving non-ocular objects or interactions in the 
life-world such as a rustling bush (Sartre, 2007:281). Within the Marxist framework of 
Sartre‟s (2007) gaze and  Althusser‟s (1998) interpellation these concepts can be 
integrated, where the interpellative gaze can thus be said to simultaneously alienate the 
individual from themselves whilst incorporating them into a subjectivity framed within 
ideologies and discourses. 
 
The gaze in cultures where there are racialized/ethnicized  social categories affected by 
power hierarchies and differentials has the capacity to objectify (Nussbaum, 1995), 
categorise and subjugate the racialized „Other‟ (Ahmed, 2000, 2004, 2006a; Alcoff, 
1999; Baldwin, 1961; Bhabha, 1993, 2002; Dyer, 1997; Fanon, 1993; hooks, 1999, 
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1992; Puwar, 2004:41; Roediger, 1998; Vorlicky, 1997:250; Ware, 2002; 60; Yancy, 
2008). This often occurs through the initial reading of corporeal signifiers around „race‟, 
to which the white gaze is directed. George Yancy describes his experience o f the 
racialized gaze in an elevator with a white woman:  
 
“On the elevator my Black body is ontologically mapped, its coordinates lead to 
that which is always immediately visible: the Black surface. The point here is 
that the Black body in relation to the white gaze appears in the form of a sheer 
exteriority, implying that the Black body „shows up‟, makes itself known in 
terms of its Black surface. There is only the visible, the concrete, the seen, all 
there, all at once: a single Black thing, unindividuated, threatening, ominous, 
Black” (Yancy, 2008:21; original italics).  
 
Racialized white gazes can thus be productive of power relations derived from 
racialized discursive formations (Dyer, 1997:45; Fanon, 1993; hooks, 1999, 1992; 
Macey, 1999; Puwar, 2004:40; Roediger, 1997:37; Standigl, 2012; Yancy, 2008), which 
Yancy (2008) suggests give rise to the phenomenal experience of racialization around 
the „body‟ both in the space and for Yancy‟s own phenomenal sense of self (Yancy, 
2008:5) and embodiment (Yancy, 2008:14). The racialized white gaze has also been 
theorized as transmitting affective information (hooks, 1999, 1992; Yancy, 2008:15),  
for example around the theme of racialized hostility, which bell hooks describes as 
“terror”  (hooks, 1999:175, 1992:170). This concept of the hostile racialized white gaze 
is frequently associated with the concepts of racialized visibility and invisibility 
(Macey, 1999:13). The gaze transmits a range of social information including social 
categories and hierarchies associated with „race‟ (Alcoff, 1999:20; hooks, 1999; Yancy, 
2008) and can operate as a vector of power (Alcoff, 1999:20; Foucault, 1991; hooks, 
1999), and thus the gaze can obtain some of its power through disciplinary practices. 
Here a disciplinary approach would be one which operates “individually” and has “an 
uninterrupted constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its 
results and is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible 
time, space, movement” (Foucault, 1991:137). I now go on to look at how Frantz 
Fanon‟s (1993) description of the white gaze helps to explicate a racialized embodied 
understanding of the concept of affect.  
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Affect and the Historical White Gaze 
The gaze has been found to be a significant transmitter of affective information, as well 
as including social and other modalities of information, in social contexts (Ellis & 
Beattie, 1986). Here I am defining affective information as being information within the 
life-world which has the potential to elicit affective qualities. The white gaze is 
associated with the transmission of social meanings around  „race‟ directed at bodies 
„marked‟ by racial signifiers (Dyer, 1997; Fanon, 1993;  Montag, 1997:284; Roediger, 
1997:37), although as we saw in the previous chapter the reading of the racial signifiers 
may often rely upon perceptual ambiguity (Ahmed, 2000:129; Ali, 2005; Haritaworn, 
2009). The attributes of the life-world which elicit the racialized meanings of the white 
gaze include the racialized discourses, practices, and representations that are sedimented 
and circulating in society (Macey, 1999:11). However it is through the invisible white 
Gestalt that both the racialized meanings are interpreted and the sensings are 
understood, and therefore the gaze must also transmit sensings between individuals. The 
gaze impacts upon the phenomenological unified Ego as a socially situated, discursively 
constructed, and embodied individual.  This is evocatively described by Frantz Fanon, 
as we saw previously in chapter one, who reveals the impact of the gaze upon his 
phenomenal awareness:  
 
“And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white mans eyes. An 
unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real world challenged my claims. In the 
white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his 
bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a 
third-person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain 
uncertainty” (Fanon, 1993:110).  
 
Fanon (1993) is describing the moment when he encountered the white gaze in a 
particular context. For Fanon the white gaze not only related to himself information 
about his raced social position as a black man, but also rendered his subjectivity with 
affective qualities  associated with his sense of blackness which he had not experienced 
before, “an unfamiliar weight”. These affective qualities (for example feelings, 
emotions, and corporeal sensations) are described using corporeal metaphors and the 
citing of the body as the locus of his phenomenal perceptions.  In Fanon‟s description 
the white gaze transmits affective information which elicit affective qualities for 
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example the sense of a phenomenal disorientation or dissociation often echoed by other 
authors (for example Ahmed, 2004; Alcoff, 1999; hooks, 1999, 1991; 2004; Macey, 
1999; Yancy, 2008), where Fanon (1993:110) describes an “unfamiliar weight” and 
“difficulties in the development of his bodily schema”. Also in Fanon‟s (1993:110) 
example we find feelings of effort and struggle: “weight”, “burden”, “challenge”, 
“difficulties”, “negating”, “uncertainty”. In Fanon‟s (1993:110) description he is 
specifically addressing the „body‟, but in the wider context of this text he is also 
describing his subjectivity in general including the external atmospheres. One 
interpretation of Fanon‟s (1993:110) metaphors and descriptions around effort, striving, 
and struggle can be as feelings of a loss of power. In addition in Fanon‟s description we 
can see how the gaze and  affect are implicated in phenomenal perceptions around what 
would be in cultural „Cartesian‟ dualistic approaches referred to as the „body‟ and 
„mind‟ (Descartes, 1983), however I have defined these  in this thesis as interwoven 
topographies of the unified Ego, which I explicate in more detail in chapter five. The 
unified Ego, as defined in this thesis, consists of the discursive topography, the affective 
topography, the hyletic topography and corporeal topography, as well as the cognitive 
processes, where each of these are interwoven and interconnected dynamically without 
fixed essential/conceptual boundaries. As a concept the unified Ego helps to condense 
some of Husserl‟s (2001) ideas around the processes of embodiment, subjectivity and 
phenomenal experiences, which I discuss further in chapter five.  
 
Before returning to Fanon, I will briefly outline three theories on affect, by Baruch 
Spinoza (1899), William James (1884), and Edmund Husserl (2001) which are relevant 
to the analysis of the lived-Body. One of the major influences on contemporary theories 
of affect is Baruch Spinoza‟s definition of affect in part three of his Ethics: 
 
 “An affect which is called animi pathema is a confused idea, by which the mind 
affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or lesser power of existence than 
before; and this increase of power being given, the mind itself is determined to 
one particular thought rather than to another” (Spinoza, 1899:174; original 
italics). 
 
In Spinoza‟s (1899) definition we can already see that affect is related to both the 
“body” and the “mind”, and to “a greater or lesser power of existence” which can be 
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read here as the ebb and flow of phenomenal awareness elicited by affect. In addition 
Spinoza suggests that there is a process which brings to the foreground one “thought 
rather than to another”, thereby reducing to the background of awareness the other 
possible affects. Spinoza‟s references to mind and body are not in terms of dualism 
(Garrett, 1997; Della Rocca, 2008), but instead relate to phenomenal perception and 
power. An alternative approach is suggested by William James who theorizes that the 
„body‟ also manifests responses to emotions and that the „mind‟ then interprets these 
corporeal responses, giving the example of a friend suffering from a neurosis for whom: 
 
“The whole drama seems to centre about the region of the heart and respiratory 
apparatus, that his main effort during the attacks is to get control of his 
inspirations and to slow his heart, and that at the moment he attains to breathing 
deeply and to holding himself erect, the dread, ipso facto, seems to depart” 
(James, 1884:199). 
 
 In addition William James (1884:202) describes how in this model the „mind‟ in its 
perceptions absent the „body‟ would simply be cold categorical thoughts without any 
feeling.  
 
Edmund Husserl (2001) takes an approach to affect which has similarities with many of 
Spinoza‟s concepts including those around the confused idea, power of existence, and 
how affects foreground a given thought with others in the background. For example 
Husserl concludes that in all phenomenal awareness (and cognitive processes) there is 
some element of affect where he suggests that “we thus ascribe to every constituted, 
prominent datum that is for itself an affective allure acting on the ego” (Husserl, 
2001:211), and that where affect engages with the Ego it “excites it, calls it to action” 
(Husserl, 2001:214), and that “affection is distributed among immanently constituted 
objects and propagated (and with this how the entire living present, as it were, takes on 
constantly varying affective relief)” (Husserl, 2001:212). Here Husserl (2001:17) is 
using the term Ego as a conflation of lived-experiences as a unity “neither the corporeal 
human being, nor as the entire psychic life” but as “the centre to which are related 
perceiving, judging, feeling, willing”, and therefore can be read as both allowing for 
Spinoza‟s (1899) affirmation by the „mind‟ and also for William James‟ (1884) theory 
of the „body‟ as the locus of affects prior to perception by the „mind‟. Thus Husserl is 
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suggesting that the Ego, as a unity, is implicated in the phenomenological experience of 
affects, albeit with variations of involvement between parts and interconnections within 
the process. Husserl (2001:281; original italics) also differentiates “objectivating 
affection from the affection of feeling”, and here I interpret objectivating affection as 
being affect which brings a phenomenal object (real or ideal) into the foreground 
(following Spinoza‟s power of existence) and affection of feeling as affect which 
additionally elicits the themes of positive or negative qualities respectively. I will 
discuss this in greater detail in section two of this chapter, however I have mentioned 
this briefly here to help provide a rationale for my use of the term affective qualities in 
this chapter which conflates the qualia, sensings and meanings of phenomenal affective 
experience. 
 
Returning to Frantz Fanon‟s (1993:110) description of the white gaze we can relate this 
to Spinoza‟s (1899) and Husserl‟s (2001) definitions of affect where “the mind affirms 
of its body or any part of it, a greater or lesser power of existence” (Spinoza, 1899:174), 
which  I conceptualise phenomenologically as the unified Ego becomes affectively 
objectivated.  In Fanon‟s (1993:110) account this is suggested by the phenomenal sense 
of himself that he is initially describing upon meeting the white mans gaze “and then the 
occasion arose when I had to meet the white mans eyes. An unfamiliar weight burdened 
me”. Husserl (1969:386) describes the feeling of weight as a phenomenological 
operation upon perception, and in the context of Fanon‟s description it is the meeting 
with the white man‟s eyes which elicits the rendering of the unified Ego with the 
affective qualities around being pulled down and burdened. There is also the 
“atmosphere of certain uncertainty” which suggests a background level of awareness 
which is interpreted as an inchoate field, an atmosphere. I will explore atmospheres 
further in chapter seven, however the “certain uncertainty” also echoes the idea of 
multiple consciousness (Alcoff, 1999; Fanon, 1993; Yancy, 2008) discussed in the 
previous chapter, in this case projected into Fanon‟s life-world. This also shows us how 
diverse affective information can be simultaneously interwoven through various 
topographies of the unified Ego and life-world, here the general foregrounding of one of 
these affective qualities at a given moment (Husserl, 2001) is replaced by double or 
triple simultaneous foregroundings of affective qualities as a result of the power 
operating through the white gaze. This phenomenological reading of Fanon‟s 
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description of dissociation shows us how the topographies of the unified Ego can de-
cohere through the negative affective power of racialization.  
 
Fanon‟s description of the initial impact of the white gaze echoes Spinoza‟s (1899) 
notion of the confused idea where “consciousness of the body is solely a negating 
activity. It is a third-person consciousness” (Fanon, 1993:110) where “the body is 
surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty.” (Fanon, 1993:110). This suggests 
the process of the unified Ego sensing the affective information from the social 
environment and trying to make sense of it, with the outcome being related to “a greater 
or lesser power of existence than before; and this increase of power being given, the 
mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than to another” (Spinoza, 
1899:174). In Fanon‟s (1993:110) description we see a lesser power of existence 
described throughout the entire passage cited from him, elicited by the „simple action‟ 
of a white gaze. What Fanon shows us is that affect is part of the phenomenology of the 
lived-Body, rather than affect being a separate occurrence or process, such as in the 
hydraulic approaches to affect (Baldacchino, 2011) for example „energy models‟ 
(Freud, 1979) or „drive based‟ models (Hull 1943). Fanon offers ideas which are similar 
to those of Edmund Husserl outlined in this section, thus we see how the gaze (as a 
social phenomenon) elicits a phenomenal experience which implicates both the „mind‟ 
and the „body‟ and here elicits a range of affective qualities related to the sense of 
“weight”, “burden”, “challenge”, “difficulties”, “negating”, “uncertainty” (Fanon, 
1993:110). In addition Fanon shows us how the racialized gaze acts within the 
sedimented racialized histories of the life-world to elicit and transmit racialized 
phenomenal meanings, interwoven with the affective qualities.  
 
 In section two I go on to examine how the social information elicited by the white gaze 
is interwoven within the phenomenal perceptions of GBME men in white gay contexts, 
through Spinoza‟s concepts of power of existence, power of action, and the affective 
attributes of positivity, negativity and striving.   
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Section Two:  
Power of Existence, Power of Action, Striving 
 
In the previous section I showed how affect is involved in the processes of 
foregrounding and backgrounding within phenomenal awareness, and how these 
processes interweave the topographies of the unified Ego and give rise to experienced 
affective qualities. I also showed how the information from the white gaze transmits 
both discursive meanings and non-discursive sensings, which provide the understood 
sense of the experience. I now go on to show how affective qualities are related to the 
social context of white gay spaces.  
 
In the Ethics Spinoza (1899) describes affect as having three fundamental attributes 
namely: positivity, negativity, and desire (Della Rocca, 2008, 1997; Garrett, 1997; 
Spinoza, 1899:117). I will look at desire or what I describe as striving later on in this 
section, beginning first with positivity and negativity. Positivity is related to increase in 
power, and negativity is related to decrease of power (Della Rocca, 2008, 1997; Garrett, 
1997; Spinoza, 1899; Thrift, 2008). For Edmund Husserl “the general typicality of 
positivity or negativity” (Husserl, 2001:282) is also theorized with the terms 
“pleasurable or unpleasurable, agreeable or disagreeable” (Husserl, 2001:278) and for 
William James (1884:189) “pleasure and displeasure”. This use of power here by 
Spinoza is different from his use of the concept in the general definition of affect where 
„power‟ is referring to “power of existence” (Spinoza, 1899:174), or what Husserl refers 
to as “the allure given to consciousness” (Husserl, 2001:196), which I am theorizing as 
the foregrounding or backgrounding of a phenomenal object (including the topographies 
of the unified Ego). This objectivating affection is part of the general phenomenological 
concept of intentionality, were intentionality is being defined here as the directedness of 
phenomenological processes towards an object, in relation to the field of information 
(Husserl, 1969, 1970, 2001).  For Spinoza positivity and negativity “are simply the 
passage to a greater or lesser power of acting, a greater or lesser ability to bring about 
certain effects.” (Della Rocca, 2008:156). This power of action is directly related by 
Spinoza (1899) in the examples he gives in the Ethics to social contexts (Della Rocca, 
2008, 1997; Garrett, 1997; Spinoza, 1899). Therefore it provides a useful model for how 
the affects within the unified Ego and life-world are foregrounded from “objectivating 
110 
 
 
 
affection” to “the affection of feeling” (Husserl, 2001:281; original italics). This 
affection of feeling relates to what I refer to as affective qualities in this thesis.  
 
The approach of theorizing the „essential‟ attributes of affect has been adopted by other 
authors (for example Johnstone, 2012; Sedgwick, 2004; Thrift, 2008; Tomkins, 1966) 
with varying and diverse quantities and processes. Both Tomkins (1966:148) and 
Johnstone (2012) suggest eight „innate‟ affects, however Tomkins‟ conceptualisation of 
affect is derived from drive theory and biological models (Piette, 2011:294), and 
Johnstone‟s is influenced by socio-biology. Eve Sedgwick‟s (2004) theory of affect 
compares it to the Periodic Table, where a large number of „core‟ elements combine in 
complex mechanisms of interaction to produce affective qualities. All three authors 
consider affects to have negative or positive attributes. I prefer the concept of two core 
themes, derived from Husserl‟s (2001:281) affective concept of the “thematic gaze”, to 
which positivity and negativity (Husserl, 2001; James, 1884; Spinoza, 1899) are themes 
rather than component, constituent, or essential factors. This thematic approach takes us 
away from the „building block‟ approach which has essentialism (and scientism) at its 
conceptual core, and instead allows positivity related to increase in power of action and 
negativity related to decrease in power of action to become concepts which link affect 
to social contexts. Johnstone (2012:4) suggests the additional theme of „neutral‟ affects, 
however I will not be using „neutral‟ because I consider it a strictly hypothetical concept 
where as we shall see in this chapter the imbrication of the social context on 
phenomenal awareness creates affective dynamics which transform any potentially 
„neutral‟ affects into either positive or negative. Rather than affective qualities (for 
example moods, feelings, emotions) „possessing‟ the fundamental and essential 
attributes of positivity and negativity, these are two themes or typologies (Husserl, 
2001:282) to which “the affection of feeling” (Husserl, 2001:281; original italics) 
becomes linked to social contexts and power, and will be referred to here as positive 
affective qualities and negative affective qualities. Affective qualities, as outlined 
previously, are the interweaving of qualia and the dialectical relationship between 
sensings and meanings.  Therefore in this thesis I will be discussing affective qualities 
elicited by social interactions such as emotions around anger or feelings of being 
uncomfortable. The range of possible affective qualities can be “infinite” (James, 
1884:191) or “manifold” (Husserl, 2001:282). In addition whether affects or affective 
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qualities are positive or negative will depend upon the wider life-world context 
(Johnstone, 2012), as my interviews with my respondents show.  
 
Brian‟s interview shows us examples of both the power of existence and the power of 
action resulting in negative affective qualities related to frustration and injustice, 
resulting here from the white gay gaze. Here the gaze is used to convey phenomenal 
meanings and qualities through avoiding direct eye-to-eye contact or by avoiding direct 
interactions: 
 
R: I was wondering if anything has happened inside a club that has made you feel 
uncomfortable?  
[...] 
Brian: just stuff like maybe being at the bar, the bar person sort of doesn‟t acknowledge 
that you‟re there and they serve somebody else. 
 
R: yeah, and you‟ll be waiting there for a while.  
 
Brian: yeah. Or being at the bar and someone pushes in front of you like they can‟t see 
that you‟re stood there. 
 
R: yeah. 
 
Brian: er, walking through the pub or somewhere, oh yeah that's a good example there, 
just came back to me then, [name of gay club], erm, I‟d come out of the toilet and as I 
opened the door, somebody was standing there, and they were there standing in my face 
expecting me to move out of the way, instead of us both. 
 
R: yeah, yeah. 
 
Brian: sort of thing, he was just going to stand there and as if he was going to walk 
straight through me, so it‟s just stuff like that I guess. 
 
R: hmm. 
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Brian: and when you think about it more it does come back to you. 
 
Here we see how Brian is being ignored by both the bar staff and the other customers in 
the gay venue, reflecting the racialized performative invisible Other (Baldwin, 1961:70; 
Hall, 1996a:441; Julian & Mercer, 1996) who are strategically denied self expression 
within the discursive formations in social spaces (Spivak 2011).  The gaze here can be 
viewed as a non-seeing or non-noticing gaze with Brian‟s descriptions:  
 
doesn‟t acknowledge that you‟re there 
[...] 
like they can‟t see that you‟re stood there 
[...] 
as if he was going to walk straight through me 
 
Yet this non-seeing gaze transmits meanings and sensings about both Brian and the 
social space. This non-seeing gaze attempts to negate Brian‟s phenomenological power 
of existence, to cease to be an acknowledged and recognized presence in the gay space, 
which thereby positions Brian as „out of place‟ (Douglas, 2002; Knowles, 2003:25; 
Puwar, 2004). Brian‟s response to my question as to what makes him feel 
uncomfortable also includes phenomenal corporeal topographic descriptions such as:  
 
being at the bar the bar person sort of doesn‟t acknowledge that you‟re there, 
[...]  
someone pushes in front of you,   
[...] 
somebody standing there, and they were there standing in my face expecting me to move 
out of the way 
[...] 
he was just going to stand there and as if he was going to walk straight through me 
 
This has the potential to negate Brian‟s subjective sense of self  as an individual existing 
in that space, where he uses the expressions „you‟re‟, „you‟, „I‟, „ me‟ , „my‟. The 
expression by Brian “he was going to walk straight through me” combines in the gaze 
both the non-seeing with the non-sensing where not seeing can involve the strategic 
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negotiation of the bodies in spaces, yet to attempt to walk straight through someone 
shows that the white people in gay white spaces are negating Brian‟s power of existence 
by communicating their pretence of not sensing Brian in the life-world. Here we see 
how the gaze interpellates Brian using affective qualities around feeling uncomfortable 
and renders Brian‟s unified Ego with sensings and meanings around being „out of 
place‟. The effort required by the bar staff and customers in avoiding making eye 
contact indicates Brian‟s presence is sensed by those in the gay space, yet the act of 
avoiding communicates meanings and sensings that they are negating and denying this 
sense of Brian‟s presence. Imran in the interviews describes a specific bar person in a 
white gay venue who habitually ignores both him and his Asian friends when they are 
trying to buy drinks: 
 
 Imran: you want to go to a bar, expect to be served straight away, enjoy your drink 
and enjoy the rest of the night, not wait an hour and then be served. If it dragged on I 
would say something to someone.  I‟d ask to speak to the manager, I‟d ask to speak to 
someone higher. Why are we still waiting and why are other people coming in and 
being served [...]. 
 
R: it sounds as if it would bother you? 
 
Imran: yes to some extent it would bother me [...] If she is there I would think „it‟s her 
again, I‟d better not go there‟. There would be something there in the back of my head if 
I saw this person [...]. 
 
R: what do you think the other white people see or feel when they notice you not being 
served? 
 
Imran: like everyone else they want to be served quicker than everyone else. As long as 
they get served they don‟t care if they‟re before someone or after someone, or if they‟re 
pushing in, as long as they get served they don‟t think twice. 
[...] 
Imran: I‟ve not said owt [sic; colloquial for „anything‟] maybe, because we‟re just the 
Asians there, maybe it might get out of hand, or we might get thrown out, so I let it go 
on until we‟re served.  
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R: do you think that's fair? 
 
Imran: no I don‟t think it‟s fair. 
[...] 
 
R: obviously you have this perception of this particular bar person. Have you discussed 
this with other gay Asian friends? Do they agree? 
 
Imran: yes they do agree because every time we go to a night club we‟re in twos or 
threes or fours and we‟ve all experienced that. 
 
R: from the same person? 
 
Imran: from the same person. 
[...] 
Imran: the longer I wait the more angry I get. 
 
R: how does the anger feel in your body? 
 
Imran: when get angry and I‟m waiting for someone I tend to move around a lot in that 
same spot.  
 
R: shuffling? 
 
Imran: yes, yes, moving around in circles, moving your arms around to get attention.  
 
The  gaze has an additional impact on power of action, whereby the non-sensing gaze 
results in Brian and Imran not being served at the bar, or being pushed in front of or 
blocked by the other customers. This power of action is related to  striving which in the 
description by Brian and Imran is negated by the actions of the non-sensing gaze. 
Spinoza‟s definition of desire is related to appetite and striving (Arnheim, 1961; Della 
Rocca, 2008, 1997; Spinoza, 1899). William James (1884:189) refers to similar 
affective concepts around “interest and excitement”. For Husserl (2001:282) desire is 
related to affects which have “tendencies of a turning towards” and attributes of 
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“striving after or driving away from”, and is the affective augmentation of 
phenomenological intentionality.  For Spinoza and Husserl in this context it is not desire 
in the sexual or erotic sense of the term often conflated in everyday communication. 
This conflation of „striving‟ and „erotic desire‟ occurs in some academic literature on 
affect (for example Deleuze and Guattari, 2011; Holmes et al., 2007), where Deleuze 
and Guattari (2011:35) also use the additional term “intensity” to define this conflation. 
Therefore, for clarity, here I will be using the term desire to refer to the affective quality 
of desire: the sexual, erotic, sensual connotations of the term. I will be using the term 
striving as appetite for (Spinoza, 1899) and striving towards (Husserl, 2001), in place of 
the term „desire‟ (which is of course not to say they are mutually exclusive). Within the 
life-world striving can be theorized as being a topographical translation towards or 
enveloping of a phenomenological object by the affective topography extending out 
from the unified Ego into the life-world, which therefore foregrounds the object with a 
greater power of existence. This I would suggest provides a simple description of the 
theory of “intentionality” or directedness within phenomenal awareness using 
topographies (see McIntyre, (1982) for an alternative description from a cognitive 
science approach). 
 
One attribute of striving for Husserl (2001:282) is that in the action of turning towards, 
the completion of the act or object, the affective-striving to orient oneself toward the 
object is decreased. This is important since it is one mechanism by which an individual, 
group, or social space does not become saturated with affective information, but that 
this affective information de-coheres, loses its effect upon the power of action, as a 
result of sensed completion. This is important for both individuals and social groups in 
that it creates a sense of closure rather than an iterative amplification of affects over 
time which may cause harm to individuals or social groups. It may also de-cohere 
meanings from being understood as sensings as a result of the exponential 
interpretations of meanings resulting from the potentially ever increasing affective 
information in the life-world. For Brian and Imran their striving to get served at the bar 
is blocked by the non-sensing gaze, thereby decreasing both their power of existence 
and their power of action, resulting in negative affective qualities of frustration or 
feeling unwelcomed. In addition Husserl‟s (2001:282) idea of the attenuation of the 
affects once the striving has been satisfied can be seen by the sense of the continued 
frustration felt by Brian and Imran. Although Brian and Imran were finally served at the 
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bar, this is not the only striving that they wished for, otherwise they would be content 
with this event and perhaps have forgotten it or described it to me positively in the 
interview. Rather, as Imran suggests the additional striving for his unified Ego was to be 
treated the same way as the other (white) people at the bar, to be served in a fair and just 
manner, to be acknowledged and recognized in the gay space.  
 
Husserl (1969:323) describes how affective qualities can linger in the background long 
after they have transitioned away from phenomenal perception. The decrease in Brian 
and Imran‟s power of existence and power of action elicited the initial negative 
affective qualities, but the inability to satisfy the act of completion for the striving 
towards being treated equally compared with the white people, results in the negative 
affective qualities of a continued mood (i.e. a lingering, inchoate, backgrounded feeling) 
of frustration and resentment related to experiences within the gay spaces. In addition to 
the affective qualities felt by Brian and Imran are the affective qualities experienced by 
the other white people in the gay space where their power of existence and power of 
action would be productive of positive affective qualities (satisfaction, presence, ease of 
being), including where Imran suggests that the people at the bar don‟t care about 
injustice “as long as they get served they don‟t think twice”. Here white people being 
preferentially served at the bar, with the power to discriminate with impunity or 
invisibly, shows how whiteness operates as an „invisible‟ racial category or discourse 
through its dominant status whilst simultaneously visible to those marginalised by it 
(Ahmed, 2000, 2006; Bonnett, 2000; Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993; Collins, 2004; 
Julian & Mercer, 1996; Knowles, 2003; Mills, 1997; Puwar, 2004;  Song, 2003; Ware, 
2002; Yancy, 2008). Positive affective qualities may also be elicited by the sense of 
comfort from being a white individual in the white (gay) space (Ahmed, 2004, 2006a, 
2006b; Puwar, 2004), where the sense of comfort helps to maintain the invisibility of 
whiteness.  
 
In addition, for anti-racist white people in the gay space, there may be negative affective 
qualities resulting from empathy with the GBME man being discriminated against, 
however their racial privilege would nevertheless result in increase in their power of 
action within the life-world of the gay space unless this was actively directed against the 
racist life-world and actors. Hadreas (2007:92) suggests that the „invisibility‟ of BME 
people results in empathetic blindness, and therefore it may be in anti-racist white 
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people‟s best interests to not notice these incidents and so not have to empathize and 
interpret racialized meanings. By not empathizing this prevents their own decrease in 
power of action, as anti-racist white people who are unable to act against racism, from 
eliciting negative affective qualities.  
 
The increase in power of action for the white person will also occur as a result of the 
awareness that the white person has violated the (tacit) social rules of equal treatment 
and fairness by being served first or having the power to ignore the GBME man waiting 
to be served. This may elicit affective qualities within the white individuals in the bar or 
club of schadenfreude (pleasure obtained from another‟s misfortune) and/or affective 
qualities and social meanings around racial status privilege (Ahmed, 2000:46, 
2004:163). Here the white individual‟s increase of power of action is imbricated with 
Brian‟s decrease of power of action producing what Della Rocca (1997:243) calls 
“affect transition”. The potential schadenfreude and privilege as positive affective 
qualities for the white individual results here from both the white individual‟s relative 
increase of power of action and Brian and Imran‟s relative decrease of power of action, 
which are relationally linked to the white individual within the gay space.  
 
Imran shows us how he responds to the negative affective qualities around anger by 
considering complaining to someone more powerful than the bar person (namely the 
manager) and physically shuffling around where he is waiting. This is Imran attempting 
to phenomenally increase his power of action, through „ideal‟ strategies by imagining 
complaining, and „real‟ strategies by animating his body so that his anger is more 
acutely communicated to the life-world.  This also increases Imran‟s power of 
existence, where being ignored by the bar person (as a reduction of power of existence) 
is countered both by imagining being listened to in a conversation with the manager 
(discursive topography), and by Imran moving around physically to indicate his 
phenomenal presence both to himself and others (corporeal topography). Imran‟s 
comments about the other customers at the bar simply having their own interests in 
being served could be interpreted as a neutral affect (Johnstone, 2012), however they 
are also participants in the process by which he is not being served and so contribute to 
the dynamics of both the negative and positive affective qualities in the life-world.  
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Christopher‟s interview also helps to explicate how power of action and existence 
operate within white gay contexts, where Christopher chooses to render the life-world in 
a particular way to elicit positive affective qualities. In this extract we are discussing a 
previous occasion where he and I were the only two BME people in a popular gay 
venue in London: 
 
Christopher: it doesn‟t bother me, I just look around and think „I‟m the only black 
person here, fine‟. I just get on with it, right. But I am probably the worst individual that 
can give you any kind of stuff, simply because I hold a position within the community, 
and that position is recognised by everyone.  
 
R: hmm. 
 
Christopher: so it‟s not a case of people seeing me and making me out to be something, 
„what are you doing here?‟, right. 
 
R: hmm. 
 
Christopher: in fact actually on the other hand, I am sought after.  
 
Christopher is talking about the white gaze in gay spaces where he is the only GBME 
person in that space, a typical demographic described by all of my interviewees. Here 
Christopher describes how he interprets the affective information transmitted by the 
white gaze as rendering him with positive affective qualities (namely respect, 
recognition of status). Here the power of action, which he describes as related to the 
social context  of his power within the gay community as a well known activist, results 
in positive affective qualities. He interprets the gaze as signifying recognition of his 
status, affirming his power of existence, and interpellating him as an LGBTQI leader or 
icon “in fact actually on the other hand, I am sought after”. These combine to create a 
milieu in which Christopher feels his striving, his ease and comfort within the gay 
spaces, are unproblematic, where his „race‟ is not a negative issue. However 
Christopher is aware, at some level, of the discourses circulating within the gay space, 
particularly those related to belonging and „out of placeness‟ (Douglas, 2002; Puwar, 
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2004), which comprise practices of governmentality and discipline (Foucault, 1991, 
2000; Stoler, 1995). 
 
Implicit in Christopher‟s account here is the suggestion that for some GBME people the 
white gaze in the gay space might signify interpellations and positionings associated 
with „and making me out to be something‟  which in racialized discourses within white 
gay contexts this could be categorising BME people as criminals or homophobic 
(Johnson, 2005; Lemelle, 2004:40; Nero, 2005; Puar, 2006a). In addition to being a 
metaphor for racialized positioning, it also suggests the constructed nature of the social 
meanings where through the gaze the GWME man is actively “making” the racialized 
phenomenal „object‟, interweaving diverse phenomenal modalities and topographies. 
Christopher therefore echoes both Fanon (1993) and Yancy (2008) who describe the 
gaze as constructing the racialized dehumanized “something” within the racist public 
imaginary. In addition the white gaze might enforce the invisible disciplinary question 
„what are you doing here?‟. Here „you‟ refers to Christopher as a racialized object not 
recognized as a person, in relation to „here‟ which is the controlled racialized space of 
the white gay club. The rhetorical question signals that the racialized boundary of the 
white gay space has been transgressed and that the gaze has monitored this and 
transmitted information, sensings and meanings into the life-world.  
 
In the context of the interviews, Christopher is clearly referring to his presence as a 
black body read as signifying a non-white „race‟ within the gay space, and hence 
positioning himself within discourses of exceptionalism (Puar, 2006a; Yancy, 2008:17) 
where he suggests he is not negatively affected by the racialized discourses, whilst 
remaining implicitly aware of how other GBME people may be positioned. For other 
GBME people in the white gay space who do not have the status within the LGBTQI 
community Christopher possesses, this “performative white gaze” (Yancy, 2008:23) 
will reduce the power of action and power of existence for other GBME people who 
may be present in the gay space. Throughout the interviews Christopher refers to being 
positioned as someone watched from a distance and admired. Here we find a striving to 
be the object of the gaze, where Christopher suggests that he interprets the gaze as 
transmitting positive affective qualities, in this context in terms of admiration or 
alternatively desire, as Christopher‟s comments indicate regarding going to gay venues 
generally: 
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Christopher: you walk into an environment and suddenly the terminology is „you're a 
fresh piece of meat‟. So everybody suddenly looks at you. 
 
And: 
 
Christopher: so I liked being the one who stood out from afar. So yeah „look at me, 
feast on me‟, I don‟t have a problem with that. 
 
Here for Christopher the white gaze in gay spaces can also be interpreted as signifying 
erotic or sexual interest which he frames in a positive way (although he hints that for 
some people this sexual objectification may be an issue by stating: “I don‟t have a 
problem with that”), enjoying the attention he gets from the GWME men. This supports 
Martha Nussbaum‟s (1995:251) suggestion that sexual objectification can be positive or 
negative depending upon the social context. His use of the terms “fresh piece of meat”, 
and “feast on me” suggest metaphors of the hunter, the prey, being hunted, and 
consumed. These hunter/prey metaphors echo the colonial discourses that position black 
ethnic groups (and the colonised regions‟ resources) as the vulnerable „Other‟ to be 
exploited by powerful colonial forces (Ahmed, 2000; Bhabha, 1993:xv; Fanon, 1993; 
Said, 1978; Stoler, 1995).  Alternatively the hunter/prey metaphor may become part of 
an exchange of these roles within economies of gay desire for example being a „top or 
bottom‟. William Pinar who is a Gay White Majority Ethnic (GWME) academic, 
describes the effects of the white gaze on African-American male individuals as well as 
the subjective processes and meanings within white individuals:  
 
“Can you not see that desire for the Black man‟s body is intertwined with racial 
subjugation and racism, as his subjectivity, his individuality are effaced, lost in 
your gaze, evaporated in your desire? We White men still fantasize a physical 
intimacy with Black bodies, especially Black male bodies, imagined today 
primarily as a fear of crime, of being robbed, raped or murdered. Still we 
imagine a Black man in our bedroom” (Pinar, 2003:284).  
 
Pinar‟s description is useful in making visible the shared social meanings between 
WME and BME gay men, and to the interpretations GBME men have regarding the 
white gaze, where too often GBME individuals are told they are „imagining‟ their 
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experiences of the white gaze, as though their racialized interpretations are incorrect, 
over-sensitive or paranoid (Goldberg, 1994). It also suggests that the role of the hunter 
and the role of prey may exchange dynamically during a social encounter. This 
exchange is supported by Christopher who stated in the previous extract that he enjoys 
being feasted upon whereas in other interviews he suggests he enjoys being the “lone 
wolf”. Of course the enactment of a particular role does not negate the overarching 
dominant discursive positionings, and a GBME man being positioned as the „hunter‟ 
will still cite the racialized discourses around crime and violence, outlined by Pinar 
(2003) and discussed in chapter three of this thesis, which will ultimately decrease the 
GBME man‟s power of action.  
 
Here the white gaze transmits affective information sensed by Christopher as erotic or 
sexual interest, rather than in the previous account by Christopher where it was sensed 
as admiration. The gaze in many gay cultures and subcultures (for example saunas, bath 
houses, parks) depending on location can be an important (Pronger, 1990:198) or the 
dominant vector of communication (Holmes et al, 2007). Here communication with the 
eyes is used to transmit a vast vocabulary of understood sensings and interpreted 
meanings between gay men, within contexts which according to tradition, culture, and 
practice “verbal communication was minimal” (Holmes et al., 2007:279). The power of 
action which creates the positive affective qualities for Christopher are both the act of 
entering the gay space “you walk into an environment [...] So everybody suddenly looks 
at you”, and the impact his presence has on drawing towards himself the gaze of the 
white people in the gay space “So everybody suddenly looks at you”  and “look at me, 
feast on me” . There is a spatial dynamic here where both the acts of entering the space 
“you walk into an environment” and standing at a distance from the crowd “stood out 
from afar”, draw in attention from the white gaze. This suggests that the transgressing 
(or potential transgressing) of spatial boundaries and discursive boundaries regarding 
the positionings of being „in place‟, „out of place‟, or „ambiguously placed‟ within a 
social context, may also be an attribute of the processes around the gaze. In addition the 
sense of transgressing culturally signified boundaries (as power of action) may 
contribute to Christopher‟s positive affective qualities (Bakare-Yusuf, 2008; Johnson, 
2005:141). Here Christopher‟s power of action is used to overcome the racialized 
cultural restrictions, and in both doing this (in the moment) and achieving this 
(afterwards) Christopher is phenomenally rendered with positive affective qualities.  
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In this section I have shown how the phenomenological approach to affect based on 
theories by Husserl (2001) and Spinoza (1899), can be used to explicate social 
processes resulting from the white gay gaze that elicit the phenomenal experiences 
within GBME men in white gay spaces. This phenomenological approach theorizes that 
affect is part of the background of all phenomenal awareness, and that particular 
phenomenal objects are brought into the foreground and can be rendered with affective 
qualities as a result of particular social experiences. The white gaze transmits affective 
information which is rendered within the affective topography and transmits discursive 
information which is rendered within the discursive topography. These are interwoven 
to elicit affective qualities that give an understanding and interpretation of the affective 
dynamics of the invisible white Gestalt.  
 
In the next section I expand upon the concept of affective qualities to show how they 
relate theoretically to emotions and feelings. I also show in greater detail how 
understood sensings can be reconfigured and interpreted as meanings through the 
interweaving of the topographies of the unified Ego.  
 
Section Three:  
Testing Ambiguity, Rendering the Affective Qualities  
 
In the following extract Brian talks about how the gaze is one of the social processes 
used to transmit affective information within the context of gay clubs and bars, and goes 
into detail about how he interprets this. Here we began by exploring themes of how to 
interpret the gaze where it is possibly open to a range of meanings: 
 
R: so for example in a gay bar someone might look at you and they might fancy you, or 
that same person might look at you and  they might be hostile and aggressive, towards 
you or make you feel unwelcomed, what‟s the difference in the way they look? 
 
Brian: [pause] well if they‟re looking at you and they like you they're usually smiling I 
guess, 
 
R:   right. Yeah. 
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Brian: just a bit cheerful. 
 
R: right. Yeah. 
 
Brian: and they're still carrying on doing what they‟re doing at the same time. 
 
R: yeah. 
 
Brian: it‟s when they're, just so hard faced, that they‟re really zoning in on you,  
  
R: hmm. 
 
Brian: sort of thing. 
 
R: and I mean is it about the face, or the eyes or body language?  
 
Brian: it‟s all of it, all of it combines. Hmm. 
 
For Brian, the meanings around of the gaze are tested regularly to make sure he is 
making correct interpretations, for example by moving around the bar to make sure he is 
the target of the gaze. The modalities for transmission of the gaze here are no n-verbal 
namely the eye gaze, the expression on the face, and the body language all transmit the 
meanings as being hostile, aggressive or unwelcoming or alternatively desiring. The 
performativity of these gestures again is dependent upon racialized discourses 
circulating within the gay space, where discourses specifically mentioned by my 
interviewees in the previous chapter relate to perceptions and stereotypes around BME 
criminality, homophobia, primitivism and aggression. There is a sense of the subjective 
spatiality conferred through the gaze with the expression „they‟re really zoning in on 
you‟ as well as a sense of a targeted penetration of personal space, and so the sensings 
and sense are also involved in Brian‟s experience of the gaze.  
 
Jack Katz (1999:332) describes how in these social contexts an individual “has a 
comfortable or awkward sense of self, appreciates the strangeness or familiarity of the 
scene, has a feeling about how the action is going. One commonly feels situations.” It is 
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through this feeling mechanism that an individual achieves a rapid understanding of 
sensings in social contexts, which a discursively expressed interpretation would fail to 
achieve as rapidly or efficiently (Freund, 1998:274; Johnstone, 2012:20; Katz, 1999), 
where in gay social spaces the intuitive sense when reading non-verbal signals is 
important to understand desire or rejection (Holmes et al, 2007).  This is echoed in 
Brian‟s description of his sense of feeling and intuition about what is going on in the 
gay space, and how following this intuitive feeling he tests his hypothesis: 
 
Brian:  I go out of my way to make sure what I‟m feeling is what I‟m feeling.  
 
R: yeah. 
 
Brian: and you know, I do usually end up kicking off and getting into arguments. 
 
R: so you've had arguments with people in gay bars about [interrupted].  
 
Brian: yeah, yeah, yeah. 
 
R: so, do you want to explain something about that, so what were they, for example. If 
you could give one example and what they were doing? 
 
Brian: it‟s all about them, basically staring at you or what ever,  
 
R: yeah. 
 
Brian: sort of, erm, if you're stood at that point and they might be looking at you, they 
might be looking elsewhere, so you move somewhere else,  
 
R: hmm. 
 
Brian: and they're still staring at ya, 
 
R: yeah. 
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Brian: so you think, maybe they're looking at you in a good way, or they're just one of 
those people that are just hard faced anyway, so you smile, 
 
R: [laughs] they‟ve had too much Botox. 
 
Brian: yeah, so you smile back, and they‟ll have a funny attitude with you or what ever,  
 
R: right. 
 
Brian: so I just get funny back with them [laughs]. 
 
R: [laughs].  
 
Brian: so, like I said I go out of my way to make sure, that that is what it is. 
 
Brian‟s description offers us examples of the distinction between the affective qualities 
of feelings and emotions in this thesis, as I will go on to explicate. In sections one and 
two of this chapter I used the term affective quality as the overarching term to define the 
interweaving of qualia and the dialectical relationship between sensings and meanings 
around affects within the unified Ego. There I explicated affective qualities (as the 
overarching concept) in terms or positivity, negativity and striving, and how these are 
related to the social and phenomenological processes around power of action and power 
of existence. Phenomenologically there can be infinite affective qualities within the 
unified Ego, yet each with the attribute of striving and themes of either positivity or 
negativity (Butler, 1999b; James, 1884; Husserl, 2001; Spinoza, 1899). Two typologies 
that are obtained from the overarching concept of affective qualities are feelings and 
emotions (I explore the affective quality and field of atmospheres in chapter seven). 
 
Within the literature on affect we find that feelings are generally defined as affective 
qualities which last for a specific period of time and can be attributed to a particular 
object (Brennan, 2004:5; Ryle, 1963:97; Izard, 1996:10), for example “how it feels to 
be comfortable. Say you are sinking into a comfortable chair. Note I already have 
transferred the affect to an object („it is comfortable‟)” (Ahmed, 2004:148).  One can 
also feel “awkward” (Katz, 1999:332) in a gay space (short-term or for the duration one 
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is in the space, and attributed to oneself being in the space/environment). The GBME 
men in my interviews may feel frustration or anger as an intuitive reaction towards the 
gay venue door staff who exclude GBME people from entering.  Feelings tend towards 
the sensed experiences and understandings.  
 
We find emotions  are often defined in the sociological and psychological literature as a 
general term for moods, psychosocial emotions, and feelings (Brennan, 2004; Ryle, 
1963), but also defined as affective qualities that have a relationship to thought 
(Arnheim, 1961:341; Brennan, 2004:6;  Parkinson, 1995:9; Ryle, 1963:110; Izard, 
1966:10) or a psychosocial basis (Munt, 2007). I am already using the term affective 
qualities to encompass feelings and emotions (as well as other affective qualities such 
as moods, atmospheres, and bodily states) as a general and inclusive term.  
I am therefore only defining emotion here as being an affective quality which has 
interwoven  discursive or psychosocial meanings, as Sara Ahmed (2004:194) suggests 
emotions are not associated “with individuals and their interior states or character, nor 
with the quality of objects, but with „signs‟ and how they work on and in relation to 
bodies”. Here the discursive topography and the affective topography interweave to 
produce the embodied experience of emotions.  For the GBME men in my interviews 
the exclusions from a (white) gay bar might be sensed as feelings of frustration as an 
intuitive reaction, but this is “metamorphosed” (Katz, 1999:337) where the feelings of 
frustration are subsequently (or concurrently) psychosocially reconfigured into 
emotions of anger and injustice around the socially contextual interpretation that „race‟ 
may be the reason for being excluded. Embodied emotions within the unified Ego arise 
from the interweaving of the discursive topography and affective topography, in the 
dialectic between meanings and sensings.   
 
In Brian‟s example this distinction between feelings and emotions can be seen where he 
says “I go out of my way to make sure what I‟m feeling is what I‟m feeling”, where the 
second use of the term „feeling‟ is about the initial sense that the gaze is unsettling when 
you first notice the man staring, and the first use of the term „feeling‟ is synonymous 
with the subsequent emotions around the interpretation that the stare of the man has 
hostile racialized meanings. Here the initial feelings are metamorphosized into emotions 
through the phenomenal interweaving of racialized social meanings. Brian‟s initial 
affective quality of being stared at is a feeling, a short period of time with a focused 
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object (namely the initial stare from the GWME man across the bar “zoning in”), 
eliciting multiple intersecting feelings of being uncomfortable or uncertain. When Brian 
says “I go out of my way to make sure”, “so you move somewhere else” and “so you 
smile back”, his actions as psychosocial and behavioural strategies that are situated 
within a social context, transform or metamorphosize the feelings into emotions (where 
emotions are defined as affective qualities with a discursive or psychosocial 
component).  
 
Brian says “I do usually end up kicking off and getting into arguments” and this raises 
the question as to why would someone staring at Brian in a gay space result in the 
elicitation of feelings and emotions associated with anger?  The power of action here is 
the power of the white gaze to position Brian as „out of place‟, the stare indicates and 
expresses that Brian is seen by the GWME man in this context as unwelcomed or a 
threat. Brian makes sure he confirms his initial feelings by making extraordinary efforts 
to test or refute his understanding, even smiling back in the hope that the man may 
desire him as a sexual partner or socially as a friend. The white gaze in gay social 
contexts is never one singular GWME individual positioning or interpellating a 
racialized Other in the white gay space. Rather it results from performative gestures 
which are read by the GBME person being positioned, by all the other people present, 
and the life-world. The gaze is rendered through the intersubjective life-world as a 
perceptual field of surveillance, action, and penetration of the Other. The performative 
act of one individual staring at a black body, reiterates and re-signifies the GBME 
individual as „Other‟ to the entire life-world within gay spaces through the gaze citing 
racialized discourses. Although it may be that in different contexts it is the person who 
is staring who unwittingly signifies themselves as „Other‟ for example a white racist at a 
Black conference or a heterosexual homophobe who stumbles into a gay bar. 
Nevertheless even in these two cases the dominant racist and homophobic discourses 
are still cited, reiterated, and reinforced in the act. The GWME man staring at Brian in 
the gay bar has a wider impact on Brian‟s experience within the gay space both 
synchronically and diachronically, and in this context will decrease Brian‟s power of 
action and power of existence. This I would suggest is an aggressive act by the white 
gay life-world and the actors within it, and the decrease in Brian‟s power of action and 
existence will result in negative affective qualities, in Brian‟s case the feelings, 
emotions, and bodily responses (“kicking off”) around anger.  
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In Brian‟s description he appears to suggest he is mirroring the affective information 
being transmitted: “they‟ll have a funny attitude with you”, “ so I just get funny back 
with them”. This return of the affective information by enacting a funny attitude back at 
them is intended to reduce the power of action and elicit negative affective qualities in 
the person who has been staring at Brian. By doing so, Brian is attempting to 
reciprocate the decrease in power of action in the individual who was staring. Brian 
does this by „naming‟ or symbolising the meaning of the stare as an enactment of the 
racialized gaze. The stare no longer exists as an „invisible‟ or „ambiguous‟ sense of 
affective information (although of course explicitly visible to Brian), but is revealed as a 
signifier of racialized interpellation and positioning. Brian cannot (in this context) 
position the white person staring within racialized discourses of the racialized Other by 
reversing the gaze (Macey, 1999:13), yet he can imply or explicitly name him as a 
racist, which in current political discourses around „equality and diversity‟ within 
England may result in embarrassment for the person staring. This in turn would reduce 
the white racist man‟s power of action within the social space of the gay bar when this 
is registered by the life-world. Alternatively Brian risks being labelled as a paranoid 
trouble-maker by those who are unsympathetic to issues around racism or who are 
themselves racist, a consequence Brian seems to be aware of as evidenced in the lengths 
to which he goes to confirm his understanding of the situation. This alternative 
consequence for Brian, has the potential to amplify the initial impact of the gaze. Like a 
spring- loaded trap saturated with the power associated with racialized discursive 
formations around whiteness including those on „race‟, class, nationalism, belonging, 
and sexuality, when Brian names the racialized stare, he risks direct hostility from the 
entire life-world of the gay space. Indeed within the interviews he says he has been 
asked to leave gay spaces on occasions. Exclusion from the gay space is an extreme 
form of reduced power of action, yet shows how a „simple‟ stare can carry so much 
affective information (Yancy, 2008:66), and elicit so many significant affective qualities 
when performatively enacted within the invisible white Gestalt. From the interviews in 
this chapter we can see that the gaze is a powerful strategy (voluntary or habitual) for 
maintaining racialized boundaries in white gay spaces.  
 
In James‟ interview we discuss the question of the gaze in gay spaces and how he 
interprets the difference between the desiring gaze and the hostile gaze. Here we find 
some of Brian‟s and Christopher‟s themes are echoed and elaborated upon, including 
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the notion around the „invisibility‟ of affect (Crossley, 1998:26), and the interpretation 
of facial gestures (Planalp et al., 2002:64; Gibbs et al., 2002:127): 
 
R: how were they looking at you, because that's something I [interrupted]? 
 
James: well the looks can vary, sometimes you can get a look, and you know, I can only 
be subjective because I really don‟t know what they were thinking,  
 
R: yeah, 
 
James: but at a guess, you get some looks, that are insolent,  
 
R: hmm. 
 
James: „what‟s he doing here?‟  
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: you get some looks that, yeah, make you feel, you walked into the wrong place,  
 
R: hmm. 
 
James: „are you sure this is where you?‟ , you get some looks that might be [pause] 
vaguely lustful, 
 
R: hmm. 
 
James: vaguely sexual, erm, 
 
R: [interrupts] can I ask how do you tell the difference? 
 
James: in terms of where they look? 
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R:  I mean how can you tell the difference, [...] how can you tell the difference between 
a hostile look and a desiring look? 
 
James: well if someone has a desiring look they tend not to spend too much time on 
your face, 
 
R: right. 
 
James: they look down towards your crotch or, 
 
R: right. 
 
James: or they might look at your, your behind, if you turn around, and  you can catch 
them doing that. 
 
R: right, yeah. 
 
James: and you know they might lick their lips,  
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: there are things people do. Body language is really powerful you know. People 
can send a lot more messages by what they do than what they say. And, you know, you 
can tell if a look is hostile or if it‟s a friendly look,  
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: because if someone is looking at you friendly, you know, they‟ll smile, they‟ll 
nod, and acknowledge you, 
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: but a hostile look, you know, they‟ll squeeze their eyes, and, so you can usually 
tell, if you know what you‟re doing.  
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Here we find James describing his experiences in general and the understanding of the 
non-verbal vocabulary used in communication in gay contexts (Holmes et al, 2007) 
where James says “body language is really powerful you know. People can send a lot 
more messages by what they do than what they say”. James does not need to talk about 
testing his hypothesis since he has been on the gay „scene‟ for thirty years longer than 
Brian, and has learnt how to interpret the stares from GWME men more quickly as 
friendly, desiring or hostile. However James‟ understanding of the subjective nature of 
his interpretations where he says “I really don‟t know what they were thinking” points 
to one of affective information‟s „invisible‟ attributes. There are some consistent 
features associated with interpreting the stare, such as the “hard faced” quality Brian 
described, for James read as “they‟ll squeeze their eyes” which modifies the gaze into a 
tighter more focused targeting „laser beam‟, as well as distorting the face into a grimace, 
thereby transmitting clearer affective information.   
 
Earlier in the chapter we saw Christopher‟s comment about the gaze not “making me 
out to be something, what are you doing here” which suggested Christopher‟s 
awareness of the gaze as a potential signifier of „out of placeness‟ for other GBME men. 
James echoes this with his comments  “„what‟s he doing here?‟” , “you get some looks 
that, yeah, make you feel, you walked into the wrong place”, and “„are you sure this is 
where you‟”. In James‟ examples we see the white gay space naming itself as the „here‟ 
and the „this is where you‟. Through the transgressing of the racialized boundaries the 
white gay space reveals itself to be racialized as white within the communication to 
James and the life-world that this is the „wrong place‟ for BME people. Implicit in the 
concept of the „wrong place‟ is that there must be a „right place‟ for GBME men outside 
of the boundaries of the white gay space (Held et al, 2008:147). This imagined „right 
place‟ for GBME men helps to maintain the phenomenal limits of the white gay 
community.   
   
In addition James‟ interview supports my previous discussion of Christopher‟s 
description of the racialized Other as object. In James‟ interview „he‟ and „you‟ refer 
not to James as an individual but as an unwanted racialized Other. This racialized 
objectification within a white space echoes the concept of the „hate stare‟ found in racist 
societies (Fanon, 1993; Ware, 2002:60). The hate stare not only transmits affective 
information to racialized Others as being unwanted or out of place, but also 
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communicates the intersubjective understanding that those transmitting the hate stare 
are experiencing affective qualities around hate and anger. James also says he can 
interpret the gaze as insolence, thereby positioning himself alongside Christopher‟s self-
affirming narratives, because for the white gay gaze to be insolent would require James 
to have a sense of self which maintained his confidence and self-esteem, thereby 
helping to maintain his power of existence (and potential power of action) and resist the 
potential negative affective qualities elicited by the gaze.   
 
James also echoes Christopher‟s “fresh piece of meat” comment around the 
„hunter/prey‟ discourse, when he talks about the gay man who “might lick their lips” to 
indicate lust or desire, and this comment follows on from James describing the gaze 
upon the crotch or buttocks, suggesting body-parts being desired both in behavioural 
actions of oral- genital/anal sexual acts, and as symbolic trophies for the hunter or 
sexual predator. In addition there is a friendly look, which James‟ description suggests 
differs from the desiring or hostile gaze: 
 
James: because if someone is looking at you friendly, you know, they‟ll smile, they‟ll 
nod, and acknowledge you, 
 
Here we see that the gaze is not focused upon the crotch or buttocks, but upon the face: 
the eyes, the smile, the nod of the head (as an amplification of the gaze with the head 
following its orientation). These are associated with acknowledging “you”, and I would 
suggest that the you here is the individual as a person being recognized as a fellow 
human, rather than the racialized Other as either a trophy object (for example the gaze 
upon the crotch and buttocks) or as an unwanted GBME man in a racist gay bar (for 
example the gaze as squeezed eyes). Frantz Fanon (1993:217) describes how the social 
impact of recognition affects an individual‟s subjectivity suggesting “it is on that other 
being, on recognition by that other being, that his own human worth and reality depend. 
It is that other being in whom the meaning of his life is condensed”. The friendly gaze 
(a positive affective quality) increases the power of existence for James as he is 
acknowledged and recognized as a fellow gay man in the gay space, and is interpellated 
into the gay community situated within that gay space. The hostile gaze (a negative 
affective quality) decreases the power of existence and action for James as this can be 
interpreted as positioning him as a racialized Other in the gay space, and mis-
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interpellates him from the gay community. The desiring gaze can both increase and 
decrease James power of existence, where the desiring gaze can signify the 
objectification of James as a sexual object/trophy within racial discourses (Perez, 2005; 
Pinar, 2003) and thus render James with negative affective qualities (such as feeling 
exploited or stereotyped), or alternatively could signify and indicate James as an 
attractive person and render him with positive affective qualities, depending upon the 
social context. The hostile gaze is transmitted with less affective information (squeezed 
eyes) compared with the friendly gaze (eyes, nod, smile) and so the hostile gaze lends 
itself towards being sensed, whereas the friendly gaze more readily communicates 
meanings.  
 
James‟ description of the multiple possible sensings and meanings of the gaze helps to 
show “our relationship to the otherness of Being cannot be adequately described as 
wholly reciprocal or wholly contesting and appropriative. It is both, and it is in being 
both that the ambiguity of our condition lies” (Bergoffen, 2000:64). Yet it is this 
ambiguity at an intersubjective level that also acts to render the racialized gaze as 
invisible, where negative racialized meanings can be strategically denied by the voices 
of GWME men, and the voices of GBME men are dismissed as irrelevant. Some 
attributes of the gaze are read by GBME men in ways which GWME men would 
probably also agree, for example the lustful licking of the lips or the friendly smile. Yet 
how would a GBME man relate to other GWME men their phenomenal perceptions of 
the gaze as communicating hostility, insolence, and racialized Othering? These can be 
easily denied as misreading the signals or oversensitivity.  
  
James talks about how his unified Ego senses the gaze where he says “they might look 
at your, your behind, if you turn around, and you can catch them doing that”. This 
echoes Brian‟s comments around sensing the gaze in bars earlier in this chapter. Here 
James‟ comments imply that he has sensed the gaze behind him and caught them, rather 
than accidently turning around. In the short gay film En Malas Compania (2000) the 
young gay character who is cruising in a shopping mall says “if you stare at a mans 
back for long enough he will turn around”.  Here we find an affective quality sensed 
through the affective topography of the unified Ego or possibly even a spec ific feeling 
in the corporeal topography of the buttocks. Teresa Brennan (2004) suggests a number 
of mechanisms through which affective information is sensed and transmitted within 
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social contexts, one example being how crowds of people communicate through 
pheromones, and this may well be one of the ways in which gay men communicate in 
gay spaces, however in this context pheromones may not elicit the specific sense of 
someone staring at one‟s buttocks. Husserl (2001, 1969) describes a number of 
phenomenological processes related to affect which could explain this sensing in terms 
of information in the life-world. Husserl suggests that “under certain conditions 
likewise movements of pleasure or displeasure, desires, even resolves, are already lively 
before we „live‟ „in‟ them, before we carry out the cogito proper, before the Ego „gets 
busy‟ judging, pleasing, desiring, willing.” (1969:323). One model suggests that the 
space-time processes in the life-world can be extended into the past to render the past 
backgrounded phenomenal object with affect, and this can also be projected into future 
phenomenal objects (Husserl, 2001:204). This is essentially a temporally fluid „affective 
arc‟ which imbricates the matrix of phenomenal objects in the life-world and brings 
these objects, which are meaningful within the particular social context, into the 
foreground of phenomenal awareness.  Therefore, rather than James having „eyes in the 
back of his head‟, he will have sensed the gaze upon his buttocks through interpreting 
and understanding the affective information within the life-world, and intuitively 
(within his cognitive processes) anticipated the actions of the white man gazing at his 
buttocks. This in turn makes James intuitively turn around to catch the man staring at 
his buttocks.  
 
In this section I have shown that the white gay gaze is capable of transmitting complex 
sensings and meanings which GBME men need to understand and interpret accurately 
to negotiate the social space of white gay venues. Here the invisible white Gestalt 
provides the phenomenal template from which to map the parts present in the white gay 
space and enables specific and accurate sensings and meanings to be made by GBME 
men. The invisible white Gestalt can be manipulated by GBME men through 
reconfiguring the parts to help clarify meanings and sense, this can be done spatially 
with the black body moving in the white gay space, it can be done through the reading 
of body language which in itself is a corporeal Gestalt open to multiple readings, and it 
can be done through the reconfiguration of the temporal flux of the life-world. I now go 
on to discuss the conclusions for this chapter.   
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Conclusions 
In this chapter I showed how the interpellative white gay gaze elicited affective qualities 
within the affective topography of the unified Ego of GBME men. In section one I gave 
a brief overview of the role of affect in social theory and how the white gaze has been 
theorized in relation to affects and power. I then looked at how the gaze can be 
theorized using Spinoza‟s (1899) and Husserl‟s (2001) models of affect and how this 
can be used to give a phenomenological reading of Frantz Fanon‟s description of the 
racialized gaze, and I used this to explicate the embodied sensing of affects in racialized 
contexts. In section two I looked at how Spinoza‟s (1899) concepts of power of action 
and existence can be used to describe the impact of the racialized interpellative gaze on 
affective qualities experienced by GBME men in white gay spaces. In section three I 
looked at how the concepts defined in section three can be used to theorize feelings and 
emotions and how GBME men use their mapping of the invisible white Gestalt to 
navigate, interpret and reconfigure the information circulating within white gay spaces.  
 
The interpretations by GBME men of racialized meanings in white gay spaces occurs 
through the affective qualities elicited by the social processes involving power of action 
and existence. These social processes involve the intersubjective communication of 
affective information, sensings and meanings mapped through the invisible white 
Gestalt. The pattern of the „parts‟ of the invisible white Gestalt help to communicate the 
sensings and meanings to all the actors in the life-world, and here they can be 
manipulated and reconfigured by actors to produce negative or positive affective 
qualities. One of the most significant „parts‟ of the Gestalt is the racialized discursive 
formation within the white gay space, and this can be foregrounded through 
performativity and the citing of these discourses in various ways, for example the 
avoiding white gaze. Other parts of the Gestalt may need to be sensed through 
interactions eliciting affective qualities around for example desire or hostility from the 
white gay gaze. By reconfiguring the parts of the invisible white Gestalt, GBME men 
can confirm racialized meanings they have sensed using affective modalities. For these 
meanings to retain coherence they must remain within the mapping of the invisible 
white Gestalt, such that the „parts‟ are arranged to provide the „shapes‟ sufficient to read 
the „whole‟. Here particularly the whole indicates the sensed understanding of the life-
world as saturated with whiteness. In chapter five I go on to explicate the corporeal 
topography of the unified Ego using Husserl‟s phenomenology, and show how the 
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interweaving of the discursive and affective topography with the hyletic topography 
enables GBME men to understand sensings within their embodied subjectivity and 
interpret the racialized meanings in the life-world.  
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Chapter Five 
The Corporeal Topographies of the Unified Ego: 
Racialized Embodied Subjectivity 
 
 
Introduction 
In chapters three and four I looked at how a phenomenological approach to 
interpellation, the gaze and affective information helped to show us how racialized 
meanings could be interpreted by GBME men from the social space of white gay 
venues. I also showed that sensing of the white gay space was achieved through what I 
referred to as the unified Ego, the phenomenological unity of the embodied self 
(phenomenal awareness) and the lived-Body (the material body and phenomenal 
awareness). In chapter three I showed how GBME men often interpreted alternative 
meanings from the semantic and categorical ones offered by dominant white groups 
within the social process of interpellative speech acts. Here the racialized meanings 
were rendered within the discursive topography and also understood as affective 
sensings. In chapter four I showed how the white gaze, was understood and interpreted 
by GBME men through the invisible white Gestalt as either positive or negative, using 
affective information in the social space. Here the sensings were rendered within the 
affective topography as affective qualities, where as feelings they indicated complex 
understandings of the social space. As emotions, rendered through the interweaving of 
the discursive and affective topographies, they expressed affective meanings which 
were semantically and discursively racialized. These processes foreground and 
background particular topographies of the unified Ego, or the totality of the unified Ego, 
and this provides one way of mapping the information (sensings and meanings) within 
the invisible white Gestalt. Alternatively where the power of a racializing experience is 
strongly felt by a BME individual, we find that double or triple layers of phenomenal 
awareness emerge (Alcoff, 1999; Fanon, 1993; Yancy, 2008). 
 
In this chapter I explicate in greater detail how the unified Ego understands and 
interprets information by developing Edmund Husserl‟s theories around the Ego, unity 
and how these combine in the lived-Body, or what I refer to in this thesis as the unified 
Ego.  I will be using Frantz Fanon‟s (1993) phenomenological concept of the racial 
epidermal schema, combined with Husserl‟s phenomenology to develop the theoretical 
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approach of the unified Ego in order to explicate the affective sensings and discursive 
meanings associated with racialized phenomenal corporeal topographies in white gay 
social contexts. Paul Gilroy suggests that Fanon‟s concept of the racial epidermal 
schema needs to be developed in a way which: 
 
 “Takes us beyond the discursivity and the semiotics of „race‟ into a sustained 
confrontation with human sensorium, with spectatorship, visual apparatuses and 
optics. It asks us to think the development of a racial imaginary in ways that are 
more distant from the authority of logos and more attuned to the phenomenology 
of the visual” (Gilroy, 1998:840).  
 
However I argue in this chapter that it is not only the discursive and visual that should 
be utilised to explicate (and resist) racialization within social spaces, but rather the 
entire phenomenological array of experience. Paul Gilroy (1998) frames his approach 
using the metaphor of the 3D body scanners used in medicine to offer an epistemology 
of the visual. One issue with this „visual‟ approach is that as a metaphor it resonates 
with the medicalized typologies used historically to categorise black bodies (Goldberg, 
1994), and arguably extends the racialized gaze „into‟ the racialized body since the 
logos underpins the visual readings of the body within medical discourses.    
An alternative „analytic apparatus‟ for interpreting and understanding the phenomenal 
intersubjective life-world is one‟s own embodied subjective experience. By prioritising 
sense rather than visually interpreted meanings, and the sensuously experienced Body 
rather than a medically constructed visual Body, we not only expand the contours, 
boundaries and „definitions‟ of the corporeal topographies but we also expand the range 
of phenomenal experiences with which we can interpret and understand the Body. In 
this sense we are not only trying to dismantel the concept of „race‟ but we are also 
begining to dismantel the historical racialized Body (for example in the concept of auras 
or energy described by my interviewees). I go on to show this approach further in this 
chapter. 
 
In section one I begin by looking at the debates around what is known as „Cartesian 
dualism‟ and how this relates to this thesis. I also briefly discuss the issues of cultural 
„Cartesian‟ dualism for Othered groups. I then go on to outline phenomenological 
theories around the „mind‟ and „body‟ and how I theorise these as a unity. In section 
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two I look at how racialized colonial discourses impact upon the representation of and 
practices around the corporeal topographies within the unified Ego and how these in 
turn impact upon GBME subjectivity. How does the unified Ego sense the information 
within the invisible white Gestalt present within white gay spaces? In section three I 
explicate in greater detail how the phenomenological model of the lived-Body by 
Edmund Husserl can be developed to explain how GBME men sense and interpret both 
their own unified Ego and the life-world and how this information is communicated 
intersubjectively. Here I will explicate the terms render and interweaving which 
simplify some of Husserl‟s more complex ideas on embodiment developed throughout 
his academic oeuvre. I also look at processes of racialization in rendering the unified 
Ego and how GBME men transmit the sensings intersubjectively within the life-world 
of white gay spaces. I end this section by discussing how „race‟, „gender‟ and sexuality 
are interwoven as discourses in ways which not only are always intersecting but how as 
a result of this interweaving they sustain the sense of „self‟ in racialized interactions. 
How can GBME men utilise their understood sense within their unified Ego to map, 
navigate and reconfigure the invisible white Gestalt within white gay spaces?  
 
 I finish this chapter with conclusions showing that non-representational and 
presentational modalities sensed through the unified Ego can provide rich and complex 
information about racialized practices in white gay spaces. These are combined with 
representational modalities to form the parts of the invisible white Gestalt from which 
the „shapes‟ of whiteness can be sensed. GBME men can reconfigure the invisible white 
Gestalt through rendering information, sensings and meanings, within both their unified 
Egos and the life-world in order to increase their power of existence and action. This 
helps GBME men to engage with the racialization occurring in white gay spaces. I now 
go on to discuss the theoretical approaches used in this chapter.  
  
Section One: Theorizing the Unified Ego 
 
René Descartes (1983) established a theoretical approach to the mind-body problem 
based upon the differentiation of body as material and mind as spirit, known as 
„Cartesian dualism‟. One of Descartes‟ solutions to how the mind affects the body was 
to propose that the pineal gland was the centre of control (Descartes, 1983: 362), though 
this theory is not supported by contemporary neuroscience (Carlson, 1986:3).  However 
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Descartes also describes the interrelation of the nervous system with the whole body as 
the control mechanism (Descartes, 1983:362) and describes the unity of the mind with 
the body (Descartes, 1983:276). Baruch Spinoza (1899) also looked at how the mind 
and body were related and proposed a „non-Cartesian‟ approach (Garrett, 1997:281), 
using the expression “ „homo‟ for the union of mind and body” (Della Rocca, 
1997:216). The theories of psychologist William James (1884), as we saw in the 
previous chapter, prioritized the hyletic topography which senses and responds to 
information from the social field that may subsequently come into phenomenal 
awareness. However later research found that corporeal states alone, for example having 
a rapid heart rate, would not be sufficient to elicit emotions (Argyle 1975 :106), thereby 
supporting the later conceptualization of emotions as interpreted affective meanings.  
 
The issue of mind-body dualism remains unresolved within „Cartesian‟ approaches to 
the mind and body in current social theory (Ahmed, 2000:41; Grosz, 1994; Lousley, 
2009; Seidler, 1994:153). There are two core conceptions around „Cartesian dualism‟, 
often conflated or confused in contemporary discussions which I define here as the 
philosophical and the cultural interpretations. Firstly there is the philosophical question 
around the material body‟s involvement in the production of embodied phenomenal 
awareness („mind‟) (Pinker, 1998; Ryle, 1963), which is what Descartes (1983:362) was 
exploring in his theories about the pineal gland and nervous system. The second 
„cultural‟ interpretation is the prioritizing of the phenomenal „Mind‟ over the 
phenomenal „Body‟ for example the cultural idea of this represented in cartoons by the 
speech bubble or light bulb drawn as coming out of a person‟s brain to show they are 
„thinking‟, and also in the expressions „think with your head not with your heart‟ and 
„my mind‟s gone blank‟. We also see this in Imran‟s description in chapter 4 on page 
113. This cultural interpretation of Descartes‟ theory is prevalent in social theory, where 
it critiques how „Cartesian dualism‟s‟ prioritizing of “the mind [...] fails to give due 
weight to the bodily and sensory aspects” (Davidson, 2003:103). It is interesting to note 
that in spite of the prominence of discussions around „Cartesian dualism‟ within Joyce 
Davidson‟s (2003) book, there is no listing of Descartes in the bibliography, which may 
have contributed to the use of this cultural definition rather than Descartes (1983) 
philosophical meanings.  
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Descartes actual arguments on the mind/body and Mind/Body, agree with much of 
Spinoza‟s non-dualistic theories on affect. For example where Descartes (1983:311) 
suggests that “by the word thought I understand all that of which we are conscious as 
operating in us” and where Descartes (1983:149) suggests that “thinking activities 
[include] understanding, willing, imagining, feeling etc” showing that thinking is 
phenomenal awareness in general not just „linguistic thinking‟ in the phenomenal Mind, 
hence the whole phenomenal Body and sensory perceptions are included in his 
definition of thinking. One additional approach by Descartes (1983) which has 
resonances with Husserl‟s approach is that sense is the fundamental experience of 
sensings and meanings, for example where Descartes (1983:251) says “in reasoning we 
unite not names but the things signified by names”, and where Descartes (1983:255) 
says “it is one thing to see a man running, another thing to affirm to oneself that one 
sees it, an act that needs no language”. Descartes (1983:350) also shows us how 
meanings, sensings and affective qualities are interwoven where he says that “words 
whether uttered by the voice or merely written down excite in our minds all sorts of 
thoughts and emotions”. This discussion of Rene Descartes‟ (1983) ideas is to present a 
phenomenological reading of his work which engages with the theoretical approaches I 
am taking in this thesis, and to clarify the terms often used in cultural „Cartesian 
dualism‟. For clarity I use phenomenal awareness for „mind‟, and I use „Mind‟ 
(capitalized) for the cultural idea. The term cultural „Cartesian dualism‟ will be referred 
to from here on as cultural dualism. The concept of the unified Ego addresses both the 
philosophical Cartesian dualism and cultural dualism, as I discuss in this chapter. 
Cultural dualism still has a dominant place in contemporary society (Burwood, 
2008:264). This therefore has implications for BME individuals and groups where the 
cultural dualism which valorises the Mind over the Body has been implicated in the 
oppression of both non-white racialized categories within discourses of racial 
supremacy (Goldberg, 1994:53; Seidler, 1994:4), and other social categories such as 
women and other subjugated groups (Ahmed, 2004:195; Grosz, 1994:22).  Elizabeth 
Grosz describes the current impasse in social theory resulting from cultural dualism:   
 
 “Although within our intellectual heritage there is no language in which to 
describe such concepts, no terminology that does not succumb to versions of this 
polarisation, some kind of understanding of embodied subjectivity, of psychical 
corporeality needs to be developed” (Grosz, 1994:21).     
142 
 
 
 
Husserl‟s phenomenology developed theories which addressed both the philosophical 
and cultural interpretations of dualism. I will outline both approaches briefly here in 
order to support the argument around unity of the lived-Body, although I am primarily 
looking at phenomenal awareness in this thesis. Edmund Husserl‟s theoretical models to 
the question of embodiment began with a more immanent solipsistic approach in the 
early works (Husserl, 1963, 1969), and developed to a more transcendental 
intersubjective approach in later works (Husserl, 1970, 2001, 2002). It is in his Ideas II 
(Husserl, 2002) that he develops the questions around the phenomenology of the Body, 
affects, sense, sensings, meanings, and the life-world, and devises phenomenological 
models to explicate these. Husserl differentiates between Korper (inanimate physical 
matter) and Leib (animate flesh of a human being or animal) (Derrida, 1973:16) which 
the translators of his works have sought to address, for example by translating into the 
English words „body‟ and „Body‟ respectively (Rojcewicz et al 2002:xiv). This is what 
Berger and Luckman (1971:68) describe as “having” and “being a body”. Husserl‟s 
distinctions between „body‟ and „Body‟ suggest that terms defining and differentiating 
the phenomenological modalities of the embodied self are required, as I now explain.  
 
Husserl (2002) takes the position that the Body is the “lived-Body” (Husserl, 2002:160). 
There are three attributes of the lived-Body I shall examine. Firstly there is the “hyletic” 
(Husserl, 2001:150) or “material substrate” (Husserl, 2002:160) that participates as part 
of the lived-Body which I interpret as being the „biological‟ processes of the body that 
participate in sensings and defined here as the hyletic topography. Secondly the lived-
Body also includes the concept of noema (Husserl, 2002:238) related to apperceptions 
and “sense-things” (Husserl, 2002:70). There is no agreed interpretation by academics 
as to what Husserl‟s noema are (Dreyfus, 1982b:97) however Dreyfus (1982a:7) points 
to the criteria that “noema must „refer‟, „describe‟ and „synthesize‟”. Since the concept 
of noema has been subsequently developed within the theories from cognitive science 
(Dreyfus, 1982a:25) and relate to predominantly „unconscious‟ processes I conflate the 
theoretical problematic around how noema operate into the concept cognitive processes. 
Here cognitive does not refer to „cognition‟ qua phenomenal awareness or experiential 
interpretive thinking, but rather the apperceptive cognitive processes theorized within 
cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, and phenomenology. Cognitive processes 
would generally be understood to occur within the „higher‟ affective, discursive and 
corporeal topographies, however I would extend the concept to include some of the 
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hyletic topography such as during ejaculation (spinal chord) and particular processes in 
the retina (Carlson, 1986). This approach of using ideas from cognitive science is 
supported by Engelhardt (1977:70) who suggests that Husserl “avoided the difficulties 
attendant to a Cartesian interpretation of the mind-brain relation. His position invites 
both neurophysiology and descriptive psychology, with their different methodologies, to 
explicate and to explain embodied mind, which retains its unity.”  
 
The third attribute of the lived-Body, when experienced as the embodied-self, has the 
phenomenal field following the topography of the bodily schema (Husserl, 2002; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2002), what I define as the corporeal topographies of the unified Ego. 
However having outlined these three „domains‟ distinctly, it is important to emphasise 
that these are interwoven in ways which do not allow of simple division or boundaries, 
hence my use of the term topography which inherently includes the concept of 
relationality and interweaving with the associated domains, rather than for example 
schemas, modules, or strata. Husserl tells us that:  
 
“Things are „experienced‟, are „intuitively given‟ to the subject, necessarily as 
unities of a spatio-temporal-causal nexus, and necessarily pertaining to this 
nexus is a preeminent thing, „my Body‟, as the place where [...] a system of 
subjective conditionality is interwoven” (Husserl, 2002:69).  
 
The lived-Body becomes the centre around which the life-world becomes oriented for 
an individual (Husserl, 2002:165), and is the „location‟ of an individuals embodied 
subjectivity. In addition the lived-Body is always intersubjectively constructed (Husserl, 
2002:86), taking on the meanings of shared social communities in “Objective space” 
(Husserl, 2002:92), where here „objective‟ refers to “a formal unity of identification” 
within a social community (Husserl, 2002:92). For Husserl unity is one of the key 
concepts he returns to within his theory of the lived-Body, where:  
 
“Sensations, perceptions, remembering, feelings, affects etc [...] are not given to 
us [...] as if they were unified with one another only through the common 
phenomenal link to the Body. Instead, they are one by means of their very 
essence; they are bound and interwoven together, they flow into one another in 
layers and are possible only in this unity of a stream. Nothing can be torn away 
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from this stream; nothing can be separated off as, so to say, a thing for itself” 
(Husserl, 2002:98; original italics).  
 
In this thesis I define four terms which are necessary to encapsulate the concepts which 
emerge from the questions arising in this thesis around the body and Body, namely: the 
corpus, corpus-object, hyletic topography, and unified Ego (the last two have been 
outlined previously). Firstly the corpus, which I define here as the static inanimate 
body, it is the material body which is on the „outside‟ of phenomenal awareness and 
cannot be experienced as an object directly (Husserl, 2001:58), though can be 
symbolically interpreted in for example scientific statistics stored in a database. 
Secondly the corpus-object, which I define as the non-sensing body or body-part which 
is also a phenomenal object, either for the self or intersubjectively. The corpus-object 
can be experienced by the phenomenal self when for example a previously sensing 
embodied limb is anesthetized. It is also experienced by other individuals as the 
dehumanised and objectified person or body-part.  Thirdly the hyletic topography is the 
material body in process and is a core part of the unified Ego, contributing to the 
embodied „I‟. It is capable of complex sensing and also provides the sensory 
information about the body image (for example from neurones). Fourthly the unified 
Ego is defined as the embodied self, the totality of the „I‟, and emerges from the 
interwoven topographies, theorized using Husserl‟s (2001, 2002) phenomenological 
ideas around the unity of the embodied self. The unified Ego is capable of experiencing 
qualia, understanding sensings, and interpreting meanings. It is experienced 
intersubjectively as being another living sensing person by other people. Whilst it is the 
discursive, affective and corporeal topographies of the unified Ego that I develop in this 
chapter, to a lesser extent I also draw attention occasionally to the presence of the 
cognitive processes and hyletic topography.   
 
In Husserl‟s (2002) theories around embodiment in the Ideas II, there is an interweaving 
of the hyletic topography through other „higher‟ phenomenological „strata‟ and 
cognitive processes towards the subjective phenomenal awareness (or „consciousness‟). 
However Husserl elaborates each „strata‟ extensively in the Ideas II yet does not form a 
clear concept that integrates the whole, except for his consistent references to „unity‟. 
The concept of the unified Ego therefore builds upon Husserl‟s various models through 
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theorizing the interweaving of the topographies through the cognitive processes, and the 
rendering of phenomenal awareness.  
 
Phenomenal awareness can be rendered within what I refer to as corporeal topographies  
which are features or body-parts of the body image, for example the abdomen, the 
penis, or the Mind. We can also have the corporeal topography of the unified Ego, as 
the experience of the whole lived-Body.  It does not matter whether the phenomenal 
object is derived from purely „ideal‟ information or derived from „real‟ information, the 
basic phenomenological principles remain the same (Husserl, 2002). Therefore a 
thought expressed in the Mind, occurs (usually) in the corporeal topography of the 
Mind, since this is the (usual) spatio-temporal location of the phenomenal experience, 
and is an object in a similar way as say for example the experience of seeing a table is 
an object. This again is true for other spatio-temporal locations of „ideal‟ corporeal 
topographies, for example when people talk about „a gut feeling‟ being sensed in the 
abdomen. A corporeal topography without the other interwoven topographies would be 
experienced as a strange and indescribable sensation. Therefore the interweaving 
through cognitive processes, of the hyletic topography, the discursive topography, the 
affective topography, and the corporeal topography renders the experience of 
phenomenal awareness (qualia, sensings, and meanings) within the unified Ego. I now 
go on to look at how racialized discourses impact upon GBME men‟s embodied 
subjectivity.  
 
Section Two: Racialized Colonial Discourses and the Unified Ego  
 
As outlined in the previous chapters one of the key parts of the invisible white Gestalt 
for sensing racialized meanings associated with the corporeal topographies of the 
unified Ego is the presence of racialized discourses within the life-world. Here the 
topographies of the unified Ego not only experience the sensing and meanings in the 
life-world but are an integral part of the invisible white Gestalt itself. I asked James in 
the interview here about his opinions as to why GBME bodies are objectified:   
 
R: I was wondering if you could talk a bit about that in terms of the body, erm, as in, 
particularly as you said African men, erm, how, I mean, how are they objectified, what 
is it about their bodies, what aspect of the body, is it just skin colour or [interrupted]?  
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James: no, I  think it all comes down, it all goes back to slavery really, I  think, you 
know, a lot of white people, still have, I  really don‟t understand how that has 
happened, they still have images of slavery in their heads, and if you see any images 
depicting slavery or  slaves, you know the black man is always very muscular, his skin 
is always very smooth, he‟s very strong, and, apparently they‟re also very, what‟s the 
word to use, [pause 10 seconds] they‟re very good when it comes to sex. So whether it‟s 
because they have big penises or whether it‟s because no matter what size the penis is, 
they‟re very good at using it. That whole image is there in the head. You know I‟ve read 
a couple of historical books, fiction and non fiction, where I‟d read that the white 
woman who was the wife or the daughter of the slave master, would creep past the slave 
quarters at night and she might see the black man having a shower, having a bath,  
 
R: hmm. 
 
James: and she‟d faint at the sight of the body. 
 
R: right. 
 
James: so that kind of thing is very very much going on. And the belief is that „oh if only 
I could snag myself a black man, sexually I‟d be in seventh heaven‟. They don‟t care 
whether he‟s intelligent or not, they don‟t care for what ideas he might have in his head, 
they don‟t care what his dreams and aspirations are, but, but, „he‟ll give me a good 
time in bed‟, seems to be the common theme. And I think in that way, black men, African 
men, men of African decent, are objectified in a way that other races don‟t seem to be. I 
mean I have a friend for example, he doesn‟t go out much now, but he says when he first 
came to [northern city] he was very busy on the scene. He‟d get approached time after 
time after time after time and it was always the same thing, one of the first things out of 
their mouths, „have you got a big one then?‟  
 
In James‟ description we can see the simultaneous presence of racialized discourses 
around the corpus-object as the enslaved and dominated „tool of labour‟ (“slave, strong, 
muscular”) and the unified Ego as the object of „pleasure and desire‟ (“smooth skin, 
good at sex”) for the white colonial gaze (Baldwin, 1961). James describes how the 
historical stereotyping of men of African descent as objects for sexual pleasure, who 
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were simultaneously seen by white people as being excluded from the possibility of 
thinking, feeling and hoping, persists in white gay contexts in the present day. 
Christopher echoes some of James‟ points in the following extract:  
 
Christopher: if you meet an individual who says „you are a trophy‟, but I'm not a trophy 
I'm an individual, I have my own ideas and my own thoughts. It is not about the size my 
penis it's not about anything like that. It's about who I am, then you have the right 
concept, right, then they realise how you are on an equal footing and that is where you 
have the problem, right, because again it goes all the way back to that time. 
 
R: sorry which time? 
 
Christopher: the time of slavery. So you‟re talking about the time when black people 
were introduced to the world as slaves and you were looked at as being breeding 
machines. The white slave owners would have a black woman but would also engage 
with black men and so on. So that kind of [thing], and because they could do what ever 
they wanted to them. So it's a case of trying to manipulate the individual, but when you 
get someone that breaks out of that mould you are a dangerous person. You are not 
someone that they can control your thinking, you‟re a human being that sees himself on 
the same level as anyone else, right. 
 
It may also be the case that in the context of sexuality during the period of slavery that 
the BME man could also be experienced by the white plantation owners as a corpus-
object in cases where he is completely de-humanised and viewed as a sexual prosthesis, 
as both James and Christopher suggest with their comments about the objectification of 
the penis as a trophy object. What we also see within both interviews is the presence of 
racialized cultural dualism which valorises the phenomenal corporeal topography of the 
Mind over the Body and simultaneously assigns this hierarchy of corporeal 
topographies along racialized criteria as to which „raced‟ groups are predominantly 
Mind and which are Body. Through the dialectic between the discursive racialized 
cultural dualism and the erotic desires of the white slave owner we see that the black 
man shifts from being experienced as a corpus-object („tool‟ for labour or „live-stock‟ 
for breeding more enslaved people) to a unified Ego (a recognised human being for 
sexual pleasure, albeit less human than the white plantation owner).   
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Husserl considered the case of the total objectification of another human being by other 
individuals to be an unlikely thought-experiment (Husserl, 2002:169), suggesting that 
intersubjectivity always elicits recognition as human rather than non-human (Husserl, 
2002:254).  However James‟ and Christopher‟s interviews, along with many 
postcolonial theories (Bhabha, 1994:70-74; Goldberg, 1994), show us that recognition 
as „fully human‟ is contingent upon the racialized discursive formations which position 
members of groups within the racial hierarchy as well as contingent upon the desires of 
the plantation owner. This shows us how Husserl failed to consider the impact of „race‟ 
in his phenomenology through his (tacit) assumption that all human beings were 
experienced equally as fully human in society, and through failing to recognise the 
impact of the cultural valorisation of particular phenomenological modalities (for 
example the discursive over the affective and corporeal) which were culturally 
racialized even during the period Husserl was writing. James and Christopher show us 
that the BME man can be positioned by racialized discourses at both limits of the 
continuum (namely non-human and human). For the white plantation owner the BME 
man could be both a corpus-object as a „tool of labour‟ or „breeding machine‟ on the 
plantation, and also a unified Ego as a human being able to have sexual relationships 
with a white plantation owner or as a „threat‟ through having intellectual autonomy and 
agency. In the context of James‟ interview I am taking the concept of interpersonal 
sexuality to be an intersubjective phenomenon between individuals who recognise that 
the Other has a unified Ego and all this means in terms of subjectivity, meanings and 
affective qualities. To have sex with an „object‟ would be masturbation, and to have sex 
with a male considered to be „non-human‟ would be bestiality, and no doubt these total 
objectifications may have occurred within the imagination of white plantation owners 
where they considered the enslaved population to be breeding machines. Although 
Husserl considered the hypothetical concept of the positioning of other human beings as 
corpus-objects, he did not think this applied to the real social contexts of communities 
and societies, a view also supported by Burwood (2008:268). James and Christopher 
show in their interviews that there is a continuum of positioning within intersubjective 
social contexts from corpus-object to unified Ego, being related to racialized 
Mind/Body cultural dualism, and that any BME man‟s position on this continuum may 
vary according to the contexts he finds himself in.     
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 It is important to note that colonial discourses and practices around „race‟ were also 
implemented within the borders of the coloniser nations themselves, upon their own 
„Othered‟ populations, such as the working class, and various BME groups within the 
nation (Goldberg, 1994:44; Stoler, 1995). This imbrication of racialized colonial 
discourses within both the colonised nations and the societies of coloniser nations 
during these earlier periods helped to establish later racialized discursive formations and 
those in our present-day society, as James says “they still have images of slavery in their 
heads”. This may also nuance the discourses such that they are not simply historical 
“Fanonian time- loops” (Yancy, 2008:9) reflecting a distant past and location, but have 
always been relevant to the experiences of BME groups within the coloniser nations 
both in the past, the present-day, and probably the future. 
 
David Theo Goldberg (1994:54) suggests that “as a mode of exclusion, racist expression 
assumes authority and is vested with power, literally and symbolically in bodily terms. 
They are human bodies that are classified, ordered, valorised, and devalued”. Body-
parts of the corpus-object or phenomenal corporeal topographies of the unified Ego, 
made racially visible through racialized discursive formations, became signifiers of 
racial characteristics during the colonial period and after (Alcoff, 1999:21; Byrne, 
2006:22; Goldberg, 1994; McClintock, 1995; Nagel, 2003; Tate, 2005). These included 
skin colour (Alcoff, 1999:21; Byrne 2006; Goldberg, 1994:50; Tate, 2009:64), hair 
colour and texture (Alcoff, 1999:21; Byrne, 2006; Goldberg, 1994:50; Tate, 2009:64) 
genitalia (Byrne, 2006; Nagel 2003), and overall corporeal dimensions (Alcoff, 
1999:21; Byrne, 2006; Goldberg, 1994:50), although it was predominantly the black 
female body that was analysed (Somerville 1994). These corporeal attributes, made 
visible under discursive regimes of truth (Bhabha, 1994; Goldberg, 1994), were then 
ordered into racial norms and hierarchies (Bhabha, 1994; Byrne, 2006; Du Bois 1998; 
Goldberg, 1994) with white raced categories set as normative and superior (Byrne, 
2006:22; Goldberg, 1994; Mills, 1997:53; Yancy, 2008:26; Tate, 2009). In James‟ 
description of stories he‟s read on Black history or set in colonial contexts, we see an 
example of how historical discourses around the white gaze and the black body 
(McClintock, 1995; Nagel, 2003; Roediger, 1998; Ware, 1992; Yancy, 2008) and its 
“epistemic violence” (Bhabha, 2002:4) still remain in present-day society. George 
Yancy gives the analysis of where:  
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“the Black body through the hegemony of the white gaze, undergoes a 
phenomenological return that leaves it distorted and fixed as a pre-existing 
essence. The Black body becomes a „prisoner‟ of an imago- and elaborate 
distorted image of the Black, an image whose reality is held together through 
white bad faith and projection- that is ideologically orchestrated to leave no trace 
of its social and historical construction” (Yancy, 2008:109).  
 
James described how the male body of African descent is represented in the public 
imaginary as a result of colonial discourses associated with the transatlantic slave trade. 
Derek talks about how these discourses are linked to „scientific‟ racial theories, giving 
an example of a racist incident which occurred in a non-gay context of people shouting 
at him in the street in England: 
 
Derek: you don't scream that across at a stranger that you don't know. Either say a 
„black man‟, you don't just say „African monkey‟. What have I done to you for you to 
call me an African monkey? How have I been demoted from being a human being to 
being a monkey? What happened? 
 
R: what do you think happened? 
[...] 
Derek: if you want an educated idea where they could have gotten it from, I think it 
stems from Darwinism. You know, because apparently men evolved from the gorilla, the 
monkey, and as explorers left Europe to visit other parts of the world they discovered 
different kinds of people. „Do we know they are human?‟ „Do we know if they are 
monkeys?‟. You know it raises all those questions raised by these discoveries, and were 
held onto as a way to maybe insult. 
 
Derek refers to Darwinism, which here I suggest is a trope for the historical 
sedimentation of „scientific‟ racial theories since the 17th century that non-white groups 
were a different species (Ware, 1992:64). In spite of supposed progress in 
deconstructing these scientific myths there are still sources of these ideas in academia 
for example Campbell (1967:61) shows images of „indigenous‟ non-white groups with 
other non-human primates in his book on human evolution. Derek‟s description 
indicates that his discursive topography is interpreting the meanings associated with the 
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words shouted at him by the racist people, and here we see the interweaving of the real 
meanings experienced in the street with ideal meanings and sense around racialized 
colonial history. In addition the words spoken are not only rendered as meanings but 
form a dialectic with the affective topography where Derek has the emotion of being 
insulted by the racist language. There is a decrease in power of existence, whereby 
Derek being positioned as less than human senses the phenomenal experience of 
himself intersubjectively with the white racists, thereby eliciting negative affective 
qualities around feeling insulted through understanding the negative implications of 
being called a monkey. Derek has sufficient self-confidence and a robust sense of 
himself as human to not accept the phenomenal interpellation as a „monkey‟ and so 
does not experience the dissociation within his unified Ego described by Fanon (1993). 
Instead Derek experiences both the feelings of being insulted within the affective 
topography and also the interpretation of the racist words within a race-cognizant 
framework (here particularly the trope of „scientific‟ Darwinian racism) within his 
discursive topography.   
 
Howard discusses how in colonial discourses the Chinese body was represented as 
passive and effeminate, here particularly through the image of the Chinese transvestite 
in relation to the white Western capitalist practices around maritime trade:  
 
Howard: you get the Western stereotype icons of gay attraction and you get the normal 
people [Far East Asian country] history. History and culture have a very strong 
element of transvestism but I think more due to the colonial past where I think 
transvestite prostitutes had Western customers such as sailors.  
 
[...]  I would say growing up in [Far East Asian country] it was always the white is 
superior to the locals. And so obviously you internalise that. And I came to the UK that 
carried on in terms of interaction with older white gay men. 
 
[...] It could be the influence of the media because the Chinese are always portrayed as 
very passive people. So that might appeal to this guy either someone young and 
someone who can do his bidding so he has that power-play isn't it. 
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Here Howard talks about the colonial representations of Chinese bodies as passive and 
effeminate, where this was amplified through capitalist practices resulting from the 
white sailors arriving at Chinese docks for trade with the West. This could be seen as a 
phenomenally sensed spatial practice of penetration which is interwoven with 
patriarchal discourses around sexuality. He relates this to the on going presence in the 
contemporary setting of his home country of Western colonial discourses around white 
supremacism and white masculinity. This not only results in particular positionings for 
Chinese men, but also is understood by present-day GWME men in England who 
exploit this in terms of power and predation. Howard talks about internalising the 
discourses around white people being racially superior and how this related to his own 
relationships with older white gay men. Here we find the discursive topography not 
only interpreting meanings around „race‟ and white supremacy, but also the imbricated 
discourses around gender, where racialized gender positions in this context result in the 
„emasculation‟ of Chinese male Bodies. This sense of decreased masculinity in Chinese 
Bodies in relation to the increased masculinity of white sailors is phenomenally 
experienced in the meanings and sensings around embodied subjectivity related to 
transvestism and prostitution. In this context the embodied subjectivity around 
transvestism (rather than transgender identity per se) and embodied subjectivity around 
prostitution (sex-work) within the unified Egos of Chinese men (who may be gay or 
straight) are configured from the invisible white Gestalt present in the life-world of the 
Chinese docks (particularly in relation to the presence of white sailors and European 
mercantile power). The ongoing performativity of these racialized discourses and their 
impact on the unified Egos of Chinese and white gay men in present-day society can be 
seen in Howard‟s discussion of the “media” and the “power-play” of oppressive social 
practices engaged by the white gay men, thereby reiterating and sustaining the historical 
colonial discourses in contemporary gay contexts.    
 
These descriptions by James, Derek and Howard show us how colonial discourses were 
productive of particular racialized representations of non-white bodies through history. 
In particular both Derek and Howard describe the penetration of black countries by 
white European sailors and how these early interactions have contributed to discourses 
which persist today. They show us that these discourses around the black body are still 
in circulation in society, since they are being talked about by my three respondents in 
the interviews. They also show us that they are still positioning GBME men in the UK, 
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impacting upon their embodied subjectivity in predominantly negative ways. I now go 
on to explore how GBME men sense and make sense of the affective information and 
racialized meanings within the invisible white Gestalt in white gay spaces.  
 
Section Three: The Racialized Phenomenal Corporeal Topographies 
 
I now go on to show how the unified Ego understands sensings and interprets meanings 
by looking at how GBME men experience white gay spaces as a sense within their 
corporeal topography.  I begin by showing how GBME men experience racialized 
meanings in the life-world as sensings within the corporeal topographies of the unified 
Ego, which demonstrates the dialectical relationship between interpreted meanings and 
understood sensings. I then go on to look at the racialized corporeal topography in 
greater detail, using Frantz Fanon‟s (1993) concept of the racial epidermal schema as a 
phenomenological model of how „race‟ creates a dissociation within the unified Ego, 
where here racialized meanings are also understood intersubjectively within the shared 
life-world.  
  
Rendering the Phenomenal: Sensing and the Unified Ego 
I use Howard‟s and Yusuf‟s descriptions here to help begin to explicate the 
phenomenological model of the unified Ego and other concepts related to this (namely: 
topographies, interweaving, and rendering). Howard gives an example here of how he 
interpreted the sexual interest of older GWME men towards him through his unified 
Ego, described by Howard as “instinct”. 
 
R: a number of points you brought up are around that sense of older or unattractive 
white gay guys being drawn towards BME people.  
 
Howard: younger BME guys. It is younger. Obviously I wasn't approached by a white 
guy and older white guy until I was in the UK. I mean they would never say to me when 
I first got talking to them oh I find you attractive because you‟re Chinese or whatever. It 
was just instinct that they were interested because I was younger, and being an ethnic 
minority I would be more willing to go with them out of gratitude, if you like, because 
they are white. 
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R: you use the word instinct there I wonder if you can expand a bit on that? 
 
Howard: it's hard to explain „instinct‟ isn't it. 
 
R: you don't have to use whole sentences, just what ever, 
 
Howard: I just got this feeling straightaway. 
 
R: was it a mental thing, or in your heart, or body? 
 
Howard: I think it was everything, mind, body, guts. 
 
R: so it‟s not like you thought about it in detail with words? 
 
Howard: no. It was instinctive an instant physiological feeling. I didn't theorise about it 
from a cultural oppression idea. It was just a gut feeling. And I could have been totally 
unfair to them and totally got the wrong end of the stick. 
 
When Howard says “I think it was everything, mind, body, guts” he is describing a unity 
of experience, the integration of the topographies of the unified Ego. This can be related 
to the discussion in the previous chapter on the gaze and affect where Husserl‟s 
phenomenology was compared with the theories of William James (1884) and Baruch 
Spinoza (1899). In Husserl‟s (1970, 1969) phenomenology, there is no distinct „mind‟ 
and body, but instead a phenomenological unity, albeit projected through phenomenal 
corporeal topographies (such as the hand). Husserl (2001, 1970, 1969) uses the term 
„ego‟ to describe the integrated embodied unity of phenomenal awareness relating to the 
„I‟ or embodied self suggesting that “ „I‟ encompasses the „whole‟ man, Body and soul” 
(Husserl, 2002:99). However Husserl frequently lapses into cultural dualistic terms such 
as „mind‟, „soul‟, „body‟, „thought‟,  or „consciousness‟ and occasionally has dualistic 
arguments embedded in his non-dualistic approach, thereby making his general use of 
the term „Ego‟ conceptually too broad. For this reason the term unified Ego makes 
explicit the fact that this is the entire lived-Body.   
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In addition Howard says “I just got this feeling straightaway” echoing the theory that 
foregrounding the affective topography provides faster processing of information than 
foregrounding the discursive topography (Katz, 1999). This is important since 
discursive topographies may be slower to recognise as important, ignored or argued 
against within the „inner narrative‟, in contrast to alternative affective qualities such as 
“instinct” which can render the unified Ego with a striving toward immediate 
understanding and action. The affective topography does of course form a dialectical 
relationship with the discursive topography, and the corporeal topography is already 
interwoven with the affective, discursive and hyletic topographies.  
 
Yusuf who is of Muslim Arab heritage talks about an incident at a gay club where he 
was pushed by a (presumed straight) white man. Yusuf says he did not interpret the 
violence as a racist incident. Here he describes how sensing specific corporeal 
topographies (the heart, solar plexus and abdomen) helps him understand and interpret a 
range of complex sensings and meanings from the social interactions: 
 
Yusuf: he approached me. I was dancing, a girl was dancing beside me and he pushed 
me, to dance with her, so, then the girl and I had an eye contact, she made an 
expression „I don‟t know what he wants‟. I think he saw that and he didn‟t like that. 
[...] 
R: you felt it was homophobic? 
 
Yusuf: he thought I was making a move on him, he thought „I‟m straight‟, then he 
didn‟t like me looking. Because I was like I‟m not sure what you want. And probably I 
was curious. 
 
R: that's interesting because you‟ve got all that information from someone pushing you. 
I wonder how that works, because there are so many other possibilities of what it could 
have meant. 
 
Yusuf: you get it from the vibe. 
 
R: tell me more about the vibe. 
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Yusuf: it‟s an unspoken language we all understand it. Depends on the person how 
sensitive, you understand. It‟s your gut feeling, which people use as judgement 
sometimes. 
 
R: right. If you‟d like to explain that a bit more. 
 
Yusuf: it‟s an inner feeling, it‟s a vibe, it‟s an energy. Something you analyse. 
Something people have or people don‟t have. People believe or people don‟t.  
 
R: where do you feel it? How do you feel it? [pause] You mentioned a gut feeling. 
Although it‟s a metaphor, it also implies the gut. 
 
Yusuf: it is a metaphor, but scientifically we have energy fields. And we have like 
chakras. 
 
R: where are these chakras? 
 
Yusuf: here and here. 
 
R: so, you've just pointed to your solar plexus and abdomen,  
 
Yusuf: or the heart. Probably heart and solar, not the, yeah, the stomach you also get a 
crunch sometimes. You get upset about something, or you capture a negative something, 
a look which you don‟t like. So your energy fields change and your chakras respond.  
 
Although Yusuf did not consider this to be a racist incident, it may be that the act of 
pushing peformatively cites colonial miscegenation discourses and taboos (McClintock, 
1995; Nagel, 2003; Ware, 1992), and also where a white man seeing a Muslim Arab 
man dancing near a white woman might see this in terms of other racialized boundary 
violations (Ahmed, 2004:53). Here it may be that even within gay contexts the same 
racialized hetero-patriarchal discourses around family, miscegenation, ownership and 
community apply (Nast 2002). As with Howard, Yusuf describes the “gut feeling” 
which locates the feelings in the corporeal topography of the abdominal area, but the 
additional comments about the “inner feeling...energy”, also suggest the diffusion of 
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the sense through the whole topography of the unified Ego. The comments about the 
“vibe” also suggest the merging of the corporeal topography of the unified Ego with the 
life-world. Since both the unified Ego and the life-world are phenomenally rendered by 
similar processes (one difference being that the life-world is not part of the hyletic 
topography) the „boundaries‟ of the self can merge into the social space in order to 
sense the space as a presence rather than object. The sensing of the „vibe‟ as the 
interaction of the self and the life-world, also suggests an understanding of the invisible 
white Gestalt within the white gay space.   
 
Yusuf has a meta-interpretation of his phenomenal feelings framed within metaphysical 
discourses and narratives such as chakras and energy fields. This not only helps him to 
map and navigate the embodied sensations, but adds an additional layer of meanings 
within the discursive topography which helps him to understand and interpret the 
phenomenal processes that are occurring. These complex understandings are sensed by 
Yusuf as a “vibe” and interpreted as “chakras” (as a metaphysical discourse). They 
arise through the cognitive processes of rendering which occurs within the interwoven 
topographies and render the phenomenal corporeal topographies of Yusuf‟s solar 
plexus, gut and heart with affective qualities.  
 
The hyletic topography is implicated by Howard where he describes “an instant 
physiological feeling [...] It was just a gut feeling”. Yusuf also talks about the “solar 
plexus [...] the gut [...] the heart”, but also how there is a movement of these embodied 
feelings through various corporeal topographies “your energy fields change and your 
chakras respond”. These examples echo William James‟ (1884) theories on how the 
hyletic topography responds to (the previously termed) „sense data‟ prior to phenomenal 
awareness, and the response of the hyletic topography subsequently communicates 
information to phenomenal awareness. However both Howard and Yusuf  suggest the 
unified Ego as a whole is sensing the meanings, so neither the „mind‟ nor „body‟ can be 
said to have priority in the construction of sensings and meanings. Both Yusuf‟s and 
Howard‟s example would also require the necessary involvement of cognitive processes 
to interpret and transmit the „sense data‟ from the hyletic topography to phenomenal 
awareness, again pointing to the interweaving of the hyletic topography, with the 
discursive, affective and corporeal topographies, and phenomenal awareness.  
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One example of how tightly interwoven the hyletic topography, cognitive processes 
within the topographies, phenomenal awareness, and social context are, is the practice 
of drinking alcohol in gay venues.  In the previous chapter Brian described how he 
would get drunk to help alleviate the negative affective qualities elicited by the 
racialized Othering in white gay spaces. Husserl (2002:78) describes the impact of 
“eating” and also of psychoactive drugs upon both the hyletic topography and 
phenomenal awareness to explicate their unity in his phenomenology. In Brian‟s 
example we can also see the simultaneous interweaving of the hyletic topography, the 
cognitive processes, and phenomenal awareness: 
 
Brian: I think I just decided to get drunk and didn‟t think about it. 
 
The ingestion of alcohol impacts directly on the hyletic topography at a cellular and 
physiological level where blood vessels dilate, neurones are less efficient at transmitting 
information, the organs alter in function, and thus sensings emerge here. The cognitive 
processes are impacted upon too where the processing of information may be less 
efficient or altered from their normal functions (for example slurred speech or loss of 
balance). The topographies are impacted upon where getting drunk as an affective 
quality relates to the affective topography, and where Brian says he “didn‟t think about” 
the negative experiences implicates the discursive topography. The life-world is also 
implicated here where the drinking of alcohol is located in discourses, practices, and 
social and cultural factors (Jayne, et al, 2010), and so the social processes around Brian 
getting drunk are also intersubjectively interwoven with the communal life-world. 
 
Brian‟s example shows us not only the unity of the unified Ego, but also that rather than 
a progression from material to ideal (hyletic topography to phenomenal awareness), that 
each is influenced by the other. This is what Husserl suggests where he discusses the 
relation of the hyletic topography upon phenomenal awareness and vice versa:  
 
“In virtue of the relations of dependence which exist between the Bodily and the 
psychic [t]he use of stimulants [...] affect the occurrence of sensations, sensuous 
feelings, tendencies etc. Conversely, a psychic state such as cheerfulness or 
sadness exercises an influence on Bodily processes. And thanks to these 
connections, the appearing external world shows itself as relative not only to the 
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Body but to the psychophysical subject as a whole” (Husserl, 2002:80; original 
italics).  
 
Brian‟s example also helps to explicate Husserls‟ (2002:80) description of the impact of 
the intersubjective life-world, whereby Brian‟s decision to get drunk was triggered by 
the racialized Othering within the white gay space, where here being drunk helped to 
elicit  “emotional, embodied and affective senses of being and „belonging‟” (Jayne et al, 
2010:546). In addition, the act of getting drunk to manufacture a sense of belonging, in 
Brian‟s case in part through the attenuation of negative thoughts, reveals the nature of 
the white gay social space where the sensings elicited by the processes of racialized 
Othering produced by the social space has elicited this behaviour. In this way, the 
intersubjective life-world can directly impact upon the hyletic topography, the affective 
and discursive topographies, and phenomenal awareness, and thus the totality of the 
unified Ego. I will look at how the intersubjective life-world of white gay spaces 
integrates with the unified Ego of GBME men in greater detail in chapter seven.  
 
Howard in the interview says “it's hard to explain „instinct‟ isn't it”, suggesting that his 
sensed phenomenal experience exceeds the linguistic (Alcoff, 2000:47; Burkitt, 1999; 
Crossley, 2007; Gadamer, 1975; Lefebvre, 1991:407; Thrift, 2008; Young, 1997:55), 
and here Howard emphasises that words  foregrounded in the discursive topography 
were not a significant part of the phenomenal experience: “I didn't theorise about it 
from a cultural oppression idea” . Yusuf says in the interview “ it‟s an unspoken 
language, we all understand it”, supporting the concept of a non- linguistic, non-
representational sensing, but also suggesting that it‟s a “language” which everyone can 
understand which in the context of his interview supports the idea that the 
understanding can also be communicated intersubjectively.  
 
Husserl (2001) describes the competition between objects in the phenomenal field, 
where the foregrounding of one results in the backgrounding of others. For Howard and 
Yusuf this backgrounding  of the discursive topography, where in the Western cultural 
norm this would usually be rendered as foregrounded spoken words or inner-narrative, 
may have allowed the other affective qualities to come to the perceptual foreground. It 
may also have allowed the whole of the unified Ego to become phenomenally 
foregrounded, rather than just foregrounding the Mind. Here the Mind is a corporeal 
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topography where the interwoven discursive topography is often foregrounded. I will 
explain these concepts further using Husserl‟s phenomenology, in order to show how 
the prioritizing of the Mind, and particularly the linguistic in discursive topographies, 
may result in the attenuation or backgrounding of the „intuitive‟ sensed phenomenal 
perceptions within the unified Ego. For this thesis the Mind is obtained from a collage 
or tessellation of interwoven phenomenal topographies around the corporeal topography 
of the head. The hyletic topography contributes information through the sensory 
modalities associated with vocalization, sight, sound, smell, taste, and kinaesthesic 
modalities associated with the head (for example the cranial muscles and semicircular 
canals of the ear). This results in a large amount of qualities, sensings, and meanings 
within the corporeal topography (interwoven with the discursive and affective 
topographies) of the Mind. Many of these particular qualities, sensings and meanings 
within the Mind are culturally valorised over other corporeal topographies such as the 
sense of touch in ones hand. The sensory modalities of the Mind are also most 
commonly related to the communication of discursive meanings in Western society. 
The dominance of the phenomenal information experienced as topographically located 
around the Mind gives it phenomenal experiential foregrounding over other phenomenal 
topographies such as the “gut”, and hence the cultural representation of the Mind as the 
„seat of consciousness‟. Nevertheless the Mind, as a cultural concept (incorporated into 
most general, academic and medical thinking), is simply another grouping of corporeal 
topographies integrated with the whole topography of the unified Ego. This cultural and 
institutional discourse that defines „the Mind‟ also helps to create the phenomenal 
corporeal topography of the Mind through the discursive topography „naming‟ the 
component parts and boundaries of the whole (as the discursive topography does with 
other „named‟ corporeal topographies such as the „penis‟).  
 
The cultural understanding is that the discursive topography renders „speech‟ in the 
Mind as an inner narrative, one has only to consider the speech bubbles in cartoons 
indicating „thought‟. The discursive topography renders meanings in relation to both 
internalised intersubjectivity and social contexts (Bahktin, 1994; Ryle, 1963) as well as 
external social interactions. It is important to remember that in the unified Ego the 
discursive topography is interwoven with the affective and corporeal topography. The 
Mind is also valorised as more rational than other embodied corporeal topographies, as 
a result of the foregrounded types of information, meanings and qualities associated 
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with it in Western cultures. However it may be the dominance of „the linguistic‟ in 
culture and society which gives the discursive topographies‟ meanings dominance over 
sensings. Both Yusuf‟s and Howard‟s descriptions on this occasion of the lesser 
significance of the phenomenal discursive topography, and the dominance of 
foregrounded affective qualities within their unified Ego “everything, mind, body, guts” 
and “energy fields”, shows us how the whole range of corporeal topographies can be 
rendered with understood sensings. It is through the shifting of foregrounding and 
backgrounding of topographies, and the qualities, sensings, and meanings rendered 
through them that the invisible white Gestalt can be mapped, navigated and sensed by 
GBME men.  It is unfortunate that, given the cultural dualism in Western society 
(Burwood, 2008), I could only ask the question in Howard‟s interview using the terms 
“mental” and “body”, which reinforced the concepts within the interview, rather than 
attempting to posit phenomenologically derived concepts and terms in the question in 
the interview, though this would have probably been perceived as a strange question.  
Yusuf‟s use of the terms “chakra”, “vibe” and “energy” helped to navigate this 
epistemological empasse. 
 
Howard‟s and Yusuf‟s descriptions also shows us the usefulness of the term „affective 
qualities‟ here rather than emotions or feelings, since these are often summarised 
succinctly and narrowly in words. For example Howard‟s complex description, could be 
described in emotional terms such as „wary‟, „vulnerable‟ or „suspicious‟, but these 
meanings are not sufficient to capture the total affective qualities experienced. 
Howard‟s affective qualities in this example had very complex extra- linguistic sensings, 
which are here translated into linguistic representations by Howard in the interview:  
 
Howard: it was just instinct that they were interested because I was younger, and being 
an ethnic minority I would be more willing to go with them out of gratitude, if you like, 
because there are white. 
 
For Yusuf, the affective qualities had complex sensings, which no single emotional 
term, meaning or expression in the English language can encompass, which he 
interpreted as:   
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Yusuf: he thought I was making a move on him, he thought „I‟m straight‟, then he 
didn‟t like me looking. Because I was like I‟m not sure what you want. And probably I 
was curious. 
 
This helps to explicate the approach I take here that sense and sensings are the 
fundamental experience of being. Sensings provide a rich, complex understanding 
which can be indicated subjectively or intersubjectively. Meanings are the expression 
and interpretation of the indicated sensings and experienced sense (Derrida, 1973). 
Evidence from other cultures shows that linguistic emotional expressions (for example 
angry, happy, sad) are not sufficient to encompass the affective qualities. One example 
being the German emotional term schadenfreude, which translates in English as 
„pleasure from someone else‟s misfortune‟, though this too has specific social contexts 
where it has meaning. Therefore the term affective qualities encapsulates the complex 
nature of emotions, feelings, and moods, and how these are also sensed non-
representationally. Both Yusuf‟s and Howard‟s unified Egos have been rendered with 
affective qualities and sensings which have as much complexity as any semantic 
meanings rendered within the discursive topography. However as Howard says, these 
complex sensings, summarised as “instinct”, are hard to put into words. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean they cannot be communicated inter-subjectively using non-
representational modalities, and this is particularly evident in the suggestion that 
Howard‟s complex interpretations were communicated to him by the behaviour o f the 
GWME men in that particular context, and Yusuf‟s suggestion that everyone 
understands the unspoken language.   
 
Rather than use Husserl‟s (1969, 1970, 2001, 2002) various terms for the pre-
phenomenal processes and ultimate presentation of the phenomenal object to 
perception, for simplicity I am using the terms rendered and rendering. The word 
render is derived from the Latin reddere  (Hoad, 1986:398) which means “to give back, 
give up, recite, represent, imitate, make to be or appear”. The term „render‟ is often used 
in the sense of generating a meaningful subjective experience by other authors (for 
example Ahmed, 2004:69 ; Alcoff, 1999:20; Crossley, 2007:90; Clough, 2007; Husserl, 
2002:162; Oksala 2011:212; Probyn, 2001:100) although the term, given that it is a 
general expression, is not usually unpacked or theorised as a process. George Yancy 
(2008:3) does use the term in a similar way that I am, where he describes how racialized 
163 
 
 
 
discourses provide “a framework according to which the Black body is rendered 
meaningful”, pointing to the discursive part of the invisible white Gestalt. My use of the 
term rendered, as the perception of the object brought to phenomenal awareness, relates 
exclusively to the phenomenal subjective experience of a given moment in space-time 
(with the understanding that all phenomenal objects are in constant process and never 
truly fixed).  
 
My use of the term rendering involves the cognitive processes, and refers to the 
processes related to the potential phenomenal object which occur before the 
phenomenal object is rendered to perception. Rendering is the interweaving of all the 
information necessary to construct a coherent object in perception, for example when 
seeing a chair the cognitive processes interweave the shapes, the colour, the weight, the 
affective information, the meanings, the memories, and the touch into the experience of 
the chair as a whole. Rendering is always on going as new information changes the 
(re)constructed chair in perception, for example if you stand up, sit down, or change the 
angle from which you view the chair. The use of the concept of rendering seeks to 
tackle the same theoretical problem addressed by the use of metaphors and terms around 
incorporation such as folding (Crossley, 2007; Massumi, 2001:30; Munt, 2007:185; 
Osaka, 2011; Serres, 2008) or ingestion (Probyn 2001) used in non-phenomenological 
approaches where the „outside‟ has to be theorised within a model or process which 
enables its interacting with the „inside‟. Of course these concepts refer to specific 
„unconscious‟ processes, and (psychopathological) unconscious processes are not part 
of the phenomenological approach and therefore I am not using them. Other metaphors 
such as the Mobius strip (Grosz, 1994) and suturing (Hall, 1996; Serres, 2008) do seek 
to address the ontology of the already-always interwoven social field and the self.  
 
Gross and Levitt (1994:80) critique the use of these metaphors, and particularly the 
Mobius strip as being “pompous as it is meaningless; but it is well contrived to impress 
readers whose knowledge of mathematics is superficial or nonexistent”. However they 
fail to recognise the value in using terminology in an interdisciplinary approach as a 
way of bridging entrenched conceptual domains which have the potential to benefit 
theoretically from one another. They also fail to recognise that even in „proper‟ science 
and mathematics, metaphors are taken from other disciplines, for example the concepts 
of „orbitals‟ and „bonds‟ in chemistry and physics. My use of „topography‟, 
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„interweaving‟ and „rendering‟ is not to legitimate their use through pseudoscientific 
appropriation or that they accurately reflect the processes they describe within their 
disciplines (for example there are no looms for weaving in the Mind!). Instead these 
metaphors convey the idea of interrelationships and connections, as well as providing a 
framework or lens through which to explore and develop theory.       
 
Grosz (1994:103) suggests that the models which posit a “nucleus of identity” or an 
empty “vessel” which incorporates external “objects” are no longer useful in addressing 
“the subject”. This implies that these metaphors around incorporation may not be useful 
within a phenomenological approach to the subject. The phenomenological approach I 
am taking here supposes that the „outside‟ is not available to direct experience (Husserl, 
1970; Ryle, 1963), and hence not part of the phenomenological analysis (Engelhardt, 
1977:53). The „outside‟ can possibly be subject to analysis of cognitive processes 
(where this would tend away from phenomenology towards cognitive neuroscience), but 
this would not tell us a great deal about subjectivity.  The „outside‟ can also be analysed 
using sociological methods such as quantitative statistical approaches to the corpus, but 
again this data can only be interpreted as human meaning, which is already „inside‟, and 
so relates to the corpus-object or unified Ego. Husserl (1970) would argue that the 
analysis of the „outside‟ through scientific epistemologies can only ever truly be 
experienced phenomenally and thus never in this sense provide an „objective‟ 
understanding of the „real‟ (Hyder, 2010; Smith, 2010; Friedman, 2010). Therefore for 
Husserl (1969:168) “reality and world, here used are just titles for certain valid unities 
of meaning, namely unities of meaning related to certain organisations of pure absolute 
consciousness”. The „inside‟ includes the phenomenal experience of the unified Ego and 
all phenomenological processes and phenomenal objects included in the life-world. 
Therefore if we have phenomenal awareness of an „object‟ (for example a chair, the 
skin, the penis, a thought, a feeling) it is already „inside‟, and so these metaphors and 
particular outside/inside distinctions do not apply to the phenomenological approach I 
am taking in this thesis. 
 
Husserl (1969, 1970, 2001) describes a number of concepts associated with rendering 
including the interweaving of information into the pre-phenomenal object prior to being 
rendered as the phenomenal object, as well as concepts around the „filling in‟ of objects 
as wholes from perceptual parts (Husserl, 2001:373). Husserl‟s arguments around this 
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process are complex and protracted and his attention focuses on different aspects of the 
problematic across his academic oeuvre (Dreyfus, 1982a). Therefore to simplify and 
focus the discussion in this chapter, by using the term rendering I am encapsulating 
three of Husserl‟s key ideas namely: (1) the bringing into phenomenal „being‟ of a 
perceptual „object‟ (including the unified Ego and life-world), (2) the interweaving of 
multiple modalities of information, sensings and meanings „into‟ the „object‟ (such as 
the body image, meanings, sensings), and (3) the phenomenal „filling in‟ of an object as 
a whole from perceived parts (such as the phenomenal awareness of a whole 3-D table 
from just seeing two legs and a surface).   
 
We can apply the concept of rendering to Howard‟s description, where Howard‟s 
affective qualities were brought into being through his unified Ego, with an 
interweaving of multiple topographies of complex sensings and meanings, and with a 
„filling- in‟ of topographies within the corporeal topography (including the “mind, body, 
guts”) with the phenomenal qualities:      
 
Howard: I just got this feeling straightaway [...] I think it was everything, mind, body, 
guts [...] it was instinctive an instant physiological feeling [...] It was just a gut feeling. 
 
If hypothetically Howard‟s phenomenal experience had been rendered with 
foregrounding of (semantic) meanings expressed as internal thoughts within the 
discursive topographies then the rendering would be through the corporeal topography 
of the Mind, the meanings would be interwoven with the „words‟, and the „filling- in‟ 
would be imagined „speech‟, although there would also be backgrounded phenomenal 
qualities and sensings interwoven in the discursive topography and throughout the 
unified Ego. Equally in Yusuf‟s description we see rendering where he says:  
 
“it‟s an inner feeling, it‟s a vibe, it‟s an energy [...] we have energy fields. And we have 
like chakras [...] So your energy fields change and your chakras respond.”  
 
Here we see the sensing of the affective qualities within the unified Ego which is 
rendered as phenomenal perceptions of “energy”. This sense of “energy” can then be 
rendered within specific corporeal topographies “heart and solar [plexus], [...] 
stomach” which Yusuf has phenomenally mapped to sense the social space. Yusuf‟s 
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description may also show a sensitivity to the rendering process within Yusuf‟s unified 
Ego since “energy fields change” suggests a dynamic flux. The flux within the “energy 
fields” also shows us how the boundary between the topographies are not fixed, but 
rather ebbs and flows, where Yusuf‟s sensing of “energy fields” points to a phenomenal 
awareness of the usually pre-phenomenal cognitive processes of interweaving and 
rendering within the topographies. In addition Yusuf has also interpreted this 
discursively to give him complex meanings through which he can navigate the white 
gay space. 
  
Rendering the Intersubjective Racialized Corporeal Topographies 
The „common understanding‟ described by Yusuf can be related to Husserl‟s theories 
around subjectivity as interwoven with intersubjective processes of meaning making 
and communication where Husserl suggests that: 
 
“Subjectivity is [...] an ego functioning constitutively only within 
intersubjectivity. From the „ego‟ perspective this means that there are new 
themes, those of the synthesis applying specifically to ego and other-ego (each 
taken purely as ego): the I-you-synthesis and also, the more complicated we-
synthesis” (Husserl, 1970:172).  
 
Howard‟s description of his instinctive understanding of the social interaction between 
himself and (mostly older) GWME men shows us how the synthesis of intersubjective 
meanings between himself and the other white men create a commonly understood 
relation of themes. Husserl‟s (1970:172) use of the term “theme” (or “index”) is 
important because we cannot „know‟ the qualities elicited in each individual‟s 
subjectivity, and almost certainly these are unique to each unified Ego. The concept of a 
theme therefore implies a category of intersubjective sensings and meanings generated 
in the social processes which bring common understandings to a social context, whilst 
maintaining the idea of unique subjective qualities. Husserl‟s (1970:172) “I-you-
synthesis” in this context will relate to sensings and meanings around the particular 
GWME man and the communication with Howard, including perhaps the themes of age 
difference or racialized difference. Husserl‟s (1970:172) “we-synthesis” relates to a 
social community and the shared sensings and meanings circulating and sedimented 
over time, and here we can relate this to Howard‟s previous experiences of older 
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GWME men in white gay venues (including this one), his experiences of specific clubs 
designed for older GWME men to meet Far East Asian gay men, and the wider cultural 
understandings around these racialized age-differentialized  interactions (Manalansan, 
2006). I would suggest that both the I-you and we-synthesis, being framed within the 
same racialized discursive formations, are essentially the same phenomenological 
interaction related to the racialized Other in the context of this thesis. Husserl‟s (1970) 
„we-synthesis‟ and concepts around „community‟, communal horizon, and 
intersubjectivity enable the impact of racialized discourses within society to be 
theorized as information and meanings which can be interwoven to render sensings and 
meanings within the unified Ego, or within specific phenomenal topographies of the 
unified Ego (such as the gut, heart, or penis), or life-world. 
 
I previously outlined how Yusuf‟s and Howard‟s experiences in white gay spaces were 
related to sensing and interpreting qualities and meanings. I explore this further here 
using Frantz Fanon‟s (1993) concept of the racial epidermal schema to show how 
racialized intersubjective experiences can impose a sense of dissonance or disorientation 
(Ahmed, 2006a) upon the unified Ego. James describes how as a result of a social 
encounter with a GWME man involving communication with both words and phys ical 
touch, his unified Ego became rendered with affective qualities and meanings which 
remained with him ever since. 
 
James: I don‟t know what‟s changed between then, I don‟t know, something about me 
changed on that day. I‟m not sure what it was, so it never happened again. 
 
R: so, 
 
James: this white guy came up to me, yeah, and wanted, well he didn‟t go sexual he 
went with money, he wanted me to come with him and he said, he was saying, he was 
like „ I‟ve got a really nice flat, I  drive a, I  drive an XR3I‟, it was model of Ford Escort 
that  was really popular at the time, at the time I was driving an RS Turbo which was 
better than what he had, 
 
R: oh, I‟m not into cars. 
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James: I don‟t, 
 
R: or football! 
 
James: I don‟t blame you. But cars have always been one of my things, but football no. 
Erm, so I was polite, and then he said something along the lines of, you know, „you 
don‟t know what you‟re missing‟, or „it‟s your loss‟ or something, something really 
derogatory, and I just punched him.  
 
R: right. 
 
James: so they threw me out, so maybe that was that. 
 
R: and he touched you? 
 
James: yeah he touched me, not on the crotch but on the thigh, erm, but ever since then 
no white man has ever approached me.  
 
James describes a specific moment in his life when something in him changed 
permanently. The GWME man began the interaction by positioning himself as more 
powerful, by talking about his expensive flat and car, thereby attempting to reduce 
James‟ power of existence and action. It can be argued that „race‟ here was also being 
cited through discourses around class and capital, that James being of African-heritage 
was therefore assumed to be of a lower class and economic status.  James was initially 
polite, yet the GWME man persisted with verbal comments about James‟ “loss”, again 
attempting to reduce James‟ power of existence and action. At some point during this 
the GWME man touched James‟ thigh, which combined with the comments about 
“loss” elicited a physical reaction from James. At each stage of James‟ description, 
power of action and existence is being utilised to transmit affective information and 
elicit affective qualities around both erotic desire and increase of power within the 
GWME man and loss of power within James. The narrative around the theme of 
“money” was interpreted by James as being about the GWME man‟s seduction which 
suggests that there are coded themes understood in the gay community as part of the 
strategies for sexual seduction. This shows that it is not only „race‟ which can be 
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„invisibly‟ operationalized in gay spaces but also sexual desire. Here James has 
interpreted the GWME man‟s behaviour towards him as related to the GWME man‟s 
positioning of James as a racialized Other, who being from a marginalized group would 
feel grateful or awestruck by the narratives around “money”. The strategy of citing 
„money‟ may have also been related to racialized discourses around ownership of the 
Other (Baldwin, 1961; Roediger, 1998), or that there was the implication of possible 
remuneration in some way for sex.   
 
In James‟ description the interpellation as being the racialized Other occurred through 
two key forms of social communication, the first being the narrative by the GWME man 
which positioned him as more powerful than James. The second was the communication 
through touch, when the GWME man touched James‟ thigh. This process, described by 
James, echoes Fanon‟s (1993:112) description of the moment of interpellation during 
the incident where a child shouts “look, a Negro!” towards him. In this extract Fanon 
describes the sedimented social meanings impacting on his sense of embodied 
subjectivity:  
 
“I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, 
stories, history and above all historicity, which I had learned about from Jaspers. 
Then assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken 
by the racial epidermal schema” (Fanon, 1993:112).  
 
Fanon‟s reference to the corporeal schema is a phenomenological concept derived from 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002). Merleau-Ponty  in turn was influenced by Schilder‟s 
concept of „body image‟ (Grosz, 1994:82) and Husserl‟s (2002:135) theory of 
embodiment where the corporeal “spatial schema” as derived from the hyletic 
topography interweaving into the “sensuously filled corporeal” schema. Merleau-Ponty 
(2002) developed his phenomenological ideas using pre-1950s anatomical and 
psychiatric medical pathology (particularly around brain injuries) as well as early 
sociological influences to explicate the processes and sensations resulting from the 
corporeal schema. Neither Merleau-Ponty nor Husserl consider the impact of „race‟ in 
their phenomenological analysis. Fanon‟s (1993) phenomenological approach therefore 
adds a particular racialized phenomenal experience which Sara Ahmed (2007:161) 
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describes as “the bodily and social experience of restriction, uncertainty and blockage, 
or perhaps even in terms of the despair of the utterance „I cannot‟.” 
 
Given that I am looking at the phenomenal experience perceived by the unified Ego as 
whole, by combining Fanon‟s (1993) concept of the racial epidermal schema with 
Husserl‟s (2002) approach to how the unified Ego is rendered, I will be using the 
concept of  racialized corporeal topographies to help explicate the experiences of 
GBME men in white gay spaces, as I explain now in more detail.  Although Fanon‟s 
(1993) descriptions do describe how racialized encounters impact upon an individual‟s 
phenomenal awareness of their embodied self, the emphasis is on the racial epidermal 
schema across which meanings are communicated rather than the sense that the 
meanings are interwoven through the totality of the topographies of the unified Ego. 
Jack Katz (1999) reminds us of the three dimensional nature of the world we live in and 
suggests a three dimensional approach to theorising the body and affect is more 
relevant. In this regard Paul Gilroy suggests that by pursuing a more three dimensional 
approach to theorizing „race‟ we can begin to resist racializa tions:  
 
“Fanon‟s notion supplies an interesting footnote to the whole history of racial 
sciences and the exclusive notions of colour-coded humanity that they specified. 
We need to find its contemporary analogs not where he looked, on the surface of 
the body, but deep within it. Their pursuit may yet yield the anti- toxins capable 
of silencing raciology forever” (Gilroy, 1998:847).  
 
 Husserl (2002:138) describes the unity of “surface coloration” regarding “body-colors” 
where the surface is viewed as a unity in spite of variation, however body colour is just 
one of the elements required for “the sensuous qualities which „manifest‟ and „fill‟ the 
form”. Husserl points to the multiple schemas or schemata interweaving into the whole, 
thereby suggesting that a single schema would not be sufficient:   
 
“The thing is constituted as a unity of schemata, or, more precisely as a unity of 
a causal necessity within the nexus of dependencies which present themselves in 
manifolds of schemata” (Husserl, 2002:135).  
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Husserl did not definitively conclude whether schemas, schematics, or stratifications 
could be analysed independently of the interwoven unity (Mooney, 2010), although 
there are strong suggestions that the unity is “intermeshed” in ways which make a 
distinct analysis of a particular schema problematic (Mooney, 2010:41), for example 
when Husserl (2002:135) states “the soul on the other hand does not allow of 
schematization”. This dynamic interconnection of topographies is also implicated in 
processes around objectification and embodiment and may prevent complete 
dissociation during racialized interpellations (Burwood, 2008:267). This is important 
because there will be instances where racialized meanings exceed the trope of „the 
epidermis‟, for example when people talk about bodily movements and spatiality in 
white gay space, or where a sense of embodied subjectivity comes from cultural forms 
such as clothing styles, or language styles. We can also see this where James (page 146) 
talks about muscular slaves and where Howard and Yusuf (page 157) talk about gut 
feelings. H. Tristram Engelhardt describes this interweaving of the topographies of the 
unified Ego both on the surface of and within the body, suggesting that: 
 
“The interiority of the lived-body is built upon the nexus of kinaesthesias, which 
weave a reticulum of coherence placing sensations on and in the body and 
conjoining them with action in the world” (Engelhardt, 1977:56).  
 
However this is not to suggest that the skin is not an important corporeal topography 
involved in the rendering of racialized meanings. Fanon‟s (1993:112) description helps 
to explicate his perception that his skin colour and surface corporeal features were 
implicated in the racialized discursive meanings circulating within the life-world. 
Fanon‟s description also shows how the meanings within the racialized discursive 
topography simultaneously rendered him with the phenomenal subjective feelings of 
disorientation (Ahmed, 2007:160), alienation (Nobel, 2005:133) and dissociation 
(Burwood, 2008: 264) from his „original‟ corporeal schema, related to his „triple 
consciousness‟ as discussed in chapter three. Using Fanon‟s ideas here to analyse the 
experience of dissociation we can see that the racialized epidermal schema of the „skin‟ 
is interwoven with multiple schemata, and Fanon‟s description points to three domains 
of schemata, namely the intersubjective discursive racial schema, the corporeal schema 
of the epidermis, and the meta-schemata relating the racial epidermal schemata to his 
corporeal schemata (sensed in the moment of change where it “crumbled”). I would 
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describe these respective „schemata‟ using the phenomenological model of the unified 
Ego as being components of: the discursive topography, the hyletic topography and the 
affective topography.  
 
Fanon‟s (1993) description also shows us the process around the foregrounding of 
racialized meanings in the moment. The perceptual shift from his description o f his 
corporeal schema „crumbling‟ and being replaced by the racial epidermal schema 
suggests the already present racialized meanings (Ahmed, 2007:153) backgrounded 
within the unified Ego shifting to the perceptual foreground of the corporeal topography 
of his epidermis. In terms of the potential types of phenomenal corporeal topographies 
through which this foregrounding can be sensed and experienced, the skin is arguably 
the most accessible. It covers the whole corporeal surface and thus can be metonymic 
for the whole unified Ego. It is also (usually) the phenomenal „boundary‟ between the 
life-world and the unified Ego. This shifting from phenomenal background to 
foreground of the already embodied racialized meanings within the unified Ego, 
described by Fanon (1993) as crumbling, can be seen in James‟ interview where he 
says:  
 
James: I don‟t know what‟s changed between then, I don‟t know, something about me 
changed on that day. I‟m not sure what it was, so it never happened again. 
 
Linda Alcoff (1999:24) uses the expression “a different texture of perception” for this 
change in subjectivity giving the example of a BME lecturer with a classroom of white 
students who mid-term in the semester introduces the academic topic of „race‟. Here 
Alcoff suggests that from a foregrounded phenomenally sensed non-racialized 
intersubjective community with the white students, the BME lecturer senses a shift to a 
racialized positioning as suspicious racialized Other. For James, in the context he 
describes, this „different texture‟ was a new feeling, a sense and therefore one which 
could not be expressed in specific terms, although it was able to be interpreted in 
relation to „race‟.  
 
In James‟ description we see that the act of the GWME man touching his thigh was 
interpreted racially, “yeah he touched me, not on the crotch but on the thigh, erm, but 
ever since then no white man has ever approached me”. Here the act of touching brings 
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to the foreground the corporeal topography of the thigh, which is close enough to the 
crotch (as metonym for the sexual) for James to notice the spatial proximity. The hand 
of the GWME man on James‟ thigh would be almost skin to skin contact were it not for 
the cloth separating the two surfaces. Nevertheless, the sensation of heat, sweat, and 
pressure would be felt where the hand touched the thigh, penetrating through the cloth. 
That topography of phenomenal intersection between James and the GWME man, a 
touch uninvited and unwanted by James, becomes interwoven with the meanings 
established in the narrative around “money” (associated with sexuality, race, class, and 
poverty) and “loss”, thereby rendering James‟ phenomenal corporeal topography of the 
thigh (initially as intercorporeal „thigh‟ interwoven with the other man‟s hand) with 
those meanings. Where James‟ thigh is phenomenally part of „James‟, rather than a 
corpus-object, these meanings can then emerge throughout his unified Ego. The 
interweaving of the meanings interpreted through the discursive topography (the coded 
narrative) and the sensings within affective topography (the touch) within James‟ 
unified Ego can be seen where he says “something about me changed on that day”  
suggesting his whole unified Ego has been changed by the experience.   
 
Of course Fanon (1993) does not say the racialized meanings exist exclusively within 
his racialized epidermal schema, and his descriptions of his embodied subjectivity 
indicate the emerging of the racialized meanings throughout his unified Ego. However 
some authors, inspired by Fanon, do refer to the „skin‟ as the key signifier of „race‟ and 
the predominant phenomenal corporeal topography which experiences „race‟,  for 
example where authors express this as “racism getting „under the skin‟ ” (Hook, 
2008:148), or “the resurfacing of the body” (Burwood, 2008:271).  As indicated by the 
discussion thus far, I would suggest that these renderings of racialized meanings and 
affective qualities throughout the unified Ego will also occur independently of Fanon‟s 
„racialized epidermal schema‟ where his concept is understood both as a trope for the 
surface interaction between the social and the unified Ego and as a schema which is 
theorized as metonymic with the total unified Ego. On this last point, given that the 
sense of racialization frequently encompasses the whole domain of the unified Ego, the 
use of the „epidermal schema‟ has the potential to narrow the epistemological 
framework for understanding racialized embodiment (Gilroy, 1998). Here for example 
„skin colour‟, which is nevertheless an important attribute in racialized embodiment, can 
distract from other topographic features theorized using the concept.    
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Fanon‟s racialized epidermal schema becomes a „lens‟ through which he can „observe‟ 
the racialized meanings of the life-world, given that the corporeal schema is influenced 
by the social context (Ahmed, 2006b; Burwood, 2008; Crossley, 2007:89; Fanon, 1993; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2002). The sense of restriction underpinning Fanon‟s phenomenology 
of the body (Ahmed, 2007:161; Burwood, 2008:269), is by definition an attribute of the 
“action in the world” (Engelhardt, 1977:56), interwoven through the topographies and 
totality of the unified Ego.  Here we can see how affect, as defined in chapter four as 
related to power of action, is elicited (or amplified) by the rendering of the corporeal 
topographies with foregrounded racialized meanings. In the context where these 
meanings are related to negative social outcomes, racialized meanings rendered within 
the phenomenal unified Ego will be understood as reducing the power of action, and 
would elicit negative affective qualities.  
 
Given that the unified Ego is always situated intersubjectively (Husserl, 1970:172, 
2002:86), foregrounded sensings (in particular, but backgrounded sensings too) have the 
potential to be communicated to the intersubjective community (Berger & Luckman, 
1971; Husserl, 1969:420, 1970:231, 2002:208; Schutz, 1970).  However Husserl 
suggests that these intersubjective sensings obtained from the non-representational 
communications of the corporeal topographies of the unified Ego may not be easily 
understood by the intersubjective community whereby: 
 
“The lived-experiences of consciousness that are indicated through the medium 
of lived-corporeality and of expression that is conveyed in a lived-bodily manner 
emerge in an ambiguous and discordant way” (Husserl, 2001:374).  
 
However James‟ description shows us that the sensings and meanings are not as 
intersubjectively ambiguous or discordant as Husserl (2001:374) suggests.  James‟ 
description is about „race‟ since the incident involved a “white guy” and he says “since 
then no white man has ever approached me”. This tells us not only about James‟ 
racialized subjectivity in relation to his own unified Ego, but also how it is transmitted 
intersubjectively to other individuals in a social context. Here we see James‟ 
phenomenal experience, which exceeds the linguistic (Crossley, 2007; Hook, 2008:150; 
Thrift, 2008), described as “I don‟t know what‟s changed between then, I don‟t know, 
something about me changed on that day. I‟m not sure what it was”, being transmitted 
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specifically to GWME men with the understood sensings and meanings around 
defensiveness or hostility: “since then no white man has ever approached me”. James 
has metamorphosized the phenomenal restriction described by Fanon (1993) into a 
shield, which whilst still being a restriction in the sense of being a barrier for James in 
white gay spaces, is being used to protect him. Linda Alcoff echoes this notion of the 
construction of a defensive shield in the moment a perceptual shift occurs following 
interpellation: 
 
“For a non-white called back from a normative postural image to a racialized 
„epidermal schema‟ as Fanon put it, the habit-body one falls into at such 
moments, I would suggest, is protective, defensive” (Alcoff, 1999:24).  
 
Alcoff‟s (1999) use of the expression „called back‟ in regards to the shift within 
corporeal topographies of the unified Ego helps show how interpellation can be sensed 
as a disorientation within the unified Ego, as discussed in chapter three, and that the 
racialized meanings can be interpreted both by the GBME individual and the others in 
the social context through the sensed qualities around defensiveness associated with this 
disorientation or re-orientation.  Later in the interview James describes his friends 
explaining to him what vibe he gives off in white gay venues:  
 
James: you have this expression on your face you‟re having a good time and everything 
but your whole body your whole aura says to people „don't you fucking dare‟. Don't, I 
just don't want, just keep away I just don‟t want to know about, just keep away. And I'm 
like how, how do I do that? And to this day I don't know how I do it. 
 
James does not suggest it is a specific corporeal topography of his body or his behaviour 
involved in the communication, in fact his face is expressing positive information 
within the life-world. It is some inchoate non-representational attribute of James‟ 
“aura”, the whole of James, his unified Ego has a permanent aura that indicates and 
transmits affective information intersubjectively and protects him from (unwanted) 
sexual approaches from GWME men.  By contrast Derek here talks about the 
transmission of positive affective information through his aura: 
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Derek: so if you're a warm loving kind gentle person who reaches out to other people in 
that manner, people are going to understand that and get that. And they will love you 
for the individual that you are, no matter what colour your skin is, the person that you 
are, you know, what your aura resonates around people.  
 
R: and you think that's more important than how you look? 
 
Derek: Absolutely. Absolutely.  
 
Derek here shows us his understanding that his aura which resonates into the life-world 
has the power to communicate the sense of Derek as a “warm loving kind gentle 
person”. Derek‟s words show that he is talking about understood sensings rather than 
expressed interpreted meanings, and he suggests that the intersubjective communication 
of these sensings are readily understood by the other GWME men in the gay venue. 
Here the affective qualities around being “warm [and] loving” and the sensings of 
“kind [and] gentle” are foregrounded within Derek‟s entire unified Ego, so that the 
negative discursive meanings associated with the racialized skin colour are 
backgrounded, not only within Derek‟s subjectivity but within the intersubjective 
community of the white gay space. This intersubjectively understood aura prevents 
Derek from being positioned as the unwanted racialized Other. We can also see how 
Derek‟s unified Ego extends his corporeal topography, which usually contours the 
hyletic topography (anatomical body shape), out into the life-world, where the idea of 
an aura that resonates would be like a glow or haze upon the surface of the body. We 
can relate this to the sense of striving, translating the affective topography out into the 
life-world towards the object or person that Derek “reaches out to [...] in that manner”. 
This shows that the topographies of the unified Ego can alter their „shape‟ in response to 
the context of the life-world (Merleau-Ponty, 2002), in a way which is intersubjectively 
understood. Christopher echoes Derek‟s belief that the subjective sensings within the 
unified Ego can be transmitted into the social space of a white gay venue:  
 
Christopher: if you go into a situation feeling „I am going to do something and I belong, 
I belong and have a right to be here‟, then you, you do. 
 
R: hmm. 
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Christopher: you just go for it. But if you start thinking, „oh my gosh this place is so 
white‟ you automatically start putting up barriers.  
 
R:hmm. 
 
Christopher: but if you go in feeling, „no, fine, so what if it‟s like this way, I‟m just 
adding some colour to the environment, I‟m adding something that's different‟, right. 
Variety has always been the spice of life, whether they accept me or not, that is their 
problem, it is not mine.  
 
Christopher‟s description however, suggests that he is aware of the potential problems 
faced by GBME men in white gay venues. This is shown firstly where Christopher uses 
a „self affirmation‟ technique of boosting his confidence before he enters the white gay 
venue, something he would not have to do if there were no potential problems around 
racism. Secondly it is shown where he ends the interview extract with the implication 
that some people might not accept him due to his „race‟. Christopher‟s use of the word 
feeling, which I interpret here as referring to sensings, are used in the sentences where 
he talks about positive „self affirmation‟ feelings (Gunaratnam, 2003:128). When 
Christopher uses the word thinking, which I interpret as referring to meanings, he talks 
about negative thoughts and meanings particularly about whiteness and restriction. Here 
we can see how the discursive topography relates directly to meanings about racialized 
discourses. By contrast the affective topography, with its sensed understandings, not 
only renders Christopher with positive affective qualities, but he suggests also 
communicates the positive understandings into the intersubjective space of the life-
world. Christopher‟s awareness that other people may not accept him contrasts with 
Derek‟s view that his aura can overcome racism within white gay spaces. This is 
important for two main reasons, firstly the racialized discourses within white gay spaces 
are still impacting upon the individuals present, and so the positive affective sensings 
communicated by GBME men‟s auras have to compete with the negative racialized 
meanings circulating in the white gay venue.  Secondly the communicated sensings 
from other white people‟s auras will also be transmitted and understood within the 
intersubjective life-world, and so if some of the GWME men are racist, these negative 
sensings will be competing with the positive aura‟s of GBME men. Christopher also 
describes the affective qualities sensed through the spatial positioning of himself as the 
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only GBME man in a white gay space. Here we see two affective qualities elicited and 
communicated, namely fear and confidence:  
 
Christopher: so I liked being the one who stood out from afar. So yeah „look at me, 
feast on me‟. I don‟t have a problem with that. And when you come over with a sense of 
accomplishment, people have two responses, a series of different responses. One is they 
automatically fear you,  
 
R: right. Because? 
 
Christopher: because you are far too confident for them. Right. Or, they think „that's 
the person I‟d like to get to know‟. 
 
R: because of the confidence again? 
 
Christopher: because of the confidence. Or, I want to be able to sap in and draw on 
that confidence, so it‟s almost as if they want to drain it off of you.  
 
R: how does that work, what kind of [interrupted]? 
 
Christopher: well it‟s almost as if you know, you know, you‟ve kind of like latched onto 
something and you're like a parasite, so you‟re draining, because you lack that 
confidence that that person has,  
 
R: right. 
 
Christopher: right. So you try to drain it from that individual.  
 
R: by being in their company? 
 
Christopher: by being in, in their company, by being around them. 
 
R: right. 
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Christopher: and you tend to do that by being demanding, by being over powering, by 
being with all with in their face, 
 
R: right. 
 
Christopher: right. Then you can drain it from them and that is where it comes from 
and resounds.  
 
Here, like Yusuf‟s dynamic flux within his „chakras‟ and „energy fields‟, Christopher 
has a phenomenal embodied sense of “draining” as an intersubjective and spatial 
experience. Here Christopher is describing himself as a GBME man in the white gay 
space possessing the confidence that the other GWME men are parasitically draining 
through the affective topography. Here it is not communicated directly through any 
representational or discursive expression of meanings, but through the spatial 
orientations of bodies and the communication of sensings. This sense of draining may 
be the reason why Christopher preferred to be “the one who stood out from afar” in 
order to reduce the affective quality of draining and the attenuation of his sense of 
confidence. This echoes what Paul Virilo (1998:110) describes as “this loss that we 
anxiously sense within ourselves and around us”, related to an individuals sense of self 
as the “centre of energy”. We can say here that the gut reaction in the GWME men is 
the affective quality of fear Christopher describes as being automatic. I would suggest 
that this is the fear of confident black men in white spaces due to racial stereotypes o f 
crime and violence (Yance, 2008; Mills 1997), and communicates the racialized 
hostility often found in white gay contexts (Nero, 2005:230). This fear is reconfigured 
within the life-world into an attraction to the confidence and desire to drain the 
confidence through the GWME men‟s spatial practices and intersubjective affective 
communication. The suggestions from James, Derek and Christopher that they can 
communicate their sensings from within the unified Ego out into the life-world shows 
us how complex understandings can be mapped using the invisible white Gestalt. They 
show us that they have interpreted the racialized discourses around whiteness, and 
respond to this by transmitting intersubjectively understood aura‟s into the 
configuration of the invisible white Gestalt in order to either change the racialized 
meanings within the white gay venue or change the affective sense of them.  
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I have discussed the presence of racialized discursive formations within the white gay 
spaces, but there are also many other discourses circulating, for example around gender 
and sexuality. Fanon‟s (1993:112) concept of the “racial epidermal schema” can be read 
here as the foregrounding of racialized meanings through the corporeal topography of 
the epidermis, other topographies, or the whole unified Ego, as a result of a 
disorientation elicited by racialized discourses and practices in a social context. 
However as Husserl (2002:135) points out, there are multiple „schemas‟ interwoven 
within any given topography, and thus the discursive topography will be interwoven 
with multiple discursive meanings obtained from the life-world. One of the discourses 
within the narrative of the GWME man described by James is that relating to 
stereotypes around gender: 
 
James: he was like „I‟ve got a really nice flat, I drive a, I  drive an XR3I‟, it was model 
of Ford Escort that  was really popular at the time, at the time I  was driving an RS 
Turbo which was better than what he had. 
 
Here we see the conversation around the theme of cars which I interpreted within the 
interview as related to gender stereotypes, where I say “I‟m not into cars [...] or 
football”. Within this gendered discourse we can see that the GWME man was also 
implicating James‟ sense of masculinity in the play for power, trying to compete with 
James for the position of the most masculine within these particular rules of the game. 
Neither the racialized corporeal topography nor the genderized corporeal topography 
can be said to actually exist as a singular trope. Instead they are interwoven together, 
along with the other meanings within a particular corporeal topography or totality of the 
unified Ego. It could be argued that what we have here in James‟ description, is a 
racialized-(homo)sexualized-genderized corporeal topography foregrounded, with 
countless other meanings and sensings backgrounded.  
 
This multiplicity of „schemata‟ is not only the case phenomenologically, but also in 
terms of the discourses within the social field which are imbricated with many other 
types of discourses. To speak of a racialized discursive formation is really to 
foreground the racialized discourses present within a discursive matrix which also 
includes discourses not directly implicated with „race‟. However both 
phenomenologically and discursively, these interweavings and imbrications suggest that 
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racialized meanings or statements are inextricably bound to the intersubjective life-
world and the social field. Therefore a singular racialized, (homo/hetero) sexualized, or 
genderized corporeal topography cannot be said to exist, except as a domain of 
foregrounded phenomenal meanings interwoven with other backgrounded meanings 
within a particular phenomenal corporeal topography or the totality o f the unified Ego. 
However given that it is often the racialized meanings which are foregrounded in the 
social interactions experienced by GBME men in white gay spaces, the racialized 
corporeal topography is essential for sensing the invisible white Gestalt.  
 
This complexity of interwoven meanings and sensings within the unified Ego may 
enable the continuation of the sense of „me-ness‟ even when “assailed at various points” 
(Fanon, 1993:112) by the racialized discourses and practices. Husserl (2002:66) 
describes instances of the corporeal topography holding its phenomenal coherence 
despite the impact of physical injury or perceived distorting sensory information within 
the hyletic topography. The unified Ego understands something is unusual by reference 
to previous embodied states. This integrity of the unified Ego (except in severe 
instances) remains even in racialized objectification where “in dissociation my body (at 
least as a whole) never becomes a „mere thing‟ for me.”  (Burwood, 2008:273). 
Therefore GBME men can utilise both meanings and sensings to defend themselves 
from the racialized discourses in white gay spaces. Even though they will be impacted 
upon by the racialized discourses there are other discourses around for example gender 
and sexuality which may be robust enough within their sense of self so as to protect 
them from the full impact of the racism (Burwood, 2008). In addition the 
communication of sensings within the corporeal topography of the aura of GBME men 
can be seen as both a defence against threat and an openness to affection depending 
upon the context.       
 
In this section I have explicated in greater detail some of the key terms I am using in 
this thesis using the data from my interviews.  I showed how the corporeal topographies 
can become interwoven with the hyletic, affective and discursive topographies, and how 
the racialized meanings can be rendered as understood  sensings, and qualities. However 
there may be times that racialized meanings remain rendered within a specific 
phenomenal corporeal topographic region, or alternatively may not be rendered as 
foregrounded racialized meanings (as in Fanons (1993) perceptions before the 
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interpellation of the child shouting).  I also showed that contrary to Husserl‟s 
(2001:374) suggestion that the non-representational sensings are intersubjectively 
understood ambiguously, the sensings can be conveyed coherently to the intersubjective 
community in ways which are understood. The life-world is the source of the racialized 
meanings interwoven within the unified Ego and corporeal topographies. Given the 
multiple intersecting discourses around gender, sexuality, and „race‟ in the life-world, 
we cannot say a single racialized „schema‟ exists, but rather that multiple meanings are 
interwoven in the discursive topographies with some meanings being foregrounded and 
others backgrounded in a particular moment. I now go on to discuss the conclusions for 
this chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter looked at how the unified Ego of GBME men understands the sensings and 
interprets the racialized meanings in white gay spaces, to give an overall experience of 
sense. In section one I discussed the theoretical and phenomenological frameworks I 
used to explicate the unified Ego. In section two I looked at how racialized colonial 
discourses around the black body are still present within contemporary English society 
and impact upon the embodied subjectivity of GBME men in negative ways. In section 
three I looked at how the unified Ego, as a totality, sensed complex information from 
the social context of white gay spaces, explicating how the discursive, affect ive and 
hyletic topographies are interwoven with the corporeal topography and how they are 
involved in the rendering of the experience within phenomenal awareness. I showed 
how multiplicities of information from diverse modalities are interwoven into the 
rendered object, filling in the „whole‟ from the „parts‟. I then used Frantz Fanon‟s 
(1993) concept of the racial epidermal schema to develop the lacuna within Edmund 
Husserl‟s (2001, 2002) models of how the whole unified Ego comes to be interwoven 
with racialized meanings. Here I showed that through foregrounding and 
backgrounding, multiple meanings or singular meanings can emerge as salient within 
phenomenal awareness as a result of the social context. This process of foregrounding 
and backgrounding is an important factor in the sensing of the invisible white Gestalt, as 
we have seen in the previous chapters where the burying of backgrounded information 
and meanings which point to racialized interpretations is often used as a strategy in 
constructing the invisibility of whiteness.  I then showed how GBME men use their 
sense of their experiences to understand their perceptions of the white gay space, and 
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also how GBME men transmit sensings which are understood by the other actors within 
the life-world. I also discussed how the interweavings of multiple discourses could be 
theorized as helping to prevent the racialized embodied dissociation described by Fanon 
(1993), sustaining the sense of „self‟.    
 
GBME men can use their whole unified Ego to sense the invis ible white Gestalt, and 
understand the hidden racialized practices. Even though this may not be translated into 
representational expressions such as words or thoughts, the unified Ego can take action 
to protect GBME men from the impact of negative affective qualities and the social 
impact of violence within white gay spaces.  Through intersubjectivity each unified Ego 
is capable of transmitting these non-representational sensings to other individuals, 
creating shared themes by which to navigate and understand the intersubjective 
sensings. These intersubjective themes comprise part of the invisible white Gestalt, and 
so can be sensed by both GBME men and GWME men in white gay spaces, although 
their interpretation may vary between people, as for example we can see in famous the 
old woman/ young girl Gestalt image. In chapter six I continue looking at the corporeal 
topographies of GBME men by explicating how the penis of GBME men is rendered 
with understood sensings and racialized meanings within white gay spaces and contexts. 
Here the penis is a corporeal topography which experiences affective qualities related to 
„race‟ and sexuality both through embodied subjectivity and also as result of the penis 
being a cultural signifier of racialized-sexualized-gendered discourses. 
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Chapter Six 
Experiencing Whiteness through the  
Corporeal  Topography of the Black Penis 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I looked at how the lived-Body, theorized as the unified Ego, 
uses the interwoven topographies to understand sensings and interpret meanings 
through mapping and navigating the invisible white Gestalt within white gay spaces. 
The unified Ego as a whole experiences the understood sense. Here I showed that 
sensings can provide complex understandings of the social space, and that GBME men 
and GWME men could communicate and understand sensings intersubjectively. The 
sensings and meanings exist in a dialectical relationship, and therefore the overall 
racialized experience will also depend upon the discursive parts of the invisible white 
Gestalt, resulting in the racialization of the white gay space and social interactions 
within it. In addition I showed how the unified Ego is reconfigured by the invisible 
white Gestalt and how GBME men can themselves reconfigure the invisible white 
Gestalt to make white gay spaces more accessible.  
 
In this chapter I explore how the GBME man‟s phenomenal penis is rendered with 
sensings, affective qualities and racialized meanings, and also how it operates as a 
signifier of raced meanings through racialized discourses circulating within white gay 
contexts. I look at how the descriptions from my interviewees make visible the impact 
of these racialized discursive meanings and non-discursive sensings upon the affective 
qualities and embodied subjectivities of GBME men within white gay contexts. The 
black penis has been historically represented relationally with the white Mind within 
cultural dualistic discourses (Friedman, 2002:82). Flowers et al. (2011) suggest that 
there has been little research or writing on the penis in the social sciences citing only 
Friedman (2002) as an example. However the penis does emerge in „race‟ critiques of 
sexuality (for example Collins, 2004; Fanon, 1993; Lee, 2005; Yancy, 2008) and is 
specifically addressed in Fung (2001). One of the aims of this chapter is to show the 
importance of the penis in social interactions and that this significance suggests the need 
for further research and theory on this topic.  
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In section one I look at how historical discourses around colonialism and whiteness 
operate to racialize the black male penis in contemporary contexts. I initially outline the 
colonial history of racialized categorisation and typology of the penis, before describing 
how these discourses persist in contemporary society within current „scientific‟ and 
cultural thought. In section two I show how the practice of interrogating GBME men 
about their penis size results in the elicitation of negative affective qualities experienced 
by GBME men. Here the penis interrogation is interpreted as an interpellation into a 
racialized category, as an act of racialized-sexualized objectification and as a hostile act 
by the GWME man. I also look at what happens when the GBME man is interpellated 
through touching the penis by GWME men in cases where the subjectivity and identity 
of the GBME man is not framed within a contextualized race-cognizant framework. 
How do the social processes around rendering and discursive performativity interact to 
produce affective qualities and meanings? In section three I develop the themes of race, 
sexuality and control. Here I consider how these are involved in both objectifying the 
GBME man as a trophy and in maintaining the white gay communities‟ racialized 
boundaries. How do the operations of power oriented around the black penis maintain 
the whiteness of white gay spaces? In section four I explore how pleasure and 
reproduction are related to power in relation to the racialized social interactions around 
the black penis in white gay spaces. How do racialized practices around the black penis 
maintain the white gay social body?  I will conclude by showing that the penis is a 
nodal point for multiple meanings and affective qualities rendered through the penis, 
unified Ego, and intersubjective life-world. These multiple meanings are productive of 
the racialized power relations which position GBME men as out of place in the white 
gay community and which sustains the whiteness of gay contexts.  
 
Section One: Colonial Discourses and Representations  
of the Black Penis 
 
Colonial discourses around the racialized penis still persist in contemporary society, as I 
will show in this section. In James‟ and Christopher‟s interview, which I quoted in 
chapter five, one of the themes they talked about was how the black body and the black 
penis were represented in colonial discourses as sexual objects. Here I begin the 
interview by trying to unpack and untangle the meanings around racialized corporeal 
topographies by asking about the racialized meanings associated with the nose. This 
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question about „the nose‟ arose earlier in the interview where I mentioned in the 
discussion that I had an „Asian nose‟, to which James remarked that he hadn‟t noticed 
my nose and also commented that he had heard about the „Jewish nose‟ only recently on 
an American television series for the first time (the racialized reading of the nose being 
an historical signifier of racialized discourses): 
 
R: I think what I'm trying to get at is [pause] if you have a nose that signifies your race 
would that make you unattractive on the gay scene that's fairly racist? 
 
James: I don't think it would because if we‟re talking racism were talking about white 
people. If a white person for whatever reason fancies black men, if a white gay man 
fancies black men I'm not sure he can be bothered to kind of break it down into „what 
kind of nose does he have?‟. As long as he‟s black and fairly good-looking. I'm not sure 
they care about their nose, and curiously enough from one or two stories I've heard 
they're not too concerned about the penis size either. Although they have the idea in 
their head about the size of a black man's penis, in cases where they've come to see it 
and found out that well it's either average or below average they haven't cared. Because 
it's a psychological thing. 
 
R: do you think they remember it as being big even if it was average? 
 
James: they'll imagine it being big even if it isn't. Which still objectifies the penis in a 
way but still they'll fantasize that it‟s big. You know they‟re being ravaged by this big 
black man, this big dick, even if the dick isn't that big.  
 
In this extract James is describing how the raced body, here specifically the body of 
African descent, continues in contemporary society to be defined by the racialized 
discourses which were present in earlier colonial periods. James is drawing together 
ideas about „race‟, sexuality and the body, specifically the corporeal or corpus-object 
topography of the penis, where the white gay man fantasizes about being “ravaged” by 
either a „savage‟ black man or by a disembodied „ravaging‟ black penis. Here we see 
how in this context the power of the colonial discourses exceeds the power of the black 
man‟s „material‟ body and penis to the extent that a small „anatomical‟ penis on a man 
of African descent is phenomenally rendered by white gay men as a larger corporeal 
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topography of the penis. The hyletic topography is interwoven with the discursive 
topography such that the discursive topography is foregrounded to render the larger 
black penis with which to ravage the white gay man. In addition the affective 
topography rendered with the affective qualities around erotic desire may also 
contribute to the phenomenal rendering by white gay men of a larger black penis 
corporeal topography by foregrounding the affective topography over the backgrounded 
hyletic topography.  
  
David Friedman (2002:4) suggests that the penis is “a part of the body that often seems 
apart from the body”, and this can be seen in practices around „glory holes‟ (Holmes et 
al., 2010), where the anonymous disembodied penis is inserted through a hole in 
adjacent toilet cubicles for sex (an act of resistance in response to past homophobic 
legislation in the UK and to avoid blackmail).  As we will see in this chapter, the black 
penis can be said to be treated as if a „dismembered‟ corpus-object by some GWME 
men. During colonization the West utilized discourses around sexuality and „race‟ in 
order to subjugate colonised groups (Bhabha, 2002; McClintock, 1995; Nagel, 2003, 
2006; Stoler, 1995; Ware, 1992).These racialized and sexualized discourses used the 
body as the site of signification, where Homi Bhabha suggests that:  
 
“The construction of the colonial subject in discourse, and the exercise of 
colonial power through discourse, demands an articulation of forms of 
difference - racial and sexual. Such an articulation becomes crucial if it is held 
that the body is always simultaneously (if conflictually) inscribed in both the 
economy of pleasure and desire, and the economy of discourse, domination and 
power” (Bhabha, 2002:67).  
 
Obviously the contexts involved in the construction of the colonial subject through 
discourse change dynamically in space-time, so it would be naive to assume that exactly 
the same discursive formations or cultural practices and representations hold true in the 
UK in present-day society (Knowles, 2003:188). However some core articulations 
within discourses can remain as consistent themes over historical periods and 
geographic domains. Bhabha‟s (2002) description of how colonial discourses impact 
upon the affective topographies and the discursive topographies to render the racialized-
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sexualized corporeal topographies, are shown in James‟ interview to persist in present-
day UK society.  
 
Historical Discourses on the Racialized Penis 
Before the onset of European colonialism, discourses around concatenated concepts 
regarding „the penis‟ and „ethnicity‟ were present in European societies, for example 
around Jewish groups and circumcision (Friedman, 2002:40). However this took on 
greater political and social significance during the period of European colonialism 
(Friedman, 2002:81; McClintock, 1995; Nagel, 2003, 2006). Particular governmental 
and disciplinary approaches were developed, for example the measurements of human 
anatomy by government agencies which included both penis size (Hedges, 1997:226) 
and skull size (Goldberg, 1994:65; Hedges, 1997:226), which coincided with and 
validated „academic‟ or „scientific‟ racial typologies (Friedman, 2002:90; Goldberg, 
1994:50). Equally black women‟s genitalia were also evaluated by white „academics‟ in 
terms which associated them with intelligence and moral character (Somerville, 1994), 
thus demonstrating that black people‟s genitalia in general were utilised in racialized 
typologies. These historical „scientific‟ validations reiterated and sustained racist 
discourses which set the white male of European descent‟s anatomical dimensions as 
the „norm‟ and provided racialized epistemologies where racialized typologies around 
for example intelligence, personality and morality were inferred from the anatomical 
data (Goldberg, 1994; Hedges, 1997:226). These racialized practices of measuring and 
categorising racialized bodies, derived from questionable and racist „scientific‟ 
ideologies and paradigms, therefore helped to establish and fix in both the public 
imaginary and in institutionally driven discursive formations the concepts which 
contributed to the racial hierarchies and racial subjugations in the past where “white 
elites reduced Black men to their bodies and identified their muscles and their penises 
as their most important sites” (Collins, 2004:57).  
 
As a result of these racist practices and representations, racialized discursive formations 
evolved which depicted men of African descent as having a large penis, and being 
hyper-sexual (Collins, 2004; Mulholland, 2007; Perez, 2005; Yancy, 2008) or bestial 
(Friedman, 2002:91; Goldberg, 1994:50). Men of Arab descent were depicted as being 
sexually immoral or perverse (Manalansan, 2006: 148; Said, 1978) or with a small penis 
(Mulholland, 2007; Puar, 2006). Men of Far East Asian descent were depicted as having 
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a small penis or being passive sexually (Caluya, 2006, 2008; Han, 2008, 2007; Lee, 
2005; Manalansan, 2003; Mao, 2002; Phua, 2007). Men of South Asian descent were 
depicted as passive (Manalansan, 2006; Mulholland, 2007).  Non-white racialized 
groups were depicted within the racialized discourses (continuously or at some point in 
history) as being hyper- fecund, both in terms of „breeding‟ their own „races‟, and being 
a threat to the purity of the white race by „interbreeding‟ with or raping white women 
(Stoler, 1995). These of course went hand in hand with governmental and disciplinary 
practices and supporting legislation to control both the white and black populations in 
terms of racialized-sexualized social contact, behaviours, and subjectivities (Stoler, 
1995).    
 
Contemporary Cultural Discourses around the Racialized Penis  
„Scientific‟ discourses around race have not disappeared from contemporary society 
(Goldberg, 1994; Song, 2003: 11). The English media have recently revived racist 
concepts around the racial cranium size by publishing news stories about new scientific 
research suggesting white people have bigger skulls (BBC news, 2011), a discourse 
which is historically linked relationally with racist representations around penis size 
(Friedman, 2002:82), where white peoples‟ „superior Minds‟ are simultaneously 
contrasted with black peoples‟ „savage bodies‟ (Collins, 2004; Mills, 1997; Yancy 
2008). This shows how cultural dualistic discourses appropriate particular body-parts to 
signify the white supremacist notion of who is human and who is less than human. At 
the same time, news stories in the English press have resurrected the „racial-
geographical penis‟. One example is the published story in the English news  media 
giving racialized statistics where: Africa and Colombia have minimum 16.10 cm penis 
length; Egypt and Brazil have 14.88cm;  Western Europe, Canada and Argentina have  
13.48cm; US, Russia, Australia and Eastern Europe have 11.67cm, China, India, 
Indonesia have 9.66cm (Metro, 2011). Here racialized meanings can be inferred from 
the national/geographical descriptions, where the general public who read these 
published news reports will frame these statistics within the cultural concepts around 
penis size and „race‟. In addition to the other discursive constructions around „race‟ I 
have already described, under colonialism „race‟ was frequently constructed 
discursively through the racialized representations of global geographies (Gunaratnam, 
2003:10). The overlaying by the readership of culturally informed racialized analyses of 
which ethnic/racial groups inhabit the countries or regions mentioned, which is tacitly 
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presumed within the design of these news reports, enables the reiteration and 
continuation of racialized stereotypes around the penis, without any explicit mention of 
„race‟ in the published text.  As we can see the „normative‟ or a-paradigmatic penis size, 
as measured in these studies,  „coincides‟ with countries occupied by or indigenous to 
white Europeans, and large non-white geographies and populations (Africa, China, 
India) are conflated into a homogenized statistic, which suggests possible geo-political 
bias or „scientific‟ bias through research undertaken within racialized (racist) 
paradigms. Here we can also relate discourses around miscegenation to representations 
around the racialized norms and deviations of penis size and racialized colonialist 
geographies.  
 
 Racial typologies and hierarchies of penis size have been discredited by previous 
research (Fanon, 1993; Friedman, 2002), as have skull typologies (Goldberg, 1994:65; 
Hedges, 1997:226). Not only do these recent „scientific‟ studies echo the racist 
discourses and practices of colonialism around categorising the body (Goldberg, 1994), 
but also more worryingly suggest that many academics are still unwilling to educate 
themselves about the erroneous racialized (racist) paradigms within which they are 
theorizing and practicing. As well as these official „medical-academic‟ racial discourses, 
there are the culturally inscribed discourses within contemporary Western media around 
the black penis and its mythical size.  Media representations around „race‟ help to create 
an interpretative framework through which cultural racialized meanings and 
significations can be derived (Goldberg, 1994:8; Collins, 2004:18). Examples of recent 
media which reiterate the concept of the penis of African descent (as large) include the 
films 51st State (2001), Queer Duck (2006), White Chicks (2004) and the popular BBC 
comedy show The Office (2002). The penis of Far East Asian descent (as small) is 
represented in the adult cartoon series Drawn Together (2006). The general absence of 
the white penis of European descent in the media as a racialized signifier of size or 
sexual stamina (unless compared directly with other racialized penises) makes its 
absence a-paradigmatic or normatively invisible. David Theo Goldberg (1994:46) 
suggests that “in a field of discourse like the racial what is generally circulated and 
exchanged is not simply truth about truth-claims or representations. These 
representations draw their efficiency from traditions, conventions, institutions and tacit 
modes of mutual comprehension.” Within the current „scientific‟ and media 
representations around the black penis we see evidence for the persistence of these 
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racialized-sexualized traditions and mutual comprehensions. Here little narrative 
explanation is necessary for the audience, who have a shared cultural understanding of 
the racialized concepts and themes, to then easily fill in the tacit meanings, innuendos or 
punch- lines.  
 
In this section I have shown how the continued efficiency of representations of the black 
penis relies upon the sedimented racialized meanings within the traditions and 
institutions of society (Goldberg, 1994:46). The historical racialized discourses help to 
create categories and typologies around the penis, and these racialized discourses 
around the penis are still prevalent in scientific thinking reported widely in the news 
media, and in cultural thinking within the entertainment media. Here we find that BME 
men are depicted as less than human by virtue of racialized representations of the penis, 
and by contrast the a-paradigmatic white penis is relationally linked to the 
representations of white people as having superior intellects. This phenomenal 
foregrounding of the penis in BME men and of the Mind for WME men in cultures 
influenced by whiteness, with the respective backgrounding of the Mind and „body‟ for 
each racialized category is both sensed within the individual unified Ego and 
understood intersubjectively. This can be seen for example where the entertainment 
media rely on the sense to produce understood comedy scenarios. In the next section I 
explore how these racialized discourses around the black penis are rendered through the 
corporeal topography of the penis as well as the unified Ego, to produce subjective 
experiences of affective qualities, sensings and racialized meanings for GBME men in 
white gay spaces.  
  
Section Two: The Black Penis in White Gay Spaces 
 
Martin Manalansan (2003:141) suggests that racialized discourses are often 
corporealised in gay contexts, and in this section I show that within white gay spaces 
the GBME penis can be phenomenally rendered with racialized-sexualized meanings 
circulating within the life-world. For each particular ethnic group there may be different 
racialized discourses and meanings circulating, and how they impact will also depend 
on the racialized subjectivity of the particular individual. Brian, who is of African-
Caribbean heritage, talks here about how he gets asked about the size of his penis or is 
asked to show his penis within white gay spaces.  
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Brian: [pause] erm. I‟ll get asked to prove, if I can prove „what they say is true‟ or 
whatever. 
 
R: and what do they mean by prove? 
 
Brian: get my knob out and show „em it. 
 
R: ok. So that would be in an ordinary bar or club? 
 
Brian: erm, [pause].  
 
R: can I ask roughly how many times this might have happened? Since I think you 
started clubbing at, going out at 16, so [interrupted]. 
 
Brian: [laughs] yeah, very, very often. 
 
R: so how many times were you going out a week for example, on average over the last 
7 years? 
 
Brian: erm,  recently it‟s gone up, I‟ve been going out a lot more, erm, but it used to be 
once or twice a week.  
 
R: once or twice a week, so if we say that per year that‟s like between 50 and 100 times 
you go out, shall we say 70 times a year, go out, to a gay venue. Out of those 70 times 
how many times would somebody ask you about your penis?  
 
Brian: [laughs] more than half the time. 
 
R: so about 35 times a year. 
 
Brian: yeah. 
[...] 
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Brian: I‟d like take it on. I‟d just, I will make it crystal clear that they will never know. 
Or, erm [pause] oh what was I going to say, I‟d just make a joke about it and leave 
them to think what they‟re thinking. Yeah.  
 
R: and how do they react to that? Do they apologise or do they get cross that they 
haven‟t got their answer? 
 
Brian: they don‟t really hang around afterwards to see what how they, what the 
reaction is. 
 
R: has anyone ever apologised when they realised it was a stupid question? 
 
Brian: erm. [pause] yeah, I think that after asking they see my facial reaction and it‟s 
like „sorry sorry I didn‟t mean to say that, I don‟t mean it like that‟.  „don‟t have a go at 
me‟ or whatever. 
 
R: so you always react in a way that makes it clear that you‟re not entirely happy with 
it.  
 
Brian: hmm. 
 
R: apart that time you were drunk, and you just [pause]. 
 
Brian: yeah. 
 
In this extract we see how the GBME penis is being used as a conduit for the 
transmission of discursive meanings and affective information both rendered through 
the corporeal topography of the Brian‟s penis, Brian‟s unified Ego and the 
intersubjective life-world. In Brian‟s account we can see the re- iteration and 
performative reinforcement of these discourses through the narrative and tone of the 
question. The „what they say‟ refers to the myth that men of African descent have a 
large penis, and as I outlined previously in this chapter, here the penis within racialized 
discourses becomes a signifier of racist concepts around the hierarchy of humanity, 
hyper-sexuality and bestiality. The asking of this question to GBME men by GWME 
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men performatively cites and sustains these racialized discourses within white gay 
spaces. Brian being asked to „prove‟ the stereotypes also implies that he has been 
interpellated as of African descent by the GWME man asking him the question, and so 
cites the „unwanted racialized Other‟. The interrogation about Brian‟s penis elicits a 
range of affective qualities within Brian, one is the sense of striving to act, “I‟d like take 
it on. I‟d just, I will make it crystal clear that they will never know”, where rather than 
not react or not say anything, Brian feels he needs to respond in some way, eliciting in 
him a striving to increase his power of action in response to the decrease in power of 
existence and action the GWME man has tried to elicit. This act of striving, elicited by 
the interrogation of Brian‟s penis, and the phenomenal perception of dynamics of power 
of action and power of existence, begin to implicate the whole self, the unified Ego. The 
phenomenal penis is rendered with racialized social meanings within the discursive 
topography and these meanings are interwoven into the whole unified Ego. These 
interwoven meanings and sensings rendered within the penis can also be communicated 
to the other people present within the intersubjective life-world of the gay community 
(Husserl, 2001:374). 
 
One affective quality elicited within Brian is that of contempt, where Brian tries to 
position himself in the role of the one who has the moral upper-hand in the situation and 
tries to shame or dismiss the GWME man. These negative affective qualities Brian 
attempts to elicit in the GWME man are designed to defend Brian from the decrease in 
power of action and existence that the interrogation of his penis has elicited. These 
affective qualities show us that the question about the penis of African descent still 
carries meanings which attempt to position Brian within negative colonial discourses, 
rather than it simply being a harmless comment or indicator of desire. The joke Brian 
refers to is not designed to make light of the situation, but is his attempt to diffuse the 
tension, to keep the situation from escalating into a full scale argument, a sort of 
affective buffer (Katz, 1999). Here we see that even though Brian has been insulted, he 
still has to take care not to be coerced into reacting in a way which may result in further 
violence to himself from either the GWME man or others in the white gay space, a point 
also echoed by Karim in this chapter on page 214.  
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There are affective qualities associated with particular parts of Brian‟s phenomenal 
corporeal topography, namely his penis, his face, and the emotions communicated 
verbally. There is also an impact upon his entire unified Ego indicated in the extract:  
 
R: apart that time you were drunk, and you just, 
 
Brian: yeah, 
 
Where in this sentence Brian and myself are referring to a time he mentioned elsewhere 
in the interview where he decided to respond to the interrogation around his penis by 
„kicking off‟, where kicking off can be considered as the totality of the unified Ego 
enacting aggressive gestures and experiencing aggressive qualities. It is not however a 
loss of „control‟, but rather a gaining of control of the power of action, though 
displaying anger may be contrary to the inequitable social regulations applied to certain 
racialized categories in the white gay social context. Brian‟s attempts to control the 
situation by making a joke, and the time he kicked off, can be seen as evidence for the 
process by which GBME men can be positioned as the „angry young black man‟. Rather 
than this being something about Brian himself, it instead shows how the invisible white 
Gestalt can „set up‟ and script racialized social interactions. Any GBME man could 
have walked into that white gay venue and the invisible white Gestalt would have 
configured the social space into one where the „invisible‟ racist violence of persistent 
questioning about the GBME penis results in the GBME man being positioned as angry 
and unreasonable. To the GWME men within the social space, it would seem that Brian 
just spontaneously kicked off for no reason. However for GBME men who experience 
this regularly the invisible white Gestalt is one they would sense and understand, where 
there is the interpellation around „race‟ by asking the „penis question‟, the interpellative 
and disciplinary gaze which alienates, interpellates and is productive of racialized 
subjectivities, and the sensing of these through phenomenal renderings within the 
GBME unified Ego and related reconfigurations within the invisible white Gestalt.  
 
Brian is asked to show his penis to the GWME man in the white gay bar described using 
the colloquial English expression“get my knob out and show em it”. Brian‟s penis has 
up till then been backgrounded within his unified Ego (by contrast if it were missing 
then this would be experienced as absent). It is suddenly made to become foregrounded 
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as a phenomenally salient corporeal topography of his unified Ego by both the initial 
question about the racist myth and then the demand to show the penis. This results in 
Brian‟s penis having an increased power of existence, foregrounded within his unified 
Ego, and is therefore also a more receptive body-part for affective information within 
the life-world. This makes it a more significant part of Brian‟s sense of self and 
therefore also makes him potentially more vulnerable to the use of his penis as a conduit 
for negative affective qualities. The phenomenal penis of the GBME man being 
interrogated, is foregrounded within the life-world of the gay community, where the 
GWME man who asks the question and other GWME men in the social space become 
part of the interwoven social and phenomenological processes where meanings and 
sensings are (re)produced by the behaviour of the GWME man.  
 
Oliver, a GWME man who is also a senior official in a gay men‟s support group 
describes his experiences of going out with GBME friends of African descent to white 
gay venues. Oliver‟s interview shows us that the meanings and sensings associated with 
the interrogation of the penis are also interpreted and understood by GWME men as 
negative and racially objectifying: 
 
Oliver: the main experience was with my mates who aren‟t from [northern city] but 
from another part of the country. There are the two polar reactions, the sexual 
fetishization, and people find it really acceptable to go up to them and talk about the 
size of their cocks and stuff. It‟s an extraordinary thing, and this is like 2 or 3 o‟clock in 
the morning, but even so, it‟s not a thing you do, you know. The other thing is thinking 
they're evolved in gang violence or drug dealing, and whether that's titillating or not 
I‟m not quite sure.” 
 
 What we see in Oliver‟s interview is that GWME men also interpret the interrogat ion 
around the penis as racist and unacceptable. It therefore contradicts any assertion by 
others that GBME men are being oversensitive, or that these practices are normal and 
acceptable within the cultures of gay venues. Oliver also shows us that the racialized 
discourses around BME men being violent drug dealers or gang members are part of the 
discursive formations within the white gay space. This association with violence, Oliver 
suggests, may or may not be erotically attractive to the GWME men, and hence shows 
how the (homo) sexualized and racialized discourses imbricate in complex ways to elicit 
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particular affective qualities and racialized practices.  James describes how racialized 
practices which focus upon the penis results in negative affective qualities elicited by 
the process of  objectification, described by Oliver, which reduce his power of 
existence, related to him as a whole person:   
 
James: I think when it comes to black men, I think white gay men, and white women, 
objectify black men in a sexual way, I don‟t know why. I‟ve never asked a white man, so 
I wouldn‟t know why. 
[...] 
R: If they are focusing on your penis, does that feel that the rest of you  feels, as part of 
the process of objectification, does the rest of you feel that it‟s being, demeaned or 
particularly if they‟re not talking to you. 
 
James: diminished. 
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: you feel like the rest of you is irrelevant, and unimportant, you‟re only there for 
one thing, and it can be very demoralising. 
 
James begins by discussing his feelings about the social interactions between black men 
(here James is referring to men of African descent) and GWME men and white women. 
This shows us that these racialized practices occur in both gay and straight contexts. He 
describes the feeling that there is a process of sexual objectification, but qualifies this by 
adding that this is a belief, that the reasons are unknown to him, and that he has not 
„validated‟ this assertion by asking a white person why this is correct. Here we see both 
the prioritizing of the linguistic over other non-representational modalities of 
communication, and the „word‟ of a white person over a black person, as validating the 
veracity of these types of claims in cultural power relations. James does have a 
knowledge of colonial history, as seen in previous chapters, so he is aware of the 
racialized-sexualized discourses which could explain the process of objectification, 
however it may be that for James this is not sufficient to explain why this is still 
happening in today‟s society or to him as an individual. However James‟ feelings are 
strong enough for him to interpret and understand the social interactions as both raced 
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and sexualized, the affective qualities around feeling diminished are interwoven with 
the phenomenal experience in its totality, foregrounding the racialized-sexualized 
meanings which are hidden by the absence of explicit expressed confessions from white 
people.      
 
James‟s description suggests he is being “diminished” as a human being and this sense 
is reconfigured into the penis corpus-object: “the rest of you is irrelevant, and 
unimportant, you‟re only there for one thing”. This echoes the colonial discourses and 
practices which positioned men of African descent as being represented metonymically 
by the penis qua object for sexual pleasure or reproduction (Friedman, 2002; Collins, 
2004). It also shows us an example where the rendering of meaning through a particular 
corporeal topography, namely the penis, also renders meanings through the totality of 
the unified Ego. In this context described by James, the phenomenal penis as a 
topography within the unified Ego is already a part of James‟ phenomenal self, it is part 
of him, interweaving meanings about sexuality and race throughout the unified Ego. 
When he is objectified by the social behaviours orientated towards his penis, he as a 
whole human being feels diminished. 
 
This shows how within the life-world of the white gay space, the penis is an important 
signifier of both racialized and sexualized meanings, which is why the penis is used 
within the social interactions described, rather than, say for example, the nose.  This is 
also the case for Western society in general, where the penis has in both historical and 
contemporary societies been a signifier and symbol of important social meanings such 
as power, gender, „race‟, and sexuality (Friedman, 2002). The penis as a phenomenal 
corporeal topography which renders sensings and meanings within the totality of the 
unified Ego, thus acts as a conduit for social meanings to become rendered throughout 
an individual. In James‟ example, the phenomenal penis has become a powerful location 
for the rendering of racialized-sexualized-genderized meanings within the totality of his 
unified Ego and also the phenomenal intersubjective life-world. The interrogation 
around the black penis for James results in negative affective qualities around feeling 
“diminished [...] irrelevant [...] unimportant [...] demoralis[ed]”.  The racialized 
discourses circulating in the white gay space script the interaction in a way that the 
black penis is foregrounded within James‟ unified Ego with negative affective qualities 
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in a way that is different than other contexts (for example during mutually consenting 
non-racially oppressive sexual encounters).  
 
We could compare James‟ and Brian‟s experiences with Fanon‟s (1993:112) description 
of the boy declaring “look a Negro!” already described in chapter five, where here the 
GWME man is indicating „look! a black penis!‟ referencing the legends, stories, history 
and sedimented discourses and also the invisible white Gestalt. The interrogation of the 
penis is an interpellative act, although I would suggest that this will be one of a 
continuous series of racialized interpellations, beginning with the speech acts and 
behaviour of door staff at white gay venues, the interpellative gaze within the white gay 
space, and the interpellative practices around corporeal topographies. This on-going 
series of interpellations will ensure that GBME men are never in doubt about their 
positionings within the white gay space, and these also simultaneously interpellate the 
GWME men as white and communicate the other meanings attached to whiteness in this 
context (for example power). This practice of continuous interpellation is to ensure the 
communication and understanding of racialized positionings (Butler, 1999b). However 
this suggests the possibility that racialized interpellations can be mitigated or attenuated 
over a period of time if not continuously reiterated, otherwise it would not be happening 
so frequently, and so provides an opportunity for agency and countermeasures from 
GBME men.  The use of the penis for interpellation as racialized Other is „invisible‟, 
because it can easily be denied as a racist practice by the GWME man and other GWME 
men in the gay space. The GWME man is not actually saying „look! a black penis!‟ 
although his actions are indicating something similar, albeit as an invisible racialized 
practice, which screams out „race‟ to the life-world yet denies this in the same breath.   
 
Ambiguous Racializations and Subjectivity 
In Brian‟s example we could see how culturally situated racialized meanings around the 
penis resulted in the affective qualities and interpreted racist meanings through 
referencing discourses around the penis of men of African descent in racialized 
practices in white gay spaces.  My interview with Carlos gives an example of how these 
processes operate when the individual‟s subjectivity is not interpreting these within a 
race-cognizant framework and the discourses being referenced and the corporeal 
signifiers of „race‟ are „ambiguous‟. Carlos talks about being in a sauna, and here the 
etiquette and rules are different from gay clubs and bars, particularly as there are naked 
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bodies present. However the affective qualities (such as feeling uncomfortable) elicited 
by particular interactions are similar within both spaces. I asked Carlos about his usual 
experiences in gay saunas:  
 
R: in the sauna, you said that people were reaching for your body.  
 
Carlos: yeah.  
 
R: What do you think they were reaching for and why? Which part of your body do you 
think they were interested in? 
 
Carlos: no, they just go straight to my dick.  
 
Here we see that Carlos describes the focus of attention upon his penis, although he 
goes on to suggest that this practice in itself is normal within gay saunas (Holmes et al., 
2007; Pronger, 1990). Carlos went on to describe a specific incident he remembered that 
had occurred in a gay sauna in a northern city: 
 
R: can I ask how many people were in the sauna in [northern city]? 
 
Carlos: it wasn‟t many people, maybe 5, 6, 7, people maximum. 
 
R: right. 
 
Carlos: yeah. 
 
R: and what happened when you walked through the door? 
 
Carlos: oh I had lots of offers. It was uncomfortable. It was mainly old people. It‟s these 
kinds of people, they touch you without, permission, well it can happen quite often 
enough in saunas. People attempt to touch you without your permission which I hate. I 
know the kind of place where I am. But I just want to have sex with the person I want. I 
don‟t want someone to try and go over me, I don‟t want that person who gets angry, 
that kind of contact. It can happen any place, but it happens quite often to me. 
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R: can I ask, because you just said it happens quite often to you, in that sauna in 
[northern city], were the other men touching each other, or were they touching you? 
 
Carlos: no, they tried to touch me but I, it was very, I didn‟t spend a lot of time there. So 
I just went there because I wanted to know how it was. 
 
R: but they weren‟t touching each other then equally [interrupted]. 
 
Carlos: not that I remember, but I remember it was maybe a couple that were having 
sex in those, but you can‟t tell what was happening there. You can see people getting 
out the cabins, but then when  walking around  I  just had people trying to go over me, 
without, you know, literally, went over my [pause]. 
 
R: yeah. 
 
Carlos: you know, and I was „hang on, what are you doing, why are you touching me?‟   
 
R: but they weren‟t touching each other that way? 
 
Carlos: no, I don‟t think so. 
 
R: just you? 
 
Carlos: yeah,  
 
R: do you think that‟s because you were new there? 
 
Carlos: I don‟t know the reason, maybe because I was the younger man in between 
them.  Or I don‟t know, or maybe because I was more exotic. Because they were all 
white, and I was the only different person there, I don‟t know. 
 
In Carlos‟ extract we can see how similar transgressions of the (tacit) rules of gay 
encounter occur in saunas as the transgressions described in gay bars and clubs. Even in 
gay saunas there is a code of conduct where some signal of consent is expected before 
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the touching of the penis (Holmes et al, 2007) and these are being ignored by the 
GWME men in the sauna, where not only are they persisting in touching Carlos when 
he is making clear he is not interested, but also displaying anger when he tries to reject 
them. The penis is a signifier of multiple meanings here, sexual interest, „race‟ 
understood by Carlos as a sense of being “exotic”, youth in relation to older men, and 
power. The question of proving whether his penis is larger or smaller may or may not be 
an issue here since it might already be on display (or alternatively be concealed under a 
towel). However the penis is being used as a conduit for other practices of power, 
namely the power to touch, the power to persist in touching and the power to display 
anger when rejected.  
 
The act of touching Carlos‟ penis in this context elicited affective qualities around 
feeling uncomfortable, and he says in the interview that he didn‟t spend much time at 
this particular sauna. Although he wasn‟t kicked out by the bouncers or prevented from 
entering by the door staff like other GBME men describe in the interviews, the actions 
of the GWME men resulted in exclusion from the venue, by Carlos‟ decision to leave 
due to their behaviour. The two reasons Carlos suggested for being targeted exclusively 
(the other GWME men did not touch each other) was that he was “younger...or maybe 
because I was more exotic. Because they were all white, and I was the only different 
person there” although he says twice in this sentence “I don‟t know” indicating he is 
qualifying his statement leaving the interpretation open for him. Here Carlos suggests 
that the sense of being “exotic” in relation to the whiteness of the other men present 
implies that he was “the only different person there”, thereby making his „race‟ the 
most salient signifier of difference in this context, rather than his (perceived) younger 
age. This city where the sauna is located has a general BME population of twenty five 
percent, and so one would expect a higher proportion of GBME men in the sauna than 
just the one, namely Carlos. Given that saunas are considered more „democratic‟ than 
other commercial gay spaces (Holmes et al., 2010), the paucity of GBME men becomes 
more significant as reflecting a racialized absence.  
 
We can see how Carlos‟ unified Ego tries to make sense of the context he has described. 
For these actions by the GWME men to make sense, Carlos tries to look at his  
„embodied self‟, and determine what attributes of his unified Ego might be significant in 
producing the behaviour from the GWME men. This may exceed his anatomical 
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features, where for example his vocal accent interwoven within his phenomenal 
corporeal vocal topography may also be a read as racialized. His use of the term „exotic‟ 
may in someway help to ameliorate the context for him, and indeed the term „exotic‟ 
has associations in the Western imaginary with the tacitly acceptable exploitation of 
sexualized racialized Others (Barthes, 1980:126), as well as being phonologically 
similar to the word „erotic‟. By not explicitly using the word „race‟ Carlos is positioned 
outside of the more race-cognizant (Frankenberg, 1993) discourses that Brian and James 
might cite when these types of encounter occur.   
 
In Carlos‟ example we can see how the power o f action impacts upon affective qualities 
associated with „race‟ and the „exotic‟. Carlos is being touched by GWME men in the 
sauna without his permission. This reduction in power of action results in negative 
affective qualities around feeling uncomfortab le, and concern around aggression “I 
don‟t want that person who gets angry”. Carlos is often interpellated as being North 
African, Pakistani, Indian or Muslim whereas he is Mestizo (mixed race Latin 
American), supporting Suki Ali‟s (2005:164) assertion that mixed race groups are 
positioned through visual readings into “an identifiable category”. This has the potential 
to render his subjective sense of how he is racially positioned by other people with 
ambiguity in English contexts (Ali, 2005:164), since the category Mestizo is not a 
commonly understood one in England. This ambiguity around racialized positioning 
may also elicit a reduced power of existence in these racialized contexts where Carlos 
cannot draw upon race-cognizant thinking and discourses to empower him or protect 
him from symbolic or physical violence. „Race‟ becomes backgrounded and „exotic‟ 
becomes foregrounded, though how these are racialized will depend upon the GBME 
individual and the particular social context.  
 
The attempt at reduction in power of action imposed upon Carlos by the GWME men 
could result in the increase in power of action described by Brian and James where they 
react defensively or aggressively to prevent reduction of power of action and the 
negative affects these elicit. Brian and James are of African descent and so the violence 
enacted against the penis becomes a salient signifier of both racist violence to them as 
individuals, and also as members of racialized social groups which are positioned by the 
same racialized discursive formations. The historical legacy of colonialism amplifies the 
experiences of affective qualities. For Carlos this is different as he has no „fixed‟ 
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racialized body constructed in relation to the racialized interpellations and discourses he 
has experienced in England, and so cannot draw upon particular racialized discourses to 
frame his embodied subjective experience. There is also no discourse for Mestizo 
individuals in relation to living in England circulating in general society, by which 
Carlos can be positioned and to which GWME men can refer in order to position Carlos 
as Mestizo. One exception here could be the concept of „exotic‟ for Carlos as relating to 
racialized understandings prior to coming to England, around gay transnational tourism 
(Binnie, 2004) between England and Latin America, rather than being related to being 
an unwanted BME immigrant in England, although he did not discuss this in the 
interview. 
 
One additional issue Carlos‟ interview raises is that the penis is an important medium 
within gay cultures generally (Pronger, 1990), taking on a range of significations 
outside of the meanings around „race‟. It may be the case that if Carlos is not framing 
his interpretations strongly within a race-cognizant paradigm, the other cultural and 
economic significations that impact on gay embodied subjectivity (Benzie, 2000) may 
be shaping his interpretations and affective qualities around being “younger” or 
“exotic”. These additional or alternative meanings relate to the valorisation of youth in 
mainstream gay culture, and also eroticised representations of young exotic Others 
(such as „chavs‟, students, immigrants, Eastern Europeans, „Latinos‟, working-class 
labourers, rural farm workers). For example in gay media such as the mainstream 
fashion and culture magazine Attitude there are adverts depicting “Five skin heads shag 
city gent” (Attitude, 2003:143), “Greek stallions” (Attitude, 2003:139), “Suck my scally 
dick” (Attitude, 2005:137), “Scally lad and parkie spank me in bogs” (Attitude, 
2005:135), “Str8 street boys prison fuck” (Attitude, 2005:136), “Italian stallion fucks 18 
yo” (Attitude, 2008:136), “Bent copper spanks/screws joy riders” (Attitude, 2005:137), 
“I fucked two horny Czech boys (18)” (Attitude, 2005:140). 
 
Again this relates to power relationships between social categories represented within 
gay contexts, where here the power relationship (if we artificially remove it from a 
racialized framework) would still be one of objectification and exploitation with the 
older more socially powerful (Thorne, 1998:250) GWME man being in social-category 
positions that enable him to enact power over the younger Othered man. The 
information circulating within the white gay space (for example about age, social class, 
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nationality) can be read from the bodies of those present (including the vocalised accent 
experienced within the phenomenal corporeal topography of the voice). A range of 
affective qualities will be elicited from the intersubjective life-world within the white 
gay context, and this provides sensings in addition to the meanings about the power 
relations through what Carlos describes as “angry” responses from the GWME men, 
and Carlos himself feeling “uncomfortable”.  Therefore even without an explicit 
racialized or race-cognizant framework to interpret the meanings elicited by the 
practices around the penis within the white gay sauna, Carlos would have alternative 
frameworks based on power relations between social categories within England to draw 
upon. These alternatives may be easier to accept than to feel at a more foregrounded 
level of awareness within the unified Ego the meanings around racialized power 
relations. If Carlos perceives himself to be “exotic” (or younger) this may help to 
provide a subjective „buffer‟ to prevent the full impact of racialized discourses and the 
practices in the gay sauna to render his unified Ego with negative affective qualities 
related to „race‟ and racism. For Carlos, it may be that the GWME men are not so much 
committing explicit racist violence against his racialized penis, but are (confusingly for 
him) violating his „exotic‟ penis. The term as I mentioned before can be synonymous 
with erotic, and may also be valorised across particular discursive formations in certain 
contexts, although where this is the racialized exotic the discourses around colonial 
exploitation will always be present.  
 
So by rendering his unified Ego with the affective qualities around the „exotic‟ Carlos 
can protect himself from the full impact of the racialized discourses, perhaps also 
bringing in elements of exceptionalism (Puar, 2006), although for some people „exotic‟ 
can also be a degrading term. If he were to render himself as a racialized-self within that 
context, he might experience the full horror of what Fanon (1993:112) describes as the 
sudden rendering of his “racial epidermal schema” and the persistence of this changed 
sense of embodied subjectivity. This shows that it is not sufficient for there to be the 
racialized discourses within a context, nor for the GBME individual to possess the 
salient corporeal signifiers of „race‟ within a context (such as the skin or penis), nor for 
the individual to be identified, categorised and interpellated by others as „raced‟, but 
there is also the need for a rendering of racialized meanings within the unified Ego that 
relate to the racialized phenomenal sense of self. David in his interview described that 
„feeling‟ black has to be more than a surface meaning and reaches deeper into his sense 
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of self suggesting that “it's more than just your skin, you have to actually have some 
feelings, something that connects you to it”. If this subjective sense of being BME or 
feeling black within the unified Ego is missing, then the individual tries to look for 
explanations outside of the „race‟ paradigm such as discourses around youth, or they 
will racially position themselves within alternative „invisible‟ racialized concepts (such 
as the „exotic‟ or „exceptional‟) that can phenomenally background other more loaded 
racialized concepts which can potentially elicit and foreground the more powerful 
negative affective qualities.  
 
I now go on to look in more depth at how discourses around sexuality and masculinity 
are imbricated with the racialized discourses circulating within white gay spaces, and 
how these operationalize the processes of power within whiteness.  
 
Section Three: The GBME Penis, Sexuality and Masculinity  
 
In the previous section I looked at the penis as a phenomenal corporeal topography 
which has the potential to act as a conduit rendering the whole unified Ego with 
racialized discourses within white gay social contexts. I also looked at how sense and 
sensings were interwoven with the meanings in ways which understood and 
reconfigured the invisible white Gestalt. I now go on to explore in more detail issues of 
power, masculinity and sexuality associated with the GBME penis in white gay 
contexts.  
 
As discussed at the start of this chapter, the black penis is an important signifier of, and 
often metonymic with, „race‟. However along with this are specific racialized discursive 
formations around sexuality, masculinity, and the practices of power. Some of these 
discourses relate to men of African descent as hyper-sexual (Collins, 2004; Yancy, 
2008) or bestial (Friedman, 2002:91; Goldberg, 1994:50), where the myth of the large 
penis „validated‟ by the „scientific‟ practices, became metonymic with and cited these 
racialized-sexualized discourses. Patricia Hill Collins (2004:32) suggests that 
“colonialism, slavery, and racial segregation relied upon this discourse of Black 
sexuality to create tightly bundled ideas about Black femininity and Black masculinity 
that in turn influenced racial ideologies and racial practices.” Some of these practices 
include the targeting of the penis as a cultural signifier of racialized power, for example 
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the acts of castration during lynching (Baldwin, 1961; Fanon, 1993; Friedman, 2002; 
Pinar, 2003; Roediger, 1998; Yancy, 2008:9). Castration of Othered and subjugated 
groups is a practice which has occurred throughout human history (Friedman, 2002; 
Stopes, 1931). However under colonialism and slavery the act of castration 
performatively cited racialized discourses and practices imbricated with discourses 
around sexuality, masculinity and power (Pinar, 2003). 
 
These colonial discourses related to the practice of actual physical castration (permanent 
removal or disfiguring of the genitals) or torture castration (electric shocks, sexual 
assaults), are still to be found in contemporary Western culture. Recent examples 
include the sexual torture centred on the penis committed by Western agencies upon the 
Iraqi prisoners in Abu Grahib (Giroux, 2004; Puar, 2005; Richter-Montpetit; 2007). 
These practices were also common in Western sponsored torture centres around the 
globe where „extra-ordinary rendition‟ meant that the present-day sexual torture against 
BME or black social categories was out-sourced to non-Western territories on behalf of 
Western governments (Sidaway, 2010; Vertigans 2010) and the UK (Casciani, 2012; 
Cobain, 2012).  In this context the Western media reiterated the discourses which 
represented non-white bodies in lower categorisations in the racialized hierarchy of 
humanity (Vertigans, 2010), showing not only how these discourses remain in society 
but how they continue to elicit the racialized sexual tortures committed by institutions 
and individuals.  In addition Patricia Hill Collins (2004:242) refers to “vicarious” 
lynching and the “erotic arousal” obtained through white spectators watching violent 
sports, where similar meanings and sensings around racialized castration are rendered 
on the black body, though in what are generally acceptable contemporary practices, 
such as boxing.  
 
This not only shows how past colonial discourses are productive of present racialized 
practices of castration, but also how these discourses mutate to adapt to contemporary 
racialized discourses, for example around nationalism, terror, immigration and other 
socio-political and cultural contexts. I will now go on to consider how the interrogation 
of the black penis in white gay contexts cites these castration discourses around 
racialized sexuality, masculinity and practices of power. Here I am theorizing castration 
as a process that begins with the initial focusing of attention (and interpellation) upon 
the male genitals, making them hypervisible and a salient object of the controlling gaze 
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(Coleman, 2007). This hypervisibility remains in the subsequent dismemberment, 
dehumanization, ownership as a trophy for the dominant racial groups, and loss for the 
subjugated man or „racial‟ group. After castration the genitals, as real (the anatomical 
genitals) and ideal (the memory of the event), remain hypervisible and saturated with 
meanings and sensings associated with loss and ownership. Although the „ownership‟ 
may have been reconfigured within the social context the new meanings and sensings 
produced are as potent as those signified and rendered by non-castrated genitals. This 
theme of racialized challenge, ownership and loss can be seen in this extract where I 
asked Brian why he thought GWME men were so prolific in interrogating GBME men 
about their penis size: 
 
Brian: there‟s challenging man [pause],  
 
R: challenge? 
 
Brian: yeah, manliness. 
 
R: right, so manliness?  
 
Brian: yeah. 
 
R: right, so just to paraphrase what you‟re saying, a bigger penis would be more manly 
than a smaller penis? 
 
Brian: hmmm, definitely.  
 
R: so, why do they want to see something that makes them feel less manly? [pause]. Er, 
I agree with what you‟re saying but I‟m just interested in, in [interrupted]. 
 
Brian: right. [pause]. When it‟s in that context I don‟t think it‟s that they want to see it, 
I think they trying to challenge it. Trying to say it‟s not true and they‟re bigger or 
whatever. 
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R: so I think. I mean,  I‟d like to pick up on that word you used „challenge‟,   I  mean 
that‟s, it sounds like, it does sound like, like a competition, or like a power thing?  
 
Brian: yeah. 
 
Brian is suggesting here that in certain contexts the interrogation of GBME men by 
GWME men about their penis size is more related to power relations around the 
GWME man wanting to “challenge” GBME men about their penis size, rather than an 
erotic interest or admiration for the GBME penis. In Brian‟s interpretation the GWME 
man sets up a competition, like a physical fight, thereby deciding who is the most 
masculine or virile. Physical competitions or challenges between men can be used to 
establish power hierarchies and give or remove status to individuals (Grogan, 2006:570; 
Pearton, 1986; Williams et al, 1984). In order to maintain the social status conferred by 
racialized challenges it is important that the demonization and preternatural power of 
the racialized Other is sustained and the „bravery‟ of the GWME man is augmented and 
exaggerated. Therefore in the performativity of the penis challenge, whether or not the 
black or white penises are larger or smaller than the other, the myth is sustained. Here 
the simple act of asking to see a black penis sets it up to be of monstrous and grotesque 
size in the white gay imaginary. The fact that this practice persists in 2012 shows us that 
the GWME men are not reporting back to the white gay community „it looked about the 
same as mine‟, but instead “they” are saying something else, as Brian shows us “I‟ll get 
asked to prove, if I can prove „what they say is true‟ .”  
 
In addition the „penis challenge‟ may be indicative of the GWME man striving to „have‟ 
the GBME man‟s penis, where possession translates the corporeal topography of the 
black penis into the unified Ego of the GWME man, through processes of 
intersubjective intercorporeality. The GWME man striving to have a black penis may be 
related to erotic desire (where for example the black penis becomes an intersubjective  
phenomenal „index‟ or „theme‟ for both men to connect to one another) or alternatively 
may be relationally linked to the dismembered corpus-object penis for the GBME man 
who has phenomenally „lost‟ his black penis and therefore the striving is related to 
power relationships that elicit negative affective qualities in the GBME man.  
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Brian is suggesting that on these occasions the GWME man possibly may not believe 
the myth, yet the fact that he is challenging Brian suggests that Brian has been initially 
read and interpreted by the GWME man as being of African descent, and that the 
GWME man has rendered his projection of Brian‟s corporeal topography using the 
discourses and stereotypes associated with the male penis of African descent. This 
rendering of Brian‟s corporeal topography with the racialized discourses and the 
associated interrogative practices suggests the GWME man has not discounted the myth 
completely, and the comment “what they say is true” may be  a rhetorical question. 
There is also the issue of a double jeopardy for Brian in this biased competition (which 
he has not consented to participating in), whereby if the GWME man has a bigger penis 
the GWME man wins and feels more masculine, more like a „real man‟, including all 
the associated racialized meanings of white male domination over BME men, possibly 
making Brian feel diminished. However if Brian has the bigger penis, then he still 
cannot win the challenge, because the racialized discourses around the African descent 
male penis will simply reiterate racialized discourses around dysfunctional hyper-
sexuality and bestiality. Equally in Brian‟s account we do not see any mention of direct 
comparison, whereby the GWME man would show his penis too, indeed he probably 
would not, as none of my interviewees have mentioned any reciprocity. Therefore the 
GWME man is also the final judge and adjudicator, being able to categorise Brian‟s 
penis without Brian being allowed to confirm or refute the GWME man‟s claims.  
 
Here we see affective qualities around competitive masculinity, feeling like a „real 
man‟, proving you‟re a real man, competition, and challenge, which are strongly linked 
culturally to expressions of power (Pearton, 1986). These affective qualities around 
competitive masculinity have a strong attribute of striving, associated with the urge to 
compete, and equally the power of action and existence are also productive of strong 
negative or positive affective qualities. We can often see the significance of this in more 
general social contexts where people compete to the point of risking injury or death. 
The GWME man in Brian‟s extract here is attempting to undermine or reduce Brian‟s 
feelings around being “manly” by using the penis as a conduit to transmit affective 
information which will elicit negative affective qualities in Brian around feeling less 
manly, feeling more saliently racially Othered in that moment, and also feeling 
subjugated in other ways.  
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We can see how the penis becomes a conduit of multiple meanings and sensings which 
impact upon Brian‟s whole unified Ego. The interrogation of the penis results in the 
foregrounding of the corporeal topography of the penis, and the backgrounding of other 
corporeal topographies of Brian‟s unified Ego. For both Brian and the GWME man 
multiple meanings and sensings are rendered through the corporeal topography of the 
penis, and simultaneously meanings and sensings are rendered into other phenomenal 
objects and also the other unified Egos in the life-world as a result of the penis 
interrogation by the GWME man. It is not only the arrangement of people and 
phenomenal objects in the life-world which provide information about the social 
meanings, but also the dynamic shifting of foregrounding and backgrounding of 
topographies, and the rendering of meanings and sensings through and across the 
topographies present in the life-world, (re)configuring the invisible white Gestalt.  In 
the case where the individual is situated in a culture where colonial discourses circulate, 
the racialized discourses are immediately and intractably interwoven within the 
discursive topography of the penis.  In addition racialized discourses around masculinity 
and sexuality are also part of the discursive topography of the penis, and of course these 
discourses are imbricated within other discursive formations. These meanings around 
„race‟, „masculinity‟ and „sexuality‟ also extend throughout the entire phenomenal 
unified Ego. Many of the social meanings rendered through specific corporeal 
topographies (for example the skin or penis), as a result of discourses and practices 
which foreground that corporeal topography, are at the same time often rendered 
through other corporeal topographies and the totality of the unified Ego as a result of 
different practices. For example racialized discourses within society can be 
operationalized by the foregrounding of the corporeal topography of the penis, the skin, 
the human voice (accent, language style), as well as the totality of the unified Ego. This 
presence of similar racialized meanings rendered across corporeal topographies thereby 
interweaves meta-meanings around the relationship and relationality between these 
topographies. Racialized skin, a racialized penis, and a racialized unified Ego are not 
three distinct and separately racialized corporeal topographies. These topographies are 
instead interwoven with additional meanings and sensings which intersect them as a 
sense related to connection, configuration and unity.  
 
I have predominantly looked at the practices around racialized discourses which 
implicate the black penis as a trophy due to its mythological large size, and here this 
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racist stereotype generally relates to men of African descent, but similar phenomenal, 
affective and social outcomes occur within racialized discourses which mythologize 
particular „races‟ (for example South Asian, Far East Asian), as having small penises or 
being passive sexually (Caluya, 2006, 2008; Han, 2008, 2007; Lee, 2005; Manalansan, 
2003; Mao, 2002; Phua, 2007). In this extract from Howard we began by talking about 
being in white gay clubs and feelings associated with this, where one of the feelings 
Howard brought up was rejection: 
 
Howard: oh, the rejection and things like that, yeah. 
 
R: yeah. I mean, and what kinds of things would you need to do to be successful. What 
kinds of things , obviously this is retrospective, what kinds of things would you do, what 
would you not do to be successful when you‟ve analysed it when you‟ve gone home? 
 
Howard: well it‟s quite difficult, I mean, I try to dress trendily, er, and I was still young 
and I still had my hair [laughs], and I was slimmer than I am now. I don‟t know what 
else I could have done to make myself more attractive, because in a way, from the 
perspective of being a Chinese man, there‟s not a lot you can do about the colour of 
your skin, isn‟t it. 
 
R: right, I mean, was that an issue do you think? 
 
Howard: I think it was the stereotype that Western [pause] people if you like, about the 
Chinese, is that Chinese have small dicks, er, or they're all passive, or, or whatever, you 
know, things like that. So they might not even want to try, or it could be that they're so 
parochial that it‟s anybody who is different from themselves that they weren‟t 
interested. 
 
In this extract from Howard we can see how stereotyped penis size is linked to „race‟ 
where the expression “the colour of your skin” becomes a metaphor for „race‟ and a 
signifier of Chinese gay men having a small penis and being passive sexually. The 
corporeal topographies associated with meanings around “the colour of your skin”, 
where this expression is metonymic of all the other surface corporeal signifiers such as 
eye shape and nose shape, become subordinated in this context to the meanings 
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associated with discourses around “Chinese have small dicks, er, or they're all passive”.  
The meanings around the skin in this context, also represent the meanings around the 
penis. Howard is implying here that in spite of his efforts to be acceptable within gay 
cultural norms (dressing well, being young, having hair, being slim), his ethnicity when 
read as Chinese became a signifier of being sexually passive and having a small penis. 
Furthermore, within gay cultural norms, Howard suggests that being stereotyped as 
having a small penis meant that other (white) gay men in the venue would not be 
sexually interested in him, as a whole person. Here we can see that Howard‟s 
experiences are at first sight relationally opposite to Brian‟s. Brian is being interpellated 
as of African descent, and thus interpreted as having a large penis and is challenged by 
GWME men, whilst Howard is interpellated as of Far East Asian descent and 
interpreted as having a small penis and thus is not challenged by GWME men in these 
gay venues. However in both contexts the penis becomes foregrounded within the 
unified Ego, and both penises are interpreted as being dysfunctional and abnormal. Both 
penises are rendered within the intersubjective life-world with meanings around 
competitive masculinity, where Brian is positioned as hyper-masculine and so worth 
challenging or having, whereas Howard is positioned as hypo-masculine and so not 
worth challenging.  
 
Howard has been interrogated about his penis, but the interrogation has occurred 
without the need to show the penis, only the requirement to display his „race‟ through 
which his skin colour signifies his penis size, and so Howard‟s penis is already visible.  
Again in Howard‟s example the GWME man is the final adjudicator who makes the 
judgement that “they might not even want to try”, leaving no opportunity for Howard to 
refute the stereotype by showing his potentially larger penis. The only places Howard is 
not rejected are clubs specifically for white older gay men to meet younger Chinese gay 
men, which Howard says are called: 
 
“a „takeaway‟, because you „take away‟ a young Chinese boy”.  
 
But even here it could be argued that the racialized power relations around sexuality and 
masculinity centred on the penis has occurred in the contextualization and marketing of 
this specialist club where class, age, „race‟, and economics already infer these power 
214 
 
 
 
relations of „small penis equals passivity‟. The outcome in this case is not rejection but 
a form of predation or „having‟ the GBME penis.  
 
The penis, in the contexts described here, is an interwoven part of the self, and that is 
why Brian doesn‟t say they are challenging his penis and that this is not important to 
him. Instead he is saying that they are challenging him, all of him. In Howard‟s case, he 
is already „castrated‟ by racialized discourses within white gay contexts which position 
him as having a small penis and being sexually passive (Fung, 2001; Lee, 2005). He 
relates his racialized positioning of his whole self with racialized stereotypes around the 
penis, and the rejection of his „penis‟ elicits affective qualities around rejection for his 
entire self. Karim‟s interview shows us how racialized discourses intersect in different 
ways to create the stereotype of a small penis attached to a sexually active gay role. 
Here we see how the imbrications of discourses around „race‟ and faith (faith qua 
„race‟) are productive of complex and dynamic phenomenal renderings of the black 
Body. 
 
Karim: I‟ve had guys come up to me and touch my crotch. I‟m more conscious about 
how I react to them, just in case. Going back to endowment, coming out on the gay 
scene at 17 I‟d constantly hear that all South Asians have small willies [note: willy is 
English term for penis].  
[...] 
Karim: again already with the negativity about my skin colour from school days, and 
then I had all that [...] we aren‟t seen as desirable, it‟s not a good thing to be seen with 
an Asian guy [...] I think it‟s like saying they‟re sexually, what‟s the word, I can‟t think 
of the word. 
 
R: the Chinese people I spoke to talked about being seen as passive. 
 
Karim: no. I‟m thinking more like if you‟ve got a small willy you‟re not sexually 
attractive, there‟s no point. 
 
R: because a bigger willy would be more [interrupted]? 
 
Karim: well yeah, they celebrate big willies on the gay scene, quite openly.  
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[...] 
Karim: I‟ve usually found that, being Asian and Pakistani, I‟m usually assumed to be 
the active partner, nothing to do with my sexuality or tastes but of my background, 
Muslim men „as long as they're the active partner they don‟t see themselves as gay‟, 
that again is what I‟m being fed, „so this is what it should be for you‟.  
[...] 
Karim: as soon as a guy is known to be passive, he‟s not seen as attractive any more on 
the gay scene. That's the impression I get, I think it‟s an accurate impression. Again it 
goes to being straight acting and being a dominant and aggressive type. It‟s a lot of 
sexual fantasies, mixed in with what the media‟s feeding people, soap operas, and 
basically it‟s totally fucked up. People‟s images and point of view is totally messed up.  
 
In Karim‟s interview we see how some of the previous racialized discourses described 
by my other interviewees combine. South Asian men are portrayed as having small 
penises and so are not desirable, however the associating with Muslim-ness adds a 
masculine dimension based around conflations of perverse heterosexuality and sexual 
dominance (Said, 1978). The South Asian penis occupies a liminal and contingent place 
in the white gay imaginary, where so long as the South Asian man is seen as active, 
straight and aggressive, his penis is desirable (maybe even perceived as large) but as 
soon as he is not seen this way his penis becomes small, passive and undesirable. Karim 
echoes James‟ earlier description of the “images” in GWME men‟s phenomenal 
experiences as being an important repository of racialized meanings. Here we see how 
these „images‟ are described as life-world „bubbles‟, namely specific moments or 
scenarios foregrounded in perception. These images not only elicit discursive meanings 
but also ideal sensings, sense and (ideal) sensory experiences as for example in a dream. 
Through the phenomenal interweaving of the information from these ideal imaginary 
life-world bubbles with the „real‟ life-world, black Bodies are rendered within the 
perceptions of GWME men.  Discursive meanings and subjective fantasies interweave 
to reconfigure an ideal life-world bubble which in turn is interwoven with the 
intersubjective life-world. The black penis will be rendered within the perceptions of 
GWME men through a dynamic flux between the „real‟ information (meanings and 
sensings) from the life-world and the „ideal‟ information from their imaginations. 
Therefore Brian‟s, James‟, Howard‟s and Karim‟s penises will be viewed by GWME 
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men through a distorting phenomenological lens, where the white gaze upon the penis 
enables operations of power which subject GBME men to forms of racialized violence.  
 
Within particular discourses in localised contexts, certain corporeal topographies 
become relatively more important signifiers than others. In many gay cultures and 
communities the penis is already a signifier of sexuality and masculinity (Padva, 2002; 
Thorne et al., 1998), and is often highly visible in gay cultures (Thorne et al., 1998). For 
GBME men in white gay cultures, the penis becomes a major signifier for meanings 
around racialized sexuality and masculinity, and this is foregrounded by the 
accessibility of the penis as a signifier of social meanings in many gay cultures 
generally. These three themes, sexuality, masculinity, „race‟, which impact upon the 
entire unified Ego though a range of cultural signifiers and intersubjective sensings and 
meanings, find a conduit in the GBME penis which is all the more receptive to the 
social meanings because these have been sedimented historically as themes that have 
been made to be strongly associated with the penis. I now go on to explore how the 
themes discussed in this section relate to practices around controlling the whiteness of 
the white gay community.  
 
Section Four: ‘Race’, Sex, Masculinity and the White Gay Social Body  
 
The historical and cultural discourses, meanings and themes which interweave „race‟, 
masculinity, and sexuality find a salient corporeal signifier in the penis. Christopher 
describes how „race‟, sexuality, and masculinity are both rendered through the GBME 
penis and within the individual as a whole, as well as within the intersubjective life-
world, eliciting affective qualities and power relations: 
 
Christopher:  well, you always hear it that black men tend to be very well endowed, and 
Oriental men tend to be less endowed. Which is not necessarily the case because I've 
seen Oriental men who are well endowed, which again goes against the grain because 
you tend to think to yourself „where is the rationale for this?‟, right. It has to do again 
with genetic make-up. It's the genetic code within you, right, and this is what people 
forget is it's a thing that's part of what it is, it‟s not designed around race. I‟ve met  
black men with small willies, and I've met white men with small, Asian men with small 
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willies, but equally met, you know, the complete opposite where it‟s been enormous 
each of the size. 
 
R: can I ask what is it about racism and colonialism that makes that part of the body so 
important in perhaps gay contexts?  I know it's important in heterosexual contexts as 
well. 
 
Christopher: it‟s control, it‟s dominance, right. 
 
R: why isn't it the nose, or why isn‟t it the shape of the eyes? 
 
Christopher: No. Because the sexual organ is the reproductive cell, is the reproductive 
organ. That is the organ that is seen to be the life giver. If you look at it for what it is, 
out of that comes semen, that semen can create life, it can also bring pleasure, and your 
nose isn't going to give you pleasure or somebody else. If you can actually let a person 
realise that that part of them is not necessarily, or is something that you want to control 
by means of saying „this is my trophy‟ or „this is a trophy‟ or whatever, or you are not 
so well endowed so therefore you have become a passive individual‟, whether you want 
to be or not, right, well that's a control mechanism. It's a way of suppressing people 
right, and that is what they do. Sex is a powerful tool, right. It goes way, way, way, way, 
way back into the very essence of who and what we are. We are sexual beings. We 
control each other by sexual urges, right, as sexual urges determine who we are.  
 
One attribute Christopher describes is how the penis is considered to be a key s ignifier 
of human reproduction and this is why as a body-part it carries greater significance for a 
number of sexualized themes than for example the nose or the eyes. Here we see the 
theme of masculinity, where the theme of masculinity can be inferred within 
Christopher‟s account here from expressions such as „willies‟, „passive‟, „control‟, 
„dominance‟, „trophy‟, as well as from the themes of sexuality and „race‟. He also 
reminds us that it is a conduit for affective information which can render the penis and 
entire unified Ego with the positive affective qualities around pleasure. In addition the 
penis elicits affective qualities around pleasure within the unified Egos of other gay men 
within the life-world. This is therefore productive of sensings related to understandings 
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of affective qualities around pleasure as well as the sense of the penis as being involved 
in pleasure. 
 
Christopher is the only interviewee who explicitly mentioned the interweaving of 
meanings between „race‟, masculinity, sexual reproduction and the penis, and why this 
makes the penis a core signifier of these concatenated concepts. The theme of sexual 
reproduction was once (erroneously) seen as irrelevant to gay men in the dominant 
hetero-patriarchal discourses, where one of the frequent homophobic comments I would 
personally hear from people was „if everyone was gay the human race would die out‟.  
Here I am taking sexual reproduction to include both the procreative, as well as the 
metaphorical in the sense of sexual behaviour which creates the gay „family‟ qua 
community.  
 
 „Race‟ was historically theorized by scientists as a category of origin, family, or 
genetics (Goldberg, 1994; Mosse, 1985). In historical and cultural patriarchal discourses 
the „family- line‟ was linked to the man‟s „seed‟ or semen (Nast, 2002). Semen was also 
involved in mythologies around the family line‟s continuation (Mead, 1977:211), and 
naturally the apotheosis of the concept of family in the West was depicted in racialized 
discourses as being white (Nast, 2002). It is also important to note that white Western 
heterosexual women were often considered to be or depicted as the „reproducers‟ of 
family and nation (McClintock, 1995; Nagel, 2003; Ware, 1992; Weeks, 1981:38), 
related to discourses around racial purity and miscegenation. Semen is of course emitted 
from the penis, which makes the penis (and in other contexts the genitals as a whole), a 
salient signifier of the meanings outlined here around family, racial purity, genetics and 
community. The continuation of the family lineage or even of the „race‟ was frequently 
seen by cultures as a major social obligation, and it remained as an important concept 
within society (Foucault, 1998; McClintock, 1995; Mosse, 1985 Nagel, 2003; Ware, 
1992; Weeks, 1981:38). Therefore, as Christopher says it is “the organ that is seen to 
be the life giver”, the penis and semen carry these meanings around reproducing the 
family-group or „race‟ (Friedman, 2002; Mosse, 1985), however this concept of 
„family‟ or community could also be extended to include the (white) gay social-body 
(Nast, 2002). 
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Although I am not talking about reproduction as the transfer of genes per se (although it 
could be theorised as transfer of genetic potentials), the historical racialized discursive 
formations around heterosexual reproduction (such as miscegenation taboos) could 
easily evolve into or feed into contemporary discursive formations around the 
reproduction of the (white) gay social-body or community. In fact given that the gay 
communities are part of wider society, there is no reason to assume that the dominant 
racialized discourses around reproduction and miscegenation would not impact in 
exactly the same way. Christopher says that “the sexual organ is the reproductive cell, 
is the reproductive organ”, and there is no reason to assume that this is only true for 
genetic reproduction, but also that it can refer to how sexuality enables the reproduction 
of the gay social-body and community. Here we can talk about the multiple ways in 
which homosexuality brings the gay social-body together, for example as an affective 
quality around sexual and erotic desire. Here this desire can manifest itself in diverse 
ways, including not only physical sex, but also through other erotic or sexualised social 
interactions such as dancing in clubs, dinner parties, watching a homoerotic film, 
wearing erotic clothing in social environments , buying and displaying luxury goods 
(expensive phones, jewellery) as a mode of sexual attraction. The erotic desire can also 
be transformed into other affective qualities, through the interweaving of meanings and 
sensings from the life-world, such as the striving to create LGBTQI communities, to 
engage in activism and to create family parenting units.  
 
There is also the strategic utilisation of the affective qualities around desire to reinforce 
the boundaries of a particular gay social-body through the „Othering‟ of outsider social 
categories. This is the maintenance of boundaries in order to maintain the identity of the 
gay social-body, control the various economies within the community (for example the 
affective, cultural, political), and also protect the community from perceived danger. 
One of the dangers may include the stigmatization of white people by other white 
people if they are seen as getting too close to BME people (Collins, 2004:41). Where 
the gay social-body identifies itself as „white‟, then the practices around „the penis‟ will 
inevitably involve the Othering of racialized BME social categories.  
 
 Christopher also talks about the penis and pleasure. The penis is a major signifier of 
discursive meanings around pleasure in gay culture, and indeed we need discursive 
meanings to categorise, define and delimit „the penis‟ and „genitals‟ in the first place. 
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The penis is also a phenomenal corporeal topography that intersubjectively 
communicates understood affective qualities and sensings around pleasure (including 
the visual, tactile, and olfactory). Perhaps most importantly the penis is involved in the 
phenomenal experience of orgasm, which as an affective quality has the potential to not 
only be foregrounded within the corporeal topography of the penis, an orgasm can also 
be foregrounded within the entire unified Ego. The traditional concept of the male 
orgasm in Western culture usually centres around the penis (Carlson, 1986), and the 
sensations of pleasure associated with the „orgasm‟ are usually considered to be highly 
valued and sought after in Western cultures. The actual ejaculation results from the 
cognitive processes within the hyletic topography, and occurs without the need for 
phenomenal awareness (Carlson, 1986). It is the interweaving of the discursive, 
affective and corporeal topographies which render phenomenal awareness with the 
experience of „the orgasm‟.  
 
Therefore not only does the penis symbolise meanings around sexual pleasure, it also 
participates in the production of actual affective qualities of pleasure and orgasm in the 
man.  Christopher‟s interview helps us consider a more detailed analysis of the 
interweavings of meanings rendered through the corporeal topography of the penis. The 
core discursive themes are those related to „race‟, sexuality, masculinity, and power. 
However these combine in ways which are also related to sexual reproduction, where 
sexual reproduction means both the transmission of genes and also the reproduction of 
the gay social-body. The penis, genitals and semen come to signify these imbricated 
discourses and the practices associated with them in gay communities.  In addition we 
find that the penis participates in the production of actual embodied feelings of sexual 
pleasure, and it would also be the case that many of these feelings of sexual pleasure 
would occur as a consequence of the discourses, practices, and cultures within the gay 
communities which enable interpersonal sexual experiences and the discursive framing 
of these experiences as sexually pleasurable. These attributes combine to make the penis 
an extremely important corporeal topography in gay contexts.  
 
Once the phenomenal penis has been rendered with meanings and sensings which 
strongly impact upon the entire unified Ego, particularly in terms of affective qualities, 
it can become a highly useful object for controlling an entire individual. Subjective 
identifications, interpellations, and categorising around the black body can then be used 
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to control wider social groupings of similar bodies (Goldberg, 1994:54). Christopher 
having outlined the core meanings signified by the penis („race‟ and reproduction, and 
pleasure) goes on to describe how the penis referred to by Christopher here as “that part 
of them” (now loaded with these meanings) can be a useful object of control. 
Christopher shows us two things here, firstly that the penis is an important site for 
control by virtue of the racialized discourses circulating in white gay contexts which 
utilise the penis as a key signifier of racialized meanings. Secondly he also shows us 
how the performativity of these discourses help to maintain the presence of the 
racialized discourses (Yancy, 2008) and implicate wider social groups (Goldberg, 
1994:54), through the enactment of practices around the racialized positioning of 
GBME men as a “trophy” or as a “passive individual”. The positionings described here 
are related to the racialized discourses around penis size. Christopher explicitly 
describes the black male penis as “a trophy”. This again echoes the other interviewees‟ 
accounts, whereby the self is reduced to the body-part, the penis, and this is used to 
increase the power of action and existence of the GWME men in these contexts, and to 
reduce the power of action and existence for GBME men. Where Christopher says 
regarding the penis “that's a control mechanism it's a way of suppressing people right 
and that is what they do”, he refers to controlling an individual and also the social-body 
as “people”. „The trophy‟ also echoes the practices around the castrations which 
occurred during colonisation (Friedman, 2002; Pinar, 2003). This suggests that the 
practices of power operating within the white gay spaces are “vicarious” castrations 
(Collins, 2004:242), strategically enacted to reduced the power of existence and power 
of action for GBME men,  and citing the discursive prohibitions on inter-racial 
relationships and miscegenation. The phenomenal dismembering of the black penis by 
the white interpellative gaze as a trophy object can be seen as another form of 
dissociation or alienation (Alcoff, 1999; Fanon, 1993; Yancy, 2008) which impacts 
upon the embodied subjectivity of GBME men. These social processes result in the 
sustaining of the white boundaries for the white gay social-body and community.  I now 
go on to discuss the conclusions for this chapter.     
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Conclusions 
In this chapter I explored how the black penis is rendered with  affective qualities, 
sensings and meanings in white gay spaces. In section one I looked at how the historical 
colonial discourses around the penis continue to (re)produce racialized meanings in 
contemporary society. In section two I looked at the affective qualities elicited by 
practices around the black penis and how the interpretation depended upon the type of 
racialized frameworks present within the subjectivity of GBME men. In section three I 
looked at how practices around the penis in white gay spaces also rendered meanings 
around power, sexuality and masculinity and how different racialized discourses are 
productive of dynamic positionings and experiences. In section four I developed these 
themes to look at how they are strongly interwoven within the phenomenal penis 
through additional discourses around pleasure and reproduction and also the affective 
qualities around orgasm. I also considered how these racialized concepts implicate the 
penis in the social production of the white gay community.  
 
The penis becomes a significant corporeal topography for the rendering of meanings 
around race, sexuality, masculinity, power, pleasure and reproduction, and also affective 
qualities around pleasure. These meanings and affective qualities are interwoven into 
the penis in ways understood by GWME men, and so can be utilized through the 
mapping and reconfiguration of the invisible white Gestalt to elicit negative or positive 
affective qualities. Here depending on the parts of the Gestalt present in the white gay 
space, GWME men can elicit a range of phenomenal meanings and affective qualities, 
particularly through the performativity of racialized practices and the phenomenal field 
of indicated sensings.  
 
The multiple meanings rendered within the penis also show us how „race‟ intersects 
with other social themes and meanings in ways which suggest that these themes and 
meanings are inextricably bound to „race‟. Here for example the discourses and 
practices citing masculinity described in the interview data, would lose coherence and 
potentially become meaningless without the racialized framework underpinning them. 
Equally without the discourses around masculinity then the racialized practices around 
the penis would lose coherence and take on alternative meanings. The coherence of 
these interwoven meanings helps to objectify the black penis and is productive of the 
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maintenance of the social boundaries that exclude GBME men from the white gay 
community. 
 
Finally given the paucity of research and writing on the penis in the (white) social 
sciences (Flowers et al., 2011), and the few detailed analyses of the penis in „race‟ 
critiques of sexuality (for example Fung, 2001), the findings in this chapter which show 
the significance of the penis in gay social interactions would suggest that further 
research into this topic is necessary. In chapter seven I look at how the diffuse field of 
affective information in the life-world, theorized as atmospheres, is used by GBME men 
to interpret the racialized meanings and understand the sensings configured within the 
invisible white Gestalt in white gay spaces.  
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Chapter Seven 
Sensing White Atmospheres 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters I have looked at how the practices around interpellation and the 
gaze impact upon the embodied subjectivity of GBME men in white gay spaces. Here I 
showed how meanings were interpreted through discursive topographies and sensings 
were understood within the affective topographies. These topographies are interwoven 
and rendered within the corporeal topographies and unified Egos of GBME men as 
phenomenal perceptions and experiences of sense. It is through these sensings and 
meanings mapped and navigated within the invisible white Gestalt that GBME men 
interpret the racialized meanings in white gay spaces. In addition I showed how the 
invisible white Gestalt could be reconfigured by GBME men and GWME men to elicit 
and control the rendering of meanings and sensings in white gay spaces.  
 
In this chapter I explore how GBME men interpret racialized meanings within the life-
world of white gay spaces by not only rendering their unified Egos with affective 
qualities, sensings and meanings but also rendering the phenomenal life-world with 
sensings and meanings.  In section one I look at how the theories of Edmund Husserl 
can be used to analyse the phenomenology of white gay spaces and atmospheres, briefly 
discussing how the „positive‟ approach in his models can include negative impacts of 
social interactions in the life-world, for example the process of Othering. In section two 
I look at how whiteness is interpreted by GBME men in white gay spaces, and since this 
is often invisible how it is read through a range of signifiers and sensed through 
phenomenal perceptions. What are the meanings and sensings within the invisible white 
Gestalt that make whiteness both visible and invisible in white gay spaces? In section 
three I look at how music operates to saturate white gay spaces with sensings and 
meanings which are frequently interpreted as racialized, and how music itself both 
interpellates and operates as the white gaze. How does music racialize white gay 
spaces? In section four I look at how white gay spaces are resisted by GBME men and 
how their striving for adventure or for community results in the pursuit of alternative 
sites for affective belonging. Here I also explicate how Husserl‟s phenomenology can 
be developed to theorize the process of Othering. How is the whiteness of white gay 
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spaces productive of alternative life-worlds for GBME men? I conclude this chapter by 
arguing that the life-world of white gay spaces is saturated with whiteness, however 
whiteness is often rendered invisible within the phenomenological processes which are 
productive of the racialized space. This invisibility is in itself an interwoven meaning 
within the rendered topography of the life-world. By mapping whiteness in white gay 
spaces through the sensing of the invisible white Gestalt, GBME men can devise 
strategies for inclusion and resistance. I now go on to discuss the theoretical approaches 
used in this chapter.  
 
Section One: Phenomenology and Affective Atmospheres 
 
In the previous chapters I have already looked at how affective information operates 
within an individual‟s unified Ego, intersubjective unified Egos within the life-world, 
and objects foregrounded within the life-world. The social field (including actors‟ 
subjectivity) is the source of information and meanings from which the phenomenal 
life-world is rendered, and the social field includes both phenomenal and non-
phenomenal attributes as well as information and meanings. In this chapter I will 
theorize the phenomenal life-world as being a phenomenal object, albeit with more of a 
field- like quality than more conventional objects, and therefore the same 
phenomenological mechanisms apply here as have been discussed in previous chapters. 
Edmund Husserl suggest that “affects may be intertwined with these background lived 
experiences or with their objects, spilling over into a general atmosphere of well-being 
or malcontentment” (Husserl 2001:19). The life-world will therefore not only include 
the foregrounded objects to which affects have elicited a greater power of existence, but 
also the backgrounded objects, combining to produce an atmosphere. Subjectivity for 
Husserl (1970:172) is located within intersubjectivity  and this is “the „space‟ of all ego-
subjects” where: 
  
“The intersubjectively identical life-world-for-all serves as an intentional „index‟ 
for the multiplicities of appearance, combined in intersubjective synthesis, 
through which all ego-subjects (and not merely each through the multiplicities 
which are peculiar to him individually) are oriented toward a common world and 
the things in it, the field of all activities united in the general „we‟ etc” (Husserl, 
1970:172). 
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Husserl‟s (1970:163) approach to the life-world here frames the concept as inherently 
social, where the mutual construction of the intersubjective life-world occurs through 
communication of meanings, sensings and norms. This shared conception of the life-
world, where sharing of social meanings and sensings may also include those meanings 
and sensings which were not part of a specific individual‟s initial subjectivity, enables 
an orientation of social groups towards various processes of social cohesion or unity, 
such as normalisation or group identity. By reversing Husserl‟s model of community we 
can also consider the converse processes around Othering. Husserl‟s use here of the 
terms „index‟ or „themes‟ reminds us that the intersubjective life-world is not a 
„photocopy‟ of identical qualities cut and pasted into the phenomenal awareness of each 
individual, each individual‟s qualia, sensings and meanings remain unique and therefore 
only experienced by them alone. For Husserl the life-world already possesses affective 
information and these are distributed throughout phenomenal space-time and related to 
action, here the life-world: 
  
“Is the universal field into which all our acts, whether of experiencing, of 
knowing, or of outward action, are related. From this field, or from objects in 
each case already given, come all affections, transforming themselves in each 
case into actions” (Husserl, 1970:144).  
 
In addition Husserl reminds us that this life-world is not static but is in dynamic and 
constant change, with the foregrounding and backgrounding of objects (real and ideal) 
according to a phenomenal sense which constructs, reconfigures or removes meanings 
and objects from its experience: 
 
“The surrounding world is in a certain way always in the process of becoming, 
constantly producing itself by means of transformations of sense and ever new 
formations of sense along with the concomitant positings and annullings” 
(Husserl, 2002:196).  
 
Husserl‟s life-world considers the phenomenology of intersubjective community and 
how this is constructed as a joining of individuals into a social collective (Husserl, 
2002:141), as well as through the social institutions such as the state, the legal system 
and religion (Husserl, 2002:148). However one of the issues with Husserl‟s work is that 
227 
 
 
 
he does not go into any depth of analysis around the processes which alienate or exclude 
individuals from a community, which is surprising given the historical context of his 
writing and the racialized social exclusions he faced as a Jewish academic in Nazi 
Germany (Ahmed, 2007:160; Carr, 1970). Indeed Jacques Derrida (2001:205) even 
considers that the omission of the Other from Husserl‟s work leads to the unravelling of 
Husserl‟s entire phenomenological enterprise.  However, I would suggest that we can 
use Husserl‟s phenomenological analysis of positive instances of intersubjective 
interaction to analyse negative instances of exclusion, since the phenomenological 
mechanisms would apply to both cases. Here for example I would argue that if the 
empathetic sharing of intersubjective themes is argued by Husserl to produce collective 
unity, then not sharing these themes equally between all individuals in a social space, or 
not having any themes present would reduce collective unity or render particular unified 
Egos as not coherent with the intersubjective community in that space. I explore this 
idea further in section four. 
 
An atmosphere is the phenomenal field comprising both the affective information 
rendered in foregrounded objects and those in backgrounded objects (Husserl, 2001:19) 
and the experience of atmospheres also becomes a salient affective quality elicited 
through the interactions between the unified Ego and intersubjective life-world 
(Langewitz, 2007). Therefore I shall not only be looking at the phenomenal perceptions 
rendered within the corporeal topographies of GBME men but also looking at how the 
phenomenal life-world of white gay spaces is rendered with affective information 
experienced as the affective quality of atmospheres. Here the phenomenological 
processes are generally the same as those described in previous chapters, where 
interweavings of meanings and sensings are rendered into the topographies of an object, 
objects or the field of the life-world. One difference would be the absence, in most 
cases, of the individual‟s „body image‟ through the hyletic topography, although this too 
has the potential to be extended or reconfigured into extra-corporeal objects such as 
seeing-sticks for the visually impaired (Merleau-Ponty 2002), social groups (Hadreas, 
2007; Husserl, 1970), and the life-world itself for example in meditation (Bilimora, 
2001). I now go on to look at how the affective qualities experienced as the field of the 
life-world, or atmospheres, can be used by GBME men to interpret the racialized 
meanings in white gay spaces. 
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Section Two: Phenomenal White Gay Spaces 
 
Within the interviews conducted with GBME men, one recurrent theme is the difficulty 
in describing what makes a gay space a white gay space. Within white gay spaces there 
are particular phenomenal qualities experienced by GBME men which stand out as 
nodal points of interpretation, although these remain difficult for my interviewees to pin 
down as evidence for explicit racialized meanings. They are also often difficult to read 
as representations or signifiers of whiteness. David talks here about recently attending a 
white LGBTQI social function where he was the only BME person present out of fifty 
white guests. Since it emerged in the interview that both of us had significant 
experience of attending a variety of Black and LGBTQI political and activist events I 
went on to pose the question around the difference in recognising African-Caribbean, 
Asian, or Muslim „themed‟ events compared with a white LGBTQI social function: 
 
R: do you think there was anything about that event that was particularly identifiable as 
white?  
 
David: hmm. 
 
R: [pause] apart from the numbers of people. 
 
David: [laughs] the people who were there. Erm, [pause] I don‟t know really. The, er, 
the theme was come along to a bit of a celebration, there‟ll be a quiz, food, and 
socialise. Is that very white? I suppose. I don‟t know? 
 
R: [laughs] 
 
David: how can you make it appeal to more BME people? 
[...] 
R: if I go to an African-Caribbean event there are particular themes in that space that 
you know that it‟s an African-Caribbean event, the same for an Asian event, the same 
for a Muslim type event. It sounds as if it‟s harder to see what things make it a white 
event? 
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David: hmm. Uh huh.  
 
R: I wonder why that is? 
 
David: I suppose [pause]. It is more normal, whatever normal is, it‟s more everyday 
isn‟t it? I suppose it‟s more difficult to find out what is different. But yeah. Things 
around music or the vibe, or food, could do differently to attract, [pause] more people 
from the BME communities. 
 
David makes the comment that the whiteness of the gay event he attended was “more 
normal, whatever normal is, it‟s more everyday isn‟t it” which at first reading makes 
sense, that what is normal becomes quotidian and part of the background, but this does 
not apply to all normal conditions in English society such as late trains or wet weather, 
where we notice this and comment on it. Han (2007:54) suggests however that “„white‟ 
doesn‟t become normal because it is so, it becomes normal because we make it so. More 
often than not, whiteness is maintained through active exclusion of those who are non-
white”. In this sense we must consider the practices around whiteness in the operation 
of exclusion for non-white racialized groups, and here it may be that for David a factor 
in his perception around the normality of whiteness was the absence of other BME 
people at the event. David acknowledges the difficulty in determining what makes a 
formal social event „white‟, where  the differences are more salient for what would be 
culturally understood as non-white social events  for example African-Caribbean, Asian, 
or Muslim, where here it may be that the foregrounding of BME meanings contributes 
relationally to the backgrounding of whiteness. Thus both the absence of BME people 
and the foregrounding of meanings associated with BME groups in different contexts 
helps to make whiteness invisible. This supports the concept of whiteness as an 
„unmarked racialized category‟ (Agnew, 2007; Frankenberg, 1993; hooks, 1999, 1992; 
Knowles, 2003), and may also be related to an identification by David (who is mixed 
race white/ African-Caribbean) with valorised whiteness which makes whiteness both 
visible and invisible (Bhabha, 1994:76). It may also be related to whiteness being an 
„invisible‟ racialized category that “has seldom been named or labelled, [or] until 
recently theorized” (Agnew, 2007:18), which suggests that the dominance of the 
linguistic in general culture and academia, in this context naming, labelling and 
theorizing,  may have been complicit in rendering whiteness „invisible‟.  
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I will discuss this briefly before returning to David‟s discussion around the theme of 
white atmospheres.   
 
This unnamed (Mills, 1997:1) or unnameable attribute of whiteness can be seen where 
Imran in the interview says he is uncomfortable using the term „white‟ after an incident 
where he was beaten up by a group of white people as he left a gay venue. I began by 
asking him about how he would perceive the reactions of individuals within mainstream 
gay support groups and he stopped and laughed nervously: 
 
R: you were about to specify a category of person, and then you laughed and stopped, is 
there a particular group that would be more hostile? 
 
Imran: white. I was going to say white, I don‟t like using the word white, but everyone 
says it. 
 
R: [talks about how the use of the terms „white‟ and „whiteness‟ is acceptable in  
academic departments and literature]. 
 
Imran: I had  a very bad experience in [northern city] centre with a group of white 
people, coming out of a night club I got beaten up,  
 
R: were they gay or straight white people? 
 
Imran: I have no idea, I came out of a gay club and they were there. I don‟t know which 
club but I know they‟d been clubbing. This was group of white people.  
 
R: they could have been gay? 
 
Imran: yeah they could have been gay, so I have that fear in me. 
 
Imran suggests that the reason he did not use the word „white‟ was related to a sense of 
not being comfortable using the word white “I don‟t like using the word white”. He then 
acknowledges that it is a word that other people use and so this suggests that his own 
personal experiences have inhibited Imran from feeling comfortable using the term 
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„white‟. It is worth noting that Imran does use BME categories (for example black, 
Asian, Chinese) without hesitation. My sense at the time was that Imran was afraid of 
violence from wider society in the form of surveillance from the state or from 
institutions, which was why I mentioned that white academics use the term „white‟ and 
so (ironically) drawing upon whiteness itself to help make whiteness visible, although 
this move by me would have inadvertently re- inscribed whiteness as the adjudicator of 
legitimate language use and the social categories permitted to use language. Imran then 
disclosed that he did not use the word „white‟ because of the assault by a group of white 
people outside a gay venue ending the passage with the comment “so I have that fear in 
me”.  However this does not negate my sense of Imran being afraid of the state in 
relation to whiteness and the assault, since there may be a fear in Imran that reporting an 
incident involving white perpetrators would risk further violence (including ignoring the 
crime) from racist police officers (Holdaway, 1984).  
 
There is an affective quality around the emotion of fear associated with Imran using the 
word „white‟, which reveals itself in silence and a nervous laugh. It may be that it is a 
fear specific to a particular real or ideal context, in this case the congruence between the 
real incident of white (potentially gay) attackers assaulting Imran and the ideal life-
world bubble I had elicited of what could happen if Imran walked into a gay support 
group.  Here the similarities between the real and ideal may have produced a strong 
memory of the real event, and Imran‟s racialized interpretation of the motives (Imran 
described them as white, rather than by gender, age, faith, or class).   
 
Imran has experienced an interpellation through the physical actions of the assault, 
impacting upon his discursive topography, his affective topography and his corporeal 
topography. His discursive topography interprets the interpellation as related to his 
„race‟ and the „race‟ of the white attackers, interpellating Imran as the unwanted 
racialized Other and simultaneously interpellating the white attackers as the dominant 
white category. Imran‟s affective topography understands the interpellation through the 
affective quality around fear, thereby interweaving the emotion of fear with both 
Imran‟s racialized Otherness and the whiteness of the attackers. Imran‟s corporeal 
topography experiences the physical disorientations and pain associated with the actions 
of the attackers, where this is indicated in the nervous laugh which communicates the 
embodied sense of dissonance both within the corporeal (the embodied vibration) and 
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affective (the emotions and feelings) topographies. We can also see the power of the 
interpellative white gaze here where Imran would have been read, categorized and 
positioned as BME by the attackers as he left the gay venue. This white gaze persists as 
an interwoven sense of surveillance and fear which contributes to the silence around the 
word „white‟. In this instance it is not only the sense of white people attacking Imran 
that elicits this fear, but also the word „white‟ itself expressed through the discursive 
topography as a result of this attack , showing how the reading of whiteness through a 
corporeal lens is imbricated with the discursive significations of racialized phenotypes. 
Through the interweaving of the discursive, affective and corporeal topographies 
whiteness is rendered not only within the discursive topography as meaning, but also 
across the diverse modalities as an embodied sense. Additional evidence that the word 
„white‟ was being inhibited through fear can be observed in that at some level Imran 
wanted to (and did) communicate the sense of fear around his experiences to me 
through the communicative modality of the laugh and silence. He wanted to do this 
without using the word „white‟.  
 
Here Imran shows us that one of the reasons why terminology around whiteness may be 
difficult to find until recently in English academic and general discourse is due to fear 
of violence. In Imran‟s interview we find that the word white is replaced by silence and 
a nervous laugh, which contains non-representational and affective sensings for Imran 
around the themes described in the extract from his interview. Here we see the concept 
of the “mask” where some BME people hide their true feelings about whiteness out of 
fear (Stanley et al., 1993:30). These types of extra- linguistic or non-representational 
modalities of sensing and communication, such as affective information, have often 
provided evidence of the vivid presence of whiteness for BME groups, particularly 
eliciting affective qualities around terror (hooks, 1992). For Imran the term white has 
affective sensings and a contextual atmosphere around fear. 
 
David‟s comments about “music or the vibe, or food, could do differently to attract, 
[pause] more people from the BME communities” also makes sense at first reading, 
however these comments also cite the often critiqued „samosas and steel bands‟ rhetoric 
of multiculturalism (Edwards, et al., 1992) which suggests that BME people are 
represented or included at an event by virtue of the tokenistic presence of minority 
ethnic food or minority ethnic music being performed in „traditional‟ dress. Lawrence 
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Grossberg (1996:88) critiques how a culture may not necessarily be the property of a 
particular social group suggesting that “discussions of multiculturalism too quickly 
assume a necessary relation between identity and culture”.  In the interview David 
talked at length about his white familial and cultural upbringing and his own white 
identity as a child and teenager:  
 
David: I was the only person there of any mixed race or BME person so I suppose to a 
certain extent you tried to fit into that. 
 
It may be that this past identification with whiteness may help to obscure or normalize 
the presence of whiteness in LGBTQI spaces for David as an adult. Later in the 
interview, when I asked him why he hadn‟t noticed the absence of LGBTQI BME 
people at the social event, he responded with: 
 
David: am I still secretly seeing myself as white? I don‟t know [laughs]. It‟s interesting. 
I‟ll have to think about that one. Because it didn‟t really cross my mind until you raised 
it then. 
 
Although David‟s experiences as the only BME person in the town he grew up in could 
be seen as a limit case, we could also infer the same processes as operating for all BME 
people in England.  Even where large BME communities exist for example in 
metropolitan cities, the presence of whiteness is still ubiquitous and dominant. In this 
sense we are all discursively and culturally mixed-„race‟, with whiteness as the 
dominant, valorised, invisible, unnamed category.  In addition David‟s work involves 
particular public-sector social practices which traditionally have utilised and 
perpetuated the „samosa and steel band‟ discourse around multiculturalism, and this 
could relate to his use of the word “attract” which implies equality-and-diversity-
demographic-thinking and tick-box marketing approaches. This may indicate that this 
discourse is still utilised in present society as a strategy for making events more 
attractive to BME groups (or less attractive for race-cognizant BME groups), risking the 
essentialisation of „race‟ qua racialized cultures (Bhabha, 2011; Frith, 1996). Of course 
the question about how to attract more white LGBTQI people is not raised, because 
whiteness is already inferred by the term LGBTQI in this context, as the unnamed 
invisible term. It also may indicate that over the last four decades a range of BME 
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subject positions may have emerged around the „samosa and steel band‟ discourse in 
England, including those that would as a result feel welcomed and included by one or 
two tokenistic BME cultural representations in an otherwise culturally homogenised 
white context (Malson et al., 2002).  
 
The alternative is that race-cognizant (Frankenberg, 1993) GBME men who attend 
white gay events in England may sense the „samosa and steel band‟ discourses and 
strategies from attempts to include these tokenistic representations, as Christopher 
points out in the interviews regarding LGBTQI BME inclusion strategies in (white) gay 
pride events resulting from Black LGBTQI activism:  
 
Christopher: they push and push and push, asking for everything under the sun, and 
this doesn‟t necessarily mean that they get what they want. [...] They get a form of what 
they want, tailored to suit the environment. And that is all that it is, right.  
 
The „samosa and steel band‟ multicultural discourse can be interpreted as an „invisible‟ 
strategy of whiteness to help position racialized Others within historical colonial 
representations of raced categories, whilst simultaneously claiming to be a strategy 
which is anti-racist and inclusive. It is important to acknowledge that it is a discourse 
often supported and perpetuated by some BME groups themselves, but also that race-
cognizant activists can subvert these stereotypes in performance or media to critique and 
reflect back the racial stereotyping to society (Carlson, 2011:311). This duplicitous anti-
racist rhetoric is critiqued by George Yancy (2008:237) who considers that “being an 
ally does not mean slumming around people of colour, eager to eat their food, dance to 
their music, rub against their „exotic‟ bodies”. Given that there has been some critique 
in academia and activism about the lack of representation of diversity within the 
LGBTQI „community‟, both in general (Young, 1997) and for LGBTQI BME identities 
(Halberstam, 2005; Han, 2007; Perez, 2005), the fact that LGBTQI BME people were 
both absent demographically (apart from David) and that there were no efforts made to 
enable inclusion might suggest, in the year 2012 within a major northern city with a 
BME demographic of 23% (and higher percentage of BME people in the demographic 
employed by or connected to the public body involved here), that this exclusion could 
have been strategic, including strategies of ignoring the issue. The descriptions around 
food and music from my interviewees may cite English multicultural discourse around 
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„samosas and steel bands‟ and elicit subject positions emergent from this over the last 
four decades (including those who resist this discourse). However representations, 
significations, and meanings around food and music also reflect more inclusive and 
autonomous subjectivities, identities and techniques of agency derived from alternative 
discursive formations and cultures (Ruffin, 2007:147) both within and outside of 
England.  I will explore how music influences atmospheres in section three of this 
chapter.  
 
In James‟ interview I asked him about his experiences of mainstream commercial gay 
clubs and bars, and here we see some of the themes David mentioned, but related by 
James directly to whiteness: 
 
James: these are white people‟s spaces. In terms of the way the spaces are decorated, 
in terms of the staff that work at these venues, in terms of the music they play at these 
venues, in terms of the attitudes at these venues. They‟re made for white people.  
 
Here James establishes that he feels the gay bars and clubs are “white people‟s spaces”  
and goes on to suggest the attributes which makes this racialized interpretation salient 
for him, including the music that is played. These are specific attributes James suggests, 
however they include a wide range of unspecified perceptions around the spaces 
designs, the people employed, the music, and the attitudes. Though, like David, James 
cannot describe what specifically about these attributes (staff, music, attitudes) makes 
them white, or how they combine to make the whiteness of the space itself. Therefore 
these attributes can be described as productive of the atmosphere of the space, the “non-
quantifiable experiences [...] that places and settings evoke” (Degen, 2008:49). These 
attributes contribute to the phenomenal perception of the atmosphere of the gay 
commercial spaces as white.  
 
James also states that these gay venues are “made  for white people”, which suggests 
both agency and strategy, in the sense that white people are able to make a space white, 
they have the power to do this, and also that this ability may be a strategy to exclude 
racialized Others. If a place is made for a particular social group, it can be inferred from 
this that other groups would not „fit‟ into that space as well. Sara Ahmed (2007:157) 
suggests that “spaces acquire the „skin‟ of the bodies that inhabit them [...] spaces also 
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take shape by being orientated around some bodies, more than others.” Therefore one 
strategy for making a space white would be to populate that space with particular 
bodies, such as those whose corporeal topography, and particularly whose topography 
of the skin is rendered with meanings and sensings around whiteness. Another strategy 
Ahmed‟s (2007) description suggests is the orientation of bodies within that space, here 
Christopher describes how a GBME man in a white gay space would find himself 
spatially positioned as a result of the social context:  
 
Christopher: if you're new to an environment and you‟re on your own as a black gay 
person the first thing that you do is stand very close to the exits, right. And you survey, 
and you try and copy and pattern yourself, or you lean up against, look at the body 
language, body language tells you, right. You stand up with your back against 
something. 
 
Christopher here is describing the orientation of the corporeal topographies of a GBME 
man elicited by the white gay space. Here we see defensive orientations cited through 
standing near exits or against a wall, and also orientations of integration cited through 
the analysis and replication of the social norms within the space.  These orientations can 
be read affectively as both implicating the affective qualities within the unified Ego of 
the GBME man and also of the other GWME men‟s unified Egos, and the affective 
information in the life-world of the white gay space. Both the strivings towards defence 
and for integration help to map the invisible white Gestalt and enable the agency of the 
GBME man who is navigating, and reconfiguring the Gestalt within these two 
strategies. Therefore gay spaces made for white people can be sensed as being such 
through both the types of corporeal topographies present and their orientation, spatial 
configuration, and strategies within the white gay space. Caroline Knowles (2003: 105) 
suggests that “race is generated in the social texture of space, and so the analysis of 
space reveals its racial grammar as forms of social practice to which race gives rise.” 
Yet there are no algorithms or rules of racial grammar to interpret these Gestalts, where 
demographics and spatiality combined are insufficient, but rather they must be sensed as 
a totality in combination with the other attributes of the Gestalt, for example the 
discursive, the structural context, and the affective.  
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Given our present-day cultural and political understanding of „race‟ in England, a social 
space “made for white people” would generally be understood as racist or very peculiar. 
The question arises therefore as to why a gay space would be “made for white people”, 
as this suggests that white gay people are happier in a normative „white space‟ 
(whatever this means), and that the space qua atmosphere itself is performing the social 
process of excluding non-white people by eliciting negative affective qualities.  Here 
possibly the strategic design of a space is used to transmit affective information which 
has the power to exclude GBME men from white gay spaces. In addition (perhaps 
risking circularity in the argument) it may also be that what makes a gay space „white‟ 
is the power to be able to make it a white space in the first place, whether or not this 
power is visibly expressed. This (invisible) power can be distributed within the 
racialized discursive formations associated with the gay venue, made visible by the 
signifiers of whiteness described by my interviewees (such as music, food, attitudes, 
design, orientations) and sensed through affective information, and hence becomes a 
phenomenal sense of whiteness qua power-of-whiteness to operate within the gay space. 
This may also be the case for society in general where whiteness as the dominant racial 
category can be phenomenally sensed through particular practices of power, such as 
racialized instances of interpellation, the gaze, and the racialization of corporeal 
topographies. 
 
Brian‟s interview shows again how the atmosphere in gay bars and clubs is perceived as 
unwelcoming for GBME men, but here we see that the atmosphere is not only white and 
unwelcoming but also that it carries an absent-present message of exclusion.  
 
R: and is there anything else you‟d want to change in those particular clubs or pubs?  
 
Brian: er. 
 
R: to make it more welcoming for black people? 
 
Brian: [pause] I don‟t know. It‟s not like they've got big posters saying „black people 
aren‟t welcome‟, so it‟s just subtle things, innit. So.  
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R: but those subtle things, do they feel as if it‟s the same as having a sign saying „black 
people aren‟t welcomed‟?  
 
Brian: more or less, yeah. 
 
Brian shows us that the absence of explicit signifiers of exclusion such as “big posters 
saying „black people aren‟t welcome” is not necessary for him to feel unwelcomed. 
This description of the big posters echoes the historical practice in England of signs 
saying „no blacks, no Irish, no dogs‟. He mentions the subtle things which include 
affective qualities around feeling unwelcomed elicited by the atmosphere. What is 
interesting here is that the “subtle things” are not considered to be explicit, where the 
representational text of a poster would make the meanings unambiguous for Brian, since 
they could be less easily denied. However the non-representational meanings such as 
the feelings around being unwelcomed are forced into a backgrounded subordinate and 
ambiguous position. This emphasis on the text as the prioritized mode of meaning, 
rather than other communicative modalities, has been critiqued by other authors on 
affect as too narrow (for example Burkitt, 1999; Crossley 2007; Thrift, 2008; Young, 
1997). What we refer to as subtle may indeed be as salient phenomenally as the 
experience of a verbal or written text, but we are culturally forced to categorise these 
affective qualities as irrational and irrelevant (Puwar, 2001:657).  This arte fact of 
Western culture has the potential to be mis-used where semantic modalities can be 
exploited in duplicitous ways to deny the evidence of other communicative modalities 
and interpretations in social interactions, as we saw in chapter three. This can be seen as 
a strategy of whiteness to position racialized Others within a lacuna of silence in which 
they are prohibited to speak of their experiences.  
 
James‟ and Brian‟s descriptions of affects and atmospheres related to white gay spaces 
can be understood as relating to the unified Ego sensing the social space and rendering 
the life-world with atmospheres. Langewitz gives a vividly descriptive analysis of how 
atmospheres can be phenomenally sensed through the unified Ego:  
 
“Even if we do not know anybody, upon entering a room we can have the 
immediate impression of a certain mood, of something „in the air‟. If trouble is 
brewing, there is heaviness in the air; the room is so to say, soaked with an 
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unpleasant atmosphere. When we have such an immediate impression, we can 
almost instantly understand and enact the appropriate behavioural response: 
laughter freezes on the face; the hand stops moving in the air” (Langewitz, 
2007:322). 
 
Here we can relate Langewitz‟s description to Husserl‟s (1970) concept of the life-
world and how atmospheres as a diffuse field can be productive of negative affective 
qualities around feeling unwelcomed, whilst objects embedded or absent within the life-
world, such as the absent-present poster Brian mentions, form the foreground of 
perception. This enables the entire field of the life-world to be rendered with negative 
affective qualities in the perceptions of GBME men. Like a Gestaltist visual illusion, the 
life-world as a diffuse field transmits the negative affective qualities around feeling 
unwelcomed which has no specific localised „object‟ to be attributed to, as it is the 
entire social space of the gay venue (although over time the venue itself may become 
the „object‟ attributed with generating the negative atmosphere). What makes 
interpreting the negative affective qualities difficult or confusing for GBME men is 
either the absence of any „object‟ which explicitly speaks „race‟, or alternative presence 
of „objects‟ which seem to promote racial equality, such as signifiers of the „samosa and 
steel band‟ discourses, posters of BME models, or BME door staff. By utilising the 
diffuse field of the phenomenal intersubjective life-world as the repository of negative 
affective information related to racialized meanings, white gay venues can „invisibly‟ 
create atmospheres which make GBME men uncomfortable or unwelcomed. These 
affective qualities are of course rendered as visible to GBME men who more or less 
sense the atmospheres as strongly as though there were “big posters saying „black 
people aren‟t welcome”.  
 
It may be asked how something as perceptually encapsulating as the life-world can be 
rendered with “subtle” affective qualities around whiteness. This can occur through 
rationalistic discourses which deny affective meanings and sensings (Puwar, 2001), but 
this can also occur as a result of the normativity of whiteness, as David suggested 
earlier in this chapter. This can be related to Nirmal Puwar‟s (2004:127) description of 
BME individuals within institutions where “they may „feel the weight‟ of the whiteness 
of organisations and, in this respect, will have occasions when they feel like a „fish out 
of water‟, while whiteness is invisible to others”. This feeling is a phenomenal 
240 
 
 
 
perception of „weight‟ within the unified Ego, and relates to the life-world where 
whiteness comprises the metaphoric „air-bound land‟ in which these BME people are 
employed, the weight is felt as pressing upon the unified Ego but its source is the entire 
life-world surrounding the „fish‟. Puwar (2004:131) goes on to describe BME “fish in 
water” who have become used to the atmosphere of whiteness and “do not feel the 
weight of the water”, and here we can see how the life-world though still saturated with 
whiteness is gradually causing the sensing of whiteness to fade into the background 
until it is „invisible‟ even to BME individuals. The sense of being „in‟ the field of the 
life-world or standing „outside‟ of it can be explicated in binary perspectives expressed 
within the interviews. James describes later in the interview his experience of a white 
gay venue, but this time the themes can be considered here to be phenomenally 
„reversed‟, where before he was looking out at the white space, whereas here he is 
remembering feeling the space and atmosphere imposing itself upon him: 
 
James:  I mean I‟m thinking about the last time I went in there, and I only went in 
because I was due to meet a friend there and I got there before he did. So I went in, 
bought myself a drink, sat down, and waited for my friend. And  er [interrupted]. 
 
R: can I ask how that felt? 
 
James: it was very uncomfortable. It was uncomfortable because I was the only black 
person there, it was uncomfortable because the music they were playing sounded alien 
completely, it was uncomfortable because, you know I was being looked at, and I don‟t 
particularly know why. 
 
Here we see similar themes that James brought up earlier (people, music, attitudes, and 
coincidentally in the same order as before), but here we see the subjective awareness 
being about James himself as a GBME person within the white space. Rather than the 
staff being WME, James is the only BME person in the space. Rather than the music 
being of a (categorical) type in the venue, it was music which was (affectively) alien to 
James. And rather than attitudes within the space, James describes the puzzling looks he 
was getting. This could be considered to be a Gestalt shift, from the foregrounded 
affective atmosphere projected phenomenally through James‟ unified Ego into the life-
world of the gay venue and the sense of its whiteness, to the backgrounding of the 
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atmosphere, and foregrounding of James‟ unified Ego. This shows how the mapping of 
sensings and racialized meanings within the unified Ego and within the invisible white 
Gestalt interrelate, where here in James‟ example there is almost a direct correlation.  
James previous description was about his sensing the atmosphere of the life-world of 
the white gay space as a space (phenomenally read as “white”), however in this later 
description James is sensing the atmosphere of the life-world of the white gay space in 
terms of how he feels within himself (rendered with affective qualities around being 
“uncomfortable”). This shows us two of the dimensions (or culturally given themes) 
through which we can phenomenally sense and read the racialized affective 
atmospheres in a space, namely the projection into the life-world mapped through  the 
invisible white Gestalt or the projection within the unified Ego. This supports Husserl‟s 
(1970:144, 2001:19, 2002:196) theories described in section one of this chapter where 
affective information is backgrounded and foregrounded in a dynamic and changing 
manner between the unified Ego and intersubjective life-world, and meanings, sensings 
and qualities are rendered through this process. 
 
This is important firstly because it means we can ask questions about the affective 
qualities experienced by GBME men both within their unified Ego and affective 
information rendered into the life-world to determine the affective information within 
the social space. This is supported by Teresa Brennan (2004:6) who suggests that “there 
is no secure distinction between the „individual‟ and the „environment‟. But 
transmission does not mean that a person‟s particular emotional experience is 
irrelevant”. Therefore we are able to pose the question “can I ask how that felt?” and 
interpret this here both as about the unified Ego and the atmosphere of the life-world 
within a social space. Secondly it means we can argue that the often utilised strategy by 
people in gay venues (door staff, managers, BME and WME clients) to deny GBME 
people‟s experiences of racism, who say „you‟re imagining things‟ or „it‟s all in your 
mind‟, can be countered with the understanding that this subjective awareness relates as 
much to the expansive life-world as it does the (generally) „localised‟ phenomenal 
unified Ego. Speaking of a place as being unwelcoming does not condemn the speaker 
to the same psychopathological positioning as does saying they felt uncomfortable, and 
indeed at one point James says “I‟m not going to sit here and say everything I‟m saying 
is spot on” in regard to his feelings when sitting in white gay bars, which here meant 
that he was suggesting his feelings may not reflect the true racialized nature of the gay 
242 
 
 
 
bar. This type of thinking is described by Teresa Brennan, who suggests “if I am not 
aware that there are affects in the air, I may hold myself solely responsible for them, and 
in this case ferret around for an explanation in my recent personal history” (Brennan, 
2004:6). Yet it may not simply be that one is unaware of affects in the air, but that 
particular racialized rationalistic discourses make it difficult to accept the affective 
qualities for fear of being labelled over-sensitive or paranoid. In Brian‟s interview he 
describes testing the social space to see if it‟s him or the white gay space which is 
responsible for the negative affective qualities: 
 
Brian: I haven‟t been out, I prefer going to different places. 
  
R: hmm.  
 
Brian: like going out of [northern city]  so it‟s a new environment, so [laughs] my 
uncomfortableness is because it‟s a new place, they've seen me so many times, so it‟s to 
do with me that they're being funny.  
 
What Brian‟s comments show us here is that for him it is more „natural‟ to think that he 
is the „problem‟ rather than to confirm that it is the atmosphere of his regular white gay 
venue which is responsible for the “uncomfortableness”  he feels. Since the whiteness 
of the gay space is invisible this means there is no specific singular object to render the 
meanings and sensings through, except for the life-world field rendered with an 
atmosphere of uncomfortableness. Brian‟s own unified Ego is more easily perceived by 
him and so he renders himself with the negative affective qualities, sensings and 
meanings. James‟ first extract described the gay space as perceived as “white”, his 
second extract described himself as feeling “uncomfortable”, yet the latter description 
could be strategically undermined by those seeking to devalue GBME experiences by 
suggesting there is „something wrong with him‟. James‟ example can be read alongside 
Brian‟s example where he tests the social meanings in the gay spaces by switching to 
different gay venues, thereby giving him two perspectives from which to interpret his 
environments. Husserl‟s (1970, 2001, 2002) phenomenology helps us to deconstruct the 
division of the phenomenal unified Ego and the intersubjective social experiences 
within the life-world by making these one phenomenal unity, whereby interpretations 
about the „self‟ or the „space‟ can tell us about both combined as well as each 
243 
 
 
 
individually. I now go on to explore how music operates as an affective atmosphere that 
racializes white gay spaces. 
 
Section Three: Music and Atmospheres within the Life-World 
 
As we saw in the first section of this chapter, the theme of music emerges in many of 
the interviews as a significant phenomenal quality related to the experiences of 
atmospheres within white gay spaces. Using the same phenomenological theoretical 
framework as has been described in previous chapters, the life-world is also rendered 
with objects („real‟ or ideal) through the interweaving of information. Music is not 
sound, but is intentionally patterned sound created by people (exceptions for example 
might include computer music, although the algorithms were programmed by humans), 
that is interwoven, understood and interpreted within unified Egos within the life-world. 
Music is in itself a Gestalt and therefore has special perceptual properties which 
reconfigure phenomenal space-time (Husserl, 2001).  Music as a cultural construct has 
been utilised to alter affects and interpersonal interactions (Cohen, 1995; McCrary, 
2000), and for bringing particular ethnic communities together (Leonard, 2005; Murthy, 
2009). In addition music has been shown to impact directly upon the hyletic topography 
promoting hormonal changes in the body (Yamasaki et al., 2012), thereby showing how 
atmospheres as affective fields impact on the unified Ego as a totality.  
 
Music is therefore phenomenally rendered into the life-world as „vividly‟ and 
meaningfully as if it were a physical object such as a wall, a poster, another person. 
How music differs from these objects is that it can be acoustically d iffused into the 
entire social space as if a field of information which permeates every object in the social 
space. This field- like phenomenal property enables it to contribute to the affective 
quality of an atmosphere experienced in the social space.  In my interview with Brian he 
talks about music as a major factor in perceptions of feeling comfortable in a gay space: 
 
R: if you could think of a few ways to get more black people to go to gay clubs, you 
know as in white gay clubs, what would you suggest, what kind of recommendations 
would you have to make it more comfortable for black people? What would you change 
for example? 
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Brian: [laughs].  Mainly the music. [laughs]. 
 
R: [laughs]. 
 
Brian: mainly the music. 
 
R: what would you change it to? 
 
Brian: erm. Maybe more R&B? More R&B. 
 
The solution Brian gave to my question about how to make gay spaces more welcoming 
for black people was “music”, specifically R&B. The lack of this style of music made 
the gay spaces unwelcoming for Brian, and he suggests for many black people in 
general. In the context of the extract, music can be considered to be one of the “subtle 
things”, which speak as if an invisible sign, more or less saying “black people aren‟t 
welcomed”. The subtle things contribute to the atmosphere of the gay space, where 
obviously, explicit events such as around racism also contribute to the atmosphere, but 
are more readily attributable and rendered to specific objects such as bodies, buildings 
or media. Commercial recorded music in gay venues creates atmospheres by being 
phenomenally dis-embodied. Music is diffused into the venues space through 
loudspeakers, designed to fill the space itself and objects within it with sound. Music in 
gay venues is not designed to be phenomenally rendered into the topography of the 
loudspeaker and attributed to the loudspeaker (unless close up to it), rather it is designed 
(by acoustic engineers) to be phenomenally rendered into the life-world of the space 
itself. In this sense music is rendered as a phenomenal experience interwoven within the 
very being of all the objects within the life-world and the space of the life-world itself. 
Therefore for Brian, the music is experienced as an affective quality which permeates 
the entire gay space, and speaks to him about racialized atmospheres. 
 
There is a risk of cultural essentialism in conflating particular BME group‟s taste with a 
particular style of music (Frith, 1996:108). However, it could also be argued that the 
absence of R&B music in white gay venues is already performative of mono-cultural 
racialized discourses through the absent-presence of R&B music (and other styles of 
music), and perhaps even a strategic cultural- racialized essentialism designed to valorise 
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the white gay space. Simon Frith (1996:120) suggests that preferences for musical styles 
can correlate with social identities around class, age, and ethnicity. One question this 
raises here is what constitutes BME music styles as such for a given moment or 
duration? Rinaldo Walcott (2007:237) suggests in relation to both disco and house 
music that “when crossovers occur, what often goes missing is the antecedent blackness 
of the style- it is reinvented as „white‟.” So therefore, given what happened to disco and 
house music, even if R&B music were to be played in a white gay venue, it may be 
appropriated and „whitened‟ in the gay venue, in the moment or over time. Interestingly 
the disco music producer Nile Rogers (2011) referred to „Black‟ disco in an interview 
on English radio, since this term was not in circulation previously this implies a 
contemporary re-appropriation of the style by Black people in response to the racial 
amnesia by those who ethnically cleansed disco in the 1970s. By contrast the concept of 
gay disco has been widely known, referring to a particular Hi-NRG style of disco 
popular in the 1970s and 1980s, so this gay heritage was not erased from cultural 
memory. However the missing whole should really read: „Black gay disco‟ or „Black 
gay house‟, an absent-presence indicative of the invisibility of LGBTQI BME bodies 
and identities within the majority of contemporary LGBTQI spaces, cultures and 
histories.    
 
Frith (1996:110) talks about the association between identity, subjectivity and music, 
suggesting that music, cultures and individual subjectivities are mutually constitutive. In 
addition he suggests that “music constructs our sense of identity through the direct 
experiences it offers of the body, time, and sociability, experiences which enable us to 
place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives” (Frith, 1996:124).  Here we can see 
how the phenomenology of the musical experience relates to an individual‟s social 
identity. The experience of the social space where the music is being played is rendered 
as the life-world, the music providing a background atmospheric field which diffuses 
into all objects within the life-world, including the people present. Now, given that 
different social spaces may play different music, this suggests that this rendering of the 
life-world and people present will take on different meanings, sensings and qualities 
according to context. This may sound obvious, but what is important here is that for a 
given moment in which an individual is within a particular social space, it is not only 
the phenomenal qualities, sensings and meanings around objects (including the people) 
which are affected by the atmosphere, but also specifically the social identity (which 
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may be conceptualised categorically as well as phenomenally). Here we can consider 
how social identity is being interpellated by the music in the white gay club, where 
those whose phenomenal unified Ego and other attributes are compatible with the 
atmosphere created by the music feel welcomed and part of the social-body. Those 
whose identities are not compatible may understand and interpret the atmosphere as 
unwelcoming and sense an affective field which phenomenally mis- interpellates them 
and excludes them from the social-body. This also relates to Husserl‟s (1970; 2002) 
concept of intersubjective themes constructing a social community, where here we 
could say the music has become an affective theme. In the case where the theme is 
compatible with an individual‟s unified Ego prior to entering the community they may 
choose to be part of that community. Alternatively where it is incompatible they may 
reject that particular community. The outcomes are of course related to complex 
phenomenological intersubjective processes and cannot be predicted by simply 
comparing individuals‟ identities, group identities, or atmospheres in spaces.    
 
Identity is fluid and relational to social contexts (Hall, 1996), and I would suggest that 
in the context of white gay venues identity can be directly impacted upon within the 
moment in ways which can be visibly seen.  For example those individuals who are 
interpellated by styles of music they feel comfortable with, show their own categorical 
and subjective identities by remaining in that space and frequenting it without complaint 
about the music being unwelcoming. As a consequence, the presence of those who feel 
welcomed and interpellated by the style of music in the gay venue, and the absence of 
those who don‟t, may result in a particular racialized demographic of customers. In this 
case the styles of music in white gay venues described by my GBME interviewees, acts 
as a „life-world filter‟ which invisibly targets racialized groups, using disciplinary 
techniques (Foucault, 1991, 2000) which impact upon the affective qualities 
experienced by both GWME men and GBME men. Therefore it is not only an 
individual‟s identity which is interpellated, constructed, and reconfigured by music in 
white gay venues, it is also the racialized „identity‟ of the white gay venue itself. James 
points to the perceived exclusionary impact of BME styles of music and how this relates 
to the racialization of white gay spaces: 
 
James: this whole idea that , which seems to be the attitude of the people here in 
[northern city], that black music you know, it will scare people away , or it‟s not the 
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kind of thing we do, or whatever their attitude is, it‟s just bull shit in my  idea, in my 
opinion. 
 
Here James is echoing Brian‟s description, but reversing the attributes such that rather 
than it being the absence of R&B which makes Brian feel unwelcomed, it is the 
hypothetical inclusion of black music styles (such as R&B) which James suggests is 
considered by (white) people to be affectively unwelcoming or intimidating to (white) 
customers in white gay venues. This show us how music contributes to the atmosphere 
of white gay spaces in ways which can be understood by both GWME men and GBME 
men as welcoming or unwelcoming and as a result helps to define and render a 
particular gay venue with racialized meanings, sensings, and a racialized identity. 
 
Brian outlines an imagined life-world in the interview, where he has a particular 
conception of how R&B music might change the atmosphere of a white gay venue to 
make it more welcoming for GBME men and perhaps encourage more to attend white 
gay venues.  James‟ interview below helps us to see an example of what actually did 
happen when R&B music was played for a short period within a white gay venue. I will 
quote it at length to give a feel of the phenomenal experience: 
 
James: and about four or five minutes after we arrived they started playing R&B, and 
immediately [laughs], you know, our whole, everything changed. 
 
R: were your friends black? 
 
James: er, they were all Asian.   
 
R: Asian. Yeah. 
 
James: and you know, we got up and started dancing and we felt like you know this was 
a place where we could enjoy being in.  
 
R: yeah. 
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James: so music does play a huge part, right. music plays a huge part, and black and 
Asian people by and large are not into this trolly-dolly music that they play. 
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: and the people who run these places know it. It‟s not that they don‟t know. They 
know it. They know that this is the kind of music that the stereotypical skinny white boy 
in the skinny jeans, and this is what he‟ll be in to.  
 [...] 
R: when they've talked about black people dancing they talked about how white people 
step back and kind of look afraid, there's a kind of tension, did you feel any of that? 
 
James: oh, that's not what happened,  
 
R: no. 
 
James: not on that day, no everyone started joining in. It was really good.  I mean it 
was only for about twenty, twenty-five minutes and then they went back to their robotic 
crap. But you know for that period of time we enjoyed being there. 
 
R: so, I mean, cos it must have changed the feel of the club? 
 
James: oh it did, 
 
R: yeah? 
 
James: it made us feel we were welcomed.  
 
R: did it feel like a completely difference place? 
 
James: it felt like, I don‟t know whether they did do it because they saw us, but that's 
what it felt like. They saw there was a group of black people there, let‟s give them some 
music that they would enjoy. And we really, really appreciated it.  
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R: right, and everyone else seemed to be enjoying themselves?  
 
James: oh yes, yes, everyone. You know, because I‟m not going to say R&B is the best 
music on the planet, I'm not in a position to say that, but a lot of, it‟s not just black 
people who like it, a lot of white people like it as well.  
 
James comments show us how simply changing the style of music can alter the 
atmosphere within a white gay venue. Not only did the twenty minutes of R&B music 
make James and his other BME friends feel welcomed, but the GWME people in the 
venue also enjoyed dancing to the music. This is the same venue where earlier in this 
chapter James described feeling unwelcomed on a previous occasion. However on this 
occasion James had a group of BME people with him, the music was R&B for twenty 
minutes, and rather than being stared at by the white people they were dancing with 
James and his GBME friends. However James again points to the possibility that there 
is a strategy behind the choice of „white‟ music styles described as “trolly-dolly music” 
rather than „black‟ music styles such as R&B: 
 
James: and the people who run these places know it. It‟s not that they don‟t know. They 
know it. 
 
R: yeah. 
 
James: they know that this is the kind of music that the stereotypical skinny white boy in 
the skinny jeans, and this is what he‟ll be in to.  
 
Here James is being specific about the type of gay “skinny white boy” the “trolly-dolly 
music” would encourage to the venue, where although he uses the term stereotypical, I 
would suggest that he means stereotypical to white gay venues, and echoes the valorised 
and ideal body type (namely: white, slim, young), rather than other styles of music 
found in typically white venues which would encourage a different body type (such as 
rock venues or BNP pubs). Here of course we could infer the hint of gendered 
discourses in James‟ description where he refers to “skinny white boy” and “trolly-dolly 
music” where the „skinny boy‟ is not quite a man yet and the „trolly-dolly‟ is a sexist or 
homophobic term for airplane staff.  James‟ suggestion that there is a strategy to 
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welcome a particular young, slim, white gay man to the venues with the style of music 
shows us that it is not white people per se but a valorised corporeal style of GWME man 
that the venues are attempting to attract.   
 
James described how when the DJ changed the style of music from „trolly-dolly‟ to 
R&B “immediately [laughs], you know, our whole, everything changed”. Here not only 
was the atmosphere more welcoming for the GBME men, but also for the GWME men 
who began to dance. The music being interwoven into the inter-subjective phenomenal 
life-world is able to render the entire atmosphere with affective information, the sound 
of the music fills the entire physical, social, and subjective space within the gay venue 
and therefore any change in music will impact upon all objects (including the people) 
within its acoustic domain. Of course this is not music qua sound, but music as a 
phenomena with social and personal sensings and meanings already given by society 
and culture, as well as the inter-subjective rendering of qualities and meanings within 
that specific moment within the white gay venue. James again describes feeling that this 
may have been strategic in the sense that he wondered if the DJ had seen a group of 
GBME men and (although derived from culturally essentialist thinking) decided that 
R&B music would make them feel more welcomed.   
 
This communication of sensings and meanings through music was rendered in the 
unified Ego as the elicitation of affective qualities around feeling welcomed. The 
unwelcoming atmosphere of the trolly-dolly music was understood in racialized terms 
as being welcoming for a particular corporeal type of white gay man (young, thin, 
white) and unwelcoming for GBME men. James believes, however, that R&B music is 
able to be enjoyed by both BME and WME people and so does not necessarily feel non-
BME people would be put off by it. James‟ comments here shows us that Brian‟s 
imagined idea about what would make GBME men feel more welcomed, namely more 
R&B music, may be a valid perception. It also shows us that on this occasion R&B 
music did not scare away the GWME men, in fact it encouraged them to dance and 
enjoy themselves. The interpellative affective atmosphere created by the music is 
something Imran also mentions. Here a similar event to that which James described 
happened to Imran and his group of Asian friends in a white gay venue where the DJ 
acknowledged their presence by playing an Asian music track:  
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Imran: he‟s seen a group of us Asians and he‟s put an Asian track on, not because I 
requested it, but because he‟s seen a group of Asians there, and he knows we‟re from 
[northern city] so he‟s got onto the mic and said a „big welcome to the boys from 
[northern city]‟.  
 
R: did you get an applause and cheer for that? 
 
Imran: no, but we did get looked at. 
 
R: everyone turned around and looked? 
 
Imran: which was good. And he put an Asian track on for us, it was good. I didn‟t know 
what to think, he put an Asian track on for us without us even requesting, he saw us 
there and he‟s always greeting us and welcoming us when we‟re there.  
 
R: he‟s white? 
 
Imran: he‟s white. He‟s also given us food. He brought some Asian food and gave some 
to me to try. He‟s done a few CDs for me, and plays my requests.  
 
R: what would your requests normally be? 
 
Imran: just dance music.  
 
Here we see that Imran and his Asian friends are recognized by the DJ and responded to 
in the playing of an Asian music track. Imran says this was good, yet also feels that the 
white people turning around to stare at his group of Asian friends was also good. This 
emphasis by Imran on the context being “good” is what I interpret as being a response 
to what I sensed as being his perception that I was fishing for racist incidents, and so he 
made sure his own racialized interpretation and understanding of the events he 
described was explicit in this respect.  The DJ interpellated the group of GBME men 
through the playing of the music and the spoken words which emphasised their racial 
attributes, since the northern city is one known to have a high Asian populatio n. The 
gaze of the other GWME men in the venue also interpellated the GBME men, however 
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along with the ocular gaze were the affective sensings indicated by the silence or rather 
the absence of cheering or other welcoming gestures. Here we can see how the potential 
affective atmosphere generated by cheering or clapping in response to the DJs 
announcement is absent, and instead an alternative response of surveillance emerges. In 
addition the welcoming gesture of the white DJ sharing his Asian food with Imran, 
could also be seen as interpellating and phenomenally foregrounding Imran‟s ethnicity.  
Imran‟s subjectivity as an Asian man in a white gay space is also rendered more salient 
by the fact that Imran usually requests what he refers to elsewhere in the interview as 
“white” dance music and not Asian music, so the DJ playing Asian music does not 
implicate Imran‟s personal taste in music requests, but instead positions him and his 
friends as Asian outsiders in respect of the white gay norms. However Imran feels that 
the playing of Asian music made him feel more welcomed, and here Alcoff‟s (1999:19) 
suggestion that the “microprocesses of subjective existence” around racializations 
contribute to the social meanings infers that Imran‟s resistance to negative 
interpretations contribute both to his racialized gay identity in the venue and also to the 
intersubjective meanings within the communal life-world.  I now go on to discuss how 
the whiteness of white gay spaces elicits responses from GBME men that result in the 
production of alternative sites for gay belonging and interaction.  
 
Section Four: Atmospheres, Striving, and Belonging 
 
Christopher, like most of the interviewees, says he no longer goes to gay clubs and 
doesn‟t like clubbing, although he suggests that the reason for him is that clubs are 
boring in comparison to non-commercial contexts: 
 
R: would you say that you've chosen environments like the Internet or outdoor non-
commercial areas because it gives you more autonomy and control? 
 
Christopher: no, I find it's more exciting. I find that bars are very boring beyond a joke. 
 
R: would you like to explain the difference between these exciting places? 
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Christopher: well you get to see what you're looking for, you know. In a bar it's all 
packaged up and sometimes when you open the package with what you've found at the 
bar, it's not what you're looking for at all [laughs]. 
 
R: I mean that's quite interesting. I mean we can talk about this later as that's quite 
important. If we can go back to, erm, this idea of, erm, why the Internet and parks have 
more appeal? 
 
Christopher: it's because there's a sense of adventure. It‟s a sense of being able to 
explore that sense of who we are, right, and it is indigenous to gay people, right, 
cruising is indigenous to gay people. It's what we do. 
 
I go on to ask Christopher what he meant by indigenous or as he goes on to say in the 
extract below “instinctual”, where he began by suggesting that most gay men‟s first 
homosexual experiences are fast and furtive, being conducted in public toilets, parks, or 
gay saunas, a point echoed in other studies analysed by  Frankis et al. (2005:275). For 
Christopher this relates to preferences around whether to choose a commercial venue 
such as a club or a non-commercial setting:  
 
R: I'm just trying to understand, is this instinctual as in genetic instinctual? Or 
instinctual because the first initial experiences make them instinctual? 
 
Christopher: no. I think it is just instinctual to gay lifestyle. It is what it is. Most gay 
people like this sort of being able to feel that they are accepted, they are attractive, that 
they are exciting. In a dark dingy nightclub you are not going to know that. Out in a 
park you can walk, you can talk, you can meet, you can this, you can that. That‟s what 
makes a person excited, it's a sense of danger, it's a sense of we don't know, it's a sense 
of unpredictability. That is what it is, right, I personally like it. Unpredictability, I like 
it. 
 
Christopher describes the hidden, fabricated, or unexciting attributes found in gay 
venues and also the customers in the bar with the words: “bars are very boring beyond 
a joke [...] In a bar it's all packaged up [...] sometimes when you open the package with 
what you've found at the bar, it's not what you're looking for at all”. Here we see that 
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the bar qua social space is productive of the „packaging‟ of the experiences, both in 
terms of the gay venue itself and the gay male bodies present. The commercial gay 
venue is packaged in ways which Christopher finds boring or predictable, and does not 
fulfil his striving for the affective qualities around a sense of adventure. The gay male 
bodies within the commercial gay venue are also relationally linked to the unsatisfying 
qualities of the venue, where when Christopher gets to know the other gay man more 
intimately, either in the bar or if he takes them elsewhere, he finds they are not what he 
is looking for. Christopher also talks about how the atmosphere in the venue impacts 
upon his unified Ego: 
 
Christopher: most gay people like this sort of being able to feel that they are accepted, 
they are attractive, that they are exciting. In a dark dingy nightclub you are not going to 
know that. 
 
The social space of the commercial gay venue contributes to the rendering of both 
Christopher‟s unified Ego and the gay venue with affective qualities around boredom, 
predictability and lack of satisfaction. Christopher has chosen to reject the gay 
commercial spaces, and chooses to expand his social space into non-commercial gay 
contexts, which are less predictable, more exciting and elicit this affective quality 
around the sense of adventure.  
 
Christopher suggests that in a “dark dingy” gay commercial venue people are not going 
to “know” that they “feel that they are accepted, they are attractive, that they are 
exciting”. This is an interesting comment as one of the marketing strategies toward gay 
men, and also the generally understood cultural attribute of commercial venues by gay 
men, is that they valorise particular attributes of gay cultural capital across modalities 
which amplify the sense of being accepted, sense of being attractive and of gay men 
feeling themselves to be exciting. A mainstream gay night club would market itself 
across those three particular cultural modalities in order to attract specific gay (and 
straight) customers. Those who wouldn‟t feel these cultural attributes of the gay venue 
phenomenally as promoting a sense of feeling accepted, attractive or exciting I would 
suggest would be those who were not welcomed by such venues to begin with, such as 
GBME men. This suggests that Christopher‟s phenomenal perception of gay venues as 
spaces which do not let him know he is accepted, attractive or exciting can be related to 
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the atmosphere around feeling unwelcomed described by my other GBME interviewees 
previously in this chapter. The adjectives “dark dingy” Christopher uses can be read 
phenomenally as not only describing the categorical attributes of the gay venue, but also 
the affective qualities around the atmosphere of the gay venue. Categorically it could be 
argued that in a dark dingy night club you can‟t easily see anyone and so the sense of 
being accepted by or attractive to others would be attenuated, however in „backrooms‟ 
in particular gay venues there may be no lighting yet sufficient tactile communication 
occurs to communicate erotic desire. If instead we take „dark and dingy‟ to be the 
sensed atmosphere of the commercial gay venue, then we have affective terms which 
indicate how Christopher feels about the atmosphere of the gay venues. Here again a 
space with a dark dingy atmosphere would generally be understood as unwelcoming, 
cold, or even unsettling. 
 
Christopher has found alternative social spaces where he can reach out to other gay men 
where he does not have the phenomenal awareness of the dark dingy atmosphere, but 
instead can experience the rendering of his unified Ego with affective qualities and life-
world with atmospheres around the sense of adventure. One important feature of public 
parks or rural spaces (Gorman-Murray et al., 2007) or the Internet (Binnie, 2004:48; 
Campbell, 2005; Fullagar, 2003) is that these spaces are often seen as more socially 
„democratic‟ for queer identities (Binnie, 2004). However the rural is often seen as a site 
of flight for LGBTQI groups who leave for the city (Gorman-Murray et al., 2007) and 
gay practices on the Internet are situated within the discourses of whiteness which 
valorise white bodies (Ward, 2008). In addition this concept of democracy may be an 
artefact of strategic exclusions by commercial practices, whereby diverse representation 
in non-commercial spaces result from practices around exclusion from commercial 
spaces (Bell & Binnie, 2004:1810). The physical attributes of the non-commercial 
spaces such as no doors, no door staff, no fee-payment, and no “dress codes” (Bell & 
Binnie, 2000:85), and the greater range of affective qualities elicited within non-
commercial spaces (both positive and negative) as a result of the diverse range of 
possible sites the category „non-commercial‟ includes, means that in terms of striving 
Christopher has a larger domain in which to extend himself: 
 
Christopher:  out in a park you can walk, you can talk, you can meet, you can this, you 
can that. That‟s what makes a person excited, it's a sense of danger, it's a sense of we 
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don't know, it's a sense of unpredictability. That is what it is, right, I personally like it. 
Unpredictability, I like it. 
 
Christopher‟s description of what can be done in a park does not actually differ much 
from what one can do in a commercial gay venue, namely walking, talking, meeting 
people, and of course sex “you can this, you can that” (even if in a dark corner or toilet 
in the gay venue). However Christopher does suggest that the space of the park e licits 
affective qualities around feeling excitement, danger and unpredictability, which I 
summarise in Christopher‟s expression “a sense of adventure”, which he doesn‟t find in 
gay venues. These particular affective qualities around the atmosphere of adve nture in 
the space of the public park suggest a sense of freedom and openness. There is also the 
possibility of some danger with homophobic attacks (Frankis et al 2005:275), non-
consensual sexual assaults (Hickson et al. 1994:288), or arrest from the police (Frankis 
et al 2005:275; Holdaway, 1984; Myers et al. 2004), although these may contribute to 
the sense of adventure for some people. This sense of adventure can be elicited within 
more fluidly navigated contexts, compared to the more controlled space and time of a 
commercial venue in which the best option to avoid negative atmospheres may be to 
leave the gay venue entirely. In a public park one can move around the space, 
experience time on one‟s own terms, and move away from localised zones of negative 
affective information.  The intersubjective life-world of a commercial gay venue is 
more homogenous than many diverse non-commercial sites (unless there are separate 
dance floors, toilet areas, or corridors), and so when one experiences negative affective 
qualities in a gay venue, the whole space can potentially take on this atmosphere. In a 
public park there will be distinct localities with different people at different times. Each 
spatio-temporal „bubble‟ of the life-world, for example the experiential moments around 
a group of bushes, a tree, a lamp-post, or a park bench, has the potential to have 
different atmospheres. There may however be a background phenomenal field for 
example the general park atmosphere encompassing the entire space of the park, in 
which these smaller bubbles are embedded.  
 
It would be easy to try to relate the controlled and regulated space of the commercial 
gay venue to whiteness through colonial racialized discourses around whiteness as order 
and control (Dyer, 1997). However the public park in England can also be designed 
with geometric regularities such as paths, herbaceous borders, fences, ponds, as well as 
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signifiers of order and control such as signs for no littering, opening and closing times, 
patrols by police. In addition I would argue that the traditional English park may reflect 
whiteness in terms of English styles and traditions for example a band stand, a Union 
Jack or St. George flag, a fish and chips kiosk, and statues of white Victorian 
aristocrats. One  difference is that, as I have suggested in earlier chapters, the white gay 
venue is associated with discourses around valorised gay whiteness. The public park 
and indeed many rural spaces such as heritage-woodlands and the „countryside‟ may be 
associated with discourses around whiteness and English nationalism (Chakraborti, 
2010; Holloway 2007; Hubbard, 2005; Neal, 2002; Ware, 2002b:218). However it can 
be resisted or transformed through sites of alternative representations, such as graffiti on 
walls and surfaces, particular transgressive activities such as skate-boarding or parkour, 
people smoking cannabis, and people engaging in queer sexual practices rather than 
heteronormative or homonormative ones. Additionally one important set of attributes is 
around the process of cultural valorisation of the space, which in many commercial gay 
venues is done through the price of entry into the venue, door staff who exclude people 
on account of race, class or other attributes, the design of the space (including music 
styles, brands of alcoholic drinks), social cultures around designer clothing and modes 
of appearance, particular condescending or discriminatory attitudes.  
 
It is important to note that Christopher does not go to black gay venues, and this could 
suggest that it is not valorised white gayness which is unwelcoming for him but the 
commercial scene in general. However Christopher has a very strong attitude towards 
the concept of LGBTQI political integration, and in the interviews he frequently talks 
about his negative opinions of those Black LGBTQI groups who wish to have a separate 
Black LGBTQI spaces or political events, and describes black gay venues (which he 
rarely attended in the past) as being loud, aggressive and camp: 
 
R: do you think you‟d be able to give me, erm, perhaps a couple of descriptions of how, 
erm, different types of BME gay environments, clubs, venues? 
 
Christopher: loud, aggressive, loud aggressive, very showing off, talking above each 
other, you know, in a very loud way. 
 
R: right. 
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Christopher: right, erm, and it‟s. You have various degrees of camp individual to 
people who are very effeminate to the point you can‟t identify, you know. 
 
R: hmm. 
 
Christopher: the way they dress, their mode of dress is completely non- conventional, 
right, it‟s just a way, it‟s a form of identity, they, they‟re trying to strive for themselves. 
But part of it is, is that they feel that they have to do this. 
 
In this extract Christopher is referring to GBME men in the third person, which may 
suggest a dis- identification by him from the GBME or Black LGBTQI cultures that 
exist in England (although Christopher identifies himself as Black and gay). This 
description of black gay venues contrasts with Christopher‟s description of mainstream 
white gay venues as being “boring beyond a joke”, and so it would be expected that he 
would find them appealing. It is also clear in Christopher‟s description that the presence 
of the black gay space and the identities of those who attend, are relational and 
interwoven with the peripheral white gay spaces and GWME men. This can be seen in 
the comments “part of it is, is that they feel that they have to do this” and “they‟re 
trying to strive for themselves” which point to the discourses and practices in the white 
gay communities outside of GBME spaces that are productive of these affective 
qualities. What seems to be happening in the black gay venue is the expression of the 
very attributes Christopher sees as positive: “feel that they are accepted, they are 
attractive, that they are exciting”, and Christopher tells me in the interviews that in the 
1980s he himself had dressed up in „drag‟ and had a white „slave‟ on a chain, and 
regularly chose bold fashion styles, when attending mainstream white gay venues:  
 
Christopher: I lived in [northern city] as well, which is an equally multi-racial place, 
within the gay scene very, very white. I walked down in full drag whenever I wanted, 
and some outrageous outfits in fetish gear with a white slave, you know, on a chain. 
 
In the past, in a city with a high BME population, Christopher enjoyed the mainstream 
gay venues which he describes as “very, very white”, but now finds them boring. He 
also seems to have expressed in white gay venues the very behaviours he considers 
adventurous, but now finds irritating in black gay venues. This could be derived from a 
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feeling of exceptionalism (Puar, 2006) as discussed in earlier chapters. Interestingly 
Christopher, a mixed race African-Caribbean/white man, had a white male slave on a 
chain within a white gay space, which could be read as a form of anti-colonial narrative, 
„reversing‟ or reconfiguring the racialized-sexualized-gendered discourses, and the 
possibility that this is an anti-colonial narrative could be supported through  Christopher 
explicitly pointing out the „race‟ of his slave. The racialized performativity of the white 
„slave‟ on the chain being led by a GBME man in drag or fetish gear, may have 
disrupted the racialized space of the white gay venue.  
 
As with the discussion in chapter three on page 84 of Carlos entering white gay venues 
with his white friends which enabled him to „pass‟ more easily into the venue through 
the proximity and association with white bodies, Christopher has in continuous 
proximity a white slave on a chain which helps him pass into the white gay space.  We 
can also interpret this as a way for Christopher to control the whiteness of the venue, 
through the symbolic representation of control and dominance over the white slave, 
which may have been understood and interpreted as such by the other GWME men in 
the venue. Here we see how Christopher‟s understanding, interpretation and knowledge 
of the invisible white Gestalt mapped within that particular gay venue helped to provide 
him with a creative and effective solution to navigate and reconfigure the racialized 
space.     
 
Christopher‟s description also supports my argument around the issue being with 
valorised gay whiteness, because fetish gear or drag would not be acceptable in most 
mainstream gay venues these days (except perhaps for stage performers or staff as a 
marketing gimmick), and a white „slave‟ on a chain would also be out of place. 
Christopher‟s comments shows a particular transition in English society from a period 
when gay venues in the past were primarily for gay men, to the homonormativity found 
in many gay venues today with the focus on marketing the space to both 
homonormative gay men and to heterosexual groups. The packaged quality Christopher 
feels within these venues may be synonymous with the homonormative marketing and 
controlled predictable commercialized atmospheres within these venues.  
 
Christopher‟s use of the terms “indigenous” and “instinctual” in the interview can be 
read here as related to „striving‟ as an attribute of affect (Husserl, 1970; Spinoza, 1899). 
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Christopher himself uses the term “strive” in regard to GBME men in black gay 
venues. The term striving is related to the orientation towards a phenomenal object in 
the life-world (Husserl, 1970). Christopher feels a quality of striving, a sense of 
adventure, towards gay social spaces such as parks and the Internet, and also felt this in 
commercial white gay venues in the past where he was permitted to attend dressed in 
drag or fetish gear. Christopher also describes the striving GBME men have towards 
creating their own black gay venues and cultures and the feeling that they need to do 
this.  These descriptions of striving relate to the possibilities and potential adventures to 
be had in the park or on the Internet or from the need to create a separate social space. If 
Christopher had said sex was instinctual to gay men, then some may argue that this is 
some essential drive within gay men which made them strive towards objects that 
elicited sexual pleasures. However the „instinctual‟ for Christopher is related to the 
types of adventure which cannot be found in mainstream commercial gay venues, but 
can be found in non-commercial spaces, and hence suggests this sense of striving is 
being elicited from Christopher‟s interaction with the social space itself.  
 
The striving for the GBME men in black gay venues can be read as speaking both of the 
striving towards a black gay space and as a striving away from the unwelcoming white 
gay venues. It is the life-world itself which for GBME men in black gay venues, and for 
Christopher in non-commercial sites, elicits a sense of striving. This life-world includes 
both of the spaces which are more welcoming for GBME men (black gay venues and 
non-commercial sites) and also the spaces which they are unwelcome in and hence 
avoid (white gay venues).  Therefore the impact of the atmospheres within the life-
world of GBME men is not only related to the eliciting of affective qualities around 
emotions, feeling or moods, but also impacts upon striving, the orientation or 
intentionality towards unified Egos and other objects within the life-world, and here one 
of the most important objects is the intersubjective community itself. Husserl describes 
this relationship: 
 
“In the comprehensive experience of the existence of the other, we thus 
understand him without further ado, as a personal subject and thereby related to 
Objectivities, ones to which we too are related: the earth and sky, the fields and 
woods, the room in which „we‟ dwell communally, [...]. We are in a relation to a 
common surrounding world - we are in personal association: these belong 
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together. We could not be persons for others if a common surrounding world did 
not stand there for us in a community, in an intentional linkage of our lives” 
(Husserl, 2002:201; original italics). 
   
Husserl‟s use of the term Objectivities here refers to the intersubjective themes or 
indices by which communities share a common life-world. This term is not however 
meant to infer any objective reality to the themes, but rather implies that these 
phenomenal themes are intersubjectively understood by a community. Husserl‟s 
description begins with concepts which are generally the same for people across the 
world, namely the earth and the sky, and therefore suggests at this level we are all 
connected to a global community of human beings. The description of the fields and 
woods begin to close-in the domain of intersubjectivity, where these are bounded spaces 
albeit accessible for most people, even if prohibited by regulations. “The room in which 
„we‟ dwell communally” begins to pose some problems of inclusivity for the 
intersubjective life-world, where a room may require permission from another to enter, 
being enclosed by walls and a door, or may be productive of positionings as a member 
of the  collective „we‟ or alternative transitory guest. We can relate Husserl‟s 
description here to the sense of striving for GBME men towards the life-world of gay 
spaces. For Christopher, his sense of striving is related to the life-world of open spaces 
such as parks, here the fields and the woods are spaces which can have atmospheres of 
adventure which other gay men can affectively understand and use to construct a shared 
surrounding world.  The room in which „we‟ dwell can be related to commercial gay 
venues, which are more restrictive, and can have unwelcoming atmospheres, and the 
„we‟ who can decide who is part of the community. Husserl takes the position that to be 
recognised as a fellow human being it is necessary that the intersubjective community 
shares the phenomenal common surrounding world. It is also necessary that each 
individual has the capacity for the striving to be joined with that community. Where this 
common world is not shared, we find that individuals or groups are Othered in negative 
ways.  The sensed atmosphere of a social space is the affective intersubjective „index‟ 
which not only speaks of who is welcome or unwelcome in that space, the sensed 
atmosphere also phenomenologically Others particular groups and breaks the intentional 
links which help to bind a community as a unity. 
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I asked Karim about how the gay community operated within the gay scene and he 
spoke about how he relied upon his family to support him, and suggested that the gay 
scene did not provide a social support mechanism for people in general. In this 
interview extract Karim supports Christopher‟s description of the commercialised 
nature of the „packaged up‟ gay scene, however Karim contrasts the sociality and 
supportive aspects missing from the gay scene with the focus on sex: 
 
R: how does the white gay community help or not help to create that sense of 
belonging? 
 
Karim: I don‟t think it helps at all, in fact it creates a lot of problems. 
 
R: because you have your own group, is that group formed as a result of lack of 
belonging in the gay community? 
 
Karim: yeah. Definitely. Definitely.[...] All I‟m hearing about is their problems on the 
white gay scene. But then you get some who love being this exotic Asian guy, but they 
have multiple partners and they‟re living up to something they're not and it‟s a 
stereotype [...].  I‟ve seen a lot of pretty Asian boys who go down a storm on the gay 
scene, and later you see them and they‟ve developed some weird personality traits, I 
think, and that's because it isn‟t real what they‟re going through, it‟s pretence. I know 
that because I was going through that process myself, I had to have counselling and 
therapy [...].  I see the gay scene as just a money making machine, it eats up a lot of 
intelligent individuals, it destroys a lot of lives, which is why I‟m against the concept of 
coming out. It‟s fine if that's for you.[...] I‟ve decided I‟m „staying in‟, because coming 
out, again, you have to go to gay bars, gay scene, if not that gay saunas, cruising 
grounds, if not that the Internet and chat sites. That's just blatant sex, there‟s no 
socialising. 
 
Karim‟s comments about “blatant sex” is not so much a value judgement around 
promiscuity as it is a response to my question about the gay family and gay community 
support. Nevertheless, it is the community aspect of being gay which he feels is missing 
for him, and has decided that being part of the Asian community offers this affective 
quality around belonging. Karim echoes Christopher‟s description of the gay scene as 
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commercial, and Karim emphasises this in his comment that it is a “money making 
machine, it eats up a lot of intelligent individuals”. Here we see the metaphor 
describing not only a system or machine but also how this machine impacts upon the 
subjectivity of LGBTQI people, where eating up refers not only to consumption spaces 
in economic terms, but also how it impacts negatively upon the mental health of 
LGBTQI people, and particularly GBME men. The life-world of the gay scene for 
Karim has become a capitalist monster, consuming the lives of LGBTQI people in the 
quest for profit, and symptomatic of this is an atmosphere of non-belonging, the absence 
of an affective community. GBME men who comply with the demands of the white gay 
scene, here young “pretty Asian boys” can obtain the profit of casual sex and contingent 
incorporation into the commercial gay scene at the expense of both a positive self 
identity and authentic belonging into a supportive gay community.  Karim‟s description 
also shows the dynamic shifting of affective qualities and meanings from the initially 
foregrounded life-world of the white gay scene rendered as the racialized “pretty Asian 
boys going down a storm on the gay scene”, to the foregrounded unified Ego with the 
themes around “personality traits [...] counselling and therapy”, returning to the 
foregrounded life-world of the gay scene as the problem where Karim says “I‟m staying 
in”.  This rendering of topographies creates changes in subjectivity and identity from 
contingent belonging through to non-belonging, and finally to a new belonging.  
 
Karim echoes Husserl‟s (2002:201) description of the intersubjective community and 
Husserl‟s metaphors around inclusivity, where Karim referring to “gay bars, gay 
scene” echoes Husserl‟s “room”, Karim referring to “cruising grounds”  echoes 
Husserl‟s “fields and woods”, and Karim referring to “the Internet” echoes Husserl‟s 
“earth”. In addition Karim‟s comment about “staying in” echoes both Husserl‟s idea of 
the “sky” and the “room”. Here the „sky‟ and „staying in‟ (as the far-flung periphery 
from the white gay scene) are the furthest distance from the white gay scene, yet 
provide potential escape into a freer community of non-racialized humanity. However 
the „room‟ and „staying in‟ also convey the meaning that a new intersubjective „we‟ 
could be formed which whilst being inclusive for Karim and other GBME individuals 
may be exclusionary for those who are not part of the „we‟. Christopher and Karim‟s 
examples here show us that by reversing the orientation of Husserl‟s (2002:201) 
argument around inclusion into the intersubjective community, we can develop 
Husserl‟s model to account for Othering, where although Othering may not be explicitly 
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described in Husserl‟s work (Derrida, 2001:205), it does follow on from Husserl‟s 
model.  
 
It is not only the commercial gay scene which no longer appeals to Karim, but also the 
non-commercial cruising and Internet sites, although it could be argued that these are 
generally not understood to provide the sense of community and belonging expected by 
Karim from the other gay settings, being primarily for sexual encounters. Now Karim‟s 
only setting for gay community and belonging is the GBME support group he attends, 
the gay social events they run, or the white gay spaces they might attend together as a 
group. This group is a more inclusive „we‟ which has members attending from African, 
African-Caribbean, Arab, and South Asian heritages, and this is sufficient to promote 
the sense of affective belonging and community, suggesting that being gay does not 
have to be a racialized concept. However at present within the white gay community it 
seems that being gay is often contingent on being white and contingent on maintaining 
the whiteness of white gay social spaces. I now go on to discuss the conclusions for this 
chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have looked at how the atmospheres within the life-world of white gay 
spaces are experienced within the unified Ego of GBME men as affective qualities 
predominantly around being welcomed or unwelcomed. In section one I outlined 
Husserl‟s phenomenological theories which help to explicate the intersubjective 
processes that elicit atmospheres in white gay spaces. In section two I showed how 
whiteness remains invisible in white gay spaces, yet can be sensed through affective 
information and interpreted as racialized meanings by GBME men. I also showed how 
the meanings and sensings around whiteness can be rendered through reconfiguring and 
shifting topographies between the unified Ego and the life-world. In section three I 
explored how music as a diffused affective field can contribute to the rendering of both 
life-worlds and unified Egos with sensings and racialized meanings. I also showed how 
music is productive of racialized interpellation and the gaze, and how this can be 
strategically operationalized by white gay venues to racialize the space. In section four I 
looked at how valorised white gay spaces are relationally linked to non-commercial gay 
spaces and black gay spaces. Here affective qualities around adventure, striving and 
belonging are elicited by the sense of freedom within these alternative spaces. GBME 
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men can resist the impact of white gay spaces by avoiding them, yet these atmospheres 
remain as part of the periphery of the life-world for GBME men, and therefore are still 
part of their subjectivity. 
 
The life-world of white gay spaces is a phenomenal field saturated with whiteness. 
However one method by which this whiteness is transmuted into being invisible is 
through the phenomenal interweaving of meanings around normality, power, and 
relationally visible blackness. Another method by which whiteness is made to be 
invisible is through its manifestation as an affective atmosphere. It is through the 
mappings of parts that the whole of the invisible white Gestalt is understood and 
interpreted by GBME men, and through this whiteness is made visible. GBME men are 
able to sense the invisible white Gestalt through the diffused field of affective 
atmospheres, and through this process devise strategies for inclusion in gay white 
spaces, or alternatively avoid the contexts where negative affective qualities are 
rendered within their embodied subjectivity. In the final chapter, the conclusions, I draw 
together the discussions and conclusions from the five thematic chapters. Here I begin 
with a summary of each chapter and show how the „parts‟ configure to form the „whole‟ 
of the invisible white Gestalt. I then discuss the implications of the racialized practices 
in white gay spaces for GBME men, and suggest approaches that support inclusion 
within the white gay community. I finish with five recommendations for future research 
that are suggested by the findings of this thesis.  
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusions: 
Sensing the Invisible White Gestalt  
 
 
Introduction 
In this thesis I have looked at how GBME men use their embodied subjectivity to 
understand and interpret the racialized information within white gay spaces. Through 
developing the phenomenological concept of the unified Ego, I showed how GBME 
men are able to phenomenally map and navigate the invisible white Gestalt present 
within white gay spaces in order to make sense of the racialized information around 
whiteness in the life-world. In addition I showed how some GBME men can 
strategically employ their agency to reconfigure the information within the invisible 
white Gestalt in order to make the white gay space more welcoming for them. I also 
showed that „race‟ is not only a part of people‟s real everyday lives and a social 
construction (Gunaratnam, 2003; Collins, 2004) but that racialized whiteness also has 
an affective dimension that is experienced as a sense of whiteness.  
 
In this thesis I have made an original contribution to the field of racialized embodied 
subjectivity and racialized spaces by using interview data from GBME male 
respondents to develop Edmund Husserl‟s phenomenology of embodied sense in 
combination with Frantz Fanon‟s theory of embodied racialization in response to social 
processes. Fanon‟s approach to racialized embodied dissonance is developed here to 
provide a theory of incongruence between the topographies of the unified Ego. Under 
the impact of racialized social processes the GBME man experiences a 
phenomenological incongruence within himself and between himself and the white gay 
space. This embodied experience helps us to analyse each topography as distinct, 
through the phenomenal process of foregrounding or backgrounding. This dynamic 
shifting makes sense, affective qualities, sensings or meanings more salient in the 
analysis of social processes, and thus allows us to examine the experience in terms of its 
parts. Without the impact of some degree of dissonance it may be that the topographies 
are so tightly interwoven that each part remains indistinguishable in social experience, 
presenting everyday phenomenal experience as a taken for granted whole.  Frantz 
Fanon‟s approach helps us to combine the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl with the 
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intersubjective racialized life-world, in addition using the interview data I have shown 
the dependent nature of the interwoven unified Ego and life-world in relation to the 
exchange and reconfiguration of information, demonstrating that the lived-Body and 
life-world form a dynamic inter-communicating system. GBME men are able to engage 
with this interwoven system that encompasses the self and the life-world where it 
operates to exclude them, through agentic reconfigurations of the invisible white 
Gestalt, thereby demonstrating that the parts can be engaged with separately in order to 
reconfigure and navigate the racialized configurations of the whole invisible white 
Gestalt.    
 
In section one of this chapter, I reiterate the definition of the invisible white Gestalt and 
then relate the thematic chapters to how the „parts‟ of the Gestalt operate in the social 
contexts explored within these thematic chapters. I then use the discussion of the „parts‟ 
of the invisible white Gestalt to consider how it operates as a whole in relation to 
embodied subjectivity.  In section two I discuss the implication for GBME men who 
find themselves marginalised within the white normative gay cultures in England, 
suggesting strategies for inclusion. In section three I discuss some future directions for 
the theoretical models I have developed in this thesis, and five future research topics 
suggested by the discussions in this thesis. I now go on to discuss how the parts of the 
invisible white Gestalt discussed in the thematic chapters can be related to the whole.  
 
Section One: Understanding the Invisible White Gestalt 
 
The invisible white Gestalt is the dynamic configuration of racialized meanings and 
sensings around whiteness circulating within white gay spaces which can be understood 
and interpreted by both GBME and GWME men. Loet Leydesdorff (2011) suggests that 
the social field possesses both information and meanings, and can also produce 
meanings extra-humanly, whereby some of the meanings are outside of human 
perception. Therefore not all the information in the social field is available to human 
perception. Alternatively the life-world is derived from the types of information in the 
social field which do participate in the production of phenomenal awareness. Here I also 
included as information in the life-world the concept of sensings, which I defined as the 
non-representational non-discursive „units‟ of information, such as aroma, colour, 
bodily shape, orientation or movement, and affective information. The parts of the 
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invisible white Gestalt are determined by the information (meanings and sensings) 
residing in the objects, attributes and processes of the life-world, and the whole is 
shaped by the dynamic patterns which can be phenomenally rendered, experienced and 
sensed as a coherent Gestalt. The invisible white Gestalt, by definition, is the „whole‟ 
phenomenal Gestalt which will always have interwoven within its dynamic 
configuration both a „part‟ comprising discourses around whiteness and also a „part‟ 
which maintains the invisibility of whiteness. Given the operations of power within the 
social field, the invisible white Gestalt that is present within the life-world is never fixed 
but is always shifting and changing. This dynamic re-configuration of the pattern, along 
with the interwoven „part‟ eliciting the invisibility of whiteness (which can also be the 
complexity of the process of reconfiguration), makes understanding and interpreting the 
invisible white Gestalt a complex and difficult process for those within the phenomenal 
life-world it encompasses.  
 
One of the ways of mapping and navigating the invisibility is by understanding and 
interpreting the information obtained from the other parts of the invisible white Gestalt. 
This can be achieved by interpreting the discursive meanings within the invisible white 
Gestalt, for example where racialized interpellations occur through the citing of 
„hidden‟ racialized discourses, for example a gay venue DJ highlighting geographic 
locations with a high BME population. This can also be achieved by understanding the 
affective sensings within the invisible white Gestalt, for example the sense that a stare 
from a GWME man is hostile. However for a Gestalt to produce the perceptually 
coherent „whole‟ it is not necessary for all the possible „parts‟ circulating in the life-
world to be incorporated into the formation, but instead for sufficient and relevant 
„parts‟ in the correct configuration to produce the sense (Arnheim, 1961; Kohler, 1929, 
1971).  In addition as a Gestalt, the invisible white Gestalt obeys many of the „laws‟ 
which other perceptual Gestalts obey, such as those for sounds and images, and here for 
example two people can experience the same information within a Gestalt yet 
phenomenally perceive two different configurations such as observed in the famous 
young girl/old woman visual Gestalt. The thematic chapters three to seven in this thesis 
looked at particular „parts‟ of the invisible white Gestalt from a range of theoretical 
perspectives, phenomenal topographies, and social interactions within white gay spaces.  
 
269 
 
 
 
In chapter three I looked at how the social process of interpellation rendered the 
discursive topographies of GBME men with meanings, and in addition how the 
affective topographies were rendered with affective qualities and sensings around 
belonging or non-belonging in relation to the white gay community. Here I showed that 
the discursive meanings elicited by interpellative speech acts from door staff at white 
gay venues were interwoven with affective sensings mapped from the invisible white 
Gestalt. The interpellative speech act rendered within the discursive topography is a 
necessary part of the invisible white Gestalt, since it is as a result of the invisibility of 
the white discourses cited within the speech act „are you gay?‟ that the invisible white 
Gestalt is sensed. If the door staff had simply said „you‟re not coming in because you 
are black‟ then this is no longer an invisible operationalization of the power of 
whiteness but a visibly racist one, and here no additional sensing is necessary for 
understanding the racialization since the categorical and semantic meanings are 
interwoven and rendered within the discursive topography (and through the total unified 
Ego).        
 
In chapter four I looked at how the social process of the interpellative gaze rendered the 
affective topography of GBME men with affective qualities, and in addition how the 
discursive topography interpreted the meanings of the gaze. In this chapter I showed 
how the sense of the white gaze was understood as a result of the mapping of the 
invisible white Gestalt, and that GBME men often reconfigure the Gestalt in order to 
test or confirm their understandings of the white gaze as hostile or friendly. In addition 
GBME men utilise the discursive information within the invisible white Gestalt to 
interpret the meanings of the white gaze in white gay spaces, although from the 
interviews with GBME men it seems that the sensings transmitted by the gaze 
predominate in their understood sense of the experience. The dynamic shifting of the 
pattern of the invisible white Gestalt, here analysed in response to the social processes 
involving the interpellative gaze, is productive of information, sensings and meanings in 
the white gay space, which in turn increase or decrease the power of action/existence for 
the actors in the space. Through this increase or decrease in power of action/existence 
the particular topographies of the unified Ego are foregrounded or backgrounded, and 
this process provides an understanding and interpretation of the invisible white Gestalt.  
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 In chapter five I looked at how the discursive and affective topographies were 
interwoven with the hyletic topography to render the corporeal topographies of the 
unified Ego. The hyletic topography is the material body in process, and provides two 
key parts for the phenomenal sense of being a lived-Body, namely the sensory 
information from the Body (for example sight or sound) and also information about the 
Body (for example the perceived body image).  The corporeal topographies enable 
GBME men to understand and interpret the racializations that occur in relation to their 
embodied subjectivity. This can occur phenomenally through the rendering of affective 
qualities within a particular corporeal topography (for example the gut) or diffused 
throughout the whole unified Ego. It can also occur through the racialized discursive 
significations of a body-part or whole body which can be communicated and interpreted 
by both GBME men and GWME men in white gay spaces. These understood sensings 
and interpreted meanings can be communicated intersubjectively between those 
individuals who are able to map the invisible white Gestalt within the life-world of the 
white gay space. Contrary to Edmund Husserls (2001:374) suggestion that the indicated 
sensings are only vaguely communicated intersubjectively, the evidence from the 
interviews with GBME men shows us that the sensings are communicated in ways 
which enable the complex and coherent sense to be understood by others within the life-
world.  The foregrounding and backgrounding of the affective qualities throughout the 
corporeal topographies of the unified Ego is one way that the shifting pattern of the 
invisible white Gestalt could be mapped and interpreted. In addition the whole of the 
unified Ego could be rendered with sense and sensings through what was described by 
my interviewees in phenomenal descriptions such as instinct, the vibe, the energy or the 
aura. 
 
In chapter six I looked more closely at the specific phenomenal corporeal topography of 
the penis. The penis is a nodal point for a diverse range of affective qualities, sensings 
and discursive meanings which can be rendered into its corporeal topography. The penis 
is also a signifier of diverse and powerful socially constructed meanings in society and 
this is particularly the case in most gay cultures where the penis is „celebrated‟. 
However one specific set of meanings around the penis in society are those related to 
the „invisibility‟ of the penis due to legislation and cultures around modesty (Flowers et 
al. 2011). This absent-present penis in society results in a range of alternative cultural 
signifiers such as innuendos, to symbolise the meanings around the penis. These 
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alternative signifiers of the penis are interwoven with racialized discourses in ways 
which are understood by most people in the white gay space, where for example the 
question „is what they say true?‟ is readily understood by both the white gay 
interrogator and the GBME man as being about the mythical large penis size of men of 
African descent. Even though the white penis remains invisible in these racialized 
interactions, its ideal image in the perceptions of the individuals present is rendered as 
relationally aparadigmatic and normative in comparison with the black penis. The 
„invisible‟ penis therefore contributes to the invisibility of whiteness when it is 
operationalized in processes of racialization. The corporeal topography of the penis can 
be rendered with complex meanings which include „race‟, sexuality, power, 
masculinity, and reproduction. It can also be rendered with affective qualities for 
example around pleasure and orgasm. In addition the penis can communicate both 
meanings (for example around „race‟ or masculinity) and sensings (for example around 
sexual arousal) which can be interpreted and understood intersubjectively within the 
white gay space. The penis as central location for the intersection of complex 
phenomenal information and intense affective qualities makes it susceptible to the 
racialized practices around „vicarious lynching‟ (Collins, 2004) that enable GWME men 
to control and subjugate GBME men. It is through the mapping and navigation of these 
meanings, sensings and affective qualities rendered within the corporeal topography of 
the penis that the invisible white Gestalt can be interpreted and understood by GBME 
men. It is also through the mapping, reconfiguration and manipulation of the invisible 
white Gestalt by GWME men that these meanings and sensings around the penis can be 
communicated.  
     
In chapter seven I looked at the phenomenal topography of the field of the life-world. 
Here I looked at how atmospheres theorized as the affective field of the life-world, help 
GBME men map and navigate the invisible white Gestalt within white gay spaces. The 
life-world and objects within it are rendered in the same way as the corporeal 
topographies of the unified Ego, with the (usual) difference being that the body image is 
not interwoven into the rendered object or life-world field. In this chapter I looked at 
how the rendering of sensings and meanings could shift between the unified Ego and 
the life-world and how this could be used by GBME men to interpret the meanings 
within the white gay spaces. This shifting of the rendered topographies from the life-
world to the unified Ego can also be used to pathologize GBME men as making the 
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problems „about them‟.  Here GBME men can be labelled as „over sensitive‟ or where 
the rendered sense of the negative impact of racialization persists this may even result in 
sustained psychological problems. I also looked at how the invisibility of whiteness 
could be theorized as being interwoven meanings or sensings around invisibility, rather 
than being due to the ephemeral, ambiguous or habitual nature of whiteness in Western 
societies. As interwoven information, invisibility therefore needs to be actively 
sustained as a part of the invisible white Gestalt whilst simultaneously not being 
revealed to be within its configuration. In this regard music can be utilised to racialize a 
white gay space in ways which can be predicted and can be used to racially interpellate 
GBME men  present in that space. The strategic use of music therefore maintains the 
invisibility of whiteness by making black people and essentialized representations of 
BME cultures visible, yet does not replicate the same processes for white people of 
stereotyped WME cultural forms. Here the strategic use of atmospheres to permeate the 
white gay space with a saturated backgrounded field of whiteness helps to maintain its 
invisible „part‟ in the configuration of the Gestalt.   
 
Having outlined the „parts‟ of the invisible white Gestalt present in white gay spaces 
that I have explored in this thesis, I now discuss how these operate as a „whole‟. These 
parts can be summarised as being the discursive part (operationalised in racialized 
interpellation), the affective part (operationalised in the white gaze), the corporeal part 
(operationalised in racialized practices of discursive signification around the body and 
in the rendering of corporeal topographies with meanings, sensings and affective 
qualities), and the spatial part (operationalized in the intersubjective affective 
atmospheres). There will of course be many other parts which I have not looked at that 
contribute to the whole. However it is only necessary to obtain sufficient parts that 
constitute the coherent phenomenal sense of the whole, both for this thesis and for the 
everyday sense of the experience of whiteness by GBME men. In addition, given the 
interconnectedness of the parts of the Gestalt in the life-world (Schroeder, 2007), 
although I focused on the discursive in chapter three and the affective in chapter four, 
there is always some degree of interweaving between the meanings and sensings within 
the invisible white Gestalt. Within individuals there is also an interweaving of the 
meanings rendered in the discursive topography and the sensings rendered within the 
affective topography, as can be observed in the interweaving of the affective and 
discursive in the affective quality of emotions rendered within the corporeal 
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topographies of the unified Ego. Nevertheless, it is important to isolate each component 
„part‟ in order to analyse and theorize the processes operating within the life-world of 
white gay spaces.  The GBME men within the interviews were able to describe the 
overall understood embodied sense of their experiences, as well as the specific sensings 
and meanings circulating within white gay spaces. Therefore within the theoretical 
framework I used for this thesis, this enabled me to conceptualise the parts as both 
distinct yet also unified. 
 
Looking at how the life-world can be theorized as a perceptual Gestalt, provides a 
model for how the unified Ego can sense the Gestalt of the life-world. Here I am 
suggesting a model of a phenomenal Gestalt within the unified Ego which responds to 
the life-world Gestalt, though not necessarily in a mirroring relationship. It is important 
to remember that the life-world is already understood and interpreted, since it has been 
phenomenally projected into experience by an individual, unlike the social field which 
is here defined as relating to the „raw information‟ from which the life-world is 
rendered. The life-world differs from the unified Ego in that it is not rendered with 
qualia, sense or affective qualities, however the other types of information namely 
meanings and sensings are predominantly rendered in the same way. As I showed in the 
thematic chapters, the unified Ego responds to changes in the life-world, as a result of 
affective processes, by foregrounding and backgrounding particular corporeal 
topographies or life-world topographies and rendering them with interwoven 
information. It is through the affective qualities and interwoven complex meanings and 
sensings rendered within a topography that the overall sense can be understood. I am 
suggesting in this thesis that sense is sufficient for GBME men to understand, map, 
navigate and reconfigure both the invisible white Gestalt and the intersubjective life-
world of white gay spaces. However within the dialogical self (Bakhtin, 1994) and 
interpersonal communication, there will often still be the coding of sense as expression 
within the discursive topography as meanings and interpretations. This coding of 
embodied sense into symbols, such as words, loses the complexity and richness of the 
sensed phenomenal experience and also attenuates or inhibits intuitive reactions that 
may be useful in particular contexts.  There is also the issue here that often in the 
experiences of GBME men in white gay spaces, the discursive meanings expressed by 
door staff or GWME men duplicitously conceal the true sense of what is intended. In 
these moments of incongruence between the discursive topography and the affective 
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topography, GBME men can map the sense of the social interaction as a rendered 
affective quality around being unwelcomed or out of place, or as an embodied 
dissonance (Fanon, 1993). It is important to remember that unified Egos also are part-
components of the life-world Gestalt and that individuals are also part of the life-world, 
and so the changes in sense, sensings and meanings within unified Egos will 
reconfigure the life-world Gestalt dynamically. The life-world is always changing and 
in a process of becoming, and therefore the racializations within the life-world have the 
potential to be resisted through understanding, interpreting and reconfiguring the 
invisible white Gestalt.  
 
There are two key temporal attributes to the experiences of whiteness by GBME men. 
Firstly what is apparent from the interviews is that the sense of the experience can 
sometimes take time to understand, where the first occasions of being interrogated on 
entry to a white gay space may be taken at face value as being about categorisation as a 
heterosexual or simply normal door staff behaviour. It is only after repeated episodes or 
through the acquiring of a race-cognizant framework that the sense elicited by the 
racializations is understood and interpreted as being about „race‟. Secondly the sense of 
being „hooked in‟ by interpellation can occur some time before the discursive meanings 
are interwoven into the interpellation. Indeed the sense of being „hooked in‟ by 
interpellation can be held as a fixed point in embodied subjectivity whilst the discourses 
can change as over time, overwriting the previous discourses with new ones within the 
discursive topography. Here for example a GBME man interrogated by door staff can 
over time overwrite the interpellative discourses where they are sequentially 
interpellated as heterosexual, the unwanted racialized Other, or the dangerous terrorist 
Other as these discourses are foregrounded or backgrounded as dominant or subordinate 
in society over time or across place.  The overarching sense however remains the same, 
they are unwanted, unwelcomed and out of place. All these experiences I have 
described in this section contribute to the affective dimensions of whiteness. Here we 
can see that whiteness is experienced affectively in terms of striving, power of 
action/existence, negative affective qualities and positive affective qualities. Whiteness 
is experienced in terms of striving, for example striving to enter a white gay venue, 
striving to be served at the bar, striving to be treated equally with the other GWME 
men, or alternatively striving to escape to less perceived racialized gay spaces. 
Whiteness can be understood in terms of power of action/existence, for example the 
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power to make a space white in the first place, or the power to negate the embodied 
presence of GBME men. Whiteness can be experienced as positive or negative affective 
qualities, for example the hostile or desiring white gay gaze, the unwelcoming or 
welcoming atmospheres elicited through the strategic racialized use of music. These 
affective dimensions of whiteness are not elicited by single social experiences, 
subjective attitudes or the presence of whiteness within a white gay space, but instead 
are elicited by the interconnections between all the component „parts‟ that comprise the 
„whole‟ of the invisible white Gestalt.  We can therefore describe the sense of whiteness 
experienced within a social space.  
 
In this thesis I have theorized the invisible white Gestalt and its impact upon the unified 
Egos of GBME and GWME men in relation to white gay spaces. However the concept 
of the invisible white Gestalt can be theorized as a phenomenon that occurs in other 
racialized contexts where whiteness is rendered invisible by the impact of social 
processes. Here for example we can consider how the affective sense of whiteness can 
be sensed within a variety of life-world contexts, for example being in a „non-gay‟ 
„multi-ethnic‟ space in England such as particular university libraries, and also being in 
a „non-white‟ space such as a Black activist conference or even being alone in an empty 
room within the geographic location of England.  In these examples BME individuals 
can have a sense of whiteness through the invisible white Gestalt, though the specific 
operationalisation of the social processes involved may vary from those described in 
this thesis (for example the „you‟re not gay‟ interpellation would not be enacted in the 
same way as found in gay venues, though homonationalisms in wider society do impact 
upon all BME categories regardless of sexuality and social context). Exploring the 
social processes and phenomenological embodied subjectivities associated with non-gay 
white social contexts in future research would develop the theoretical framework and 
method of this thesis.  This type of research may consider for example the 
phenomenological impact of the practices of „Stop and Search‟ by the English police as 
an „invisible‟ racist act upon BME embodied subjectivities where the life-world bubble 
of the space in which the interrogation is occurring manifests the invisible white Gestalt 
and elicits the sense of the racist interrogation as indicative of affective whiteness. In 
addition to the concept of the invisible white Gestalt, we can consider an overarching 
concept of life-world Gestalts which can be used to theorise social processes that elicit 
the embodied sense of other social phenomena, such as gender, class, sexuality and 
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flows of power in the social field.  I now go on to discuss the wider implications of the 
racialized white gay spaces for GBME men.  
 
Section Two: The Implication for GBME Men 
 
From the interviews in the thematic chapters we find that GBME men have a range of 
experiences in white gay spaces. For many the act of racial profiling and interrogation is 
experienced as strongly negative and remains as a lingering feeling about the white gay 
space or white gay people in general. For others who I interviewed, the act of 
interrogation is seen as a normal part of gay culture and can be engaged with as if a 
game between themselves and the door staff. The white gaze in white gay venues again 
can elicit negative feelings which remain as potent reminders that they are not 
welcomed in white gay venues, whereas the gaze can also be understood as desiring or 
friendly if that is sensed as the intention of the GWME man doing the gazing. This 
results in two types of experience. Firstly GBME men generally understand that white 
gay spaces will be locations where at least some sort of racist experience will occur on 
each occasion. This anticipation and the actual experience impacts negatively on GBME 
men both in terms of social interactions and in terms of their subjectivity and affective 
qualities. Secondly there is the uncertainty involved in GBME men understanding the 
racialized information, and duplicity involved in GWME men concealing the racialized 
information. This results in GBME men being forced to „test‟ the racializations 
occurring in white gay spaces, for example moving around to see if the gaze follows 
them or going to a different gay venue in another city. It also results in GBME men 
having to devote their cognitive resources (processing time and neural activity) into 
thinking about and analysing the social processes in white gay venues. These are 
important cognitive resources that would benefit GBME men more if it were not forced 
by the racist context into being diverted to dealing with racism, and instead applied to 
other contexts such as friendships, family, education, or work.  The duplicity of GWME 
men denying racist practices can also result in psychological harm to GBME men, 
where a GBME man knows that he is being discriminated against due to his „race‟ yet 
being repeatedly told that he is imagining things can have devastating effects on their 
psychological well being (Baldwin, 1961).     
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The impact upon GBME men‟s embodied subjectivity in terms of the penis is also a 
cause for concern. The penis is a discursively constructed body-part through which 
racialized, sexualized and gendered discourses are signified. The racialized discourses 
will impact on the different BME categories in different ways, ye t underpinning each 
are the meanings around abnormality, perversity and control. The penis is also a 
corporeal topography which is rendered with affective qualities, sensings and meanings, 
and therefore the information rendered within the penis is experienced as an embodied 
part of GBME and GWME men that reaches into their whole sense of self. Racialized 
practices in white gay contexts that negatively impact upon the GBME man‟s penis can 
therefore have negative consequences for their sense of sexual and rac ial identity and 
subjectivity, and also impact upon their interpersonal relationships.  
 
GBME men can find ways to resist the negative racialized practices in white gay spaces 
through a number of ways. They can avoid going to white gay venues and instead go to 
black gay venues or less perceived racialized non-commercial spaces. They can 
reconfigure the invisible white Gestalt through being in the company of a group of 
white gay friends in order to „pass‟, through having a white slave on a chain, through 
projecting the sense of their „aura‟ into the white gay space, or through disrupting the 
whiteness of the gay space by citing blackness, BME cultures (for example music or 
fashion), or simply being present as a phenomenal black Body in a white space. GBME 
men can also reconfigure the invisible white Gestalt in white gay venues indirectly 
through political activism, for example being part of Black LGBTQI organisations that 
campaign against racist practices in the gay community, or through anti-racist 
campaigning within white LGBTQI organisations. This activism may gradually change 
the wider racist culture of the gay community and thus impact upon the local cultures 
within gay venues.  I now go on to discuss the future research suggested by the findings 
of this thesis. 
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Section Three: Future Research 
 
 There are a number of future research questions that emerge from this thesis, five of 
which I briefly describe below. 
 
1) How is the human voice experienced as both an embodied part of the self and also as 
a projection into the life-world?  
The embodied human voice as an integral part of the sense of self, is unique in that it is 
interwoven with the corporeal topography and also with the life-world. Here the work 
of Jacques Derrida‟s (1973) Speech and Phenomena which explored Husserl‟s theories 
on phenomenology and language can provide a theoretical platform from which to 
begin. I have already obtained the empirical data on the voice that I intend to use, which 
looks at voice production, synaesthesia between multiple modalities of sensory 
perception, and the life-world. This research can also help to develop the concept of the 
unified Ego and the limits of the body image, since the voice can extend the body image 
beyond the hyletic topography into the life-world. This can therefore help to theorize 
intersubjectivity and intercorporeality in terms of non-hyletic corporealized 
topographies which interweave and interact in the life-world.  
 
2) How does the experience of racialized embodiment impact upon the subjectivity of 
those who are not of the social category they are being categorised as belonging to, 
particularly in the context of powerful disciplinary racializing discourses? 
In the interviews within the thesis some of my GBME respondents talked about being 
categorised within a racial category that they did not feel they belonged to. In addition 
my Muslim or Muslim-heritage respondents talked about the racialization related to 
discourses linked to Islamophobia. One area of research that could address the impact of 
incongruous racialized experiences is to study the impact of the discourses of the „War 
on Terror‟ on the racialized embodied subjectivity of non-Muslims. We can think here 
about the murder of Jean Charles de Menezes by the English security forces in 2005 as 
a result of racial profiling, as a terrible and extreme example of the impact of power on 
the Body. However there are numerous other examples of non-Muslim white and black 
bodies being read as Muslim by others and being operated upon by disciplinary power. 
This sample population of non-Muslims categorised as Muslim can provide evidence 
for how embodied subjectivity reacts to powerful discourses associated with specific 
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racialized signifiers in society. Under the impact of these powerful discourses, through 
which violence can be enacted with impunity, there may be a greater incidence of the 
types of embodied dissociation described by Frantz Fanon (1993).  
 
 3) Can a process defined as indicativity be theorized as occurring through the emulation 
of the invisible white Gestalt? 
Judith Butler (1993) theorized the process of performativity in relation to subject 
positions and subjectivity as involving the reiteration and citing of discourses. 
Discourses are a „part‟ of the invisible white Gestalt, and so performativity occurs 
within this part. One of the arguments in this thesis is that non-representational and non-
discursive sensings also form a coherent pattern in the Gestalt (interwoven with 
meanings) that can be mapped, navigated and reconfigured in ways which impact on 
subjectivity, identity, and social interactions. Within the thematic chapters of this thesis 
there is evidence that points to a process similar to discursive performativity, that can be 
theorized as Gestalt indicativity that may to be operating within the interactions, 
understandings and embodied sense that occurs within the white gay spaces. However 
this needs further exploration within additional research to determine if indicativity can 
be theorized as a distinct process. Related to the concept of indicativity is the idea that 
discursive formations provide a perceptual Gestalt which can be sensed. Here if we 
consider a Gestalt comprising only discourse, the pattern of information as meanings 
will be productive of an overall sense of the Gestalt, for example how a discourse feels 
to an individual.    
 
4) Can the invisible white Gestalt be theorized as extending beyond the „bubble‟ of the 
life-world within the white gay space and into the wider life-worlds of the gay 
community? 
I have theorized the invisible white Gestalt as being a pattern of information that exists 
within a bounded space for a period of time. This bounded attribute is due to the fact 
that unlike discursive formations which can be dispersed through the social field 
through a range of meaning mechanisms (such as performativity, cultures or texts), the 
coherency of the Gestalt relies upon the transmission of sensings. Sensings are non-
representational and inexpressible and therefore cannot be communicated as symbols, 
through practices over distances, or cited through signifiers. Therefore for an 
intersubjective community to develop and establish the indicated sensings as shared 
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intersubjective themes, I have suggested that individuals need to interact in ways which 
communicate the sensings so that that they can be experienced and understood.  
Sensings can be communicated in ways which extend outside of the life-world bubble, 
for example the sense indicated in speech, or music and the use of the white gaze to 
elicit affective qualities in different locations. The question remains however as to 
whether the complex dynamic configuration of a specific invisible white Gestalt within 
a particular gay venue can be translated or extended to other places.  
 
5) Is the sexual orientation category „gay‟ becoming racialized as white in England? 
Within sexual orientation categories gender bifurcates homosexual orientation 
categories into gay (man) and lesbian (woman). If these social categories are socially 
constructed then there is no essential reason why homosexuality is divided into two 
distinct gendered categories, after all the categories of bisexual or straight are not 
gendered in themselves. This suggests that homosexuality may be potentially (if not 
already) reconstructed through imbrications with other discursively constructed social 
categories such as „race‟. In addition in many parts of the world (Aldrich, 1995; 
McCormick, 2006) and throughout history (Aldrich, 1995; Plato, 1999) particular types 
of homosexuality are often not conceptualised as an identity category or enduring 
subjective quality but rather as a practice or leisure activity. The globalisation of 
Western representations around homosexuality (Gopinath, 2005) carries with it white 
European conceptualisations and histories of homosexuality and often erases traditional 
representations of homosexuality within other cultures (McCormick, 2006) or promotes 
transitions from alternative non-Western homosexual identities or life-styles to a 
Westernised gay identity for GBME men within Western nations (Manalansan, 2003). 
This suggests that hegemonic white Western gay culture may in itself be incompatible 
with the alternative homosexual subjectivities of many GBME men, and may be resisted 
by GBME men when perceived as a form of Western colonialism (McCormick, 2006). 
The academic literature cited in this thesis and the interviews with my GBME male 
respondents suggest that within the dominant white gay culture GBME men are not seen 
or accepted as being gay by the wider white gay community. Under these social 
conditions there is a risk that homosexual categories will come to be discursively 
constructed along racialized lines. Here for example the category „gay‟ will come to 
mean white homosexual male, and alternative terms may come into existence for black 
homosexual men. We can see this emerging in the sexual orientation category „men who 
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sleep with men‟ (MSM) which in the academic literature is often used to describe black 
homosexual men rather than the term „gay‟. Researching and critiquing this potential 
future black/white binary racialization of sexual orientation categories, before it 
becomes firmly established in society, can help to provide de-racializing strategies and 
approaches towards inclusivity within the gay communities. In addition the greater 
inclusion of GBME men may „queer‟ the homonormative gay community through the 
influence of alternative conceptualizations of what it means to be gay and what it means 
to reject the concept of „race‟.     
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Appendix One: 
Biographies for interview respondents 
 
Name 
(anonymised)  
Ethnicity Age at time of 
interview  
Sample 
recruitment 
Data quoted 
in final 
thesis? 
Brian  African-Caribbean 23 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
Carlos Mestizo 37 Personal 
acquaintance 
yes 
Christopher Mixed race 
African-
Caribbean/white  
55 Personal 
acquaintance 
yes 
David  Mixed race 
African-Caribbean/ 
white  
32 Respondent to 
request. 
yes 
Derek African  30 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
Eddy  white  21 Respondent to 
request 
no 
Howard  Chinese 56 Personal 
acquaintance 
yes 
Ibrahim South Asian 27 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
Imran  South Asian 28 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
James  African  51 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
Karim South Asian 38 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
Oliver  white  47 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
Rob white  24 Personal 
acquaintance 
no  
Yusuf Arab 35 Gay men‟s 
Support group 
yes 
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Appendix Two: 
Aide memoire for interview questions 
 
1) Biographical: 
1a) How do you define your ethnicity or „race‟?  
1b) How do you define your sexuality? 
1c) How old are you? 
1d) Tell me a little bit about yourself? 
1e) What does your „race‟/ethnicity mean to you? (if confused prompt: is it a cultural 
feeling, is it about where your parents come from, is it about how you look?)  
1f) What does your sexuality mean to you? (prompt: is it about who you are attracted to, 
is it about the gay scene or culture, is only about sex and relationships?) 
1g) Do you think you were born gay? 
 
2) Gay contexts: 
2a) Can you tell me about any experiences you‟ve had in white gay spaces or contexts 
for example gay venues or gay support groups? 
2b) Can you tell me about what happens when you first decide to go out to a white gay 
venue? How do you prepare? What clothing do you choose to put on?  
2c) Can you tell me what happens when you‟re queuing outside the white gay venue to 
get in? How does it feel? What do people say?  
2d) Can you tell me about what happens when you interact with the door staff at gay 
venues? How does it feel? What do people say? 
2e) What happens when you walk through the doors into the gay venue?  
2f) Can you tell me about what happens when you go to the bar to buy a drink? 
2g) How do people dance in gay venues? How do they communicate how they are 
feeling for example if they are attracted to you or if they don‟t want to dance with you?  
2h) Where do you normally like to locate your self in the gay venue? For example near 
the bar, near the DJ booth, in the centre of the dance floor?  
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3) The body: 
3a) Tell me a bit about what kind of bodies are seen as attractive on the gay scene?  
3b) How does „race‟ work to make particular bodies more or less attractive on the gay 
scene? 
3c) Are there particular parts of the body that are more attractive or of interest on the 
gay scene? 
3d.i) You mentioned the penis, can you tell me bit more about that? (only if they 
mention the penis unprompted) 
3d.ii) How does „race‟ work in terms of attraction and the penis on the gay scene? 
3f) How does it feel when people interact with you in terms of your bodily appearance?  
3g) How do people in gay venues communicate with their bodies whether they are 
attracted to you or not attracted to you? 
3h) how does eye gaze work in communication between people in white gay spaces?  
 
4) Atmospheres: 
4a) How would you describe the atmosphere of commercial gay venues?  
4b) How would you describe the atmosphere of gay support groups?  
4c) What is it about a white gay space that makes it white? 
4d) What is it about a white gay space that makes it gay? (prompt: contrast with straight 
pubs) 
4e) What would you do to make a white gay venue more welcoming for BME people?  
4f) Are there gay places or contexts you go to which are more welcoming for BME 
people? How are these contexts different from white gay commercial venues?  
 
